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INTRODUCTION 
 
U.S. GOVERNMENTAL AND NATIVE VOICES IN THE 19TH CENTURY: 
RHETORIC IN THE REMOVAL AND ALLOTMENT OF AMERICAN INDIANS 
In the fifteenth century, Nanamakee (Sauk) prophesied the impending contact 
between a strange race of Wasichus – or white men – and his people.1 Nanamakee 
revealed to the Sauk that “by the end of four years, you should see a white man, who 
would be to you a father.”2 Sauk history tells that four years later Nanamakee traveled 
east, under the protection of the Great Spirit, to meet the Wasichus.  According to his 
descendent, Black Hawk, when “he [Nanamakee] came into sight, his father came out to 
meet him. He [Wasichus] took him by the hand and welcomed him into his tent … He 
[Wasichus] told him [Nanamakee] … that the Great Spirit had directed him to come here, 
where he should meet a nation of people who had not yet seen a white man – that they 
should be his children and he should be their father.”3 The Wasichus carried with him a 
message of heavenly proportions, one granting his providential ascendancy over those 
with whom he came into contact. Thus began the Sauk Nation’s familial relationship with 
European culture.   
Around the time of Nanamakee’s revelation, a Lakota holy man called Drinks 
Water also predicted the coming of a Wasichus band that would impact the land and its 
inhabitants.  Having lived contentedly in a sovereign culture, Drinks Water forecast for 
the Lakota a changed life of dependence, western economies and individual ownership 
disengaged from the Lakota’s ancestral Black Hills.  Cultural change seemed part of his 
premonition, as he said, “When this [contact] happens, you shall live in square gray 
houses, in a barren land, and beside those gray houses you shall starve.”4 The Lakota 
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legend continues that Drinks Water was so entirely shocked by his vision that he soon 
after died of despondency, claiming on his deathbed that he would rather return to the 
“Earth Mother” than witness the transformation of his people.     
 The divinations of Nanamakee and Drinks Water foreshadowed some vital themes 
of European impact on American Indian cultures.5 For one, the notion of a familial 
dynamic related by Nanamakee dominated not only early affairs between Europeans and 
indigenous people, but also the legal, political, social and cultural connections created 
between the United States and American Indian nations during the nineteenth century.  
Indeed, as Deloria notes, “Paternalism is always a favorite subject of the [U.S.] 
government … It has therefore become an accepted tenet that paternalism dominates 
government-Indian relations.”6
Drinks Water’s premonition, more foreboding, alluded to the consequences of this 
relationship.  European influence, though first appearing well intentioned, often harbored 
inequality and interference. Indeed, the other side of benevolence demanded subjugation 
in return for the gifts of protection and patronage.  For instance, in “rhetorical strategies 
for imperial conquest,” Leverenz argues, “the United States often used the rhetoric of 
fatherhood to justify its national self-image of rightful dominance.”7 Given the power 
dynamics and hierarchical structures that underscore such a kindred bond, the United 
States predicated its displacement of American Indian populations based on its right of 
dominion over Natives.     
But what Nanamakee’s and Drinks Water’s words also demonstrate is the hybrid 
relationship engendered by contact between European and Native cultures.  To be sure, 
European and American subjectivities did not simply affect the indigenous groups with 
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whom they met on the North American continent in a unidirectional way.8 If, 
considering Nanamakee’s narrative, we understand that the Wasichus “took him by the 
hand and welcomed him” and later stated “that they [Sauk] should be his children,” then 
we also recognize that the “him” and the “they” existed, spoke and interacted.9
According to Wald, the responsiveness of the indigenous “other” reflects back to, and 
likewise impacts, those in power.  She notes, in a related way, that Native voices “pose a 
threat” to those in authority.10 In other words, the agency of “indigenous peoples are 
examples of how a culture, through its institutions and its conventions,” defines both 
Native and governmental character.  The way that Natives speak, write or act within the 
intercultural relationship, then, affects governmental identities just as governmental 
voices influence Native identities.11 This phenomenon is expressed through the concept 
of hybridity. 
Similarly, some have argued that the rhetorical efforts of a subaltern group impact 
both their own, and the dominant public’s, identities.  Of this Watts claims that voice 
needs a relational base between subjectivities.  He says, “’Voice’ in this explication, is 
constitutive of ethical and emotional dimensions that make it an answerable phenomenon.  
Thus, ‘voice’ is the enunciation and the acknowledgement of the obligations and 
anxieties of living in community with others.”12 Todorov elaborates that “it is [the 
government’s] very capacity to understand the other that confirms him in that feeling” of 
identity and superiority.13 In a similar vein, Lepore writes that Native groups’ discourse 
helped fashion “doubts about their [American colonist’s] own identity” by placing early 
American culture alongside Native communities.14 Such identities, “because they are 
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linked to culture and collectivities,” might best be described as “points of articulation” – 
they are called into existence through discourse. 15 
The hybrid U.S.-Native relationship and identities as reflected through discourse 
reached a level of rhetorical intensity in the nineteenth century as the government began 
enacting widespread Indian policies.16 One of its first policies involved removing 
American Indian nations from their eastern homes during the 1820s and 1830s.  The 
reasons for removal are sundry and contested.  Some claim that the government wanted 
to remove American Indians to the farthest point possible in order to foster a white 
nationalism.  Mead argues, for instance, that the United States saw itself first as a family 
and that it needed to expel those who did not fit into the parameters of its “all white” 
dictum.17 Kersh also asserts that the United States wanted its union to be biologically 
sound, meaning that certain “blood quantums needed to be extirpated” from the national 
gene pool.18 These commitments to the country’s white citizenry were confirmed early 
on in one of the new republic’s first racialized legislative laws, the Naturalization Act of 
1790.  The Act codified the requirement that every American citizen be “a free white 
person,” “a person of good character,” and willing to break all allegiances to other 
nations of origin.19 This, of course, meant that the thousands of African Americans living 
in the now-independent colonies – either freed or enslaved – could neither participate in 
U.S. political life nor garner protection under the Declaration that ironically considered 
“all men created equal.”  American Indian populations were similarly denied 
consideration as participants by the federal government.20 
On the other hand, removal proponents thought that dispossession “was a 
dynamic and potentially positive policy” because it sought to protect American Indians 
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from land encroachers – who would otherwise steal Native land and exterminate whole 
communities – while simultaneously creating a civilized group of yeoman farmers 
beyond the Mississippi.21 President Andrew Jackson claimed that the benefits of excess 
land and the elimination of hostile Natives who threatened frontier communities were 
consequential to the policy’s primary aim: saving Native communities.  After signing the 
Indian Removal Act of 1830, which codified removal, Jackson reported “the 
consequences of a speedy removal will be important … to the Indians themselves.” He 
continued: “the pecuniary advantages which it promises the Government are the least of 
its recommendations.”22 Removal’s benefits to American Indians were, according to 
most proponents, the primary benevolent thrust of the policy.   
This attitude was echoed by Jackson’s Secretary of War, John Eaton, who noted 
that “usurpations” by southern states and the resulting condensing of Native sovereignty 
could only be remedied by “a removal beyond the Mississippi, where, alone, they can be 
assured … protection and peace.”  Eaton promised Native nations that: “Beyond the 
Mississippi your prospects will be different. There you will find no conflicting interests. 
The United States … will be able to say to you … the soil shall be yours while the trees 
grow, or the streams run.”23 To proponents, then, failing to enact a removal policy would 
lead to American Indians’ cultural disappearance.  In this vein, Supreme Court Justice 
William Story worried that “They [will] pass mournfully by us, and they will return no 
more.”24 The New York Board of Emigration, Preservation and Improvement of the 
Aborigines of America – an anthropological research group – similarly concluded that 
“the only means of preserving the Indians from that utter extinction is to remove them 
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from the sphere” of white influence.25 Proponents, thus, justified removal through a 
benevolent rhetoric of protection for American Indians.     
In the 1880s, the expanding nation reached the fringes of the Native reservations 
to which dispossessed American Indian communities had been removed.  Such expansion 
caused myriad conflicts between the federal government and American Indian nations.  
For instance, as U.S. traffic swelled along the Bozeman Trail, cutting through Sioux 
reservations, Native raids correspondingly increased, sparking in their wake numerous 
armed encounters.26 In the late 1870s, the Great Sioux Reservation and its inhabitants 
fell victim to further land wrangling on the part of white settlers.  Ostensibly, gold was 
discovered in the Black Hills, prompting Americans to swarm the Sioux Nation’s land in 
South Dakota.  Historians have noted that “there was a clamor by settlers to open a large 
portion of the land for sale.  Some settlers even moved onto the reservation illegally.”27 
Also, the federal government forced the Sioux Nation through an 1883 land agreement to 
“cede to the United States all of the Great Sioux Reservation, as reserved to them by the 
treaty of 1868, and modified by the agreement of 1876.”28 The reservation’s land base 
dwindled, yet again, as the treaty made way for ever-rolling waves of gold-seekers. 
 Perhaps wishing to secure more land for homesteaders, Congress passed the 
General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) of 1887 that called for the redistricting of American 
Indian land.  Simultaneously, the allotment policy sought the relocation of Natives to 
smaller parcels of land to assimilate them through American agriculture.  Yeoman 
assimilation would convert American Indians to privatized land ownership and would 
promote an agricultural subsistence.29 Deloria argues that, “it was thought, if the Indian 
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had his own piece of land, he would forsake his tribal ways and become just like the 
white homesteaders who were then flooding the unsettled areas of the United States.”30 
Dawes Act proponents claimed that allotment was the only way to save the 
American Indian communities who were failing to thrive on barren reservations.  To 
Indian Commissioner Thomas Morgan, “they [Indians] are in a ‘vanishing state of things’ 
… and must adjust themselves to their environment, and conform their mode of living 
substantially to our civilization.”31 Meanwhile, opponents argued that the United States 
simply wanted for its own use the land it had bequeathed in a so-called benevolent way 
through the policy of removal.  For instance, furious over the government moving 
Cherokee individuals to unfertile parcels of land while offering whites the most lush 
portions of the reservations, D.W. Duncan (Cherokee) could only quip, “The Government 
of the United States knows that these allotments of the Indians are not sufficient!”32 
Critics also derided allotment because it sought to replace tribal culture with American 
culture through assimilation.  According to Prucha, “lacking all appreciation of the Indian 
cultures, they [government officials] were intent on forcing upon the natives the qualities 
that they themselves embodied. It was an ethnocentrism of frightening intensity.”33 
The removal and allotment policies certainly thrust upon Native populations a 
variety of diminutive constructions and subservient roles.  In both cases, the government 
was able to displace American Indians to make more room for frontier whites.  At the 
same time, the United States strove to assimilate Native communities to control for 
“savage” behavior that threatened the fringes of the frontier.34 And, of course, the 
paternal nature of U.S.-American Indian affairs championed as a benefit the security and 
preservation of “the Indian who is in all cases, broadly speaking, destitute of some of 
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these safeguards [self-preservation] … and in some cases destitute of them all.”35 For, as 
the Indian Rights Association claimed in 1885, “The Indian as a savage member of a 
tribal organization cannot survive, ought not to survive … but his individual redemption 
from the condition of savage nomad … is abundantly possible” with American 
protection.36 This type of policy, though, did more than provide material advantages to 
the benefactor and protection to the beneficiary.  In addition, the policies helped shape 
the very identities of the groups involved in the rhetorical exchange.  Assuming the role 
of “the helper in an interracial benevolent dyad was tantamount to asserting higher status, 
so when Americans offered to save the Indians from white aggression, their rhetoric 
reaffirmed whites’ superiority” as much as it provided land to the government or aid to 
Native nations.37 
Undoubtedly, the rhetorical impact of the policies held vast power in constructing 
American Indian cultures.  Bosmajian, for instance, claims that “once one has been 
categorized through a language of suppression, one loses most of one’s power to 
determine one’s future and most of the control over one’s identity and destiny.”38 Jehlen 
agrees, averring that “naming them ‘other’ seems to cast the speaker’s cultural 
interlocutors in an inferior position by rendering them mere negative quantities defined 
by an opposition to which they do not contribute.”39 With naming, a dominant group has 
in its possession the very constitutive tools needed to construct what a nation means and 
how other groups mean to the nation.   
However, American Indian populations were not helpless and voiceless.  In fact, 
as Hoxie has argued, Native groups “talked back,” which helped both to reconstitute their 
own identities and to rebuke and take to task – and hence to reconfigure in the rhetorical 
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process – U.S. identities.  “By talking back to those who considered themselves 
superior,” he maintains, “Indians could show that they rejected the self-serving 
nationalism they heard from missionaries and bureaucrats. The Natives made it clear that 
they refused to accept the definitions others had of them – savage, backward, doomed. 
And they attacked people who thought white culture epitomized the virtues of 
‘civilization.’”40 
The shaping of U.S. identities and Native identities can be found in an exchange 
of voices.  The formation of a community or nation, Balibar suggests, does not involve 
one voice or several voices speaking alongside each other.  Instead, identity comes about 
by “forging one conception out of another” to obscure the understanding of community; 
nation is not so much a continuity as a disruption brought about by reciprocal 
discourses.41 Campbell agrees, noting that voices within a nation are “communal, social, 
cooperative, and participatory, and simultaneously, constituted and constrained by the 
material and symbolic elements of context and culture.”42 These interactive identity 
constructions were salient for nineteenth century U.S.-Native relations.43 
In this study, therefore, I examine the rhetoric of U.S. governmental identities and 
Native identities surrounding the policies of removal and allotment.  Instead of focusing 
only on institutional discourse comprising U.S. Indian policy or Native discourse that 
responded with protest or acquiescence, I address the relationship that is reflected in such 
discursive exchanges.44 In this way, I examine how U.S. Indian policies helped fashion 
not only U.S. identities but also Native identities.  Simultaneously, I analyze how Native 
rhetoric helped constitute both Native and U.S. identities.  More specifically, I assess 
executive, legislative and judicial discourse surrounding the removal and allotment 
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policies to interrogate the messages of identity formation.  This is accomplished with a 
concurrent assessment of the ways that American Indians contributed to the shaping of 
U.S. and Native identities during these same eras.  With this purpose in mind, the 
remainder of this introduction sketches the parameters of the project.   
GOVERNMENTAL IDENTITY, REMOVAL, AND ALLOTMENT 
As the United States marched forward on the North American continent in the 
nineteenth century, it simultaneously sought to bring new cultures into the nation.  
Though this practice tended to emphasize obedience to the U.S. governmental vision, 
opening America’s borders also invited other voices and experiences into the nation.  In 
the continental territory of the United States, this “anarchy of empire” manifested through 
an interaction of dominant and subaltern groups. Kaplan recently argued that “while the 
United States strove to nationalize and domesticate” these territories, “annexation 
threatened to incorporate non-white foreign subjects into the republic in a way that was 
perceived to undermine the nation as domestic space.”45 This “threat” to American 
identities is reminiscent of the way that American Indian presence and discourse 
influenced a broader American nationalism.  As Stuckey argues, the integration and, yet, 
“dispossession of American Indians … could serve as an appropriate vehicle for the 
construction of American identity.”46 
The tension of managing nineteenth-century geographical and cultural expansion 
conflated the segregation of American Indians from the U.S. civis with the demand that 
they assimilate.  At times, the U.S. government appeared welcoming, infusing its 
constitutive identities with the rhetoric of equality and open borders.  Consider, as an 
example, when during the allotment period an American Indian who “adopted the habits 
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of civilized life, [was] hereby to be declared a citizen of the United States.”47 This status 
appended to Native individuals if they shunned tribalism and assimilated fully to the 
“American way.”  With the allotment policy, it appeared that the U.S. government was 
making an effort to be more inclusive.  However, such inclusion came at the cost of 
segregating from the U.S. nation. In order to be part of the American community, 
American Indians were required to live separated from the centers of the U.S. civis.
The Removal Policy 
Though American Indian nations encountered the U.S. government and its 
citizenry prior to the removal policy, scholars tend to mark the era – roughly between 
1815 and 1838 – as a hallmark moment of contact between Americans and the diverse 
societies of indigenous people.48 According to Remini, Indian removal solved one of the 
most looming issues hanging over the government’s head: “The operation of removal 
provided the American people with the land they hungered for over the past hundred and 
more years.”49 At the same time, though, removal marked the largest benevolent effort of 
the United States to civilize American Indians under the paternal wing of the government.  
About this, Remini argues “that removal was never just a land grab … [America] fully 
expected the Indians to thrive in their new surroundings, educate their children, and 
acquire the skills of white civilization.” Removal provided “all of these blessings.”50 
Calloway agrees that removal was a milestone in that it sped up “the inevitable process of 
dispossession as Indians dropped their old ways in favor of a more civilized existence.”51 
And, Prucha suggests that the removal period magnified and codified the notion of 
paternalism in U.S.-American Indian relations.  He says, “Whatever may have been the 
purposes of the proponents of removal … the rhetoric of the age described Indians as 
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children or wards, in need of guidance from white officials who would work for their best 
interests.”52 
Some scholars following the tenets of diplomatic history paint a picture of the 
removal era as an objective and pragmatic policy.  For Satz, the government was merely 
“attempting to open up the land east of the Mississippi River to white settlement.”53 In 
his and others’ antiseptic accounts of the age, violence and social oppression are 
abandoned for chronological simplicity and causality.  So, for instance, in Pearce’s 
interpretation of dispossession, “When the clash of Indian and white on the frontier 
finally demanded it, in the 1820’s and 30’s, the conception was realized formally as the 
government’s policy of Removal.”54 These early studies tend to demonstrate the 
simplicity of the removal policy, and the unidirectional way that institutional discourse 
influenced Native identities.  
More contemporary studies, however, complicate the removal policy by moving it 
beyond chronology and pragmatism.  Dippie, as a case in point, situates removal in the 
context of paternalism.  In doing so, he interrogates the benevolence thought to underpin 
removal’s “protection of American Indian wards” and challenges what such paternalism 
meant: “The venerable concept of a separate Indian country provided the policy’s 
foundation and a humanitarian rationale was its cornerstone … This gift of civilization – 
the ultimate gift to whites’ way of thinking” came with benefits for the dominant group.  
Concluding, Dippie maintains that paternalism “always seemed to please the donor more 
than the recipient.”55 Delving into the power relations associated with removal’s 
paternalism, Ryan similarly concludes that “asserting what will contribute to the well-
being of another and what will not – is best understood as an exercise of power in itself. 
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As the case of Indian removal demonstrates, these definitions and assertions are neither 
transparent nor benign.”56 Deloria argues that removal granted the government a 
justification to negate “the rights of the Indian tribes to sovereignty and equality among 
the nations of the world.” He continues that the dependency arising from removal’s 
benevolence has given way to historical and modern conceptions of Natives as “a group 
of lazy, dirty Indians loafing the day away at the agency.”57 Such sentiments of 
dependency carried on into nineteenth-century U.S-Indian relations through the allotment 
policy of the 1870s-1890s.   
The Allotment Policy 
The allotment period, like the removal era, was a vital “point of contact” between 
American Indian nations and the U.S. government.  Many are in basic agreement that the 
allotment period marked the second full-scale U.S. Indian policy following removal, and 
that allotment related to removal in its common paternal agenda.  Most notably, Dippie 
has argued that “Like the proponents of removal sixty years earlier, allotment’s 
supporters had assumed the disappearance of the Indians” and like removal, the allotment 
policy dispossessed American Indians to smaller pieces of land, where “the surplus 
would be sold” and Natives would be “given agricultural projects designed to help them 
assimilate to Americanism.”58 On this latter point, Prucha agrees that, “The Indians were 
engulfed in this flood of Americanism.  Their Americanization, indeed, became the all-
embracing goal” of allotment supporters claiming the policy as a “benevolent” and 
“culturally uplifting” project aimed at saving the “savage.”59 Wallace concurs, noting 
that “The abuses of the reservation system [resulting from removal] gave new life to the 
old idea of ‘incorporation,’ the policy of making the Indians … like other Americans.”60 
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In a way, the removal and allotment periods are related in their importance as “moments” 
of identity construction within U.S-American Indian relations. 
 Some diplomatic historians have discussed allotment in sanitary terms, 
emphasizing the chronology of events and the institutional documents proffered in 
defense of the policy.  For instance, Otis details the “chronology of events leading to the 
policy of allotment of lands in severalty.”61 Washburn offers a pragmatic account of the 
Dawes Act wherein he argues that allotment was, simply, an extension of removal’s 
failure to assimilate or separate American Indians enough to “cast away his [Native’s] 
savage customs.”62 Allotment is also discussed cursorily in frontier histories and mass-
marketed American Indian histories.  Frontier histories prefer to champion the action of 
the Indian Wars over the policies of assimilation and reservationism that underpinned 
violence between the U.S. government and American Indian nations.63 Similarly, 
popular western histories reduce allotment to a footnote of the bloodshed associated with 
U.S-Native affairs during the Indian Wars.64 
With the rise in popularity of American Indian Studies, however, the allotment 
policy has been considered for the ways that the Dawes Act and the assimilation of 
Natives demonstrated the identity politics involved in U.S. Indian policy.65 For Prucha, 
allotment increased the government’s identity as an administrator of Indian affairs: “The 
bureaucracy of the Indian Office also greatly expanded, until all Indian aspects from 
cradle to grave seemed to be managed by government officials and employees … 
[allotment represented] the principal means to accomplish assimilation.”66 Others have 
argued that the increase in governmental involvement evolved into increased dependent 
identity on the part of American Indians.  For instance, Nabokov claims that allotment 
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failed to “civilize” American Indians and that the government shrouded its desire to take 
the only fertile lands left on the reservations in a rhetoric of benevolence.  He writes that 
allotment “turned Indians into impoverished” groups “dependent on the government for 
food once again.”67 Though the Dawes Act purported to “uplift” American Indians, 
agricultural projects could not be supported on the desolate land that Natives were 
allotted.  Instead, “hungry, impatient, or confused Indians sold over a quarter-million 
acres for quick cash … shady deals were common.” White opportunists were appointed 
as ‘guardians’ and “allottees were bribed or murdered to steal their property.”68 
Some view more dismally the ways that allotment influenced future American 
Indian populations.  Fritz, for example, agonizes that “the Dawes Act virtually 
condemned reservation Indians to poverty for many generations.”69 To he and other 
critics, the Dawes Act also moved beyond material consequences to impact identities.  
Discussing the denigration of Native culture, Deloria quips that the shrinking of Native 
land sought to corral American Indian communities under U.S. governmental tutelage.  
He then carries the metonym of children further to animals: “Because the Indian occupied 
large acres of land, he was considered a wild animal … With allotment, the wild animal 
was made into a household pet whether or not he wanted to be one.”70 There exists, 
overall, sufficient research to contextualize institutional voices in addressing the policies 
of removal and allotment.   
The present study expands the extant scholarship on institutional discourse by 
analyzing the ways it helped constitute U.S. governmental and American Indian 
identities.  In addition, the study demonstrates the fashion in which institutional discourse 
overlapped and interacted with Native discourse.  The exchange of these two bodies of 
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discourse move institutionalized scholarship beyond an isolated examination and more 
toward an interconnectivity between U.S. and American Indian rhetoric.   
American Indian Voices and Identities 
 
Some scholars also attend to American Indian responses to the removal policy.  
This scholarship ranges from rhetorical strategies to historical narratives related to the 
ways Native communities understood and reacted to removal.  Strickland, for example, 
performed an argumentative analysis of Cherokee discourse and discovered that the most 
common themes were that “Cherokees should not relinquish the land of their ancestors” 
and “that any removal would be followed by more relocations.”71 Similarly, Conser’s 
work on the moral and political appeals of Cherokee Chief John Ross found that the 
Cherokee engaged in three counteroffensive tactics: “the first revolved around the issue 
of legitimate authorization to undertake negotiations. The second was the rationale for 
resistance in memorials … The third centered on popular political non-cooperation.”72 
Others offer biographical accounts of Native leadership, such as Moulton’s work on 
Chief John Ross, which includes allusions to removal rejoinders.73 Others, still, organize 
the memoirs and papers of well-known indigenous figures into a historical narrative.74 
As with the literature on removal, there is some discussion of American Indian 
voices as they responded to the Dawes Act and the allotment of Native lands.75 Perhaps 
the most noteworthy research to integrate indigenous responses is Clark’s work on the 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock case, a Supreme Court holding that resulted from a Kiowa Nation 
challenge to the allotment policy.  Clark argues that, rather than merely acquiescing to 
allotment, the Kiowa challenged the presumption “that Native peoples were incompetent 
as a result of membership in their tribes” and fought against the notion that “tribalism 
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itself caused the child-like behavior that required guardianship.”76 The American Indian 
discourse analyzed by Clark, not surprisingly, generates from the briefs filed by the 
Kiowa against the Dawes Act.  Nabokov’s collection of American Indian rhetors, also, 
includes responses to the allotment policy, especially as he describes the discourse and 
introduces the context of each text.77 
Recently, a strand of literature on what Hoxie calls American Indian “back talk” 
has been produced that helps inform the blending together of cultures extant in the 
constructions of identities as explicated through discourse.78 Senier’s analysis of literary 
responses to assimilation and Nelson’s examination of U.S.-Indian relations hint at the 
interconnected creations of U.S. governmental and American Indian identities through 
discourse.  Senier shows the importance of Native agency both in combating diminutive 
images of Indianness and in reformulating America’s so-called benevolence; similarly, 
Nelson shows how indigenous communities approached “talks” with the federal 
government to reconstruct the U.S-American Indian relationship.79 Clair’s work in 
ethnography and rhetoric also helps us get closer to an American Indian discourse that is 
not merely a “response” to broader institutional American discourses, but rather 
substantively powerful alongside this institutional rhetoric.  For Clair, American Indian 
“silences” combined with “articulations” during removal negotiations not only helped 
shape Native identities as resistant (as opposed to quiescent) but also demonstrated that 
the government’s sentiments were not always accepted prima facie. Regarding the latter, 
she says Natives challenged U.S. governmental discourses as exceptional and self-
important.80 Similarly, Morris and Wander’s analysis of the Ghost Dance as a rhetoric of 
resistance argues, more broadly, for the constitutive power of Native discourse, both 
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consummatorily (within indigenous communities) and instrumentally (in appealing to 
white Americans).81 This project, however, seeks to examine the unexplored hybrid link 
between Native and U.S. governmental discourses as they co-constituted identities.82 
INSTITUTIONAL AND NATIVE DISCOURSES:  IDENTITY FORMATION, 
CONSTITUTIVE RHETORIC, IDEOLOGIES & HYBRIDITY 
As the above discussion indicates, scholars investigating the removal and 
allotment periods rarely – or scantily – address American Indian voice during these 
historical contexts.    Scholars tend to agree that the U.S. government was “genuinely 
concerned about the welfare of a million natives [sic]” but that, concurrently, nineteenth-
century Americans felt they “had a special mission in clearing the continent which must 
not be impeded by the backward red men.”83 Scholars have gauged what roles Native 
voices and agencies played in nineteenth-century U.S. Indian policy, but they have yet to 
attend to how U.S. governmental and American Indian discourses co-constructed their 
respective identities and those of their cultural counterparts.84 Viewing the rhetoric 
surrounding the policies as transactional offers an important interpretation of this hybrid 
relationship.  
Significantly, governmental and American Indian voices should be considered 
together as interactive forces.  As Calloway argues, “Native American history is more 
than the mirror image of United States history; it is also a part of the shared past.”85 
Bearing in mind the transactional exchange of American and American Indian cultures, it 
is important to pay more attention to a mosaic of relations instead of “viewing American 
history as the story of a westward-moving frontier – a line with Indians on one side, 
Europeans on the other.”86 Understanding how both Americans and American Indians 
20
constructed nineteenth-century identities and culture provides a more complex and ethical 
portrait of the United States.  To deny one side of a contentious moment a “say” leaves 
the story partially told.87 
This project, thus, extends the knowledge of nineteenth-century institutional and 
Native discourses to include the rhetoric of removal and allotment as they assist in the 
construction of U.S. government and American Indian identities.  In exploring the 
institutional rhetoric of removal and allotment and American Indian discursive rejoinders 
to these policies, this project investigates two related questions.  I first aim to discover 
how the U.S. government constituted American Indian communities – while 
simultaneously shaping its own identities – through the policies of removal and 
allotment. Analyzing institutional constructions of American Indians and the U.S. 
government warrants investigation to uncover the ways this complex discourse 
functioned to help constitute the confluence of identities. This initial question integrates 
the examination of public discourse of all three institutional branches of the U.S. 
government.  I also seek, though, to examine how American Indian communities 
constituted U.S. governmental identities – while simultaneously shaping their own 
identities – within the policies of removal and allotment.  The second question highlights 
the ways Natives responded to the changing and, oftentimes, conflicting governmental 
constructions of the United States and American Indians. 
In answering these questions, I examine a variety of primary documents 
concerning removal, allotment, and American Indian remonstrations from a number of 
collections. With regard to institutional discourse, texts derive from archival and printed 
sources.88 From the outlook of American Indian rhetoric, texts derive from governmental 
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and Native archives, as well as published materials.89 Native texts have been 
authenticated as precisely as possible.90 All of the texts are approached as fragments of 
the nineteenth century U.S.-American Indian milieu.  By “fragments,” I mean that the 
pieces of discourse derive from a number of different locations and, yet, come together to 
inform an understanding of context.  As McGee puts it, rhetoric in this vein “does not 
begin with a finished text in need of preparation; rather, texts are understood to be larger 
than the apparently finished discourse that presents itself as transparent. The apparently 
finished discourse is in fact a dense reconstruction of all the bits of other discourses from 
which it was made.”91 In fact, the only extant traces of the interplay between institutional 
discourse on removal and allotment and American Indian responses are found in 
disparate locations.  In this way, the texts of governmental and Native discourse are 
gathered in a “composite” fashion. Kuypers, Young and Launer write that “for the 
purpose of analysis, these fragments may be combined and read as a composite narrative, 
the aggregate of smaller narratives and thematic fragments.”92 Such discourses are 
approached through the critical lenses of identity formation, constitutive rhetoric, 
ideological criticism and hybridity. 
Identity Formation 
A nation, in the sentiments of Anderson, “is an imagined political community – 
and is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”93 In other words, a nation is 
not natural or inevitable but rather is a way humans organize their lives based on 
historical, racial, economic and political contexts.94 At the center of such an organization 
flourishes the power of governmental discourse in constituting the nation.  Hobsbawm 
contends that the power of people uniting into a community through governmental 
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rhetoric “lie[s] at the heart of the nationalism of language.”95 In a nation – such as the 
United States that comprises a polyglot of ethnicities, languages, religions and heritages – 
it sometimes appears, to Beasley, “the only things that would seem to be left are ideas 
and the rhetoric used to explain them.”96 That is, rhetoric exists at the heart of the 
complexities surrounding U.S. governmental identities.     
Like nations and nationalism, “national identities” are, too, constructions called 
into existence through language.97 A government’s identity, “much like that of their 
nation,” Stuckey argues, “is largely imagined, based less on historical or geographical 
inevitability and more on the power of rhetoric to form and focus allegiances.”98 
Identities ebb and flow depending on the contexts of crises, ideologies and patriotic 
sentiment.  Moreover, such identities are only shown to be definitional in their varying 
meanings which “are multiple, even contradictory, and can be shown to have changed 
radically over time.”99 National identities instantiated by governmental discourse, in 
particular, evolve over time based on the mingling of various groups competing or 
intersecting within the nation.100 
Certainly, governmental bodies in power define, in part, the bulwarks of 
identities.  In fact, conceptions of dominant ideologies with respect to governmental 
identities have tended to consume scholarly interest in the topic.  Examining the top-
down studies undertaken by Anderson, Bruner, Gellner, Gerstle and Takaki offers a 
glimpse at the way subaltern voice has been occluded from the study of national identities 
in contrast to the weight afforded institutional authorities.101 Still, one cannot deny the 
agency of the subaltern in helping constitute national and governmental identities.  As 
Hobsbawn puts it, identities must be examined with an eye towards a “dual phenomena, 
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constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed 
from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of 
ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist.”102 Even 
when dominant ideologies through the government direct a nation’s character, always 
present are the voices of the subaltern.  The voices of dominant and the subaltern groups 
help construct the topography of cultural relations.   
The vitality of topography as a trope of identity formation does not end or begin 
with cultural mappings.  Territorial expansion, as well as control over other groups, 
demands physical place and space within which to develop and thrive.103 The issue of 
land, and the rhetoric of space, was imperative to U.S. governmental and American 
Indian communities.  For nineteenth-century U.S. governmental identities, such territorial 
“place” was necessary to “the nation’s rapidly industrializing economy.”104 Additionally, 
the “space” that was attached to the physical land was vital to build a nation “based on 
the assumptions of racial and cultural superiority as well as an insatiable desire for land, 
expansion and empire.”105 The American public, as well, needed land for enlargement 
and was not above exacting the sentiments of terra nullius, “the uninhabited or 
unimproved wasteland commonly described by early European explorers and settlers in 
North America and other regions inhabited by aboriginal peoples.”106 To nineteenth-
century U.S. national identities this “uninhabited wasteland” allowed for the growth of 
American economies and cultural identities based on a rhetoric of space that justified 
such expansion.    
Alternatively, land for indigenous nations was connected ontologically to cultural 
and individual existence.107 According to Strickland, American Indians consistently 
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argued against removal from homelands on the grounds that they “should not relinquish 
the land of their ancestors” or the source of their spiritual worth.108 To critics of 
American expansion, the so-called “settlement” of the West, in particular, is terribly 
flawed.  Robbins argues, for example, that the idea of discovery and settlement “refuses 
to acknowledge the presence of others who already inhabited the regions.”109 Needless to 
mention, there existed a substantial disconnect between U.S. and American Indian 
perspectives of land.110 
The power to control land developed into an important feature of place and space 
in the U.S. government’s nineteenth-century nationalism.  According to Delaney, the 
frontier world was carved into meaningful spaces; lines were socially constructed and 
were imposed and enforced by the dominant group.  All one needs to do, he writes, is “to 
call to mind the experience of access granted or denied, of exclusions and expulsions 
enforced, or protection or sanctuary respected or violated.”  To think more carefully 
about the nineteenth-century world of territory is, hence, “to become conscious of the 
social relations of power.”111 The fashion in which the United States dispossessed 
American Indians of their land and then removed Natives to desolate, unfertile 
“checkerboards,” demonstrates how oppressive the “geographies of power” could be for 
peoples of color.112 Part of understanding U.S. governmental identity formation in the 
nineteenth century involves investigating how the rhetoric of space played out, and how 
land moved between U.S. and American Indian societies.  Once under investigation, the 
context surrounding issues like removal and allotment help explain the ways 
“geographies of power” constitute hierarchies, and help address the manner in which 
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hierarchies coalesced into the imbrication of U.S. governmental and American Indian 
identities.113 
Territory is also closely tied to U.S. citizenship.  Citizenship, or the designation of 
“criteria for membership in a political community,” is among the most elemental of social 
tenets.114 From the outset of America’s founding, membership in the republic merged 
with territorial ownership.  According to Ricci, this was so because “property assured 
economic self-reliance which, in turn, permitted independence of mind and will.”115 In 
addition to the personal benefits of territory to American self-reliance, property-holding 
bivouacked the U.S. nation itself.  James Madison acknowledged in The Federalist 
Number Ten that “the freeholders of the country” would be “the safest depositories of 
republican liberty.”116 With a personal stake and investment in the land and the nation 
under which it existed, Madison and others believed that U.S. frontier borders would be 
both protected and steeped in the precepts of liberty.  The more landed citizens that the 
nation could boast, the “more stable and secure the political system” would be.117 
Moreover, property equated to territorial unity, which bonded the white male citizenry 
despite the proliferation of partisan division.  Or, as Schudson puts it, “there was no 
question in the minds” of American leaders that a “property qualification” was imperative 
for a productive and cohesive citizenship.118 
Citizenship surely defines subjectivities’ political stance, but it moves beyond 
doing so for status or nomenclature alone.  In addition, citizenship and its laws “literally 
constitute – they create with legal words – a collective civic identity.”119 By linking land 
to citizenship, the U.S. government – through its numerous naturalization acts – afforded 
property a definitional quality of Americanness.  The possession and control of land, 
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writes Shalhope, “meant control of an economic future of people living in an agrarian 
society” but access to land concurrently “constituted the vital prerequisite for political 
and social” identity for the U.S. citizen.120 Those (whites) who owned property were 
considered a part of the nation.  And, those who could eke out a productive and economic 
life on the land had an unquestionable right to the land.121 
Citizenship in the nineteenth century United States furthermore worked through 
the exclusion of African Americans and American Indians.  If citizenship vested in 
property – and the productive (agrarian) use of the property – then both subjectivities 
failed the naturalization test.  For African Americans, property ownership was a non-
issue that the institution of slavery made moot.122 For American Indian nations, though 
the U.S. government admitted their quasi-ownership, or “tenantship,” of the land, and 
subsistent modes of hunting and gathering disqualified them altogether from 
citizenship.123 In this vein, indigenous communities were not recognized by European 
powers “as having any territorial claim whatsoever” let alone the trappings that 
citizenship bestowed.124 Native nations in eighteenth and nineteenth century America – 
what the Declaration of Independence called “merciless Indian savages”– could not be 
allowed into the U.S. citizenry.125 This was so, speculates Takaki, because the nation had 
to have a homogenous population, a “people with the same laws and language…owners 
of private property.”  Diversity, he continues, was dangerous to republicanism, especially 
when the “civilized” precepts of the “new American republic” had to mingle with 
“cultures close to nature and the instinctual life.”126 The “uniform rule” of the U.S. 
government’s numerous naturalization acts, thus, occluded American Indian nations 
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based on race – to be sure – but also on their mere “occupancy” of the land and their 
inability to “produce” on the land as part of a larger U.S. citizenry.127 
Still, U.S. citizenship – and the ways that American Indians were considered for 
or occluded from the nation’s citizenry – was not always clear and was rarely consistent.  
As Smith asserts, U.S. citizenship “has always been an intellectually puzzling, legally 
confusing … and contested status.”128 When complicated by American Indians’ 
triangulated positions (tribal, state and federal affiliations) the naturalization processes of 
the United States become even less clear.  The following chapters read American Indian 
and U.S. national identities through this lens of citizenship.   
Overall, these theories and histories of governmental identity – and the way they 
develop, evolve and function – serve as a critical template for analyzing the institutional 
and Native discourses of removal and allotment.  Following Beasley’s lead, this 
perspective allows critics to grapple with the ways that subjectivities are interpellated into 
a nation.  Or, as she also puts it, “Perhaps, then, instead of continuing to ask only what 
Americans’ shared beliefs are, we might also ask how they are – how and when they 
come into being, how they are defined and understood, and how they thus constitute the 
‘knowledge culture’ that is assumed to accompany American national identity.”129 
Identity contains a number of integral components including constitutive dynamics, 
ideologies and hybridity; these components are next considered. 
Constitutive Rhetoric and Ideology           
Closely related to identity formation is the perspective of constitutive rhetoric.    
Bearing in mind the constitutive nature of federal powers, Wald notes that such powers 
“call attention to the symbolic processes through which the U.S. government constitutes 
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subjects: how Americans are made.”130 The constructive role of discourse hearkens to 
Charland’s conception of constitutive rhetoric, a vital identity-builder that explains how 
“the people, in general, exist only through an ideological discourse that constitutes 
them.”131 The process is broadened with the work of Jasinski, in which we find the 
constitutive rhetoric of “The American subject … residing, ironically enabled by those 
excluded negative others: the white middle class woman, the American Indian warrior, 
and the enslaved African-American.  This dialectic between self and ‘other’ functions as 
a central element in this dimension of discursive constitution.”132 Constitutive rhetoric, 
thus, reveals one element of institutional rhetoric: the representation of a subaltern 
identity through juxtaposition against, and mergers with, a dominant group. 
 Furthermore, the American government inculcates an additional component of 
constitutive power and identity formation.  Executive orders, legislative acts and judicial 
decisions move beyond constructing ethnic identities alone to achieving political ends by 
the imbrication of broader national identities.  Nationalism remains but one way humans 
organize themselves around political and cultural circumstances.  The idea of a nation 
comprised of a people is a rhetorical function. It is “a creation brought about by a specific 
sort of historical necessity and specific kinds of rhetorical action.”133 The federal 
government’s rhetorical action, here, involves the assumption that institutional discourse 
is “conceived as a prime mechanism for furthering the political development of the 
United States as a nation-state.”134 Oftentimes, then, governmental discourse helps 
construct U.S. governmental identities through other subaltern identities.  
 This element of constitutive rhetoric illustrates the “community building” 
function White discusses in noting that government discourses are not solely about “the 
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message” of institutional language, but also about the “experiences” they offer the 
community.135 Discourse moves beyond self-identity to broader collective purposes.  
Rhetoric, according to Jasinski, “functions to organize and structure an individual’s or a 
culture’s experience of time and space, the norms of political culture and the experience 
of communal existence (including collective identity), and the linguistic resources of the 
culture (including in particular, the stock fundamental political concepts that shape the 
culture’s understanding of political existence).”136 Of course, part of “communal 
existence” involves racializing the nation through institutional rhetoric.  Hence, Clark 
reminds us that through institutional rhetoric, “Indian tribes in less than a century traveled 
the pathway from nearly complete independence to restricted dependence under the 
paternalism of the federal government.” The government “served as a powerful 
instrument for confining Indians and forging drastic changes upon them.”137 
Scholars of constitutive rhetoric, in addition to assuming a “top-down” 
mechanism, also recognize the construction or reconstruction of identity from the 
perspective of a subaltern group.138 Whereas Jasinski’s work tends to view constitutive 
rhetoric moving from the powerful to the less-powerful, the differing, and yet 
complementary, “bottom-up” function of discourse provides for response, community-
building and reconstitution.139 Charland argues that people call themselves into existence 
– or challenge another’s perception of them as a “people” – through discourse.  He 
continues that such a “constitutive rhetoric leads us to call into question the concept …of 
an audience composed of unified and transcendent subjects. If we are left with a subject, 
that subject is partial and decentered.  History, and indeed discourse itself, form the 
ground for subjectivity.” 140 Or, with Wald, we understand how identities were fashioned 
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over time and across contexts by examining the discourses that label and establish the 
borders of a subjectivity’s identities.141 Part of this identity construction comes from the 
subjectivities themselves – from their own voices – as well as institutional powers. 
The emancipatory notion of a people calling themselves into existence holds a 
long tradition in rhetorical studies.  The early work of Campbell and Gregg leads us to 
view subaltern voices as powerful in the reconstitution their own identities.142 Similarly, 
McGee’s argument that people coalescing as a rhetorical union demonstrates how 
responsive discourse can empower a group with agency in the face of grave exigencies 
levied by institutional powers.143 From an American Indian perspective, Lake’s criticism 
on Native discourse taking on consummatory purposes exemplifies the power of internal 
discourse in uplifting Native communities.144 The constitutive and reconstitutive 
function of language is integral to understanding the interaction of Native and U.S. 
identities through the rhetoric that comes to craft these identities. 
This project, overall, assumes that ideological forces are at work in constitutive 
moments of identity formations surrounding removal and allotment.  Wander writes that 
such rhetorical criticism introduces ideology as a topic of judgment:  “An ideological turn 
in modern criticism reflects the existence of crisis, acknowledges the influence of 
established interests and the reality of alternative world-views, and commends rhetorical 
analyses not only of the actions implied but also of the interests represented.”145 
Importantly, ideological criticism assumes the power of discourse – so vital to both 
identity formations and constitutive rhetoric – in shaping hybrid cultural character.  To 
conceive of a text as ideological, according to Therborn, “is to focus on the way it 
operates in the formation and transformation of human subjectivity … Ideology operates 
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as discourse, addressing or … interpellating human beings as subjects.”146 Similarly, 
McGee has argued that discourse and ideology intersect in the text and that “through the 
analysis of rhetorical documents” a “people” can be discovered to function.147 These 
people or “culturally available subject positions” are, according to Campbell, “shifting, 
not fixed, identities” and raise issues about “the formation of publics and 
counterpublics.”148 Subjectivities can be tracked through discourse.  A people’s myriad 
identities, and how they interact with others’ identities, can then be examined through 
texts.  
This project also assumes that ideologies and texts can travel from one historical, 
political, social and cultural era to other subsequent eras.  According to Campbell, an 
analysis of ideologies embraces a “diachronic concern for the movement of constitutive 
transformative experiences over time.”149 Successive periods, therefore, are not isolated 
but linked together by ideological formations that transcend moments in time.  Or as 
McGee argues, discourses “presuppose taken-for-granted cultural imperatives, all of 
culture is implicated in every instance of discourse.”150 Longitudinal ideological studies 
“could begin with a historical epoch and proceed to analyze … a before and after 
meaning.”151 
The analysis that follows presumes that ideologies can be examined “by 
comparisons over time” so as to “establish an analog” of their impact on discourses and, 
in this case, U.S. governmental and American Indian identities.152 Concerning nineteenth-
century governmental and American Indian discourses of removal and allotment, my 
focus is on how identities formed and functioned within particular ideological contexts 
that evolved over time.  As Nelson asserts, “We might recalibrate our understanding of 
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identity politics in the early nation … to see Indianness not simply as a mythological 
oppositional/negative contrast to ‘white’ identity, but as something more complex and 
flexible than that…”153 Indeed, U.S. and Native discourses were not always a simple 
mirror image of the other, as Lepore has suggested, but a complicated ideological mosaic 
of national identities.154 Senier argues that these discourses were participatory and yet 
separatist; conciliatory and yet oppositional – they were hybrid.155 
Hybridity 
The concept of hybridity remains a vital component of this study.  Hybridity 
considers the process of rhetorical intermingling through which differing ethnicities 
emerge as changed subjectivities.156 According to Greaves, the defining quality of 
hybridity is this “ritual of transition when a novitiate is neither the former nor the 
subsequent social category.”157 Instead of positioning identities as monolithic or static, 
hybridity hypothesizes that upon interaction cultures experience a “blurring of 
boundaries” that explodes characteristics formerly understood as “universal.”158 There 
exists during contact the sluicing of centers, or as Kaup suggests, “the forces of contagion 
and continuity across boundaries” are stronger than entrenched identities.   Overall, 
hybridity accounts for how the “poetics of relationality” displace the insularity of 
individual identities during intercultural relations.159 
Hybridity impacts Native and U.S. governmental identities in numerous ways.  
One of the prevailing stances states that bringing together U.S. and Native identities 
consequentially forces American Indians to assimilate and seemingly “kill off” their 
subject-positions.160 That is, while the United States represented the “great force of 
change” and positioned itself as a dominant identity, Natives “represented what had been 
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lost.”161 Hybridity in this case leads to assimilation, a practice that assumes a “dialogic 
contamination” that is “asymmetrical, not parallel.”162 
American Indian Studies has challenged this unidirectional understanding of 
hybridity.  Scholars following this tradition have asserted that hybridity mostly takes on 
emancipatory functions, allowing Natives to constitute and secure new subject-positions 
by resisting U.S. Indian policies.  Hybridity, thus, weakens the foundation of U.S. 
centrality, and helps American Indians enter into conversations with the U.S. 
government.  Hybridity in this vein permits American Indians to operate “as a more or 
less unrestricted actor in shaping [their] own life and a more general social destiny.”163 It 
provides indigenous communities the chance to experience being a particular subject for 
themselves instead of becoming a subject of the United States.164 In Young’s estimation, 
the “doubleness” created by hybridity brings together, fuses “but also maintains the 
separation” of concession and self-agency in discourses.165 
I view hybridity as an amalgam of the polar instantiations articulated above. 
Hybridity calls into power the notion of the “Third Space” – alternatively known as the 
“borderland” or “threshold” and, hence, involves both sides. According to Bhabha, 
space166 is needed for cultures to assemble, commingle and hybridize their identities 
through discourse.  In his view, “displacement and mixture give rise” to this zone of 
contact.167 Within space, “the transformational value of change lies in the re-articulation, 
or translation, of elements that are neither the One … nor the Other … but something 
else besides which contests the terms and territories of both.”168 In other words, this 
“betweenness” becomes a space where a poetics of culture “as in-between” builds 
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triangular relationships among the individual cultures entering an interaction and the third 
hybrid postures that result.169 
The convergence among, and fusion of, so many subject groups with the U.S. 
government brings to light constructs of hybridity and cultural identities.  Indeed, culture 
is “as hybrid in America as anywhere in the world.”170 One of the most time-tested 
borderlands involves the U.S. government and American Indian nations.  Kaup and 
Rosenthal argue that the meeting ground between Native groups and the U.S. 
government, in particular, have involved “identity changes [or hybridizations]” on behalf 
of all the groups involved.171 The syncretic impact of discourses points to a new 
elevation of American Indian “orality and written texts” to the transformative levels of 
U.S. governmental rhetoric.172 
This project rests heavily upon this shift toward “radical indigenism.”173 My 
reliance, here, borrows from Harmon who reminds us “… it would be a mistake to 
downplay the power of Indian people in the definition process.”  American Indians have 
not just moved through their relations with the United States by consenting or remaining 
indifferent.  Alternatively, they have also acted by strategizing “to perpetuate themselves 
in a state that comports” with them; they have worked “to achieve or retain economic 
resources, power and autonomy, safety … and the other necessities of human 
existence.”174 American Indians did so, in part, by appropriating the government’s 
rhetorical frameworks but also by articulating their own rhetorical strategies.   
The power of governmental agency, though, should not ignored. The government 
certainly set the discursive strictures of the U.S.-Native relationship. In turn, as my 
analysis shows, the government enacted a greater leverage of power than American 
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Indians. Thus, this study presumes a power differential that fails to completely balance 
the power of Natives and the U.S. government.   
Outline for Study  
This study situates institutional and American Indian discourses at the interstices 
of nineteenth ideologies that underscored interactions of the U.S.-Native relationship.  
Specifically, the project argues that both U.S. governmental and American Indian voices 
contributed to the policies of U.S.-Native relations throughout the nineteenth century’s 
removal and allotment eras.  Simultaneously, these discourses co-constructed the 
identities of both the U.S. government and American Indian communities and contributed 
textures to the relationship.  Such interactions – though certainly not equal among groups 
– demonstrated the hybridity extant in U.S.-Native affairs in the nineteenth century.  That 
is, both governmental and indigenous discourses added arguments, identity constructions 
and rhetorical strategies to the relationship.  Ultimately, the study argues that this 
hybridity helped shape “Indian” policies and constituted cultural identities in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.   
American Indians, it is contended, achieved numerous goals in terms of impeding 
the implementation of the removal and allotment policies.  Likewise, by appropriating the 
U.S. government’s discursive frameworks and inventing their own rhetorical strategies, 
American Indian communities helped reshape their own and the government’s identities.  
Natives, further, worked through the government’s homogenization of indigenous culture 
to organize a pan-Indianism that allowed them to unify in opposition to the government’s 
policies and constructions of American Indian identities. During the first third of the 
twentieth century, American Indian agency was shown to impact the U.S.-Native 
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relationship as Natives urged for the ultimately successful passage of the Indian 
Citizenship Act of 1924 and the Indian New Deal of 1934.  These acts granted U.S. 
citizenship to American Indians and also allowed them connections to their tribal 
cultures, respectively.  As will be contended, American Indian resistance throughout the 
removal and allotment eras helped motivate these more emancipatory policies of the 
U.S.-Native relationship.  American Indians concomitantly challenged the government-
instigated identity constructions of Natives as savage, childish, weak and uncivilized into 
positive self-characterizations of independence, strength and unity.  Similarly, American 
Indians interrogated the government’s self-professed identities as benevolent, paternal, 
just and civilized; in the process, they illustrated how the U.S. government acted through 
deception and fraud. 
In the end, Native communities were granted increased discursive power, though 
the U.S. government still retained its control over American Indians.  Part of this control 
derived from the government’s territorial management of Natives, which functioned as a 
crucial space for constituting American Indian and governmental identities. The Indian 
Citizenship Act and the Indian New Deal – where this study concludes – demonstrated 
the prevalence of the identity duality of U.S. citizenship that assimilated American 
Indians to the nation, yet segregated them on reservations outside the spaces of the U.S. 
civis. This duality of inclusion and exclusion was built incrementally through the 
removal and allotment periods, and existed as residues of nineteenth century U.S.-Native 
relations.  Here, the U.S. government transformed its self-identity constructions as 
paternal, benevolent and equitable into a controlled citizenship and controlled 
sovereignty over American Indian communities.  In so doing, the legislative and judicial 
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branches – led by the executive – reified its constructions of American Indians as 
monolithically dependent, quasi citizens and unworthy of complete autonomy.  At the 
same time, the executive branch ascended as the principle force in U.S.-Native affairs.  
Chapter One reviews the history of U.S.-Native relations, focusing on cultural 
interactions and identities during the time period between European contact and the 
beginning of the nineteenth century prior to the removal era.  The chapter details the early 
interactions among American Indians and both Europeans and Americans from the 
fifteenth century to the removal era (1810s-1840s).  Both institutional and Native 
discourses are examined to demonstrate how hybridity undergirded the early relationships 
preceding the Indian Removal Act of 1830.  The chapter also introduces the ideologies of 
expansion, territoriality, republicanism, paternalism and citizenship that carried into the 
later decades of the nineteenth century. 
Chapter Two examines U.S. governmental discourse surrounding the Indian 
Removal Act by positioning it in the crucible of Jacksonian era ideologies.  Specifically, 
the chapter contends that as the executive, legislative and judicial branches codified the 
removal policy they overcame disagreements regarding Native policies and American 
Indian identities. The removal debate, and the final ratification of the Indian Removal 
Act, significantly reduced such uncertainties for U.S. leaders and constructed American 
Indians as perpetual wards of a paternal and controlling government.  These identity 
dynamics would remain intact until the dawning of the allotment era in the 1880s.  The 
chapter, too, shows how the government viewed territory through the doctrine of 
discovery in order to occlude American Indians from citizenship as uncivilized and failed 
toilers of their lands.  Simultaneously, American Indian identities were homogenized, 
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thereby eliding the nuances of individual indigenous communities.  The Act clarified that 
all American Indians – regardless of past efforts to assimilate or undertake “civilizing” – 
would exist as controllable wards of a benevolent U.S. government.  The executive 
branch, therein, represented the government, and both legislative and judicial discourses 
elevated the presidency (and its attendant cabinets) as the primary institutional force in 
guiding U.S.-Native affairs.  The government’s removal era rhetoric punctuated the 
hybrid identities of itself and Native communities by creating a submissive-dominant 
cultural hierarchy. 
Chapter Three explores the ways that Native communities contributed to the 
removal debate and responded to both the Indian Removal Act and the governmental and 
Native identities it helped construct.  American Indians were able to reshape these 
identities by appropriating governmental arguments and rhetorical strategies as 
empowering investitures into the removal debate.  At the same time, American Indians 
contributed differing governmental and Native identity constructions, which permeated 
the government’s debate over removal.  One such strategy involved the framing of 
territory through moral inheritance that provided them with some semblance of 
occupancy rights despite the government’s goals of segregation through removal. Such 
interaction with governmental discourses punctuates the hybridity at work, as both the 
U.S. government and American Indians added to the U.S.-Native relationship. 
Specifically, the rhetoric of the Five Civilized Tribes, the Cherokee Nation and northern 
and northwestern nations indicates that they sought sovereignties positioned outside the 
scope of U.S. citizenship.  To this end, they reconstituted themselves as independent, 
worthy of territory, just, stable and godly.  Alternatively, governmental identities – 
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especially due to the Indian Removal Act’s passage – were constructed as untrustworthy, 
sinful and ungrateful.  Overall, the chapter contends that American Indians exhibited an 
empowering agency that at once slowed the implementation of removal and also 
challenged the governmental and indigenous identities stimulated by the policy.    
Chapter Four addresses governmental discourses surrounding the Dawes Act of 
1887 and the identity constructions that arose as the nation edged ever closer to removed 
Native communities in the West.  The chapter, particularly, argues that the U.S. 
government transformed the paternal relationship it employed in the 1830s to exclude 
Natives into a rhetorical strategy of assimilation.  Territory, therein, was linked to – and 
conflated with – citizenship, and hence Natives were at first viewed as potential yeoman 
citizens.  In the process, American Indians were constituted as dependent and yet 
civilized enough for agricultural production as a key contribution to the U.S. nation-state.  
This illustrated a commodification of Native communities through republicanism. And, 
the government constructed itself as a republican father that would train American 
Indians for possible citizenship through the allotment policy’s insistence on yeoman 
farming.  The late nineteenth century promises of citizenship pointed to the possibility 
that American Indians could exist as equals within the civis. However, the Dawes Act 
continued to distance American Indians from the U.S. nation.  This conflation of 
assimilation and segregation underscored the identity duality of U.S. nationalism.  Native 
communities therein were not granted full U.S. citizenship; the childish and dependent 
identities attributed to American Indians in the removal era cropped up again in the 
1880s.  Instead, Natives were cordoned onto reservations as dependent occupants. But, 
the possibility that citizenship was feasible – and the government’s notion that Natives 
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could produce on their land – acted as a rupture that American Indians worked through to 
petition for both U.S. citizenship and separate sovereignty. 
Chapter Five analyzes the fashion in which American Indians challenged the 
allotment policy, and did so in part by restructuring their dependent – and the 
government’s self-professed paternal and controlling – identities codified in the Dawes 
Act. American Indians crafted their rebukes to the policy through petitions, memorials, 
biographical and literary works and public speeches that served to interrogate the identity 
duality that was entrenched in the allotment scheme.  And, they also worked through 
territoriality as a topoi of garnering citizenship or sovereignty. Specifically, the chapter 
argues that American Indians gave voice to this dualism and these identity constructions, 
signifying both the hybrid relationship between the U.S. government and Native 
communities and the power of indigenous voice in exposing the government’s 
contradictions.  That is, Dawes era Native discourses pierced the mythos of 
republicanism and paternalism that the government imbricated, thus revealing the 
incongruence of the allotment policy’s promises of citizenship combined with further 
exclusion.  The puncturing of such mythos also points to the ways that American Indians 
added to the hybrid U.S.-Native relationship. Part of Native resistance generated from 
pan-Indianism – the gathering of American Indians across particular individual nations.  
Pan-Indianism appropriated the U.S. government’s homogenization of Natives in order to 
channel it into an empowered rhetorical strategy.  But, the ends of pan-Indianism were 
not always the same.  This chapter serves also to nuance the differences in American 
Indian discourses between those indigenous groups wishing for U.S. citizenship and 
those who sought an autonomous existence outside the scope of U.S. citizenship.    
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Finally, the Conclusion considers the exchanges of governmental and American 
Indian discourses in the first third of the twentieth century.  Here, the chapter argues that 
the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 and the Indian New Deal of 1934 
culminated from a merging of governmental and indigenous voices, thereby exhibiting 
the hybridity present in the residues of their nineteenth century exchanges.  Both of the 
outwardly emancipating acts were symbolic of the power of Native agency over the 
course of the removal and allotment eras.  Seemingly, integrationist American Indians 
would achieve the U.S. citizenship they had striven for throughout the allotment era 
through the Indian Citizenship Act.  Likewise, separatist Natives – who resisted during 
the removal and allotment eras – would attain independence through the Indian New 
Deal, which allowed for tribal restructuring.  However, the acts also pointed to the ways 
that the U.S. government retained its control over American Indians by reifying the 
identity duality of U.S. nationalism.  That is, the acts granted American Indian 
communities a controlled citizenship and a controlled sovereignty. The government’s 
management of Native territories was a synecdoche of this control.  American Indians 
could neither fully enact their citizenship in the U.S. civis as segregated sectors of the 
nation, nor could they enjoy full separatist sovereignty because assimilation to the U.S. 
nation functioned to block their autonomy.  In the end, both U.S. governmental and 
American Indian voices were blended into the resulting twin legislation that capped the 
cultural exchanges extant in nineteenth century hybrid U.S.-Native relations. 
Before delving into examinations of U.S. and American Indian discourses – and 
how the voices therein helped constitute identities – a survey of the contexts leading to 
the removal era is offered. 
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END NOTES
 
1 Though the designations of “tribe” and “nation” are both correct when attributed 
to distinct American Indian groups, I use the term “nation” (lower case when discussing 
groups in general; upper case when speaking of a particular indigenous group).  “Tribe” 
as a descriptor has come to represent a diminutive, powerless “group of people united by 
ties of common descent from a common ancestor, community of customs and traditions, 
adhering to the same leaders” (Newcomb).  In a sense, here, “tribe” is more taxonomic 
than political.  “Tribes” exist apart from land, governments, negotiating power and 
sovereignty.  Alternatively, a “nation” is “a body of people, associated with a particular 
territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government 
peculiarly its own” (Newcomb).  Notice, here, that a “nation” is active and mindful; it 
seeks government and possesses governmental ideologies.  According to Newcomb 
(Shawnee/Lenape), referring to American Indian groups as “tribes” constructs them in a 
passive light – while elevating their U.S. counterparts as decision-makers, governments, 
sovereigns, and confederations.  With Newcomb’s argument in mind, I use  “nation” to 
demarcate American Indian groups, therefore applying “the most powerful terms in the 
English language to express … political identity” (Steven Newcomb, “On the Words 
‘Tribe’ and ‘Nation,’” Indian Country Today 24:26 [8 December 2004], A3).    
2 Black Hawk, Black Hawk’s Autobiography (Ames: Iowa State U P, 1999), 9. 
3 Black Hawk, Autobiography, 9-10. 
4 Black Elk, “The Spider’s Web,” in Black Elk Speaks, ed. John G. Neihardt 
(Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1931), 35-36. 
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5 Throughout this project, I will refer to Native populations in North America as: 
American Indian, Indigenous and Natives, per the current trends in American Indian 
cultural studies.  These designations, in particular, are welcome identity signifiers 
according to Eva Marie Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native 
America (Berkeley: U of California P, 2003); Devon Mihesuah, ed., Natives and 
Academics: Writing About American Indians (Lincoln, NE: U of Nebraska P, 1998); and 
Russell Thornton, ed., Studying Native America: Problems and Prospects (Madison, WI: 
U of Wisconsin P, 1998).  Readers are encouraged to bear two precepts in mind.  First, 
the proper designation of Native populations in North America remains controversial.  
Differences exist and divide sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and – most 
importantly – Native folk themselves.  Second, due to the variant descriptors 
accepted/rejected, I am dedicated to integrating all three primary labels.  Whenever 
possible, I will designate populations based on their national affiliation (e.g., Seminole).  
Also, due to the importance of representing the contextual bedding of this project, I quote 
nineteenth-century sources that often refer to American Indians as “tribes,” “tribal,” 
“children,” “heathen,” and “savage” among other dubious metonyms.  Such labels arise 
from the text of the particular epoch under investigation. 
6 Vine Deloria, Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (Norman: U of 
Oklahoma P, 1988), 14. 
7 David Leverenz, Paternalism Incorporated: Fables of American Fatherhood, 
1865-1940 (Ithaca: Cornell U P, 2003), 6. 
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8 See Siobhan Senier, Voices of American Indian Assimilation and Resistance: 
Helen Hunt Jackson, Sarah Winnemucca, and Victoria Howard (Norman: U of 
Oklahoma P, 2001).  
9 Black Hawk, Autobiography, 9-10. 
10 Priscilla Wald, Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form 
(Durham: Duke UP, 1995), 16-17. 
11 Throughout this project, I refer to “U.S. identities” and “Native identities” (or 
“American Indian identities”).  I choose to pluralize “identity” in these cases taking into 
account Hobsbawm’s argument that a national or group identity is never monolithic or 
singular.  That is, a nation or group is made up of a “myriad of voices” that come together 
to form a mosaic of identities.  See E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: 
Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1990), 110.  In terms of 
U.S. identities, dominant nineteenth-century voices range from English and German to 
Scottish and Irish ancestry, among numerable others. See Rogan Kersh, Dreams of a 
More Perfect Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2001).  Nineteenth-century American 
Indian identities worked through – and alongside – some 500 nations and 300 languages.    
See Donna Hightower Langston, The Native American World (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and 
Sons, 2003), 103.  My use of “identities” reflects this plurality of voices within the two 
broader cultures of the U.S. nation and American Indian communities.  There were, of 
course, also African-American voices extant as a part of U.S. identities during the 
nineteenth century.  This project focuses specifically, though, on the interaction of more 
dominant U.S. identities and American Indian voices.        
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12 Eric King Watts, “’Voice’ and ‘Voicelessness’ in Rhetorical Studies,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 87 (2001): 180. 
13 Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New 
York: Harper Perennial, 1992), 248. 
14 Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Phillip’s War and the Origins of American 
Identity (New York: Vintage, 1998), 5.  According to Horseman, whether through spoken 
or written word, American Indian communities helped shape both Native identities and 
“the experience of the United States” (Reginald Horseman, Race and Manifest Destiny: 
The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism [Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1981], 207). 
15 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “Agency: Promiscuous and Protean,” Communication 
and Critical/Cultural Studies 2 (2005): 5. 
16 For more on the importance of the nineteenth century to the trajectory of U.S.-
American Indian affairs, see Dee Brown, Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee: An Indian 
History of the American West (New York: Henry Holt, 2000). 
17 See Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and 
How it Changed the World (London: Routledge, 2002.) 
18 See Rogan Kersh, Dreams of a More Perfect Union, 199-200. 
19 Naturalization Act of 1790 1 Stat. 103-104 (March 26, 1790). 
20 Though I focus in this study on the hybridity between U.S. and American 
Indian discourses in forging identities, I also recognize that other internal and external 
forces played a role in incubating this hybridization.  For instance, Britain influenced 
much of the United States’ treatment of indigenous populations.  Part of the War of 1812, 
in fact, dealt with Britain’s role in gathering Native allegiances to oppose the American 
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nation.  Such external events affected the way the United States would later act toward, 
and entreat with, American Indian populations through removal (See Prucha, The Great 
Father).  Intercultural hostilities also helped bring about internal policies and tensions. 
British alliances with American Indians to overthrow the United States on the frontier 
edges (during the War of 1812) also came to light with regard to the paranoia 
surrounding the Monroe Doctrine.  Spain could easily, it was argued in Monroe’s Annual 
Message of 1823, inspire American Indian forces to take back some of the territories 
siphoned-off by the Treaty of Ghent.  Thus, he considered European alliances with 
Natives “a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States” (James 
Monroe, “Monroe Doctrine – Annual Message of 1823” in A Documentary History of the 
United States, 7d., ed., Richard D. Heffner [New York: Signet, 2002], 96-98).  The self-
protectionist and dependent-protectionist ideology of the Monroe Doctrine may have 
affected the United States’ justification for removal and reservationism (which kept 
Natives at a safe distance and isolated them from outside forces) and, later, the 
liquidation of these reservations (to further control dissident forces). Though these 
external and internal contexts certainly relate to an analysis of U.S-Indian relations, I 
choose instead to focus on the hybridity between and among the United States and 
American Indian identities.  It must also be acknowledged that Native identities preexist 
the arrival of Europeans.  Again, though, this project focuses on those identities present 
and vibrant during nineteenth-century U.S-American Indian relations.      
21 Brian Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy 
(Lawrence: U of Kansas P, 1991), 67. 
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Secretary of War John Calhoun in 1824 and placed atop the newly-minted Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) within the War Department.  The BIA worked throughout the 1830s 
and 1840s to engage in Indian removal.  As the enterprises of reservationism, 
assimilation, and allotment gained steam – and bureaucratic complexity – the BIA (also 
called the Indian Office, the Office of Indian Affairs, the Indian Service and the Indian 
Desk) was moved under the auspices of the Department of the Interior in 1849 to 
administer U.S.-Native affairs.  The Bureau remains a part of the Interior to this day, and 
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1880s) between the United States and American Indian nations.  Broadly, these reform 
organizations’ “solution to the Indian problem was that the Indians were to be ‘civilized,’ 
assimilated into the economy through land ownership and education.”  As Konig relates, 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
U.S.-NATIVE RELATIONS: 
INTERACTIONS AND IDENTITIES FROM CONTACT TO REMOVAL 
The United States did not commence its Indian policies and constructions of 
Indianness without some semblance of responsiveness and co-construction on the part of 
American Indians.  As Calloway has argued, U.S-Native relations is at once “a story of 
conquest and colonization” propagated by the United States, but is also a tale of 
“resilience, innovation, and survival” on the part of American Indian nations.1 Both 
contribute in some way to the larger context of U.S-Native relations.  And, though the 
voices of the mainstream United States and indigenous cultures during the removal era 
often bypassed each other, they also sometimes clashed and commingled.  Senier 
contends that, while the interactive voices might be hard to uncover and pin down, this 
“difficulty exists at least partially because these discourses” are not seen as exactly 
“oppositional, but as dynamic and mobile, able to meet new cultural challenges.”2 The 
dynamic voices of the U.S. government and American Indians – especially as they co-
constructed identities – helped figure and make sense of policies, such as removal.  The 
notion of co-constitution can be found, according to Rosteck, in the “consideration of the 
whole ensemble of culture, its ‘mosaic of documents’ … accounting for popular opinions, 
beliefs, and constellations of attitudes.”3 Generally, the interactive relationship between 
U.S. and Native identities is discerned from discourses crafted during historical, political 
and cultural contexts, such as removal.  
The hybrid relationship between the United States and American Indian nations 
did not begin, however, in the 1830s with the Indian Removal Act and the subsequent 
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Trail of Tears.  In fact, the relationship began even before the formation of the American 
republic, well back into the first contact between Natives and early European American 
settlers.  The present chapter looks backward to review the extending and interactive 
characteristics of the U.S.-Native experience.  As Lepore explains, the identities of U.S. 
nationalism as well as Native populations in the New World “would form the basis of 
American nationalism as it emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.”4 Lepore suggests that early interactions between European American and 
Native cultures marked the beginning of the trajectory of U.S.-Native relations.   
This chapter, then, moves through the seventeenth, eighteenth, and (early) 
nineteenth centuries in order to trace the interconnected relationships leading to the 
removal policy.  First, European American and Native identities are addressed from 
Columbian contact to the French and Indian War to demonstrate how identities developed 
through juxtaposition, around varying perspectives of land, and within tutelage 
constructs.  Next, identities are considered during the early American period.  Within this 
era, U.S. identities centered on protectionism and interventionism, and Native 
communities argued for a sovereignty outside the scope of the government.  The period 
ends with U.S. and Native voices interacting over issues of expansion, assimilation, 
territory and citizenship.  Finally, hybrid identities are approached at the turn of the 
nineteenth century to reveal how the U.S. government’s constitution of its own, and 
Native, identities shifted from an inclusive to an exclusionary relationship.  In addition, 
American Indians challenged and reconfigured the inclusive characteristics of 
assimilation and the exclusionary features of early removal as they affected both Natives 
and the United States. 
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PRELUDE TO AMERICA’S “LONG, BITTER TRAIL”5
European American and Native identities transformed noticeably between the 
arrival of the Spanish in the fifteenth century and the ascension of the English in the wake 
of the French and Indian War in the eighteenth century.  Within the Columbian period of 
contact, European and indigenous communities viewed each other with caution and 
disdain.  The Spanish, in particular, constructed Native identities as inferior, while 
indigenous groups constituted Spanish identities as malevolent.  In both cases, self-
identity was crafted in opposition to those identities of the groups’ counterparts.   
The juxtaposition of identities continued with the dominance of the English in the 
seventeenth century.  After the English settled in North America, relations with Native 
nations turned on economic identities including the trading of goods and the exchange of 
land.  Differences over views of land – for the English, it was a site of production and 
commodification; for Natives, it was a space of spirituality and moral inheritance – led to 
aggression among the groups.  England’s victory over Native forces led to the elevation 
of European American identities as superior – again – in opposition to weakened Native 
identities.  Finally, aggressiveness transformed into a form of tutelage, wherein European 
Americans involved themselves in guiding Native nations through conversions to 
Christianity, adaptations to agriculture, and dependence on trade with the English.  This 
latter hybridity of identities arose when the English began its “benevolent era policy” 
after it secured Native lands following the French and Indian War.          
Columbian and Early European American Contact  
When the first European explorers landed on the shores of North America, they 
found, first, neither gold nor the proverbial fountain of youth, but myriad communities of 
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indigenous nations.  From the start, the self-professed “civilized” European cultures 
clashed with the New World’s pre-existent and (because they were deemed non-Christian 
and non-white) “savage” populations.6 Christopher Columbus, upon setting his sights on 
the Natives he encountered, immediately considered indigenous communities 
subordinate.  Constructing a diminutive Native identity, he wrote: “they are fit to be ruled 
… they would make great slaves.”7 Columbus’s 1492 journal remains infused with 
metonymic constructions.  For instance, he wrote on December 11, 1492, “these people 
are as inferior to the Spaniards as children are to adults … there is as great a difference 
between them as there is between savagery and forbearance … almost – I am inclined to 
say – as between monkeys and men.”8 In fact, Columbus and other Spanish explorers 
classified these seemingly new-found “discoveries” as specimens to be carried home to 
Europe along with trees, birds, mammals, and minerals.  As Columbus recorded in his 
log, “I have sent men to a house on the west bank of the river.  They have brought me 
back seven head of women, girls and adults, and three infants.”9 These Natives were next 
crowded into the belly of one of the great Columbian triumvirate of ships along with 
various exotic flora and fauna, and were sent as gifts to Queen Isabella of Spain for her 
living menagerie. 
 Though Columbus and other Spanish explorers would come to construct the 
“enduring images” of indigenous North America for future Europeans, Native 
populations were not without some observations of their own.10 To Mayobanex 
(Ciguayo), for instance, it was the Spanish who exhibited savageness.  He noted in 1533 
that “the Spaniards are violent and perfidious men, and only seek to shed the blood of 
innocent people.”11 Reconstructing Ciguayo identity as “innocent” and Spanish identity 
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as bloodthirsty, Mayobanex indicated that he would never entreat with the Spanish “nor 
form any alliance with so false a people.”12 Having viewed some of the atrocities 
committed by the Spanish, a Taino medicine man likewise portended in 1519 that the 
Spanish were doomed given their tendency to mistreat North America’s Natives.  The 
medicine man explained, “Departing souls go in two directions: one is bad, full of 
darkness, where those who do evil to men go; the other is good and happy, and peace-
loving people go there.”13 The Taino, of course, traveled the latter direction. Reversing 
the order of the Spaniards’ Christian destiny – reducing Natives into submission based on 
God’s will – he reconfigured the way good and evil played out through European 
American and Native identities.          
The metonymic construction of Native identity by way of European Americans 
continued forth, beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with the arrival of 
French, Dutch and English colonists who eventually settled, and remained permanent 
residents of, North America.  European Americans in the seventeenth century shaped 
their own identities in juxtaposition to Native nations.  In a pivotal anthropological work, 
Pearce posited that “Aboriginal Americans, so European voyagers were again and again 
to find, denied their holy, human selves and lived like beasts; they were, in the traditional 
terminology, more animal than rational.”14 English Reverend Samuel Purchas’ 1622 
narrative of early European-Native relations demonstrated this typical belief.  The 
Natives, he argued, were “bad people, having little of Humanitie but shape … more 
brutish than the beasts they hunt, more wild and unmanly than that unmanned wild 
Countrey.”15 To the Christian, landed, and literate European American, the American 
Indian became the heathenistic savage.   
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This relationship soon helped construct European American identities based on 
contrasts to Native identities. One of the first counterpoints of early European American 
identities involved simultaneously evaluating themselves against Natives and Europeans, 
and noting the differences from both the east and west.  European Americans foiled 
themselves against the “red savages” whom they averred were de-evolved or 
underdeveloped versions of themselves.  Pearce points out that this key identity 
construction of the “Indian creature” showed European Americans “what they might be if 
they were not civilized and Christian, [if they] did not fully partake of the divine idea of 
order.”  Natives seemed, in early European American thought, “to have fallen as far away 
from his proper state as he could and yet remain human.” 16 
Seventeenth century European Americans, contrary to fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries’ conceptions that reduced Natives to untamed animals, began viewing 
indigenous communities with human characteristics; they were part of “all men” and 
“remain[ed] human.”17 This may have been so as European Americans decided to remain 
in North America and, thereupon, increased amicability with Native communities.  One 
of Jamestown Colony’s first settlers, Robert Gray, opined in 1609 that they were 
certainly human, albeit humans in need of civilization: “it is everie mans dutie … to bring 
the barbarous and savage people to a civill and Christian kinde of government, under 
which they may learne how to live holily, justly and soberly in this world … rather than 
to destroy them.”18 In the colonials’ view, the practice of “civilizing” became a vital part 
of European American identities, just as the need for civilizing became a part of Native 
identities.  Simultaneously, European American discourse assembled a hierarchy wherein 
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Natives figured as lower order humans in need of tutelage from the higher ordered 
European Americans.      
Ascension of English-Native Relations 
On the heels of European American settlement, in the early seventeenth century, 
English colonists and Native peoples began engaging in an assortment of relationships 
regarding land exchange.  Natives soon realized, though, that the colonists were not only 
remaining on, but also expanding throughout, the land.  Captain John Smith, for instance, 
reminded both his fellow Jamestown colonists and a group of Powhatan in 1620 that “by 
reducing [Indian land], God shall be served, His Majesties Empire enlarged by the 
addition of … large Territories … and the Planters themselves enriched by the trafficke 
and commerce.”19 The early English planned to broaden their territories to the detriment 
of Native holdings.   
Indigenous communities typically viewed their relationships with the English as 
unhealthy, especially when the colonists insisted on “treating the Indians despicably” 
concerning trade and the exchange of land.20 According to Native leaders, the more 
friendly Natives were and the more they extended their hands and hearts to the colonists, 
the more European Americans trespassed on Native lands.  As Wahunsonacock 
(Powhatan) explained to Captain John Smith in 1622, “Yes, Captain Smith, some doubt I 
have of your coming hither, that makes me not so kindly seeke to relieve you as I would: 
for many inform me your coming is not for trade, but to invade my people and posesse 
my Country.”21 Moreover, as Natives opened the door to the material exchange of goods, 
European Americans wanted to trade language, Christianity, and Eurocentric culture, 
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such as dress, virtues, and economic systems (including agricultural technologies) at a 
feverishly quicker pace.22 
As the American colonials became more involved in Native cultures and the 
process of land exchange, aggression among English and Native groups increased.  In a 
sense, then, the pattern of “hostility and open war” arose as a “dominant part of English-
Native relations until almost the end of the nineteenth century.”23 As McNickle puts it, 
peace between Natives and the English was destroyed due to “competition for material 
goods” and territory – which was “part of the cultural baggage of the incoming white 
man.”24 More succinctly, negotiations broke down in the face of increased expansion on 
the part of European Americans.      
The first “great moment” of aggression between European American colonists 
and indigenous nations stemmed from white attempts to colonize Native nations.  In 
1675, a group of Wampanoags under the leadership of King Phillip, also known as 
Metacom, rose up and attacked several white colonies in New York, Connecticut, and 
Massachusetts.  The ensuing attacks from the European Americans and further response 
from the Wampanoags garnered the title, “King Phillip’s War.” 25 King Phillip 
eventually lost the war, and was beheaded.  Increase Mather remarked that “the 
memorable day” of Metacom’s death was “a monument of revenging Justice” that 
witnessed the chief’s limbs “hewn in pieces before the Lord.”26 It seems that the violence 
wreaked on the Wampanoags was committed under providential watch. In addition to the 
importance of eliminating a major war chief on the new frontier, King Phillip’s War led 
to European acquisition of land and the formation of identities.  According to Lepore, the 
war confirmed the instability of the American frontier, and set into motion an endless 
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repeatability in which European Americans advanced their culture and influence over 
Natives and their land as they tramped westward.27 
These actions – and the rhetoric that justified white encroachment – arose from 
and perpetuated the identity changes facing the new colonists.  Lepore asserts that 
“seventeenth century English colonists in New England were plagued with issues of 
identity, not of self and the other, but of the more difficult triangulated self and the 
other.”28 When stuck between the English and the so-called savage, the colonists chose 
the path of least resistance as a vehicle for forging their new “American” identity.  In this 
vein, John Winthrop noted that English colonists were “sons of Adam” who were 
productive and used the “Lord’s garden” justly, compared to the Native who “lay waste 
[the land] without any such improvement.”29 English identity was predicated on 
productivity and commodification of the land.  Evidently, these young colonists could not 
move eastward, back across the Atlantic, to settle land in Great Britain.  Not only was 
England historically situated as a metropol of European empire, but the British military 
would have summarily obliterated whatever scrappy militia the colonists could have 
gathered.30 
Instead, European American colonists directed all attention toward their errand 
into the wilderness – the settling of the west as made manifest by the “Almighty.”31 Part 
of this wilderness involved the inferiority of Native identity. As Churchill describes the 
situation: “The resulting rhetoric of dehumanization directed at indigenous peoples, 
juxtaposed as it was to a contemporaneous rhetoric of ‘civilization’ by which Europeans 
were indoctrinated to view themselves as the world’s inherently superior race” became 
the key rallying discourse of early American colonial identity.32 It remained easy for the 
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English settlers to view themselves as civilized when, comparatively, they considered 
Indians – as Cotton Mather labeled them – “atheisticall, proud, wild, cruel, barbarous, 
bruitish (in one word) diabolicall creatures … the worst of the heathen.”33 
The bond between territory and inclusion was vital during the English colonial 
period.  And, this connection was rooted in the colonial errand. The “one outstanding and 
universal requirement” for inclusion as active members of colonial life was some type of 
a “landed property” qualification for citizenship.34 British jurist William Blackstone, for 
instance, argued that colonists without property lacked the resolve to civilize the North 
American wilderness.  They had neither the motivation to protect the Crown’s colonial 
holdings nor the personal connection to the land that stimulated virtuous citizenship.  He 
wrote in 1765 that “the true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard to 
property” for citizenship within the British Empire, “is to exclude such persons as are in 
so mean a situation as to be esteemed to have no will of their own.”35 By all means class-
based, Blackstone’s directives and legal holdings additionally prohibited those racial 
inferiors who occupied (not owned) land within the colonies.  European whites who 
understood the “labor value” of land were seen as the Crown’s true citizens.  Those 
“others,” such as American Indians, “did not correctly use the land which God gave 
mankind, did not mix their labor with natural resources to make property.”36 According 
to the British, the “children of the forest” did not cultivate land and therefore understood 
not the value of republicanism with its emphasis on individualism, production and civic 
virtue.   
Events like King Phillip’s War, and subsequent interactions, allowed Native 
communities to construct their identities and to understand better those of the English.  
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These indigenous nations soon realized that the English could not be trusted, as they were 
taking lands based on a European American providential right of possession.  King 
Phillip (Wampanoag) reminded his community of the dangers associated with the 
English: “… and you now see the foe before you, that they have grown insolent and bold; 
that all our ancient customs are disregarded; that treaties made by their fathers and us are 
broken, and all of us insulted … these people from the unknown world will cut down our 
groves, spoil our hunting and planting grounds, and drive us and our children from the 
graves of our fathers, and our council fires, and enslave our women and children.”37 
Here, Wampanoag identity was centered on ancestral connections to the land; that 
customs would be overlooked and grounds spoiled affronted King Phillip.  King Phillip’s 
warning also foreshadowed the land wrangling that would soon follow, as well as the 
dangers associated with the English.  Around this same time, an Onondaga, Cayuga and 
Seneca council announced to their respective tribes: “we have a new Chain, a strong and 
straight Chain that cannot be broken.”38 Constructing themselves as steadfast and united, 
these Natives worked to counter any weakened identity applied to them.   
King Phillip’s War, and the awareness that aggression represented one of few 
options for expansion, actually shifted the rhetoric of European American identity to one 
of benevolence and neighborliness.  Following the war, colonists maintained that future 
atrocities might be avoided if American Indians were civilized and Christianized under 
English tutelage.  In 1681 William Penn wrote, of this ideal, that with civilization Natives 
would be “commanded to love, and to help, and to do good” and that with assimilation 
“we may always live together as neighbors and friends.”39 Interestingly, this rhetoric of 
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benevolence helped alleviate the colonists’ cognitive dissonance concerning the balance 
of supporting civilization projects with destroying savage culture.    
Impact of the French and Indian War 
The next historical event to shape the English-Native landscape involved the 
peace treaty accorded England in the wake of the French-Indian War, 1756-1763.  Also 
known as the Seven Years War, the campaigns therein witnessed the English and their 
American charges battling the French and their Native supporters on the frontiers of 
North America.  The battle lines were drawn between the English (and the colonists 
hoping to secure French and Native lands) and the French (along with Natives who 
desired the expulsion of the English from the continent).40 The English and French 
empires had been battling militarily and politically for a number of years. North America 
and the milieu of the colonist-Native tension – replete with its developing paternal 
dynamics – figured in as, yet, another venue through which to grapple over world 
domination of the high seas, the New World, and international commerce.41 
When the French lost the Seven Years War, the Peace of Paris in 1763 established 
the boundaries and governments of new British areas in North America, settled former 
Indian lands, and demarcated the boundaries of Indian country in these new areas.  In his 
famous Proclamation of 1763, King George III reserved the right to extinguish all Indian 
title.42 That is, the English would control the land upon which Natives lived.  King 
George announced to the American colonies that “we have thought fit … to issue this 
Royal Proclamation, hereby to publish and declare to all our loving subjects that we have 
… granted our letters patent … to erect within the countries and islands ceded and 
confirmed to us by said treaty distinct governments in the Indian territories.”43 French 
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and Spanish officials and Christian missionaries were to remove immediately following 
the establishment of new British governments in colonial North America.   
King George’s Proclamation of 1763 set into motion a new phase of European-
Native relations: the benevolent policy era.  In exchange for possessing Native lands, 
Britain promised to protect its Native populations as wards.  King George noted “the 
several nations or tribes of Indians with whom we are connected, and who live under our 
protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such parts or our 
dominions and territories.”44 Notice the construction of American Indians as 
subordinates in need of protection.  As protector, the Crown made no qualms about 
“declaring it to be our royal will and pleasure” to take hold of and use those lands for the 
British colonists.45 
Britain’s North American identity, which was predicated on territorial expansion 
and western agricultural use of the land, did not go unnoticed by American Indians.  To 
the charge that Natives were “brutes” who “passed away their time” and squandered 
fertile lands, indigenous groups challenged this Eurocentric view that Native identity was 
wasteful and inert.46 Canassateego (Onondaga) argued that American Indians did 
understand land value: “We know our lands are now become more valuable. The white 
people think we do not know their value; but we are sensible that the land is everlasting, 
and the few goods we receive for it are soon worn out and gone.”47 Canassateego 
intimated that ancestral land was eternal, even though what the English considered of 
value (i.e., timber, fecund soil, minerals, game) might have been short-lived.  Here, 
Native conceptions of land – as sacred and “everlasting” – challenged the European 
American view of land as commodity.  Also, though, Canassateego’s use of the term 
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“value” demonstrates a commodification in the vein of European American conceptions 
of land.   
 The British governments within Native territories soon began negotiating trade 
and land pacts with indigenous communities.  An early example of these pacts arose in a 
plan issued by the Lords of Trade, the New World office of British commerce.  In the 
“Plan for Future Management of Indian Affairs,” the Lords argued that local trade led to 
Native uprisings due to inconsistency of terms between locales: “all local interfering of 
particular Provinces” had “been one great cause of the distracted state of Indian affairs.”48 
Instead, the Lords set about establishing a centralized Indian board.  As Prucha contends, 
the Lords of Trade instituted a metropol that issued forth colonial policies related to 
Natives.  He notes also that “the plan included an imperial department of Indian affairs 
independent both of the military commander in America and of the colonial 
governments.”49 The July 1764 plan stated “the regulation of Indian Affairs both 
commercial and political throughout all North America, upon one general system, under 
direction of officers appointed by the Crown, so as to set aside all local interfering of 
particular provinces which has been one great cause of the distracted state of Indian 
Affairs in general.”50 Simply, local colonial governments were too divergent and 
inconsistent in their policies, and could not “grasp the overall pressure along the 
frontier.”51 Instead, the British Crown began the long-standing tradition of protecting 
Native nations through centralized, governmental agencies. 
Lest Native populations appear quiescent to British imperialism within tribal 
lands – and the identities constructed by the British – it must be noted that American 
Indian rebellions challenged the governing role bequeathed to the American colonists by 
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the Proclamation of 1763.  Chief Pontiac (Ottawa), for instance, began confronting 
British forts along the upper Mississippi Valley.  Pontiac traveled from the upper 
Midwest down to Creek territory (Alabama and Arkansas) enlisting support for his coup 
against the British.  In a rallying call to a council at River Ecores on April 27, 1763, 
Pontiac exhorted an intertribal gathering to contest British encroachment:  “My children, 
you have forgotten the customs and traditions of your forefathers. Why do you not clothe 
yourselves in skins, as they did, and use the bows and arrows, and the stone-pointed 
lances, which they used?” 52 In this oration, Pontiac resituated Native identity within the 
frames of ancestry and tradition. He continued, “You have bought guns, knives, kettles 
and blankets, from the white men, until you can no longer do without them … Fling all 
these things away; live as your wise forefathers lived before you.”53 He agonized that 
American accoutrements had diminished the heritage of the gathered nations’ ancestors.  
The chief’s centering of customs and land within the purview of Native ancestry 
occluded European American influence.  Therefore, he suggested that the Natives discard 
English materialism.  In the process, his discourse reflected a paternalistic construction of 
his fellow Natives, thus indicating that such paternal commitments were a visible 
component of Native identity as well.        
Pontiac was not alone in his agitation, although other Native nations eschewed 
violence for the negotiating council.  American Indians often met to discuss grievances 
against the Crown, including the practice of entering Native lands that the French had 
previously held.54 These meetings between Native nations, and also between Natives and 
British colonials, continued into the Revolutionary era.  In such a gathering, in 1774, 
Mihnehwehna (Ojibway) railed against the English to a group of kindred Native nations 
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and some representatives of the Crown: “Although you have conquered the French you 
have not conquered us! We are not your slaves. These lakes and woods and mountains 
were left to us by our ancestors. They are our inheritance and we will part with them to 
none.”55 Like Pontiac, Mihnehwehna hearkened to the gathered nations’ moral 
inheritance to their ancestral identity.  Land, so vital to American Indian identity, was 
sacred because it was bestowed by ancestors.  That the English predicated their identity 
on their ownership and production of the lands fell on deaf ears.  Thus, the English had 
overwhelmed the French, but not the Ojibway.  Native identity challenged English land-
holding and English capitalistic assumptions about property and land rights.   
THE AGE OF U.S. INDIAN POLICY 
 The hybridity of U.S. and American Indian identities continued, following the 
American Revolution, within the parameters of economics.  Following England’s lead, 
the U.S. government instituted a treaty system predicated on an ideology of 
protectionism.  That is, the United States promised security and friendship to American 
Indians in exchange for safe passage through Indian territory and the acquisition of 
Native lands.  U.S. and American Indian identities, as in the past, clashed over 
understandings of land.  As a result, the United States and Native nations negotiated the 
meanings of their identities through treaty meetings and councils.  The U.S. government 
worked from an identity of superiority, modeled after the English, while simultaneously 
constituting Native identities as ward-like and dependent.  American Indians, however, 
challenged these identity constructions by asserting self-sovereignty to the land.  In the 
end, European American conceptions of land “discovery” as well as U.S. expansion and 
assimilation collided with American Indian notions of spiritual landholding and separate 
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sovereignty, demonstrating the contestation extant in the discursive exchange of U.S. and 
Native identities.         
Rise of the U.S. Treaty Era 
The ascendancy of the American colonists over Britain ushered in another phase 
of relations.  The U.S. treaty era found its way into U.S.-Native relations beginning with 
the 1778 exchange between the Continental Congress and the Delaware Nation.56 It 
seems, according to Prucha, that the United States graciously inherited Britain’s control 
over American Indian nations through “the use of treaties, carried over from British 
practice.”57 The idea of inheritance, thus, extended beyond land, capital, and 
independence won through the agency of the Revolutionary War.  Ostensibly, the new 
American nation received at the war’s end a population to control. 
Treaties allowed the United States to acquire land and secure peace in exchange 
for the protection of American Indian nations and the payment of goods and money.  
Working from a protectionist identity, the United States employed western contractual 
law as the dominant form of agreement between itself and American Indians, thus 
limiting the space and agency of Native treaty parties.  Some Native studies scholars have 
viewed this as a cultural imperialism that would consistently lead to U.S. interests 
trumping tribal liberties.58 
Treaties – many of which concentrated on taking indigenous land – hearken to the 
vital theme of geography within U.S. and American Indian identities. Prior to the English 
arriving in Jamestown in 1607, roughly 800,000 Natives lived in vicinities east of the 
Mississippi River.  According to Salisbury, most Native nations led insular lives replete 
with internal governments – or some system of social organization – and dependence on 
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subsistence farming and hunting.59 Though the focus of a nation was inward, there did 
exist various forms of contact among groups, including both pleasant relations such as 
intermarriages, joint-hunts, and communal spiritual practices, as well as antagonistic 
clashes related to wars and contests over land boundaries and resources.  Certainly, there 
were always distinct characteristics of each indigenous culture, however, all tended to 
share a sense of ancestral homeland.60 Although fringes of land were traded with other 
Native nations, “all tribes insisted on retaining their heartlands.”61 
Ancestral land represented the core of an American Indian identity.  Land’s 
importance was so great, in fact, that many nations related their own physical existence 
and spiritual health to the ground upon which they claimed the Great Spirit placed them.  
We get a sampling of the indigenous connection to land with Antiwaneto’s (Cowasuck) 
1764 speech to the Massachusetts governor in Boston regarding the taking of Native 
lands: 
We hear on all sides that [we] … are bad people. Tis in vain that we are taxed with a bad 
heart. It is you … that always attack us; your mouth is of sugar, but your heart of gall. In 
truth, in the moment you begin we are on our guard … We have not yet sold the lands we 
inhabit, we wish to keep possession of them … We acknowledge no other boundaries of 
yours than your settlements whereon you have built, and we will not, under any pretext 
whatsoever let you pass beyond them. The lands we possess have been given us by the 
Master of Life. We acknowledge to hold only from him. We are entirely free.62 
These sentiments, first, indicate that Antiwaneto reconstituted the identities of the 
English and the Cowasuck.  He replaced and contrasted Native identities as “bad hearts” 
(which colonists supported) with a Native construction of the colonists’ “heart of gall.” 
86
Second, Antiwaneto expressed the Native desire to keep land – not for its commodity – 
but because only the “Master of Life” possessed the land, not the British.  Antiwaneto’s 
oration challenged American colonial identity predicated on the land’s utility and worth 
with an American Indian land identity based on its sacred and ancestral meanings.    
 Yet, despite Native understandings of their homelands, Europeans descended on 
American Indian lands and brought with them the “Doctrine of Discovery.”  Beginning in 
the fifteenth century, this doctrine helped form European identities in North America.  
According to Lens, the doctrine was cited as the rationale for seizing land in the western 
hemisphere.  More specifically, he argues that “because they were ‘Christian’ and 
‘civilized,’ said the Europeans, they enjoyed the ‘right of sovereignty’ over the lands they 
claimed. They were people of a higher order endowed by the Creator with special 
rights.”63 Reflecting the sentiments of Native identity by Columbus and other earlier 
explorers, European American settlers simply claimed an identity of domination over any 
land on which they set their feet regardless of Native heritage to the territory. The 
doctrine of discovery, then, “paved the way for further progressive infringement of 
independent Indian sovereignty as the United States made efforts to legitimate its quest to 
fulfill  … the country’s ‘manifest destiny’ to extend from sea to sea.”64 
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, treaties were part and parcel 
to a U.S. version of the “Doctrine of Discovery.”  This doctrine helped establish the 
dominance of U.S. identity over Native identity.  While past European Americans might 
have claimed dominion over the land while simultaneously, or shortly after, 
exterminating Native people, the United States sought to extend a protective, yet 
controlling, hand to Native nations through treaties.  Though Americans were quick to 
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react angrily to the “agreements” that Great Britain made with its North American 
colonies, “in turn, the American colonists were not slow to use the same language in their 
dealings with the native Indian population.”65 The United States might have appropriated 
the treaty model because it did not involve explicitly devastating Native cultures.  After 
all, claims Dippie, “the essence of paternal authority [in the United States] was firmness 
tempered with justice.”66 America could not, that is, balance its new experiment based in 
life and liberty with actions deemed overtly violent or exterminatory to a “dependent” 
population.   
America could, though, translate its desire for conquest into a language of care 
and concern, which helped form a benevolent identity concerning Native relations. And, 
at the same time that it could seek to civilize Native communities and later take their 
land, the United States could also ferret-out dangerous identities that threatened the 
American frontier based on an identity of concerned intervention.  According to Ryan, 
“while Anglo-America figured the nation’s nonwhite populations as its most dangerous 
elements, they also characterized intervention into such lives as whites’ greatest 
opportunity for redemption.”67 As the nation extended outward, it claimed “a care taking 
quality that might counterbalance the aggressiveness and expansion for which they were 
becoming known.”68 Treaties, thus, became part of a rhetoric of spatial dominance that 
concomitantly rationalized territorial expansion and justified control over dangerous 
populations while reiterating America’s mission as a god-fearing people civilizing non-
whites.  Such a rhetoric of control was cast throughout in a discourse of benevolence. 
One of the first treaties crafted by the United States involved securing the aid of 
the Delaware and Shawnee nations of the Iroquois Confederacy against the British during 
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the Revolution.  The Delaware Indian Treaty (1778) promised the return of Iroquois lands 
(to conditions pre-existing the Proclamation of 1763) and guaranteed an Indian state in 
exchange for both the end of hostilities against the revolting colonists and the Natives’ 
pledge to side with the Americans against the Crown.69 The 1778 document 
recommended that “all offences or acts of hostilities by one, or either of the contracting 
parties against the other, be mutually forgiven” and that a “perpetual peace and friendship 
shall from henceforth take place.”70 Having built this ethos of friendship, treaties 
typically then articulated demands and stipulations.  In the case of the Delaware Indian 
Treaty, the United States asked for aid against the British in the form of safe passage 
through Iroquois lands and the “affording to said troops of supplies of corn, meat, horses, 
or whatever” for the “accommodation of such troops.”71 In exchange, the Iroquois would 
receive “territorial rights in the fullest and most ample manner” along with a separate 
U.S. state, “whereof the Delaware shall be head” and a Native “representative in 
Congress.”72 
Vestiges of American benevolent identity exist in the Delaware Treaty through 
the promise of tribal protection against the British.  For instance, Article III guaranteed 
that “The Delaware nation … shall be garrisoned by such a number of troops of the 
United States, as the commanding officer can spare.”73 Now, it appeared, the United 
States would replace the Crown as a protectorate or, as Article V noted, “the 
confederation entered into by the Delaware nation and the United States renders the first 
dependent on the latter.”74 Also, the British were constructed as the enemies of both the 
American Indians and the United States: “these enemies … have tried to possess the 
Indians in general with an opinion … to extirpate the Indians and take possession of their 
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country.”75 With the treaty, the United States laid the framework for a contractual 
relationship that demonstrated the hybridization of U.S. and Native identities. 
Some 371 treaties were negotiated between the United States and tribal nations, 
but the Treaties of McIntosh (1785) and Hopewell (1785) began the codified practice of 
land control and land acquisition through a type of syncretic hegemony. The Treaty of 
McIntosh, for example, initiated the long-standing tradition of forcing tribes to consent to 
American superiority.  The treaty’s second article asked the Wyandot, Delaware, 
Chippewa, and Ottawa nations to “acknowledge themselves and all their tribes to be 
under the protection of the United States and of no other sovereign whatsoever.”76 Here, 
any sense that the Native nations would be treated as foreign countries on equal footing 
with America was obliterated.  Instead, indigenous nations who negotiated with the 
United States were required to accept American protection.   
The Treaty of Hopewell extended U.S. protection to the realms of commerce and 
trade.  Couching their desire to regulate Native economies in a protectionist rhetoric, the 
Hopewell authors ensured that Natives would not have the right to trade with anyone but 
the United States.  “For the benefit and comfort of the Indians and for the prevention of 
injuries or oppressions on the part of the citizens or Indians, the United States,” argued 
the treaty writers, “shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating trade with the 
Indians.”  Moreover, the United States tasked itself, here, with “managing all their affairs 
in such manner as they think proper.”77 Nationhood status, or in the least sovereignty, 
tended to allow for such free trade; by the United States’ occlusion of free trade, 
American Indian groups were denied an equal presence before the United States 
government as respected powers.78 Slowly, these denigrating treaty articles began to 
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manifest in the shape of a hegemonic relationship initiated by the United States that 
simultaneously strengthened U.S. and Native economic symbiosis. 
Land acquisition articles within McIntosh and Hopewell ultimately propagated 
cultural borders that became entrenched around the turn of the nineteenth century.  In 
McIntosh, the United States not only detailed the boundaries of its newly wrested 
territory, but also cautioned American Indians to stay away from white settlers therein: 
“the Indians … do acknowledge that the land in the east, south and west of the lines … 
belong to the United States.”  Natives were warned that they should not “presume to 
settle upon the same or any part of it” lest they desired the wrath of the American settlers 
likely crouched and ready to seize the territory.79 The Treaty of Hopewell contained 
these same elements of land acquisition.  American negotiators at Hopewell also made 
the bold request for free movement of whites within Cherokee territory.  For instance, 
Article X read: “all traders, citizens of the United States, shall have liberty to go to any of 
the tribes or towns of the Cherokees to trade with them, and they shall be protected in 
their person and property” to move from border to border.80 
From an imperial perspective, the United States also took it upon itself through 
these treaties to redefine Indian Country.  McIntosh continued that “the United States 
allot all the lands contained within the said lines” to the tribes with which they entreat. 81 
Hardly visible in the treaty provisions was the Native voice.  Rather, the rhetorical 
construction of the treaties followed from the American worldview, and typically placed 
the United States in an active role to protect, defend, trade, move, exchange, and decide 
for a tribe.82 For instance, in the above McIntosh quotation, it is the United States which 
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“allots” the lands.  Such active verbs constructed U.S. identity as vigorous compared to 
diminutive and passive American Indian identity. 
Cultural inclusion and exclusion were residues of these constructed identities.  
And, territorial ownership played a significant role in who belonged to the United States 
as active and vigorous citizen members.  Typically, citizenship was only offered to white 
males who could prove to possess fifty acres of land and, at least, two years of residence 
on the land.83 Land ownership as a prerequisite to citizenship appeared, from the outset 
of the young United States, in the papers of the Continental Congress.  The Congress’s 
Committee on Indian Affairs, for instance, celebrated the partitioning of American Indian 
lands as a way to quickly integrate emigrating Europeans.   The Committee reported in 
1783 that territory would exist as a “bounty” to those English immigrants, in particular, 
willing to relocate to the colonies, and that Native occupied (not owned) lands would 
make for a “speedy provision for extending” the colonies’ citizenry.84 Those whites who 
received the bounty would be part of the U.S. citizenry.  American Indians could never be 
considered, here, because they merely occupied territories and, at any rate, had to be 
driven off of what property they purported to own. 
Furthermore, the Constitution offered little in the way of citizenship for American 
Indian nations.  The Constitution provided that Congress “establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization” but did not specifically outline the qualifications for citizenship for 
whites, let alone Native communities.85 Citizenship was split between individual states 
and the federal government.  Localized citizenship tended to take precedence (so long as 
it remained consistent with whiteness and freeholding), but – beginning in 1790 – the 
U.S. Congress began moving citizenship requirements into central form.  The 
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responsibility of separate states to establish citizenship requirements ended, officially, 
with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in which Congress determined “all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof 
shall be citizens of the United States and of the State in which they reside.”86 Prior to 
that, both state and federal authorities negotiated citizenship. American Indians, of 
course, were not considered “citizens of the United States” and therefore were not 
protected – both prior to and following the Fourteenth Amendment.  No state, then, was 
able to make or enforce “any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.”87 Native nations, however, were left out because their 
lands were not their own.  Their occupation of territory and misuse of “republican” land 
rendered them “as separate from white Americans’ territorial and affective union.”88 Both 
the federal and state governments could deny Native communities citizenship as a part of 
the U.S. public.   
The first attempt to legislate exclusive and inclusive citizenship was the 
Naturalization Act of 1790, which required free white persons to own property and reside 
for two years within the United States before becoming vested community members.89 In 
March of 1795, Congress amended the Naturalization Act to increase the land and 
residency requirement to five years as Federalists feared the Crown implanting British 
loyals into the country.90 The landholding requirement was amended again during the 
Quasi War with France, whereupon fourteen years became the standard residency 
condition due to protectionist needs.  The Alien Acts of 1798 codified this new 
requirement in the hopes of strengthening the American citizenry and, also, facilitating its 
break from European ties.91 The naturalization acts “marked out” American Indians as a 
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“group distinct from citizens in general.”92 They were neither white nor were they 
perceived to hold territory; hence, Native communities were “not guaranteed 
opportunities for citizenship.”93 But, American Indians could trade their territories – as 
tenants – through treaties that favored the U.S. government. 
Native Responses to Treaty Making  
Just as American Indians responded to early European American relations and 
English dominance, Native groups likewise challenged the identities constructed by the 
United States in its post-revolutionary years.  Joseph Brant (Mohawk), for instance, 
undertook an interesting strategy of linking Native sovereign identity to U.S. sovereign 
identity.  Arguing against the typically one-sided dynamic of treaties, Brant appealed to 
George Washington in 1794:  “We are of the same opinion with the people of the United 
States; you consider yourselves as independent people; we, as the original inhabitants of 
this country, and sovereigns of the soil, look upon ourselves as equally independent, and 
free as any other nation of nations.”94 In this case, Brant confirmed American Indian 
sovereignty apart from the government, while also connecting the United States’ recent 
battle for independence with the Mohawk’s own distinct sovereignty.  Just as the United 
States fought for sovereignty so, too, did Brant constitute American Indians as sovereign 
of the land.  Moreover, Brant added the gloss that Natives were “original inhabitants,” 
perhaps increasing American Indian ethos as ancestral inhabitants of North America.   
Similarly, Ohnawiio (Mohawk), Oteatohatongwan (Mohawk) and 
Teholagwanegen (Mohawk) articulated their sovereign identities apart from the United 
States by appealing to key ideologies of the U.S. nation.95 The trio contended: “Formerly, 
we enjoyed the privilege [that] we expect is now called freedom and liberty; but since the 
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acquaintance with our brother white people, that which we call freedom and liberty 
becomes an entire stranger to us; and in the place of that comes flattery and deceit.”96 
This Mohawk group created an impasse for its American counterparts: dealings with 
Americans had severely limited freedom, thus violating an ideological building block of 
the United States.  The use of familial language that reified the hybridity of kinship 
furthered the Mohawk grievances as the U.S. government arguably violated the rights of 
fellow family members. English revolutionary John Tucker justified the American 
colonists’ rebellion, arguing that “All men are naturally in a state of freedom, and have an 
equal claim.”97 The Mohawk, here, seemed to hearken to these sentiments in order to 
urge equal status among brothers in the treaty-making process.   
THE ROAD TO REMOVAL 
 American Indian and U.S. identities changed, once again, with the dawning of the 
nineteenth century.  In addition to clashing over trade and land, the cultural groups began 
negotiating the idea of American Indian assimilation.  Presidents Washington and 
Jefferson supported the acculturation of Native communities to American agriculture, 
trading, education, and domestication.  Assimilation, almost by definition, reified a 
hierarchy of supervisor-to-ward, and the hybridity of identities reflected and refracted the 
impact of assimilation on both the United States and American Indians.  When 
assimilation seemed to falter, the U.S. government shifted to a policy of removal.   
Suddenly, American Indian identities, which U.S. assimilationist rhetoric had previously 
constituted as adaptable and promising, became obstinate and removable.  Throughout 
the evolution of U.S. Indian policy from assimilation to removal, the United States 
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further solidified its role as a paternalistic and protectionist force over American Indian 
nations, while Natives attempted to reconfigure these identities.   
U.S-Native Relations in the Washingtonian Period 
As the U.S. government entrenched itself in the duties of nationhood, early 
leaders began to take notice of U.S.-Native relationships and to issue comments relating 
to the interconnected identities.  Fields, for instance, argues that George Washington 
regarded “Native Americans either as separate nations to be dealt with through treaty and 
diplomacy or ‘banditi’ testing the new nation’s resolve and discipline.”98 Washington’s 
uneasiness in classifying American Indians as friends or foes spoke volumes of the 
identity confusion experienced by those living in indigenous nations at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century.  They were at once savages as well as extensions of the American 
nation – albeit ancillary and useable extensions.99 
Washington and Jefferson viewed American Indian nations with greater trust and 
promise.  Natives were, to these presidents, worth helping because they could contribute 
to the American nation by assimilating.  For instance, in an 1802 Presidential Letter to 
Congress, Jefferson reminded politicians that they needed “to encourage them [Indians] 
to abandon hunting, to apply to the raising of stock, to agriculture and domestic 
manufacture, and to prove to them that less land and labor will maintain them on this 
better than in their former mode of living.”100 These assimilation policies, though 
differing from the Jacksonian ideologies that will soon be illuminated, still remained 
controlling.  Both Washington and Jefferson wished to replace Native identities with 
American identities predicated on American socio-economic practices, such as yeoman 
farming.   
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Washington’s policy involved a softening of U.S.-Native relations, despite his 
personal prejudices.  Washington, as Wallace reminds us, was covertly tentative about 
trusting American Indians and placing faith in the community as an intelligent, 
independent cadre of cultures.  The president was “an old Indian fighter” from way back, 
and made no qualms about denigrating as inferior those who he considered his Native 
wards.101 In 1787, following passage of the Northwest Ordinance,102 Washington wrote 
to Secretary of War Henry Knox that the Indian and the wolf, “both being beasts of prey” 
might be ill-affected by the U.S.’s encroachment onto Native lands in the Michigan-
Wisconsin-Minnesota region.  He continued, “the gradual extension of our settlements 
will as certainly cause the savage, as the wolf, to retire.”103 At the same time, though, 
Washington was encouraged by Knox and others in his administration to take a softer line 
on land acquisition.  The Northwest Ordinance came to represent Washington’s overt 
policy that “the Indian tribes should be considered foreign nations” and that the United 
States “had only a preemptive right – an exclusive option – to purchase Indian land.”104 
The Washingtonian period indicates that U.S. and Native identities were built 
around dollar diplomacy. One of Washington’s most extensive ideas for negotiating with 
American Indian communities was the establishment of trading houses.  Such a system of 
trade, he said, “would be as honorable to the national character as comfortable to the 
dictates of sound policy.”105 This “sound policy” involved forcing American Indians to 
rely on goods produced by the United States.  The policy was purported to work in two 
ways.  First, it would help assimilate Natives to American customs and cultures.  Second, 
as Natives entered into debt with trading houses, they might be more willing to sell their 
land to offset the debts.106 As Washington put it, “the establishment of commerce with 
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the Indian nations on behalf of the United States is most likely to conciliate their 
attachment” to the land.107 
The presence of Washington’s dollar diplomacy was certainly recognized by 
American Indian nations.  Natives tended to view America’s economic policies as 
contributing to a diminutive indigenous identity.  Speaking against the power dynamics 
of U.S.-led treaties and economic plans, Corn Tassel (Cherokee) challenged U.S. 
economic plans in 1795: “How [can the president] tell me that it [land] is yours by right 
of conquest? … I should retort on him that we had last marched over his territory; even 
up to this place which he has fortified so far within his former limits … If, therefore, a 
bare march, or reconnoitering a country is sufficient reason to ground a claim to it, we 
shall insist upon transposing the demand, and your relinquishing your settlements on the 
western waters and removing one hundred miles back towards the east.”108 Corn Tassel 
called into question the hegemonic control of the United States.  If, he contended, power 
over the land generated from mere occupancy then, surely, American Indians would have 
the more legitimate claim.  If this were the case, the United States should remove.  Such a 
reconstitution of identities was vital to Native voice.   
For Little Turtle (Miami), speaking in 1795, American Indians did not ask to enter 
into treaties, as the United States had claimed.  Instead, he “was much surprised to hear 
you say that it was my forefathers [who] had set the example to other Indians in selling 
their lands.”  In fact, he argued that the United States came seeking territory and did so to 
the detriment of Native connections to the land: we “are of the opinion you take too much 
of [our] lands and confine them … within the limits too contracted.” 109 Such 
constructions of the U.S. government as greedy contributed to a Native understanding of 
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European American identity rooted in commodification.  Little Turtle intimated, also, that 
the U.S. government’s “contracted” use of the land conflicted with Native identities 
regarding spiritual and ancestral worth of territories.   
Trade and Assimilation in the Jeffersonian Era    
Jefferson continued the notion of trading houses as a way to assimilate American 
Indians and to siphon away more land with the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802, which, 
like the Treaty of Hopewell, limited all American Indian trade to the U.S. government 
alone.110 In a special message to Congress in 1803 he argued that trade would promote 
both Native assimilation and U.S. expansion: “to multiply trading houses among them” 
and to lead “them thus to agriculture, to manufactures, and civilization; in bringing 
together their and our sentiments, and in preparing them ultimately to participate in the 
benefits of our Government, I trust and believe we are acting for their greatest good.”111 
Trading houses became another way to instigate Native reliance on the U.S. government, 
strengthening their hybrid identities. 
The hybridity between U.S. and Native identities also, though, centered on 
cultural integration. The overall watchword of Jefferson’s Indian policy was assimilation, 
a practice that sought to integrate Natives into American culture.  Jefferson’s faith in 
natural rights, however, led him to pursue such assimilation under the aegis of an equal 
structure of human nature.  Jefferson’s public papers indicate his trust of, and sympathy 
toward, American Indians.112 He even attributed any inferior identity concerning 
indigenous communities to environmental circumstances.  Jefferson wrote in 1785: “I 
believe the Indian then to be in body and mind equal to the whiteman.” Given different 
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geographical conditions, he argued, “we might find that they formed in mind as well as 
body, on the same module with the Homo sapiens Europaeus.”113 
Jefferson’s assimilation turned on converting American Indians into yeoman 
farmers, a not unexpected ambition given Jefferson’s agrarian roots.  As Prucha contends, 
Jefferson thought “if the Indians came to rely on agriculture and domestic manufacture 
for their food and clothing, they would no longer need extensive hunting grounds and 
would willingly give up their unneeded lands for white settlement.”114 More to the point, 
assimilation would lead to the Natives’ decreased need for land.  This reduced necessity 
would, in turn, benefit the white land squatters who were anxious to occupy  fertile 
American Indian lands.  
Because Jefferson “was far more sympathetic” to American Indians, assimilation 
grew in importance throughout his administrations.115 He felt a benevolent policy of 
assimilation was the primary solution to U.S-Native difficulties.  For instance, he advised 
a group of Miami, Potawatomi, and Wea Indians in 1802 that “We shall with great 
pleasure see your people become disposed to cultivate the earth … These resources are 
certain, they will never disappoint you, while those of hunting may fail, and expose your 
women and children to the miseries of hunger and cold.  We will furnish you with 
implements for the most necessary arts, and with persons who may instruct you how to 
make use of them.”116 Jefferson also exhorted Congress that institutional intervention 
into Native education was crucial to Native survival.  He noted in his Annual Message in 
1803, “preparing them [Indians] ultimately to participate in the benefits of our 
Government, I trust and believe we are acting for their greatest good.”117 Overall, 
Jefferson exhibited the hybrid nature of U.S. and Native identities; the U.S. would 
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entrench itself in Native cultural uplift through assimilation, while Natives would benefit 
the U.S. economy and expansionist goals through their assimilation. 
 Still, Jefferson never intimated that American Indian nations would attain the 
status of inclusion in the U.S. citizenry.  He actually layered his goal of increasing white 
citizenship over Native communities’ “mere occupancy” of their lands.118 He did this by 
lowering territorial requirements in order to accommodate the enlarging white American 
population.  In his first inaugural address – which foreshadowed his more liberal 
naturalization plan – he argued that a “rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land” 
demanded territory and yeoman farming – the latter of which could only be practiced by 
tying citizenship to the land.119 Therefore, he suggested and signed into law the 
Naturalization Act of 1802, which lowered residency requirements to five years, but still 
maintained that land ownership was vital to U.S. citizenship.120 Part of Jefferson’s 
aspirations of linking territory to citizenship can also be seen in his 1803 confidential 
letter to Congress asking for funds to explore the Louisiana Territory.  He said then that 
“an extension of territory which the rapid increase of our numbers will call for” was 
imperative for U.S. citizenship.  This citizenship-through-land, Jefferson continued, could 
be had by displacing American Indians from their territories.  He encouraged the 
establishment of trading houses for the purposes of obtaining this land, and he averred 
that “experience and reflection will develop to them [Natives] the wisdom of exchanging 
what they can spare and what we want, for what we can spare and what they want.”121 
Occluded from Jefferson’s landed citizenry were American Indian nations themselves.  
At the heart of Jefferson’s naturalization plan was the “idea that prolonged terms of 
residence” and land ownership – for whites alone – was the “surest way” to guarantee 
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U.S. citizenship.122 Indigenous communities and their territories were the currency that 
allowed the white American citizenship to grow.   American Indians were “excluded 
from the privileges and immunities of citizenship.”123 
Impact of U.S. Expansion 
 The Lewis and Clark expedition of 1803 commenced following Jefferson’s 
Louisiana Purchase and summarily took as its thrust a surveying of the newly acquired 
land west of the Mississippi River. The Purchase demonstrated U.S. expansionist identity 
by allowing “the United States to claim a huge tract of land west of the Mississippi River, 
extending from New Orleans to Canada.”124 The Louisiana Territory, also, came to 
impact Native identities by suggesting new areas onto which indigenous nations could be 
removed in the event that assimilation did not work.   
Jefferson sponsored the Lewis and Clark expedition, in particular, to ascertain the 
quality, scope, topography, and fruitfulness of the western purchase, but also to discover 
possible locations for removal of the Five Civilized Tribes east of the Mississippi 
River.125 In a private memorandum to Congress in January 1803, Jefferson opined that 
“Indian tribes residing within the limits of the U.S. have for a considerable time been 
growing more and more uneasy at the constant diminution of the territory they 
occupy.”126 He then crafted an economic argument showing that the joint strategy of 
teaching the Natives agricultural technologies and surveying the Louisiana Purchase for 
their possible placement would add even more area to the Purchase as indigenous groups 
began vacating their eastern territory.  Of this, he wrote: “The portion of their [Indian] 
country most important to us is exactly that which they do not inhabit … in the interior 
country.”127 But, Jefferson needed an agency through which he could remove Natives 
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altogether by replacing and replicating their entire holdings, both hunting acreage and 
settlement areas.  The Lewis and Clark expedition funding was, therefore, predicated 
upon Jefferson’s argument that Indian removal would justify the cost of exploration and 
pay back into the American economy by seizing Native lands.  The idea “is particularly 
interesting,” wrote Jefferson.  “In order peaceably to counteract this policy of theirs” we 
should “provide an extension of territory which the rapid increase of our numbers [in the 
eastern Indian country] will call for …”128 
Hence, Jefferson actually engineered the groundwork of what would later come to 
be known as Indian Removal.  Evidence suggests that at the conclusion of the Lewis and 
Clark expedition Jefferson supported a constitutional amendment to “provide among 
other things for the transporting of the Eastern Indians to the newly acquired territory.”129 
In a letter to Louisiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison, Jefferson averred 
that Indian removal might best compliment U.S. expansion by eliminating the possibility 
of wrangling with Natives. The Indians, he argued, “will in time either incorporate with 
us as citizens of the United States or remove beyond the Mississippi.”130 In other words, 
the president’s assimilatory policy involved a built-in alternative.  If Natives could not 
retain success as yeoman farmers, thus entreating with the United States to transfer their 
excess land, they had better plan to remove.  Jefferson often wavered on the removal 
issue, wondering whether “driving them across the Mississippi” might be “the only 
condition of peace?”131 
Jefferson’s amendment never made it to Congress, but the absence of a removal 
bill did not occlude his lobbying for removal.  Wallace suggests that Jefferson “instructed 
Governor Claiborne of Mississippi Territory to make presents of trade of goods to the 
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southern tribes in order to encourage advance parties to cross the Mississippi.”132 
Wallace also contends that Jefferson met several times with the Chickasaw in 1805 and 
Choctaw and Cherokee representatives in 1808 to inspire their removal.133 So vital was 
Jefferson’s early maneuvering for removal that Andrew Jackson relied on Jefferson’s 
negotiating template.  Jackson biographer, Remini, has argued on several occasions that 
“Jackson was probably one of the earlier converts to the notion of Indian removal through 
an exchange of land, an idea first put forward by Thomas Jefferson.”134 
The War of 1812 and U.S.-Native Relations in the 1820s 
Jefferson’s policies represented the calm before the storm.  Following Jefferson’s 
administration, America found itself in the throes of the War of 1812, which coalesced 
for indigenous communities, in dozens of home-bound battles.  By the time the war with 
Great Britain ended, American Indian communities had lost thousands of miles in the 
Southeast and suffered the decimation of countless numbers, including those who were 
British sympathizers and those who agitated against the U.S.’s expansion into western 
territories.  
Following Jefferson’s administration, U.S.-Native relations began transforming 
into an aggressive dynamic that threatened not only the lives of those Natives caught up 
in the war’s wrangling, but also the relationship between the United States and American 
Indian communities.  Whereas Washington and Jefferson viewed indigenous populations 
graciously – albeit with an eye toward domination – the administrations of James 
Madison, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams ushered in war and increased 
expansion. As with the Washington and Jefferson administrations, the era between 1810 
and 1828 would set the stage for eventual removal. 
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The hybridity of U.S. and American Indian identities also evolved into a 
colonizing dynamic.135 During the tenures of Madison and Monroe, the idea of removing 
American Indians from America-proper and colonizing them on reservations promised an 
efficient, entropic mechanism for purifying U.S. identities.  As Wallace argues, “by the 
1820s, the term ‘colonization’ had become a popular label for the concept of solving 
social problems” by effectively removing those races deemed “problematic.”136 Madison 
and Monroe both believed if Jeffersonian assimilation failed, that American Indian 
colonization west of the Mississippi represented the next logical solution to the “Indian 
problem.”  In this vein, Monroe claimed in 1818, “it is indispensable that their 
independence as communities should cease, and that control of the United States over 
them should be complete and undisputed.”137 Later in 1825, Monroe argued that by 
colonizing Natives “and by the establishment of such a government over these tribes … 
we become in reality their benefactors.”138 Ostensibly, the ideal of removal began to take 
shape as the United States, comprehending its tentative relationship with Natives, entered 
the war.  Adding to this realization, American Indians in disproportionate numbers 
supported the British over what Chief Tecumseh called “the common enemy” of 
America.139 
The war between the United States and England unfurled on lands owned by 
Native populations.  The venues for the white dispute involved, mostly, the edges of the 
ever-expanding American empire.  Hence, border skirmishes erupted along the U.S.-
Canadian border and – most important with regard to Native lands – on the outer fringes 
of the American frontier: the Midwest along the Missouri and Ohio River valleys.   
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Tecumseh (Shawnee), a chief from the Detroit encampment area, viewed the 
presence of settlers on his nation’s land as a sign of aggression.  In October of 1812, 
Tecumseh gathered groups of dissenters and went on a tour to rally support against the 
U.S. government.  Along the way, he drew into his fold hundreds of American Indians 
from the Seminole, Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Cherokee nations.  Upon arriving at 
an inter-tribal council in Alabama, Tecumseh delivered an oration meant to unite the 
spirits of his community against the United States.  He exhorted, “Listen! … Oh 
Muskogees! Brethren of my mother! Brush from your eyelids the sleep of slavery, and 
strike for vengeance and your country! … Let the white race perish! … Back whence 
they came, upon a trail of blood, they must be driven! … Burn their dwellings – destroy 
their stock – slay their wives and children, that the very breed may perish!”140 Equating 
U.S. treatment of American Indians to “slavery,” Tecumseh responded to American 
demands for early removal by suggesting that Americans remove.  As an alternative to 
accepting an identity as Native outsider, the chief constructed U.S. identity as the 
unwelcome pariah.  In the process, the chief constituted Native identity as violent to 
inspire his audience to take up arms; this identity construction conflated Native violence 
and identity with their own survival.   
Tecumseh’s oration helped ignite a battle that led to the Fort Mims Massacre, 
north of Mobile at the convergence of the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers.  Fort Mims 
generated an ongoing hatred between the Creek, in particular, and the federal 
government.  Supported by the British, Tecumseh and his supporters argued that the war 
offered the opportune moment to challenge the United States for its past indiscretions, 
including the numerous broken treaties that resulted in Native losses of land.141 With the 
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end of the war, “the Indians were defeated in both the north and the south, despite their 
hopes for aid from Great Britain.”142 Instead of victoriously ousting Americans from 
Native land, the Creek and Tecumseh’s inter-tribal union lost their part of the War of 
1812.   
Other American Indian responses to U.S. activity in Indian Country during the 
War of 1812 were less bellicose than Tecumseh’s sentiments.  Buffalo (Ojibway) 
responded to U.S. encroachment by appealing to a higher power.  In 1812 he noted, 
“although we are red and you are white, there is One above to whom we all have to give 
an account, and who will not permit such acts of injustice to be done without visiting 
them with displeasure.”143 Here, instead of threatening the U.S. government with force, 
Buffalo alluded to a divine retribution should more injustices be visited upon Natives. In 
a sense, as well, Buffalo demonstrated a union of identities between the United States and 
American Indians.  That is, a higher power hybridized American Indian identities and 
U.S. identities through a duty of care for justice.   
In another example of Native voice, Red Jacket (Seneca) worried, in 1811, that 
the U.S. government’s movement into Native territory would dispossess indigenous 
nations from their spiritual homes:  “If we should sell our lands … we should be looked 
upon in the country to which we go as foreigners and strangers … we should soon be 
surrounded by the white people, who will there also kill our game, and come upon our 
lands and try to get them from us.” 144 Red Jacket, here, constructed a U.S. identity based 
on continual expansion. At the same time, Red Jacket argued that the Seneca were 
determined “not to sell our lands, but to continue on them. We like them. They are 
fruitful and produce.”145 Thus, Red Jacket reconstituted the way that the United States 
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viewed Native identity; instead of American Indians squandering land, as earlier colonists 
believed and U.S. leaders had claimed, Red Jacket acknowledged the agricultural and 
productive value of land and promised the Seneca Nation’s active and continued usages. 
Early Removal and the Confluence of Territory and Citizenship 
U.S.-Native land conflicts during the War of 1812 ended when Indian fighter, 
Andrew Jackson, defeated the Red Stick Creeks in 1813 at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend 
near present-day Talladega, Alabama.  As the war ended, with Jackson ascending as the 
quintessential military hero, the Tennessean inherited a new position: Chief Indian Agent.  
Beginning in 1815, Jackson took it upon himself to meet several times with the North 
American “Five Civilized Tribes” (Seminole, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, Choctaw) in 
order to initiate, what would soon be called, the removal policy.  Throughout these talks 
with Natives, Jackson strengthened the familial bond between the United States and 
American Indians, begun earlier with the relationships spawning from the Proclamation 
of 1763 and the ensuing U.S.-Native treaties.  Perhaps borrowing from the protectionist 
ideology of these treaties, Jackson employed parent-child metaphors in constituting 
Native and U.S. identities in his 1821 address to the Creek nation: “Your white brethren 
must be settled there [Indian land] to keep from you bad men and bad talks. I wish to be 
informed where the Red people in the Floridas are settled, that I may make it known to 
your Father the President, that he may be enabled to judge your situation, [so that] you 
may be treated as the rest of his beloved children.”146 Here, he reaffirmed an 
authoritarian role for the U.S. government, noting that it would be best enabled to judge 
American Indians’ situations.  Jackson also indicated that part of U.S. identity involved 
protecting Native nations; in the process, he additionally constructed American Indians as 
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dependents of a central power.  Such constructions foreshadowed Jackson’s and the 
larger culture’s paternalistic mindset that would become even more pronounced in the era 
of removal.147 
In another example of early removal rhetoric, Jackson found an opening to offer 
his guidance by diminishing Native identity and capacity to reason.148 In an 1820 talk 
with Choctaws, Jackson commanded: “Hear and listen well. Decide for the happiness of 
all your people … We have labored hard to convince you of your real interests. We hope 
you will see them as we do, and adopt the treaty proposed … Should you reject it, it will 
be a source of great regret.”149 It appears that American Indians had minimal choice in 
determining their “interests.”  Instead, the U.S. government decided the “real interests” of 
American Indians.  Jackson constructed U.S. identity as superior and, therefore, the 
United States retained power to guide because it ruled with reason.150 Native identities 
were seen as closer to nature and therefore were susceptible to wild desires.151 
The defeat of the Red Stick Creeks during the War of 1812 provided the United 
States a justification for further control over American Indians. Colonization of American 
Indians grew, not only through the office of the President and through Congressional 
treaties, but also through Supreme Court decisions.  Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
infamous “Indian Trilogy” set the stage for a weakened Native identity.  Simultaneously, 
Marshall inscribed upon Native communities the status of non-citizenship.  Or, as Kettner 
asserts, the high court held that “Indian tribes did not enjoy full sovereign power over the 
lands they occupied.”152 
The first case, Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), involved two European Americans 
wrangling over control of previously held Indian lands.  According to Cheyfitz, in 1775 a 
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group of British investors including Thomas Johnson purchased a tract of land in present 
day Illinois from the Piankeshaw Indians.153 In 1778, the state of Virginia seized this 
tract of land for itself.  Then in 1783 Virginia ceded the land to the newly created United 
States, which sold nearly 12 thousand acres to William McIntosh in 1818.   The sale to 
McIntosh provoked a lawsuit by the heirs of Johnson, who claimed the land was theirs 
based on trade with the Piankeshaw.  The legal question at stake in 1823 was whether the 
Piankeshaw held land rights and subsequently could sell land. The Court “found that such 
a sale was not legal, precisely because, in the opinion of the Court, the U.S. held absolute 
title to Indian lands.”154 Thus, McIntosh held title to the land because the United States, 
and not a Native nation, had sold him the tract. 
The Court’s justification for denying the Piankeshaw land rights brought to light 
an early example of how the Court helped constitute American Indian identities and 
outright denied Native involvement in the U.S. citizenry. Marshall codified the rule that 
“the extent of their right of alienation must depend upon the laws of dominion under 
which they live … They are subject to the sovereignty of the United States.”155 His 
holding strengthened the U.S. government’s tendency to view Natives as dependents.  
Moreover, racial stereotypes of the “red child” were constituted with Marshall’s 
insistence that the United States treat Natives “as an inferior race of people, without the 
privileges of citizens, and under the perpetual protection and pupilage of the 
government.”156 Seemingly, Marshall contributed to the notion that Natives could not 
acquire citizenship based on race.  After Jeffersonian assimilation failed to convert 
American Indian citizens, and as removal garnered popularity, the Supreme Court 
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codified the stripping away of indigenous citizenship as a justification for dispossessing 
Native communities and taking more land.    
The Court’s insistence on the “doctrine of discovery” as law solidified the 
“European narrative of conquest of America.”157 Marshall said, “To leave them in 
possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness.”158 In other words, the 
logical suggestion if Natives were to remain in possession of newly discovered lands, 
then the land would go to waste.159 Marshall’s holding demonstrated how the United 
States predicated part of its identity on a “productive” use of the land, while denigrating 
American Indian identity which included occupying the land for ancestral and spiritual 
purposes.  According to Johnson and Hamilton, Marshall took into account the U.S. 
government’s expansionist identity and ambitions:  “(It) could not be ignored.  Indian 
tribes could not be too sovereign.”160 Extending too many rights and privileges to too 
many people, especially those deemed savage, would presumably impede a strengthening 
American identity.     
The primary legal consequence of Johnson v. McIntosh for Native identity was 
the transfer of land ownership from indigenous authority to the U.S. government.  
Ostensibly, the Court admitted Natives were occupants of land, but with the caveat that 
“their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they 
pleased, was denied” by the fundamental principle of discovery.161 The Court’s rhetoric 
pointed to an imperial identity that blocked American Indian empowerment.162 
Moreover, Marshall’s nineteenth century vision of discovery created a landlord-tenant 
relationship.  As landlord, the U.S. government “possessed the power to terminate the 
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‘tenancy’ of its occupants but also could materially affect the lives of Indians through its 
control and regulation of land use.”163 That American Indians could not hold property – 
in the western sense – indicated to Marshall and the broader U.S. government the 
inability of Native communities to obtain full U.S. citizenship.  Overall, as Wilkins 
reminds us, the Court’s holding in Johnson was that “indigenous peoples [did] not have 
the natural right exercised by citizens of ‘civilized’ nations” to own, sell or claim 
property.164 
Native status faced another challenge when, in 1825, President James Monroe 
announced a voluntary policy of removal. Concerned that assimilation had not worked as 
planned, Monroe suggested that “removal of the tribes from the territory which they now 
inhabit … would not only shield them from impending ruin, but promote their welfare 
and happiness.”165 Thus, as Indian agent Jackson strove for removal through his “talks” 
with Natives, and as the Supreme Court diminished Native connections to the land, 
Monroe set into motion Jefferson’s ideas for removal.  John Quincy Adams also 
supported voluntary removal as an option alongside assimilation, but did not discuss it in 
the public record.166 
Even prior to an official involuntary U.S. removal policy American Indians 
responded with disdain to the government’s early attempts at dispossessing Native 
nations.  To one of Jackson’s removal talks, Black Thunder (Fox) retorted in 1815: “I 
have nothing new to say here in your councils … You heard it, and no doubt remember it. 
It [is] simply this. My lands can never be surrendered; I was cheated and basely cheated 
in [U.S. sponsored] contracts; I will not surrender my country but with my life.”167 It 
seems, here, that Black Thunder typified American Indian identities related to the land, 
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and was willing to die for the cause of remaining on his ancestral homeland.  Similarly 
arguing against President Monroe’s voluntary removal policy, Petalsharo (Pawnee) 
lamented in 1822: “when we did not know the whites – our wants were then fewer than 
they are now … we had then seen nothing which we could not get.  Before our 
intercourse with the whites … we would find the buffalo feeding around our camp – but 
now they are killing them for their skins, and feeding the wolves with their flesh to make 
our children cry over the bones.”168 Petalsharo, here, constituted U.S. identity as caustic; 
prior to contact, Natives enjoyed their land without barrier. On the other hand, Petalsharo 
suggests that land, under Native care and influence, was honored for its natural 
abundance.  Moreover, throughout the discourse can be seen traces of an “intercourse” 
that illustrates the interconnectedness of U.S. and Native identities.      
A sampling of Native identity based on a connection to the land is also found in 
the Chickasaw Nation’s response to a U.S. government offer to exchange their Tennessee 
Valley hamlets for land west of the Mississippi River. In its 1826 plea to agent Jackson 
and President John Quincy Adams, the Chickasaw leadership opined: “it being the land 
of our forefathers we” do not want to remove.  “If we should exchange our lands for any 
other … the consequences may be similar to transplanting an old tree, which would 
wither and die away, and we are fearful it would come to the same.”169 Here, indigenous 
identity and possession of the land hinged on where one’s ancestors were buried.  In 
addition, the Chickasaw response intimated that one’s land was also where one was born; 
birth and life were both vested in the land.  Removing an American Indian community 
subsequently caused it to die as a deracinated tree.  Following the metaphor, here, roots 
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referred not solely to one’s physical birth, but also the location where one’s people were 
created and remained spiritually and temporally.   
President Monroe’s 1825 address suggested that the acculturation of American 
Indians had been a flawed policy.  Monroe said then: “in their [Indians’] present state it is 
impossible to incorporate them … into our system … without a timely anticipation of 
land provision against the dangers to which they are exposed, under causes which it will 
be difficult, if not impossible, to control, their degradation and extermination will be 
inevitable.”170 Speaking benevolently, Monroe argued that American expansion and the 
salvation of Native nations depended on a new policy.  Monroe was “impressed with the 
opinion that removal” would form the crux of such a new policy.   With removal, Monroe 
thought that “permanent peace” would be secured for American Indians and that “our 
commerce [would] be much extended” with an Indian policy of dispossession and 
relocation.171 
The prospective plans for removal would also further separate American Indians 
from members of the U.S. citizenry.  Removal came to exemplify what Wilkins has 
called “territorial integration.”  This concept is “the establishment of national central 
authority over subordinate political units” which exist apart from the central populace, 
but remain part of the national community, at least spiritually, as domestic charges.  
Native communities were not so much divorced from the U.S. government and U.S. 
public as they were reduced to ward-like land tenants (not owners) who were, thus, 
disqualified from citizenship based on property requisites.  Such removal to the outer 
spaces of the nation also served to diminish contact and to blunt away any expectation of 
citizenry rights or claims.       
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Though important to both Monroe and (Quincy) Adams, removal was never 
officially implemented in the 1820s.  Removal as an involuntary policy would have to 
wait until 1828 when Jackson was elected to the presidency.  Old Hickory, the “great 
Indian fighter,” would disparage assimilation for the outright removal of Native identities 
from the U.S. landscape.   The next chapter explores the way that U.S. institutional 
rhetoric helped construct U.S. and Native identities around the policy of removal. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GOVERNMENTAL RHETORIC AND THE CRAFTING OF U.S. AND NATIVE 
IDENTITIES: THE INDIAN REMOVAL ACT 
Though the United States, at first, showcased assimilation as its central plan for 
American Indians, expansionist circumstances and the failure of partial acculturation 
pointed to removal as a viable policy.  Even Thomas Jefferson, the key advocate of 
assimilation, admitted in 1824 that white expansion into the western vicinities of the 
Louisiana Territory was inexorable and – absent a removal policy – Natives would soon 
“disappear from the Earth.”1 These sentiments were echoed two months later when 
James Monroe foreshadowed the need for an involuntary removal program.2 Writing in 
his eighth annual message, he averred, “experience has shown” that the “tribes” have yet 
to become “civilized” and “can never be incorporated into our system in any form 
whatever.”  He proposed a benevolent plan, one that would “rescue them from such 
calamities” of “their extinction” and allow the “parental” to remove and uplift “the infant 
state.”3 As Monroe argued for removal, he cast the U.S.’s governmental identity in the 
leading role of a cultural rescue myth.  The government, described as active and 
constructive, offered “civilization” to American Indians and a “well-digested” plan for 
their “own security and happiness.”4 Simultaneously, Monroe alluded to the 
infantilization of Native identity and the country’s need to legislate for Native 
communities.   
That American Indians had not assimilated flawlessly was one justification for 
their removal across the Mississippi.  The second rationale, the continual westward 
movement of whites, was also at issue.  The myths of the frontier and the “errand into the 
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wilderness” outwardly suffused U.S. identity.5 As John Quincy Adams’ secretary of war 
reported to the House in 1826: “one master passion … that of acquiring land, has driven, 
in ceaseless succession, the white man on the Indian.”6 Following Monroe’s voluntary 
removal program, several sub-tribes of Native nations agreed to relocate west based on 
the contention that white expansion would cause harm to indigenous communities.  An 
1826 treaty with the Creek Nation, for instance, stipulated that its agreement to relocate 
“would remove the difficulties which have thus arisen” by white settlers encroaching on 
Native lands in Georgia and Alabama.  The treaty endeavored to alleviate the problems of 
boundaries in the east between whites and American Indians.  These “artificial lines 
[were] no security [for] the untutored Indian against those trespasses which the 
coterminous whites perpetuated upon them.”7 Similarly, a treaty with the Western 
Cherokees in 1828 boasted that, with removal, the Cherokee had “freed themselves from 
the harassing and ruinous effects consequent upon a location amidst a white population.”8
In either the cases of assimilation’s failure or white expansion, removal as a 
governmental policy of Native relations escalated in the mid-1820s leading into the 
Jacksonian period.   
The ascendance of Andrew Jackson to the presidency in 1828 marked a pivotal 
shift in policy toward involuntary removal.  As Stuckey contends, the frontier character 
of an expanding America was both scripted by, and layered over, Jackson’s leadership.  
For Jackson, the key to America was not a revolutionary disposition “as it had been 
understood by members of the founding generation, but land.”9 As his domestic policies 
commenced, Jackson transformed Jefferson’s stationary yeoman farmer into “an 
adventurous pioneer opening up the nation and increasing its territory.”10 But, before this 
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pioneer spirit could fully flourish, American Indian nations on the frontier had to be 
displaced to allow for the unfettered settlement of white communities.11 Early on as an 
Indian agent, Jackson intimated at the importance of overrunning Native lands.  He wrote 
to Monroe in 1817: “I contend that the Legislature of the Union have the right to 
prescribe [Indians’] bounds at pleasure” and that the government has “the right to take it 
and dispose of it.”12 The dual focus of removing American Indians while usurping their 
land for a broadened American citizenry became the hallmark of Jackson’s later Native 
policies as president.  Overall, Jackson’s removal ideas greatly influenced the U.S. 
government.  Both Congress and the Supreme Court were simultaneously grappling with 
the issue of removal as Jackson addressed its viability.  
To be sure, there was a lack of consensus among the branches of the federal 
government regarding American Indian identity and how Native communities should fit 
into the nation.  On the one hand, American Indians were considered children and part of 
the U.S. nation as protected wards.  As a result, American Indians could not be 
completely expelled from the nation due to the familial relationship inhering between the 
U.S. government and Native nations.  Early in his career Jackson demonstrated this 
familial role when he told a Chickasaw group in 1816 that “the President of the U States 
loves his red children, & will do justice to them” by considering their interests.13 The 
protective relationship was also revealed as Monroe refused to engage in a removal 
policy that would “cause harm” to the nation’s “wards.”  He addressed Congress in 1824, 
noting that to “remove them [Indians] by force, even with a view to their own security 
and happiness, would be revolting to humanity and utterly unjustifiable.”14 Native 
identity seemed, in these constructions, diminutive yet safe.  Sovereignty may not have 
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been solidified, but a familial and protective relationship undergirded the thought that 
American Indians were part of the nation.   
A competing perspective of Native identity, though, situated American Indians as 
uncivilized and in need of severance from U.S. territories.  They were, according to 
Governor John Forsyth (Georgia), “a race not to be admitted to be equal to the rest of the 
community … treated somewhat like human beings, but not admitted” to be men with 
“civil and political rights.” Forsyth concluded that American Indians should be pushed 
aside because they possessed not “sovereignty” but “petty” and “animal” character.15 
This Native identity had little connection to territory – except through tenancy – and was 
used to justify an involuntary removal plan.  As Secretary of War John Eaton wrote to the 
Cherokee Nation in 1829, “No right … save a mere possessory one … is conceded to 
your nation.”  He continued that the “soil, and use of it, were suffered to remain with you, 
while Sovereignty abided in those states within whose limits you were situated.”16 
The responsibility of determining American Indians’ places in the nation was 
similarly ambiguous and lacked administrative clarity.  At times – as noted in Eaton’s 
quotation above – it appeared that individual states would hold sway over managing 
Native affairs. Thomas McKenney (Jackson’s advisor on removal) echoed Eaton’s 
sentiments when he remarked that “the General Government will not interfere (nor should 
it) to prevent states from extending their laws over the Indians within them.”17 And, of 
course, the arguments of the southern states for removal were predicated on the 
supremacy of states’ rights over federal control.  At the same time, however, the 
responsibility of governing Indian affairs had always legally fallen to the U.S. 
government.  Even prior to the U.S. Constitutional period, the U.S. government claimed 
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pre-eminence over individual states.    A notable proclamation of the Continental 
Congress helped forge one of the guiding tenets of U.S.-Native relations: “the United 
States … have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the trade and 
managing the affairs of the Indians, not individual member states.”18 Overall, there 
existed a scarcity of consistency regarding whether individual states or the federal 
government possessed the right to guide American Indian nations.         
This chapter situates governmental discourse concerning the ambiguity of 
American Indian identities in the Jacksonian-era ideologies of expansion, citizenship, 
territoriality, republicanism, paternalism and sectionalism.  The chapter unfolds, first, by 
examining Jackson’s executive removal rhetoric.  As will be argued, Jackson worked 
through competing perspectives of American Indian identities as: childlike yet 
empowered; civilized and independent; and uncivilized and dependent.  He ultimately 
settled on childish, dependent and needy identities for American Indians. These identities 
allowed the U.S. government greater ease in removing American Indians from their 
homelands based on U.S. benevolence.  Such identities, in turn, occluded Native 
ownership of their lands based on their lack of cultivation of the territories.  Jackson 
worked through a Native “tenant” identity that eventually prompted Congress to ratify the 
removal policy. The other side of such discourse, simultaneously, helped constitute U.S. 
governmental identities as fatherly, paternalistic and controlling.19 
Next, the chapter considers the twenty-first Congress’s rhetoric and its debate that 
culminated in the Indian Removal Act (1830).  Here, I contend that the Senate pro-
removal advocates characterized American Indians as uncivilized “mere occupants” of 
territory – which afforded Natives the power to actively exchange these lands with the 
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government – but that concomitantly limited Native sovereignty as landowners.20 As 
Smith writes, because they were viewed as “meager” occupants, American Indians “were 
marked out as a group distinct from citizens” belonging to “lesser classes.”  At the same 
time, the U.S. government did not recognize them as “members of fully independent 
nations.”21 This was done through the use of savage identities attributed to American 
Indians.  Meanwhile, Senate anti-removal advocates countered removal sentiments by 
demonstrating a competing paternal vision of U.S.-Native relations that, while purporting 
to grant Native sovereignty and natural rights, nonetheless diminished indigenous identity 
to the benefit of the federal government.  Here, American Indians were shown to be too 
childish to cultivate their lands; thus, they could not be considered landowners in the 
sense of producing on their territories. In the House, both removal advocates and 
opponents further weakened Native sovereignty by exploiting American Indian rights as 
a channel for sectional and political wrangling.  Here, too, Natives were not granted 
inclusion based on an uncivilized identity that precluded their proper use of territories, 
resulting in a status outside the bounds of U.S. citizenship.  In the end, the Congressional 
debates reconciled Native identities as monolithically dependent and in need of removal.  
Finally, the chapter explores the ways the U.S. Supreme Court under John 
Marshall worked through paternalism to ensconce the diminished status of American 
Indians as dependent.  Importantly, this section asserts that American Indian identities 
and Native nations’ roles within the United States were steered by contestations between 
federalism and states’ rights.  In this vein, American Indian identity became a commodity 
that simultaneously served U.S. governmental interests and limited Native sovereignty.  
The removal policy included American Indians, mostly, as a conduit to dispute states’ 
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rights.  There was little contestation within the Supreme Court as Marshall and his fellow 
justices codified the exclusive right of the federal government to manage Native affairs.  
Simultaneously, Marshall grappled with the government’s paired Native identities of 
uncivilized and childish.  In the end, the Supreme Court crystallized the characterization 
of American Indians as dependent and childlike, thus homogenizing Native identities as 
controllable by the U.S. government.  Therein, Native communities were constituted as 
dependent occupants of the land, which dissociated them from land ownership and U.S. 
citizenship. These identities helped the U.S. government justify its use of the doctrine of 
discovery in the confiscation of Native lands. 
As each section demonstrates, by the time of the Removal Act, clear 
disagreements existed over the Native question on matters of Native citizenship, 
sovereignty, oversight of federal versus state’s rights, and especially American Indian 
identity in relation to the U.S. nation-state.  Through the removal milieu, and especially 
with passage of the Indian Removal Act, however, such contestations were significantly 
lessened for the federal government – at least leading into the late nineteenth century 
when the close proximity of American Indians and settlers reopened questions about the 
U.S.-Native relationship.  The Indian Removal Act worked to reduce the government’s 
own uncertainties over the status of American Indians and their relationship to the U.S. 
government, though – as will be shown – American Indians were not was amenable to the 
solvency of these uncertainties.  The Act codified the notion that American Indians would 
be treated as perpetual wards of a controlling U.S. government.  The policy was couched 
in a type of familial benevolence that appeared guiding and helpful to American Indians 
instead of beneficial solely to U.S. expansionist projects.  American Indians were also 
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constructed monolithically as dependent.  To this end, the government overlooked tribal 
differences and geographical nuances; the Act specified that all Native communities 
would be reliant on the U.S. government.   
During the removal era, land functioned as a crucial space for contestation of 
Native identities.  For the government, territory was viewed as a key criterion for U.S. 
citizenship, as long as inhabitants appropriately cultivated the land.  American Indians 
were considered too uncivilized to cultivate the land. Therefore, the government 
dismissed their ownership rights to land based on a lack of productivity.  Instead, Natives 
were granted tenancy (or occupancy) rights; their lack of territorial toil and citizenship 
resulted in the removal policy.  Native communities lost rights to their homelands, which 
became the territorial property of the U.S. government.  Here, the government worked 
through the doctrine of discovery to justify the taking of these Native homelands.  In a 
sense, land was something to discover, conquer and civilize in order to expand the nation.           
Throughout the resolution of contested issues surrounding removal, governmental 
discourse codified the paternal U.S.-Native relationship at the federal level to the 
detriment of states’ rights.  And, in the process, removal cemented the hybrid identities of 
the U.S. government as a dominant federal force responsible for supervising Native 
affairs and of American Indians as a homogenized monolith of neediness and weakness, 
which further eroded Native sovereignty and identity.  Tangentially, the Removal Act and 
its accordant discourse empowered the presidency with control over U.S.-Native affairs.  
The federal government shared this solution to the complexity of U.S.-Native relations; 
but this sentiment was not similarly held by Native nations. 
 
141
JACKSONIAN IDEOLOGIES SURROUNDING REMOVAL 
Expansion, citizenship, territoriality, republicanism, paternalism and sectionalism 
combined to define, in part, U.S. nationalism during the Jacksonian era.  These ideologies 
moved the government toward a position of control over the continent through a 
hybridized hierarchy.22 But, this seemingly clarified position did not come without 
contestation.  Part of the government’s control involved the subjugation of indigenous 
populations through competing ideological frames.  The ensuing discussion spotlights the 
identities of American Indians and the U.S. government that were disputed and 
considered through Jacksonian ideologies. An appraisal of these ideologies contextualizes 
the analysis that follows.    
Governmental identities in the Jacksonian era can be partly linked to a self-
professed mission of expansion into new lands and civilizing so-called savages in the 
“wilderness” both with the support of divine providence.  This mission was used to 
justify how the United States “conquered” others and “establish[ed] and perpetuate[ed] 
histories” that naturalized a hierarchy where the federal government possessed 
considerably “greater importance” than “others” like American Indians.23 The mission of 
progress as a nationalistic concept has been deemed “manifest destiny.”   
Manifest destiny as a term derives from journalist John O’Sullivan’s now classic 
interpretation of the U.S. nationalist projects sponsored under the Jackson, Tyler and Polk 
administrations during the early 1830s through to the 1840s. To O’Sullivan, America’s 
westward movement was ordained by a higher power, and demanded that Americans 
fulfill such a divine plan as central to its destiny as a “superior” people.24 In discussing 
expansion he worried that opponents of western expansion by “thwarting our policy and 
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hampering our power, limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our manifest 
destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our 
yearly multiplying millions,” would counteract the momentum of U.S. nationalism.25 
O’Sullivan’s term stuck over the course of the nineteenth century.26 
Vestiges of this identity can be traced back to Samuel Danforth’s “errand into the 
wilderness” sermon in which expansion became the driving consequence of the Puritans’ 
covenant with God to satisfy “His” plan.27 The early U.S. Republic later secularized the 
errand as it sought divine justification for its separation from Great Britain.  Lens 
describes this as a grand motivation needed to remind early Americans that God was on 
their side both in their revolt from the Crown and in their conquest of American Indians 
and African slaves.  He argues, “The Americans believed that in furtherance of the great 
law of self preservation, nature had given them a special right to expand. They were like 
the ancient Israelites, a chosen race … carrying progress forward wherever they went. 
They were not trampling on other people, they were opening up new vistas for them.”28 
With God on its side, the nineteenth century U.S. nation could not only rationalize its 
existence but could also commence expansion to fulfill its desire to grow the nation’s 
economy and to secure more land for white settlers.29 
Closely related to manifest destiny was the expansionist notion that the U.S. 
government’s identity involved the presence of a “frontier” or open and blank-slated 
lands along with cultures upon whom to inscribe American principles.30 Again, such 
nineteenth century expansionist identity was predicated on America’s grand mission to 
spread from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans.  For all the stereotypes of Old World 
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Europe as stagnate and entrenched, the United States was most certainly the reverse: 
mobile and nebulous.31 
The broadening of the U.S. land base inevitably led to a connection among 
citizenship, territory and republicanism.  That is, as the U.S. nation expanded in the early 
nineteenth century, and as American settlers occupied these new spaces, property holding 
became a vital component of a republican citizenry that would nurture the nation.32 
Takaki claims that expansion “offered whites the promise of property ownership and [the 
government] a stable republican future.”33 And, though U.S. citizenship was an 
“intellectually puzzling, legally confused, and politically charged and contested status,” 
one thing was certain: land typically affected citizenship status.34 As Kersh explains, 
federal and state grants of land “encouraged grantees to view their holding as part of a 
unified American territory.”35 Moreover, as James Madison made plain in 1787, bonding 
land and republican citizenship protected national and governmental interests.  
“Freeholders of the country,” he noted in Federalist #10, were said to be “the safest 
depositories of republican liberty.”36 The more citizen-freeholders there were in the 
newly expanded republic, the safer the U.S. nation would prove against the external 
challenges of early nationhood. 
Property ties to citizenship, however, seemed to loosen in the Jacksonian era as 
the populism of Republicans promoted lower classes to U.S. citizenship in contrast to the 
elitist and limited citizenship promoted by the Federalists.  Land was certainly considered 
beneficial to citizenship, but it did not have to be inherited or owned in multitudes.  With 
Jacksonian democracy – one known for privileging meritocracy over aristocracy – came 
the “enunciation of the cult of the self-made man.”37 As long as people worked the land 
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with an eye toward improving the union, they could justly be considered republican 
citizens.  After all, work attached people to the land, even if the people lacked ownership.  
And, this attachment similarly united people with the U.S. nation.  Toil and pride in one’s 
assiduousness equated with the “individual industriousness that spawned the virtue upon 
which” republican nations depended.38 
Such a populist vision sprang from the role of expansion in the United States and 
the limitations of property requirements to settling new lands.  Perhaps property holding 
requirements waned because yeoman farmers emigrating west could not afford land or 
because an increasingly large and “prominent slice of the population” was artisan, 
mechanical and shop-keeping, therefore owning little or no land.39 That new lands could 
not keep up with the surges of American emigration and European immigration to the 
“West” during the Era of Good Feelings meant that relaxed and expedient citizenship 
rules needed to guide naturalization even more.40 If such property requirements remained 
intact during the heady days of the Jacksonian era, new territories would have been 
virtually citizen-less.  Furthermore, the continual descent of Federalist interests in the 
U.S. government meant that naturalization restrictions codified in the Naturalization Act 
of 1790 and the Alien and Sedition Acts likewise loosened.41 
Next to property ownership, the issue of ethnicity figured most prominently in 
Jacksonian citizenship.  And, ethnicity seemed to exacerbate the uncertainty of who could 
be considered part of the U.S. nation.  As Jacksonians moved toward a state-centered, 
populist and “white republic,” they defended their claims to citizenship “in terms of racial 
superiority rather than strained doctrines” of territory.42 Any such guilt about this was 
alleviated through “scientific doctrines” that placed whites on a higher evolutionary and 
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cultural plane than other ethnicities.43 Racial purity and economic security were certainly 
at stake with regard to African Americans.  Keyssar concludes, for instance, that 
“permitting African Americans” to be citizens would open the door to “amalgamation 
and thus [would] diminish the significance of whiteness and citizenship.”44 For 
American Indians, then, their “occupancy” with regard to land in North America meant 
little in terms of citizenship to the U.S. government of the time.  Jacksonians, in 
particular, used ethnic categories to define citizenship as white-only.  Jackson noted in 
1829 that “Indians … lacked the honest industry” of white citizens and, therefore, “the 
children of the forest” could not be a part of the U.S. nation merely because “they had 
seen [it] from the mountain or passed it in the chase.”  White people, he wrote, were the 
“true” Americans; Natives had only “artificial distinctions” as weaker neighbors.45 Even 
Anti-Jacksonian Daniel Webster summarily dismissed American Indian importance to the 
U.S. nation.  Writing to a friend in 1826, Webster noted “there is little [about American 
Indians as citizens] worth studying or worth knowing.”46 American Indians also often 
understood that their occupancy occluded them from the U.S. citizenry.  Speaking to a 
group of Americans during a tour around the eastern seaboard following his surrender in 
1833, Chief Black Hawk (Sauk) concluded, “we Indians … are outside the Union.”47 
The ambiguity of American Indians’ citizenship often teetered between their 
rights to territory based on birthright and occupancy and the competing idea that their 
race precluded citizenship. Even though indigenously born to North America, American 
Indians would not be considered either citizens or property owners during the Jacksonian 
era.  Smith makes the ironic point that in terms of the “jus soli understanding of birthright 
membership, no one had better claim as native-born Americans than Native 
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Americans.”48 This was indeed the case according to the common law.  But, their non-
white identity limited their property roles as occupants, not owners.  Ownership involved 
a productive use of the land, as well as private holdings of territory.  As far as the U.S. 
government was concerned, only western (and white) Europeans satisfied these criteria.  
Nineteenth century America, argues Takaki, averred that a nation should be 
“homogenous” in both ethnicity and civilized “character.”  This homogenous nation 
included “a people with the same language and laws, good cabins and enclosed fields … 
and private property.”49 Native nations, for the most part, supported different languages, 
non-European dwellings, hunting and gathering subsistence and communal property.  
This diversity of ethnic identity prevented American Indians from “owning” land in the 
European sense of productivity.  Instead, writes Wilkins, the U.S. government “reduced 
tribal claims to aboriginal lands as mere tenancy” – the political concept that American 
Indians existed on, but did not use and certainly failed to own, territory.50 
Paternalism, another Jacksonian ideology, likewise guided U.S.-Native relations.  
Paternalism involved a rhetoric infused with “policies and practices of treating or 
governing people in a [parental] manner, especially by providing for their needs without 
giving them responsibility.”51 Nineteenth century paternal identity in the United States 
was concerned with the familial relationship of parent to child especially regarding 
American Indian communities.  The federal government worked from a paternal ideology 
as if it were “acting as a father acts with respect to his child or children.”52 Such 
paternalism functioned by naturalizing familial imagery within political contexts and 
likening “what is done by colonial powers to what goes on in the family, giving it a moral 
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justification that it otherwise would have lacked.”53 The United States imitated the 
family relationship to control its “minor” Native “children.”54 
Vitally, nineteenth century paternalism involved hierarchies of power.  
Paternalism modeled itself on a “relationship of genuine dependence and incapacity, in 
which the helpless child’s survival and well being was contingent on adult care.”55 
Kleinig agrees, noting that such identity was a “technique for legitimizing control and 
violence.” Nineteenth century Americans were seen as “possessing virtually unlimited 
authority” over the nation’s myriad subalterns.56 Thus, it can be ascertained that identity, 
that of the child, was constituted as dependent and incapable; simultaneously, the other 
identity, the parent, garnered authority “in regulating their [children’s] conduct and in 
supplying their needs.”57 
One advantage that paternalism held for Jacksonian America was the license to 
intercede into tribal affairs.  To Goodell, “paternalism was interference with others’ 
autonomy justified by reasons referring to their welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests 
and values.”58 The United States was able to interfere, at will, as long as it could justify 
the intrusion as benevolent.  But this naturalized kinship often provided more benefits to 
the U.S. government than indigenous people.  Benevolence sometimes masked a code of 
oppression or exploitation.  Paternalism could similarly capitalize on the symbolic 
gesture of charity; the “very act of receiving” in the nineteenth century characterized the 
beneficiary as veritably weaker and indebted.59 
The paternal persona of the United States during the nineteenth century regarding 
Native populations complicated the certainty of American Indians’ roles in the U.S. 
nation, thus signaling a hybridized relationship.  On one hand, the United States enabled 
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itself to assert, what many consider, an “unnatural control” over Native communities 
using the ironical, natural relationship of a father to his child.60 In this vein, Natives were 
constructed as veritable wards who “as children were ignorant; they could be deceived or 
treated in a way that served the interests of the adults – a kind of exploitative 
paternalism.”61 This oppression involved the cultural status of indigenous populations.  
As the United States constructed its own paternal relationship with the continent’s 
numerous Native nations, it additionally constituted these nations as inferior and less-
than-civilized, or less-than-white.62 On the other hand, American Indians were, as 
familial dependents, incorporated as protected by the nation and vital to the U.S. 
government’s acquisition of territory.  The government seemed at a loss for how to define 
Native character based on the competing dynamics of Native diminution and Native 
consideration involved in the paternal relationship.  According to Bahktin, this 
multifarious double movement is what comprises a “hybrid relationship.63 
Possibly, such diminished identity for American Indians and elevated status for 
the U.S. government assisted the nation in westward expansion.  At a cultural level, 
however, the denigration of American Indians also allowed the United States to exert its 
influence over indigenous nations. As Prucha argues, “since children were defenseless, 
they required assistance and support, and since they were not fully responsible, they 
required guidance.”64 The idea of a nation as “family” – with the U.S. government as 
father figure – often justified land encroachments on the part of the United States.65 
Natives were also consistently caught between two sectional “father figures” 
during the Jacksonian period, which further complicated American Indian identities and 
how the U.S. government would interact with Native nations.  Native sovereignty was 
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mired in the wrangling between the federal government and individual states, which 
raged beyond the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates.  Under the Articles of 
Confederation, sovereign states possessed the “grounds for independent action” to 
resolve conflicts and relationships with American Indian nations.66 However, part of the 
Federalists’ revised plan for a more supreme central government involved limiting states’ 
rights to encroach on Native territories.  The Continental Congress’s report on the 
Southern Department in August 1787 declared that “the laws of the States can have no 
effect upon a tribe of Indians or their lands within the limits of the state … no particular 
state can have an exclusive interest in the management of affairs of any tribe.”67 Soon, 
the federalization of U.S.-Indian affairs was codified in the Constitution, which asserted 
that only Congress possessed the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several States and with the Indian tribes.”68 In the end, Native sovereignty 
was further weakened by becoming a sectional token for federalists and states rights’ 
advocates.    
Individual states, typically more adverse to Native sovereignty since it impeded 
local expansion, attempted to regulate Indian affairs against constitutional doctrine.  Such 
state power was overlooked as the federal government became more occupied with 
naturalization.69 As more European immigrants arrived in the United States, the federal 
government could not keep up with a central system of naturalization.70 States, especially 
in the South, viewed the federal government’s efforts to entreat with Native nations, and 
also regulating immigration to the states, as too slow.  Therefore, the federal government 
“did not forbid the states to continue” to accept immigrants and “grant them citizenship 
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rights with regard to local laws and politics.”71 And, states were not equally prevented 
from regulating relationships with American Indians.  
However, once the War of 1812 threatened national security the federal 
government stepped in to regulate Native relations and naturalization.  The former was 
necessary as a number of Native nations sided with the British against the United States.  
These American Indians were led in spirit, if not in physical battle, by Tecumseh 
(Shawnee) who made his partisanship known: “I am now backed by the strong arm of 
British soldiers.”72 Likewise, newly arrived British immigrants were feared to throw 
their loyalty to their homeland, despite taking an oath of allegiance to the U.S. 
government required by law.  In any regard, states’ rights concerning American Indians 
were drastically reduced in the wake of the War of 1812, and this decline additionally 
obscured U.S.-Native relations. 
The states suffered numerous challenges to their sovereignty that complicated the 
sectional conflict and U.S. governmental and American Indian identities.  In 1819, John 
Marshall held that “it would be difficult to sustain” the proposition that “the powers of 
the general government … are delegated by the States” and, hence, “the people of a 
single State cannot confer a sovereignty” which would extend above and over the 
Union.73 This opinion (McCulloch v. Maryland) put a temporary check on states’ rights; 
according to Brands, the court “swept aside” states’ rights en route to charting “the 
course of the republic by the Federalist stars.”74 The high court’s ruling and Congress’s 
continued privileging of federal authority over states’ rights through the Missouri 
Compromise (1820), Tariff of Abominations (1828), and the Foote Resolution (1830) 
brought the Union to the brink of collapse.  Jackson’s vice president, John Calhoun, 
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threatened in his South Carolina Exposition, that states would be “equally clear in the 
existence of a necessity to justify its exercise” of nullification should the General 
Government “persist in its improper assumptions of power.”75 Sectional rifts were thus 
widening between the South and the federal government. 
Expansive nationalism, citizenship based on territoriality, paternalism and 
sectionalism experienced increased vigor and rejuvenation in the Jacksonian era.  Mead 
contends that Jackson’s administration along with Congress and the Supreme Court 
during this era configured and strengthened familialism as a vital component of the U.S. 
nation. And, all of the above ideologies entered into the creation of some semblance of a 
U.S. “family.”76 Mead writes, for instance, that Jackson was absolutely fixated on 
viewing the American polity as a family.  Jacksonian America, he argues, was “an 
emotion, like the love of one’s family …The nation is an extension of the family.  
Members of the American folk are bound together by history, culture, and a common 
morality.” And, Jackson felt that “a feeling of kinship exist[ed] among Americans.”77 
Still, the fashion in which American Indians fit into the “U.S. family” remained unclear 
prior to the removal era. 
EXECUTIVE REMOVAL RHETORIC & PATERNALISM 
Jackson became the executive mouthpiece of the federal government in dealing 
with the issue of removal.  Scholars locate Jackson at the epicenter of the policy.  The 
pinnacle of the Jackson-centered era is Rogin’s psycho-historical analysis of Jackson.  
Rogin’s work argues that expansion “dominated his public life from the beginning” as 
well as his private understanding of his self-ethos.78 Less personal accounts of Jackson 
still situate him as the central force in removal.  Buchanan memorializes Jackson as the 
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prime catalyst for the policy: “Monroe and others knew the answer [to the Indian 
question] and it was simple: Turn Jackson loose!” and then “the southern warrior 
Jackson” would provide the nation with its “hammer” for indigenous removal.  
Continuing, Buchanan characterizes Jackson as an “indispensable man of action with [a] 
demonic will,” making the government’s removal “visions possible.”79 
Even though Jackson’s plans matured with his presidency, he long viewed 
removal as a viable policy.  Following the War of 1812, Jackson became the primary 
Indian negotiator of the Madison, Monroe and (Quincy) Adams administrations.80 The 
quintessential “Indian fighter,” Jackson sought to negotiate small land cessions with 
Native nations so that the U.S. population could enact “the honorable toil of carrying the 
republican standard” of America “to the heights of Abraham.”81 Speaking of Jackson’s 
aims as an Indian negotiator, Ward comments that he reaffirmed the nation’s belief in its 
sense of national prowess and destiny.82 On the heels of the War of 1812, the United 
States sought some semblance of justification for expunging the British and moving into 
areas previously held by European powers and Native nations – both aims were reflected 
in the Treaty of Ghent in 1815.83 
Jackson constructed American Indian identities and constituted the U.S.-Native 
relationship while advocating for removal.  In so doing, he relied on competing 
formations of American Indian character.  In his pre-presidential discourse, Jackson 
alternated between Native identities as childlike and, yet, empowered, eventually 
centering on childlike dependency as a monolithic characterization.  In his presidential 
rhetoric, Jackson interchanged Native identities as civilized and independent and, in 
contrast, as uncivilized and dependent, eventually settling on the latter pairing in order to 
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further cement his constitution of American Indians as dependent and in need of 
protection.  Part of these identity constructions limited American Indian ownership rights 
to their territories based on their lack of production on the land.  Though Jackson hinted 
at Native agency in exchanging territories, he eventually solidified the Native “tenant” 
identity that motivated Congress to pass the Indian Removal Act.  Simultaneously – 
throughout both his pre-presidential and presidential rhetoric – Jackson fortified the 
government’s role as a paternal force justified in removing American Indians based on 
familialism.  Also, the presidency, in general, was constructed as the leading force in both 
removal and American Indian protection.  Jackson’s clarifications of identities moved the 
federal government – though not American Indians – toward solidifying itself as paternal 
and Natives as dependent.      
Jackson’s Pre-Presidential Removal Rhetoric 
Jackson’s pre-presidential constructions of the U.S.-Native relationship mostly 
wavered between American Indians as childlike and, yet, empowered to make decisions.  
At the same time, Jackson was most clear on the government’s identity as paternal. 
Jackson’s paternal appeals derived from and supported the idea of expansion, which was 
“destined to be of increasing importance as America turned away from Europe and 
westward to its own development.”84 In the process of his pre-presidential discourse, 
Jackson assisted in reducing the contestations over American Indian identity for the U.S. 
government – ultimately settling on Native characterizations as childlike.  Concurrently, 
U.S. governmental identities were bolstered as paternal.            
 Jackson’s pre-presidential rhetoric enacted paternalism through a hybrid 
construction of American Indians as ward-like and the U.S. government as fatherly.  This 
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hierarchical relationship singularized American Indians as childlike and dependent.  
Early in his negotiations as head Indian agent, he found an opening to offer governmental 
guidance by diminishing Native capacity to reason.  In an 1820 talk with Choctaws, 
Jackson commanded: “Hear and listen well to Your Father. Decide for the happiness of 
all your people … We have labored hard to convince you of your real interests. We hope 
you will see them as we do, and adopt the treaty proposed … Should you reject it, it will 
be a source of great regret.”85 It appeared that American Indians had no choice in 
determining their welfare.  Instead, the United States, as a paternal figure, was 
empowered to decide the “real interests” of the Choctaw community.   
But, the dependent identity Jackson linked to Americans Indians also challenged 
paternalism by alluding to American Indian agency to make decisions.  Here, Jackson 
permitted some independence on the part of indigenous communities.  When he exhorted 
the Choctaw Nation to “decide for the happiness of all your people” by removing, he 
intimated that the Choctaw had some vestige of choice in their actions.86 His talk to the 
Choctaw complicated Jackson’s initial Native identity constructions as childlike and 
dependent. 
 Jackson also tended to spotlight the government’s controlling role by inspiring 
childlike guilt, again, constructing American Indians as dependent.  In an 1815 speech to 
a Creek commission, Jackson presented a list of ways the United States had guided 
American Indians.  Due to the government’s benevolent treatment, Jackson demanded 
that they listen to his advice and remove to Oklahoma.  “Listen!” he commanded, “Did I 
not feed you by the orders of your father the President of the U. States and save you and 
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your nation from starving?”87 Here, Jackson employed his granting of subsistent needs as 
a token for an exchange of Creek territory.  He continued: 
Have I not by the orders of your father the President sent goods into the nation, to 
cloath [sic] you and your naked woman [sic] and children … Listen! I send you a 
true talk. You know I have never deceived or told you lies, and I now tell you if 
you listen to the talk of wicked men … you will bring immediate destruction on 
your selves.88 
Jackson presented his leadership as rational and sagacious.  After all, he exhorted, he 
neither “deceived” nor “told” them lies.  As a paternal character, Jackson wove a rhetoric 
of trust and wisdom, one that couched the language of guilt in the decision to remove his 
so-called “red children.”  Jackson insinuated that he had cared for the Creeks – as well as 
the Choctaws – and had always been truthful.89 The two Native nations should, he said, 
allow the U.S. government to nurture them, hence alleviating “guilt” and “preserv(ing) 
and perpetuat(ing) you as a nation.”90 
By constructing Natives as childlike, the U.S. government retained the parental 
identity to manage Native affairs.  But, Jackson also demonstrated how American Indians 
had previously made decisions, thus alluding to their independence.  Jackson basked in 
the power to forgive Natives’ “bad decisions” while, simultaneously, justifying the 
settlement of whites in indigenous territories.  The “Father the President” was charged 
with guiding his red children; he was enabled to “judge the situation” of American 
Indians and to direct them westward.91 By bolstering hybridized American Indian 
identities as dependent on the U.S. government’s superior identity, Jackson placed the 
onus for Indian removal on Natives’ shoulders.  Thus, Rogin argues, “Indian removal 
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represented an early application of democratic control … liberal planning structured the 
environment to load the dice strongly in favor of a single alternative, and then gave 
(Indians) the onus of choice.”92 Jackson set up unfair “choices,” however, and persuaded 
Natives to consent to his power.  Hence, if Natives internalized the impossible situation 
they faced, then they, not the U.S. government, would be “responsible for the choices 
made.”93 The conflation of American Indian identities as dependent and, simultaneously, 
empowered with choices reveals Jackson’s internal dissonance about Native identities. 
 In the end, Jackson’s pre-presidential removal rhetoric settled on a construction of 
American Indian identity as dependent and childlike in order to motivate early Native 
removal.  To this effect, Jackson created overt constructions of Native childishness and in 
so doing he subverted any past Native empowerment to their dependent need for 
governmental protection.  Jackson justified white encroachment and Native removal, for 
instance, by reminding American Indians that they had made some rather “childish” 
choices in the past.  The Natives had cavorted with the “wrong crowd.”  Jackson 
explained to the Seminole Nation, “your childish Nation was once led astray by the 
advice and counsel of wicked and bad men; the Creek Nation had listened to the same 
bad counsel, and in consequence, had brought destruction upon themselves.”94 Jackson 
did not want them to end up like their “red brethren” in the southeast.95 The U.S. 
government, Jackson proclaimed, “tried to give them Peace,” but the Creek “compelled 
your Father the President to send his whites … to chastise and subdue you, and thereby to 
give peace to his red children.”96 Jackson warned American Indians against acting out of 
line.  The “red children” would not be “taken by the hand again” and lectured to next 
time; severe punishment would befall them unless they adhered to the rules of their white 
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father: removing beyond the Mississippi River.97 Overall, Jackson’s familial metaphors – 
and his clarification of Native identities as dependent – assisted the government in 
shoring up its paternal dominance over American Indians. 
Jackson’s Presidential Removal Rhetoric 
As president, Jackson continued working to organize a paternal U.S.-Native 
relationship.  He often justified this paternalism with a conflicted view of American 
Indians as both civilized and independent and uncivilized and dependent.  Though he 
alternated between these constructions, he eventually settled on constituting American 
Indians as uncivilized and dependent.  Concurrently, the U.S. government was considered 
civilized and paternal.  These constructions would influence how the government 
eventually settled the complexities of governmental and Native identities. 
The pairing of American Indians as uncivilized and the government as civilized 
tended to be part of Jackson’s internal (administrative) discourse. For instance, in 
discussing his removal aims in a letter to one of his sub-agents, he argued that Creek 
territory should be populated by “the civilized” of the United States.  It is “essential,” he 
reasoned, that the land “be settled by a hardy race that would defend it … our settlement 
[must] extend to the Mississippi.”98 Concomitantly, Natives were to be removed because 
they threatened the physical sanctuary of the nation and the fortitude of American 
character.  The United States then, he averred, ought to “adopt every means to populate 
speedily this section of the Union … our national security … and reputation … require 
it.”  Jackson viewed the “less advanced” American Indians as dangerous to, and 
undeserving of, the land.99 In a sense, such a diminution of Native identity set the stage 
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for their occlusion from citizenship rights and land ownership that undergirded the 
forthcoming removal policy.  
Jackson’s characterizations of Native identity as uncivilized also connected with 
his constitution of American Indians as dependent and in need of protection.  For 
instance, he thought that indigenous communities were equally at peril from contact with 
whites.  Waxing paternalistic, Jackson said “their security require it” as well and that “the 
happiness and security of the whole require its salutary agreement.”100 Certainly 
American Indians were to be protected, but this protection was vital only inasmuch as 
they had lands to exchange; after the exchange, they were to be removed to the margins 
of U.S. territory.  Native nations were said to be land tenants (as opposed to owners) due 
to their lack of civilization; they could not, in Jackson’s estimation, “own the 
territory.”101 In this way, Jackson thought that American Indians’ lack of civilization 
occluded them from claiming a stake in, and protecting, their territories.  Thus, the U.S. 
government – symbolized by the president or “Great Father” – was to step in to offer 
paternal “supervision.”102 Jackson’s continued use of the “Great Father” moniker also 
intimated that the government’s power over American Indians would vest in the 
presidency.    
Jackson’s claims about Native territoriality – based on uncivilized and dependent 
tenancy – still hinted at American Indian civilization and independence, thus 
demonstrating his own internal uncertainty regarding Native identities.  After all, territory 
was vital to the government’s conception of rights, sophistication and citizenship.  The 
expansion of U.S. territory and removal of Native nations had to be accomplished 
through diplomacy to uphold the republican ideals of territoriality.103 Jackson was still 
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sensitive to “act humanely” and “justly” in exchanging – versus grabbing – Native 
territory.104 This diplomacy speaks to the importance of American Indians being able to 
exchange their territory versus the federal government taking it without removal treaties.  
Jackson’s insistence on removal negotiations indicated some sense that American Indians 
possessed agency as independent landholders in order to exchange their territories. 
The benevolent justification of negotiating land exchanges became the hallmark 
of Jackson’s removal rhetoric.  Constructions of the U.S. government as a conquering and 
protective force were paired contrapuntally with a Native population that was in need of 
safeguarding.  American Indian identity seemed, here, to have been domesticated – that 
is, if Jackson was claiming that the government had conquered land (and thus should 
populate it) then groups inhabiting it had been subdued, and then reduced to subjugation, 
by the United States.105 That group, in his own words were “the isolated” ones, the 
“children” who threatened both themselves and the U.S. family.106 
Jackson assumed the U.S. government had full responsibility in rescuing Natives 
from eminent ruin by removing them to the far reaches of the American landscape.  Not 
only did he view “treaties with the Indians [to be] an absurdity not to be reconciled to the 
principles of our Government,” but he also configured a dichotomous relationship 
between the U.S. government and American Indians.  To him, American Indians “were 
subjects of the United States, inhabiting its territory and acknowledging its 
sovereignty.”107 Crafting a paternal American identity alongside a dependent Native 
identity, Jackson reiterated that any plan in which American Indians were granted agency 
to be “absurd.”  He concluded that there was nothing wrong with a relationship in which 
the “sovereign” decided for the “subject” their “wants and safety.”108 No matter how 
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much American Indians had accomplished through efforts to acculturate, the expediency 
of U.S. expansion required their removal.  The doctrine of discovery and the United 
States’ “rights and the will of Divine Providence” justified the exercising of paternalism 
to “save” Native communities. At the same time, the doctrine provided “American 
stability” as the frontier continued to be populated by white settlers.109 
Though Jackson did not specifically detail a plan for removal in his 1829 
inaugural address, he hinted at the hybrid relationship between the U.S. government and 
American Indians.110 He stated then that it was his “sincere and constant desire” to 
extend to American Indians “a just and liberal policy, and to give them that humane 
treatment and considerate attention to their rights and their wants which is consistent with 
the habits of our government and the feelings of our people.”111 Importantly, here, 
Jackson situated U.S. governmental identity in a paternal and benevolent role.  The 
government sought, above all, to assist American Indian communities, both “earnestly 
and steadily.”112 Of course, this notion assumed that Natives were in need of such 
guidance.   
By working through his own internal contestations over Native characterizations 
as both civilized and independent and uncivilized and dependent, Jackson moved toward 
clarifying Native and governmental identities for U.S. leaders.  As his removal plans took 
shape in 1829 and 1830, Jackson cemented a dependent role for American Indians in 
conjunction with a strong federal paternal character.  U.S. expansion began to take shape 
as a selfless effort for the benefit of dependent American Indians.  While preparing his 
first annual address in December of 1829, Jackson elucidated this paternal benevolence.  
For example, in responding to an inquiry from head Indian agent James Gadsen about 
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how to “entreat” with Natives, Jackson reminded his agents that “I shall adhere to the just 
and humane policy toward the Indians … and have recommended them to quit their 
possessions on this side of the Mississippi.”  Part of his response indicated a concern for 
Native posterity: in the West, they “will always be free from the mercenary influence of 
White men and undisturbed by the local authority of the States … the General 
government can exercise a parental control over their interests.”113 
Importantly, Jackson protected the “dependent native [sic]” by demonizing 
encroaching whites in his paternal argument for protecting American Indian 
communities.114 States wishing to take upon themselves the duty of regulating Native 
affairs were shown to be a detriment to Native life.  In the weeks preceding his 1829 
annual message, and only a few months before the passage of the Indian Removal Act in 
May 1830, Jackson also elevated the “General government” as the primary influence over 
Native nations.  Historians have long assumed this break from his states-centered 
ideology was due to cordial relations with the Federalists to secure passage of the ensuing 
removal act.115 At any rate, the U.S.-Native relationship was not to be merely paternal 
but exclusive to the federal government and unhindered by states’ interests. 
This same paternal shaping of removal, based on American Indian dependence, 
continued into his first annual message in which Jackson firmly committed his 
administration to pursuing a legislative bill for removal.  The removal bill would 
seemingly codify the paternal relationship hybridized between the U.S. government and 
Native nations.  Jackson established for Congress the difficulties resulting from 
Jefferson’s assimilative program.  He wrote that, “It has long been the policy of the 
Government to introduce among them [American Indians] the arts of civilization in the 
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hope of gradually reclaiming them from a wandering life … [the] Government has 
constantly defeated its own policy, and the Indians, in general … have retained their 
savage habits.”116 Governmental assimilation, in addition to proving futile had, worst 
yet, been responsible for pushing American Indians farther away from “civilization.”  
That Jackson pinned the blame for assimilation’s failure on the U.S. government created 
the entrée for Congress to take appropriate action in the upcoming session.  His blame 
also assumed that American Indian dependence was linked to a lack of civilization – thus, 
the need for governmental protection. 
Before crafting his solution to the “Indian problem,” Jackson noted the impetus 
for the problem’s timeliness.  Southern states were mobilizing against American Indians 
while, in tandem, supplanting federal authority over Natives.  Of late, the state of Georgia 
had enacted several laws calling for the removal of the Cherokee Nation within the state’s 
confines.  In 1828, for instance, Georgia passed a resolution that granted it “the right to 
extend her authority and laws over her whole territory, and to coerce obedience to them 
from all descriptions of people, be them white, red or black who may reside within her 
limits.”117 The U.S. government had promised the state in an 1802 agreement that the 
Cherokee Nation would be removed within twenty years.  The Georgia legislature 
remarked that “all this will not do … the United States will not redeem her honor” and, 
therefore, took it upon itself to entreat for removal or to “attempt violence” if other 
“means of redress fail.”118 Notably, Georgia had a pecuniary reason to begin its 
enforcement of the 1802 compact near the turn of the decade.  Satz writes that “the 
discovery of gold in northeastern Georgia in the summer of 1828 added new 
complications to the controversy by bringing swarms of whites into the area claimed by 
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the Cherokees.”119 Jackson desired to forge his plan before Georgia threatened violence 
or forced American Indians to “submit to the laws of those States.”120 And, Jackson 
worried about appearing too sectionalist in his support of states’ rights; as a politician 
with an eye toward passing removal legislation, he had to straddle the fence.121 
Ultimately, though, Jackson made unequivocal the paternal relationship between 
the government and American Indians by positioning the U.S. government within the 
purview of the Constitution in interacting with American Indians.  Again, the “Great 
Father” would lead the effort of the federal government.  He hearkened to the provision 
that Congress had the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations … and with the 
Indian tribes” and that “no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation” 
with outside bodies.122 Later in his message, he bivouacked federal ethos by referring to 
the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802 in which the U.S. government codified the rule 
“that [states] could not negotiate such treaty or convention … to treat with any such 
Indian nation, or tribe of Indians.”123 Again, Jackson had to appear impartial in order to 
get Congress behind Indian removal.  As Masur perceptively points out, Jackson 
alternated between opposing measures like the Bank of the United States and the 
Maysfield Road which would “lead to the destruction of states’ rights” while supporting 
protective tariffs legislation (i.e., 1828 and 1832) that would, also, minimize states’ 
rights.  As an “ardent nationalist” and, yet, a supporter of state sovereignty, Jackson had a 
rough go at traipsing sectional politics.124 Enacting a removal bill would triply: solidify 
the U.S. government’s controlling role in Native affairs, quell Southern antagonisms 
about indigenous presence in the states, and secure more land for white settlers while 
pushing American Indians outside the mainstream American polity.125 This move toward 
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a removal bill based on Native dependency erased vestiges of American Indians as 
independent, while elevating governmental identities to supremely parental.  
Jackson spent the remainder of 1830 with American Indian nations entreating 
with them to sign removal agreements.126 Here, Jackson continually reified the hybrid 
paternal relationship between the U.S. government and American Indians.  The two broad 
groups were symbiotic to Jackson; respectively, he thought that one’s controlling role 
juxtaposed the others’ lack of independence.  Similarly, one’s dependence strengthened 
the other’s identity as paternalistic.  Following his logic, one was to be centralized in this 
national imaginary while the other would be removed from such psychological identity 
formations.  Speaking to Chief John Pitchlynn (Cherokee) in August of 1830, Jackson 
argued that his promotion of removal had left him feeling “conscious of having done my 
duty to my red children … I have exonerated the national character from all 
imputation.”127 
Again, Jackson paired the U.S. government’s duties to American Indians with the 
preservation of a benevolent U.S. identity. Omitting the mention of new white 
settlements prospectively planned for the Cherokee land, Jackson kept his discourse 
focused on highlighting the benefits of removal for American Indians and the concern of 
the government in affording justice to Natives.  One advantage, Jackson reminded 
Pitchlynn, was that removal would mean the Cherokee Nation could survive and prosper.  
Outside of removal, the nation could only expect to be “poor” and “deluded” and would 
themselves induce an “annihilation” of their culture.128 
In the end, Jackson constituted Native identities as uncivilized and dependent, 
while characterizing the U.S. government as paternal. Native identities, here, diminished 
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American Indian land ownership. To Jackson, they were not civilized enough to sustain 
productive use of the lands; hence, they could be neither landowners nor yeoman citizens. 
The Jackson administration was not the only institutional branch considering removal as 
a solution to strained relations between American Indians and the U.S. government.  And, 
the Executive was not alone in grappling with the contestation over American Indian 
identities and the government’s identity in relation to Native nations.   The twenty-first 
Congress also shouldered the responsibility of codifying a policy of “forced removal.”129 
As with Jackson’s resolution of Native and governmental identities, Congress’s 
cementing of these roles for U.S. leaders did not come without capriciousness.     
LEGISLATIVE RHETORIC, REMOVAL & JACKSONIAN IDEOLOGIES 
A removal bill had long been in the sights of Congress.  President Monroe 
charged Congress as early as 1825 with determining a way to administrate such a plan.  
He was “deeply impressed with the opinion that removal of the Indian tribes from the 
lands which they now occupy” would yield more land for the United States while 
simultaneously quelling conflicts between states and Native nations. Monroe spoke 
directly to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, appealing that they “adopt, by solemn 
declaration, certain fundamental principles in accord” with removal.130 
The Committee acted quickly, and within five days chair Thomas Hart Benton 
received a draft bill from Secretary of War John Calhoun, which he presented to his 
colleagues on February 1, 1825.131 The Committee and the Senate passed the bill, but the 
House rejected it because of a request for an unacceptable sum “to carry out a policy of 
removal.”132 The issue did not fade from memory, though, and in February of 1826 a 
new removal bill was recommended, this time by the House Committee on Indian 
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Affairs.  Committee chair John Cocke wrote to Secretary of War John Barbour assuring 
him that “[we] are desirous to cooperate with the views … in relation to the Indians 
[being removed] within the limits of the U. States.”133 Despite agreement among the 
House, Senate and President John Quincy Adams, the bill failed due to a “lack of 
information on the conditions of the Indians.”134 
The following year, Georgia passed its removal law designed to rid the state of a 
Cherokee presence.135 Conditions did not get better between southern states and 
American Indian communities, but the forthcoming presidential election pushed the 
“Indian issue” to the legislative backburner.  As (Quincy) Adams left office in 1828, 
however, he urged President Jackson to find an expedient solution to the intensifying 
difficulties in the southeast.  In his fourth annual message in December of 1828, Adams 
said, “We have been far more successful in the acquisition of their lands than [civilizing 
them] … Indians are forming in the midst of ourselves communities claiming to be 
independent … and rivals of sovereignty within the territories of our Union … [we need 
to secure for] our confederation the rights of sovereignty and of soil.”136 Here, Adams 
reified the discovery doctrine and the American errand to conquer the vast western 
wilderness before them.  Instead of assimilating, Native communities were staking their 
own sovereignty, which competed severely with the “sovereignty” and “rights” of the 
United States.   
 As Jackson rounded out his first year in office, conditions between southern states 
and their American Indian neighbors were quickly deteriorating.  Not only did Georgia 
and Alabama pass individual removal laws, but southern leadership also began 
petitioning both House and Senate Committees on Indian Affairs to get a bill onto the 
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twenty-first Congress’s docket.  To this end, Georgia governor George Gilmer argued 
that a removal policy would be a crafty tool to induce “ignorant, intractable, and savage 
people” to “yield up what civilized peoples had a right to possess by virtue of that 
command of the Creator.”  He insisted that the U.S. government allow its white 
population to “be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it!”137 
Based, in part, on these appeals, the House Committee reported a removal bill by 
Representative Samuel Bell of New Hampshire that bolstered this expansionism by 
insisting that the policy would elevate “the claims of civilized communities over those 
savage tribes.”138 Actually, the Senate Committee first reported out a bill by Tennessee 
Senator Hugh White on February 22, 1830.  Bell’s bill made it out of committee two days 
later.  The Senate debated the White bill, deliberating from April 6 to April 26.  After 
White’s bill passed, it moved into the House, where Representative Bell allowed White’s 
bill to supplant his own removal proposal.  The House took up White’s bill on May 13 
and passed it on May 26, whereupon the Senate received it back with a monetary-based 
amendment and passed it that same day.  Jackson signed the bill into law on May 28, 
1830.139 
Congressional arguments surrounding removal brought to light several 
inconsistencies in the government’s general outlook on American Indian identities.  
Proponents of removal in the Senate tended to characterize Native communities as 
uncivilized.  The preceding quotations by Governor Gilmer and Representative Bell 
demonstrated these pro-removal constructions of American Indian character.  Moreover, 
removal supporters in the Senate constituted American Indians as crude land tenants, thus 
limiting their sovereignty by occluding them from ownership.  Concurrently, supporters 
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employed savage metaphors to ensure the government’s control over Native territory and 
communities.   
This view competed with anti-removal advocates in the Senate. Removal 
opponents were inclined to discuss American Indians in childlike and dependent terms.  
Senate opponents, therefore, attempted to invalidate the reduction of Native identity to 
uncivilized by hearkening to paternalism and contesting Native savagery by hinting at 
American Indians’ natural rights.  Although combating the diminutive images of 
savagery, such familial constructions nevertheless veritably contributed further to 
American supremacy through the frame of benevolence, thus weakening Native 
sovereignty and identity.  Native territorial rights were limited here, as well, not due to 
savage identities, but because their childlike character disallowed the proper cultivation 
of land.  This demonstrated the conflation of territory and inclusion as part of the U.S. 
nation. 
In the House, both sides of the debate manipulated American Indian removal to 
engage in the nation’s widening sectional conflict.  In the end, like both counterparts in 
the Senate, the House debate elevated U.S. governmental identity to the detriment of 
American Indians. In the process, Native territorial ownership was weakened based on a 
failure to produce as was required of republican citizens before being granted inclusion in 
the nation. Overall, the eventual passage of the Indian Removal Act – a compromise 
between the battling sides of the debate – crystallized the U.S.-Native hybrid domestic 
relationship for the federal government leading up to the late nineteenth century.  In so 
doing, however, the resolution of incoherent identity formations eroded Native 
sovereignty by constituting a monolithic Native identity, reducing the ideological 
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uncertainty over the Native question for the U.S. government.  Concomitantly, the federal 
government’s identity was illuminated as dominant in managing American Indian affairs. 
Such a cemented hybrid relationship continued to frame U.S.-Indian policies from that 
point forward for U.S. leaders, though not American Indians.140 
Territorialism and the Senate Debate, April 6 - April 26, 1830 
 Senators supporting removal tended to hail from southern states and be 
Jacksonian Democrats.   Southerners such as John Forsythe of Georgia – the most 
outspoken proponent of White’s bill – were obvious champions of removal since their 
respective states had more at stake in the policy.141 Forsythe exemplified the pro-removal 
position in the Senate. His opening comments on the bill attempted to justify U.S. rights 
to territory based on American Indians’ so-called lack of sophisticated land ownership.  
Connecting Georgia’s past actions to expansion, he said: “Georgia stands justified in her 
course … the condition of these remnants of the once formidable tribes of Indians is 
known to be deplorable; all admit that there is something due to the remaining individuals 
of this race”142 Here, Forsythe diminished Native identity in order to rationalize why 
removal should be codified.  He shrouded expansionist ends in a rhetoric of protection; 
American Indians, he noted, were owed their removal in order to secure their well being.  
In making this argument, though, he alluded to American Indians as outdated and weak.  
They were once powerful, but were now residues of their ancestors.  They no longer 
owned the land but merely “dwelled there” without “proper” attachments to territory.143 
Forsythe employed savage metaphors to further erode Native sovereignty while 
pairing this diminution with constructions of a controlling governmental identity.  
Continuing his argument, Forsythe said that the U.S.-Native policy of assimilation had 
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worked in exactly the reverse of its intended effects.  To allow American Indians to 
remain in the East, he exhorted, “you might as reasonably expect that wild animals, 
incapable of being tamed in a park, would be domesticated by turning them loose in a 
forest.”  Analogizing American Indians to animals, he contended that their “wild nature 
never was yet tamed but by coercive discipline.” Such discipline was to be administered 
by the U.S. government, which could “better domesticate” these “impoverished 
savages.”144 It is clear that Forsythe hid none of his prejudice toward Native 
communities.  They were at once wild and in need of discipline. Regarding the latter, 
Forsythe helped fortify the U.S. government’s identity as dominant.    
 Forsythe buttressed governmental supremacy by encumbering American Indians 
with a lack of property holding.  He continued to articulate joint U.S. governmental and 
American Indian hybrid identities by positioning his justification for removal in the 
doctrine of territorial discovery. The United States, through its relation to its European 
forebears, he said, had found North America, and therefore “had a right to possess it as 
such.”145 Forsythe asserted, “In no part … have the Indians [had] an admitted right to the 
soil … [they are] a race not admitted to be equal to the rest of the community.”  In fact, 
he continued, Natives were historically only “treated somewhat like human beings.”146 
He rationalized that no land was due “savage” groups, but rather that the United States 
assumed the civilized character needed to decide for American Indians.  And, the U.S. 
government was deciding to move “Indian savages” to the west.   
Similarly, Forsythe metonymically reduced American Indians to literal territory.  
The United States discovered land, he said, and had found American Indians: “The land 
and Indians are, according to the same principles, subject to the exclusive control” of 
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state and U.S sovereignty.147 For this reason, he declared, “the European doctrine of the 
right conferred by the discovery of new countries, inhabited by barbarous tribes was” a 
reason to take land.  He, therefore, predicated the expansion of the United States on the 
need to remove these “remnants” and “wild animals,” but likewise based removal on 
territorial dominance.  After all, he told the Senate: “The lands, the streams, the woods, 
the minerals, all living things, including the human inhabitants” are all the “property of, 
or subject to, the government of the fortunate navigator.”148 
Forsythe also supported removal through an economic argument whereby he 
constructed American Indians as unworthy of territory. Whereas Jackson glossed his 
desire to expand U.S. territory in a discourse of benevolence, Forsythe declared that 
territorial considerations trumped the United States’ need to help its so-called “wards.”  
“Purchase [land] from the Indians” and remove them, he said, “not because it is the only 
or the justest [sic] mode of managing them, but as the cheapest and most convenient” for 
achieving territory.149 This quotation reveals that Forsyth viewed territorial desire as 
strong evidence for removal.  Though he, at times, referenced U.S. paternalism, he 
seemed to argue from a hard-line expansionist discourse.  The United States could 
exercise its power “whenever” it chose; the Native nations “must remove” because the 
United States had no obligation “to submit to the intrusive sovereignty of petty tribes of 
Indians.”150 These petty tribes, he insinuated, were neither sovereign nor part of the 
nation.  As with Jackson, Forsythe intimated that Native nations should be important only 
long enough to exchange their occupied (not owned) land. 
 Senator Robert Adams of Mississippi, who constituted the U.S. government as 
strong and American Indians as needy, also made territorial arguments.  In fact, his 
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avoidance of extending rights to Native communities as land owning was his focal point.   
Ostensibly, he worried about those anti-removal senators who failed to trust the “the 
President … to assign a district west of the Mississippi and, by strong arm, to drive these 
unfortunate people from their present abode.”151 For instance, in complaining about 
removal opponents, he said “it is their [removal opponents’] wish that this exchange 
should be left to the free and voluntary choice of the Indians themselves.”  He disagreed 
with this, as voluntary removal had progressed too slowly and as American Indians, in his 
estimation, were not worthy of “sophisticated” land use.152 
Adams insinuated that American Indians had no agency to decide their own fate 
because they were not U.S. citizens.  Free choice, said Adams, was impossible for 
indigenous communities because they were “mere” tenants.  This was so, he insisted, 
because over the years American Indians had “acquiesced … they submitted … as soon 
as their power was lost, and they were no longer formidable … they became subject to 
the control and legislation” of the United States.153 With regard to constituting identities, 
Adams evidenced that the U.S. government considered American Indians “poor, ill-
fated,” “subdued,” and “blindly compelled to yield up their territory.”  On the other hand, 
the U.S. government had the “superiority of mental strength” to take land, and was 
dominant and “ably suited” to control Native nations.154 American Indians were part of 
the U.S. family so long as they could traffic land.  Still, they were not ably suited for full 
consideration, let alone citizenship.155 Thus, of forced removal, Adams asked, “Is there 
any thing alarming in this proposition? … I confess … I see nothing in the provisions of 
the bill before us unbecoming the character of a great just and magnanimous nation.”156 
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Opponents of removal tended to deny the territorial arguments concerning 
removal and the movement of U.S. settlers into Native territory.  Speaking from 
paternalism and American Indian natural rights and land tenancy, opponents seemingly 
supported Native sovereignty.  In the process, though, they reified a hybrid and paternal 
relationship binding the U.S. government to American Indians.   
Senator Theodore Frelinghuysen of New Jersey was the first opponent to speak 
during the debates.  Frelinghuysen admitted that American Indians were “the original 
tenants of the soil” and he also elevated this right to “share in the common bounties of a 
benignant Providence.”157 Tenancy – though not ownership – complicated the case for 
removal opponents.  American Indians nations, as tenants, he admitted, had “some 
connexion [sic]” to the land, though not as resonant as the U.S. nation.  Therefore, he 
concluded that American Indians had no need to remove.  Instead, it would remain the 
U.S. government’s responsibility to motivate peace with American Indians.  
Frelinghuysen, moreover, constituted American Indian identity as equal “under natural 
rights” and the U.S. government as the cause of the very alleged problem it claimed 
inhered in Native communities.  Even if he could admit Native inferiority, Frelinghuysen 
argued, how could the United States blame them: “the confiding Indian listened to our 
professions of friendship; we called him brother, and he believed us … [now we’ve 
taken] more of their land than can be cultivated in centuries … We have crowded the 
tribes … and, still, like the horse-leech, our insatiated cupidity cries, give! give!”158 
Frelinghuysen’s more progressive view of American Indians’ natural rights conflicted 
with removal proponents who denied such rights under tenancy and certainly the natural 
rights of Natives.  
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Despite his progressive thinking, Frelinghuysen’s constructions of American 
Indian and U.S governmental identities hinted at the hybrid relationships of 
landlord/tenant and warden/ward.  At the same time that Frelinghuysen countered an 
exceptional U.S. governmental identity, he succeeded in victimizing American Indians – 
albeit in softer terms than removal supporters.  His victimization reduced American 
Indian sovereignty just as pro-removal discourse had limited Native identities to 
disadvantaged and feeble.  For all their differences, the two sides of the Congressional 
debate demonstrated similar types of hierarchy of governmental power hybridized with 
Native subjugation.  His insistence on calling American Indians “poor, helpless and 
defenceless [sic] creatures” likely did not assist his support of American Indian 
sovereignty.159 
Though he argued from benevolence Frelinghuysen replicated the very 
paternalism that he claimed Jacksonians abused.  For instance, speaking for why the 
United States should not seclude Native communities, he opined: “If the United States … 
shall withdraw their protective shield from around and above them; if the aegis, that in 
the days of her truth she raised, shall now be rudely and cruelly torn away, we shall refer 
the poor, driven, persecuted Indians over [to savagery].”160 Here, Frelinghuysen 
employed paternal rhetoric, thus characterizing the hybrid relationship.  His insistence on 
demoralizing Native identity limited the fullness of Natives’ agency to resist policy.161 
His enveloping and directional metaphors – “protective shield from around them and 
above them” – also imbricated a hierarchy wherein the United States oversaw and 
contained its “ward.”  The vehicle of a “shield” related to a tenor of protection.  But, the 
shield’s positions of around and above clarified the U.S. government’s identity as a 
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parental figure that “raised” up Native nations and controlled their actions.  This is a 
case-in-point for hybridity woven through a protected/protector relationship.         
Frelinghuysen also called into question the government’s republican character as 
he reified American Indian identities as dependent.  Through this, he urged the Senate to 
consider the nation’s reputation should it reject its foundational precepts by removing 
American Indians.162 He employed the rhetorical tactic of moral inheritance to U.S. 
forebears as authoritative support for his anti-removal goal.163 “Sir, if we yield up this 
right [of letting Natives remain in the east],” he averred, “the struggles of the Revolution 
will have been in vain. There will be but the exchange of tyrants … We should … resist a 
despotism that would despoil” the American system.164 In this way, Frelinghuysen 
intimated that the U.S. government had been replicating British imperialists from which 
the nation had separated.  He tread on shaky ground, however, as he reified Native 
limitations. He continued that, “If we abandon these aboriginals … these adopted 
children of our forefathers, how shall we justify it to our country?  To all the glory of the 
past, and the promise of the future? Her good name is worth all else besides that 
contributes to her [sic] greatness.”165 Here, Frelinghuysen ended up reducing American 
Indian identity to child-like, while elevating governmental identity to “fatherly.”   
 Senator Peleg Sprague of Maine also spoke from moral inheritance and, similarly, 
constituted Native communities as needy.  To Sprague, the moral obligation involved the 
United States retaining its honor by fulfilling past treaty obligations.  With removal, a 
number of treaties regarding Native sovereignty to their eastern territories were going to 
be abrogated.  Sprague contended that, “[w]e have pledged to them our protection; and 
instead of shielding them where they are now within their reach, under our own arm” we 
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are sending them away amongst fierce and warlike barbarians.”166 Sprague substantiated 
the familial relationship at work in U.S.-Native affairs, for sure, but he also denigrated 
those American Indians west of the Mississippi.  He used the presence of allegedly 
“uncivilized” Natives in the West – with whom eastern emigrants would mingle – as 
justification for failing the bill.  To demonstrate American Indian dependence – and the 
necessity of U.S. protection – in the East, he paired Native neediness with savagery in the 
West.    
The trumping of benevolence over the material advantages of territoriality 
comprised another line of Sprague’s argument.  As with Frelinghuysen, Sprague 
predicated his benevolence on a diminutive Native identity.  He concluded his speech on 
April 20 by stating “to have secured, even to the poor and despised Indian a spot of earth 
upon which to rest his aching head – to give him but a cup of cold water, in charity, will 
be a greater treasure than to have been the conquerors of kingdoms, and lived in luxury 
upon their spoils.”167 Here, Sprague eschewed the prize of territory associated with 
removal for the benevolence of uplifting the “downtrodden” American Indian.  
Demonstrating heightened levels of charity toward Natives compared to many of the 
period, he rejected the ideology of territoriality, offering a critique of U.S. dominance and 
power. At the same time, however, he promoted a paternal hybrid relationship fused 
between the government and American Indians.  Sprague’s approach to the hybrid 
relationship carried into the House debates.  
Sectionalism and the House Debate, May 13 - May 26, 1830 
The House removal debates did not deviate much in substance and style from the 
Senate’s key speakers.  Remini mentions, for instance, that the House debates replicated 
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earlier Senate speeches since the Bell and White bills were virtually identical.168 
Moreover, the Senate exchanges between Forsythe and Frelinghuysen have been most 
popularly cited as the “essential” arguments articulated by both sides of the debate and in 
both chambers concerning legislative rhetoric during removal deliberations.169 However, 
sectionalism played a larger role in the House debates perhaps, as Satz argues, because 
northern representatives sensed the removal bill’s impending passage.170 Unlike Senate 
removal adversaries, anti-removal House members would take a different oppositional 
tack.  Sectionalism provided another layer of contestation over American Indian identity 
during the debate.  Whether viewed as uncivilized, dependent or some combination 
therein, the sectional strand of debate queried who would control Native communities.   
The House’s pro-removal discourse – generating from Jacksonian Democrats – 
defended the states’ character while advancing removal.  This was accomplished through 
a rhetoric of expediency and dissociation.171 As Schmeckebier wrote in a 1927 
government report, House southerners wished to pass the White bill quickly, since most 
of the “moral” arguments had already been hashed out in the Senate.172 In terms of 
dissociation, southern Jacksonians appeared to make removal a general issue and not 
state-based to deflect any signs of self-interest.  Satz contends that states such as Georgia, 
Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi were being accused of self-aggrandizement in 
supporting removal.173 Georgia Representative Thomas Flournoy Foster, a Jacksonian 
Democrat said of this: “We are considered … parties of interest, as advocating our own 
cause … I beg them [the House members] to consider the cause, and not the advocate.”174 
Therefore, removal advocates urged quick affirmation of the bill while the momentum of 
Senatorial approval was on the upswing.  
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The first removal proponent to speak during the House debates was Wilson 
Lumpkin of Georgia who burdened American Indians with a dependent identity.  As the 
debate neared a resolution, Lumpkin softened the pro-removal position by working 
through paternalism instead of savagery.  Perhaps he sensed that such a move toward a 
compromise over Native identities would ensure the bill’s passage.  He began his speech 
with a dire need to affirm the Senate’s version: 
… [T]o those Indians whose good we seek, the subject before you is of vital 
importance. It is a measure of life and death. Pass the bill on your table and you 
save them. Reject it and you leave them to perish. Reject this bill, and you thereby 
encourage delusory hopes in the Indians [which we] friends and allies well know 
will never be realized … I therefore call upon you to avoid these evil 
consequences … Delay is pregnant with danger to the Indians; what you do, do 
quickly, before the evil day approaches.175 
This passage is vital for the Manichean dilemma that Lumpkin organized.  Ostensibly, he 
charged the House with either saving or killing American Indian nations by passing or 
rejecting the policy; there were no alternatives to his false dilemma.  That the matter was 
about life and death also helped him convey the expediency that Jacksonians sought in 
passing the bill.  Moreover, Lumpkin constituted southern identity as friendly towards 
indigenous communities rather than self-serving land grabbers.  He claimed the southern 
states to be virtuous.  They combated “evil” and sought the good of American Indians.  In 
this way, Lumpkin, it seems, enacted a benevolent discourse to detract from the southern 
territorial issue, and he similarly added a gloss of expediency to move the bill quickly 
through the House. 
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In similar fashion, Lumpkin paired Native dependence with a dissociation of 
Georgia as a zealot – a characterization that opponents had previously assigned southern 
states.  The so-called “inhumanity of Georgia,” he asserted, “so much complained of, is 
nothing more nor less than the extension of her laws and jurisdiction over her this 
mangled and misguided population [of Indians].”176 Here, he resituated Georgia’s recent 
individual removal law in a language of benevolence, versus oppression.177 It was not so 
much, he intimated, that Georgia’s plan to dispossess American Indians was inhumane, 
as it was a way to alleviate the “mangled” Natives and to guide them (since they were 
“misguided”) along a safe path.  Instead of constituting a southern identity of 
“inhumane,” Lumpkin turned the finger at removal opponents: “I have endeavored to tear 
the mask from this subject, that the character and complexion of the opposition might be 
seen and known.”178 Opponents of the White bill were then pegged as villains for 
insinuating that anything other than benevolence toward American Indians had entered 
the debate.   
In the process of Lumpkin’s defense, hybridity was enacted in a way that 
subjected American Indians to Georgia laws in the name of protectionism. The Cherokee, 
in particular, were within the supreme limits of the state.  To this end, Lumpkin also 
declared that American Indians’ “childish habits” might be jettisoned and they could 
“enter the full enjoyment of all the blessings of liberty” should they be “required to take 
leave” of the east.179 
The defense of southern states’ character and Native dependent identity was 
continued with the speech of Representative Foster.  Foster, speaking of how Georgia had 
“uplifted” the Cherokee Nation by supporting localized and humane removal, questioned 
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the House: “Is this, then, sir, the State whose laws and whose courts are so oppressive to 
the Indians – whose people disregard all the objections of humanity, and trample on the 
rights of the weak and defenseless?” To the contrary, Foster said: “I feel proud that I can 
stand up here, and proclaim to the Representatives of the American people that all the 
records [of our state] furnish no unjust judgments against our red neighbors … our alters 
have never been crimsoned with their blood … the rights of the Indians are not to be 
violated with impunity.” 180 Here, American Indians were “weak and defenseless” 
neighbors.  Interestingly, in dissociating an individual state from any type of territorial 
benefit, Foster proceeded to, nonetheless, endorse Native degradation.  Georgia, he said, 
provided American Indians with protection against violence.  Not only that, but the state 
was strong and defensive, versus the depreciated Natives.  Again, pro-removal 
representatives tempered their discourse with paternalism rather than prejudice (against 
“savages”), seemingly, to bridge the chasm about native identities with removal 
opponents.  
Anti-removal representatives focused much of their opposition on the pro-
removal Jacksonians.  Perhaps sensing the move from savagery to paternalism in removal 
advocates’ arguments, anti-removal representatives attempted to reconnect Jacksonianism 
with the ills associated with removal.181 This shift toward sectionalism and partisanship 
in the debate may have spawned from a number of issues.  First, the upcoming 1832 
presidential election influenced the trajectory of the House debate.  The National 
Republicans were searching for a way to oppose Jacksonians at every turn.182 Jacksonian 
Democrats found it strange that northern Republicans opposed the measure so 
vehemently when many had supported John Quincy Adams’ near-identical plan.183 
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Jacksonians charged their northern colleagues with partisanship, and that may well have 
been the case. According to Satz, “the fact that it was Andrew Jackson who was 
sponsoring the measure did actually have a great deal to do with the mounting opposition 
to Indian removal.” Republicans who supported Adams’ plan were fearful that Jackson, 
unlike Adams, would use the measure to “force” the Natives out without care.184 Second, 
the White bill passed the Senate based on the same arguments pro-removal House 
members were poised to make.  Possibly, House Republicans had found another 
dimension of removal – namely the Jacksonians’ “rough and ready” persona – with 
which to oppose the bill.185 
Regardless of the motives, House opponents focused a great deal of their 
antagonism, then, on Jacksonian cruelty toward dependent Native communities.  William 
Storrs of Connecticut, the most outspoken Republican in the House, argued that the very 
fact Jackson mentioned a removal plan in his first inaugural (1829) and first annual 
message (1829) so hastily was enough evidence to demonstrate Jackson’s lack of regard 
for Native rights and U.S. reputation.186 Storrs exhorted the House: “By surrendering the 
question of [Native] sovereignty, the Executive has, for all substantial purposes, virtually 
surrendered the treaties, too.”187 Storrs continued that if Jackson’s removal plan 
attempted to undercut American Indian sovereignty agreed upon in earlier treaties, then 
the land given to the United States in exchange must also be null and void.   Therefore he 
averred that Jackson abridged past diplomacy and failed “in his responsibility … to the 
opinion of the world” to represent the United States as fair and just.188 Jacksonians 
(especially the southern states) were to be disdained for such injustices.   
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Isaac Bates of Massachusetts also approbated Jacksonians as villains of American 
ideals and American Indian sovereignty.  Bates considered Jackson’s law to be a 
“mockery – to be used as an expedient, a contrivance – the means of driving a bargain 
and accomplishing an object.”189 The object, he contended, was states’ rights and 
territorial expansion.  Not only did Bates attack Jacksonians’ support of a territorial 
ideology and the South’s arguments for “expediency,” but he also elevated U.S. identity 
to paternal to make his point.  Why pass such a removal bill, Bates asked, if “they 
[Indians] are already under the protection of the United States … [if] the boundary is 
already defined between them and the United States … [if] we are already pledged” to 
“protect” and “defend” them?190 Here, he paired U.S. paternal identities with ward-like 
qualities of American Indian communities.  Moreover, the nationalistic dynamic of 
separation came to bear as the formation of boundaries was shown to be acceptable for 
U.S.-Native relations.  Bates came closer to the reconciliation of Native identities by 
admitting that such cultural boundaries existed.  The admission of such boundaries led to 
the passage of the Indian Removal Act, which cleared up the U.S.-Native relationship for 
the government.  
The Codification of the Indian Removal Act 
For all the partisan and sectional wrangling, the eventual passage of the Indian 
Removal Act clarified for the government a once-ambiguous relationship between itself 
and American Indians by constituting Native identity as dependent and by granting the 
federal government the ultimate power in deciding removal.  Rather than being 
considered “savage,” American Indians would be demarcated monolithically as childlike 
and immature.  The constant reference to “all Indians” sought to homogenize Native 
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nations, thus demonstrating an elision of individuality, geographic specificity and past 
relationships with the federal government.191 Also, though Native territoriality failed to 
appear as ownership, their natural rights – reiterated by Senate removal opponents – led 
to removal through negotiation, thus alluding to vestiges of Native agency.  Tenancy, 
however, no longer sheltered American Indians from removal, especially as land 
ownership began equating more to U.S. citizenship.  Thus, the Act noted, lands 
ownership “shall revert to the United States.”192 Finally, the benevolent terms of the 
Indian Removal Act – and the notion that Natives would agree to removal through 
treaties – erased the sense of hypocrisy riddling U.S. governmental identities as 
imperialist.  Section Five stated that the government would “cause such aid and 
assistance as may be necessary for their support and subsistence” across the 
Mississippi.193 Such paternal protection squelched governmental identities as zealous 
and forceful, while reifying Native dependence.  The alleged hypocrisy of the 
government, which connected its treatment of American Indians with the British 
Empire’s treatment of the American colonies, was quelled by the paternal relationship 
cemented by the Congressional debates and the eventual passage of the Indian Removal 
Act.    
Overall, the U.S. government would come to support American Indians as a part 
of the nation, albeit a part that existed separated spatially and culturally from the 
dominant population.  Demonstrating the conflation of territory and citizenship, the 
governmental removal discourse clarified that Native land entitlement was negated, 
which resulted in a justification for their dislocation from these territories.  Another 
compromise between the factions was that, if removal was to commence, the federal 
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government and not the states would administrate the policy.  States were not given this 
responsibility and, instead, a hybrid relationship was cemented between the federal 
government and American Indian communities, diminishing state sovereignty over 
Native matters.   
The Indian Removal Act, moreover, granted an empowered role for the president 
over the treatment of American Indians.  Section One of the Act noted “that it shall be 
lawful for the President of the United States … as he may judge” to apportion land to 
Natives in the West and also to “exchange any and all of such districts … with any tribe 
or nation of Indians now residing within the limits of the states or territories.”194 This 
move coincided with the accentuation of federal power over states’ rights in the removal 
debate and in the codified act itself.  The use of paternal logic combined with the 
bivouacking of federal powers naturalized the president’s role as the perpetual “Great 
Father” of American Indians.  This executive role would carry into the latter stages of the 
nineteenth century until Congressional powers supplanted executive privilege in the 
General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887. 
The act, summarily, endowed the United States with a controlling identity in 
guiding American Indian communities.  It allowed the federal government “to cause such 
aid and assistance” toward American Indians as it deemed fit.  The government also 
retained the duty of protecting American Indians “against all interruption and 
disturbance.”  Perhaps the most telling of the law’s paternalistic rhetoric was its elasticity 
clause, which codified a “supervisory” role for the U.S. government over Native nations.  
Section Seven clarified this role by allowing the executive “the same superintendence and 
care over any tribe or nation in the country to which they may remove … that he is now 
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authorized to have over them at their present places of residence.”195 Overall, the act 
reduced the confusion and ideological contestations over the Native question for the 
federal government, at least until the 1880s when westward expansion brought whites 
and American Indians closer together, thus opening up more questions about the U.S.-
Native relationship.196 The solvency of the Native question (for U.S. leaders) through 
removal was further solidified by the Supreme Court.  
ADJUDICATING PATERNALISM & SECTIONAL CONFLICT 
The Supreme Court under Marshall is remembered as the tenure that, perhaps 
more than others, codified American Indian identities and the U.S. government’s relation 
to Native nations.  To be sure, the Marshall Court’s decisions made “the Indians the only 
group of people in the United States who are governed by a distinct body of law.”197 
Specifically, the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 
cases defined, in some measure, what it meant to be “Indian.”198 The constitutive power 
of the Supreme Court in shaping both American Indian and U.S. governmental identities 
is found amid the course of these cases. Bearing in mind the constitutive nature of the 
high court, Wald notes that “these cases call attention to the symbolic processes through 
which the United States constitutes subjects: how Americans are made.”199 
The Marshall years are also remembered for enacting “the largest number of cases 
supporting American federalism.”200 Indeed, the period between 1801 and 1833 
witnessed the championing of federal powers over state rights that, in part, eventually led 
to rifts between southern states and the U.S. government.  Moreover, the period 
propagated a rise in cases extending the power of the Supreme Court to intervene into 
states’ rights issues (e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland).   
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The Supreme Court’s decisions in Cherokee Nation and Worcester helped 
construct both monolithic and feeble American Indian identities while bolstering U.S. 
governmental identities as exceptional and paternal.  Working from Jacksonian 
ideologies, the court’s discourse reaffirmed the paternal ties between the United States 
and Native communities and ensured the dominance of the federal government – both of 
which were confirmed by Jackson’s removal plan and the Indian Removal Act debate in 
Congress.  To the issue of the federal government’s dominance, the high court appeared 
to use American Indians as a cipher to fortify the federal government’s influence over 
both states and Native nations.201 The court’s discourse illustrated an attempt to wrest 
control over the “parenting” of America’s “red children” from individual states in order 
to constitute a central U.S. identity and a monolithic Native identity.202 Marshall also, 
though, vacillated between the Native identities of savagery and childlike dependence.  
The result of the Marshall Court’s “Indian cases” was that American Indian identities 
were ultimately homogenized, for the federal government, as childish, weak and hence 
controllable.203 American Indian communities were confirmed as ward-like occupants of 
the land – a status that precluded them from land ownership and, thus, citizenship. 
Therefore, their diminished identities aided the U.S. government in rationalizing the 
ultimate seizure of Native lands through the doctrine of discovery.   
Federalizing Identities 
Jackson was administrating his removal policy at the same time that Marshall was 
grappling with the policy’s impact on governmental and Native identities.  Once the 
removal policy gained momentum, Jackson revised his previous rhetoric that endowed 
the “General government” with removal responsibilities.204 The shift worked, instead, to 
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endorse a territorial program of states’ rights.  For sure, American Indians were to be 
removed by federal mandate, but Jackson hinted that individual states should encroach 
into Indian Country and pressure Native communities to remove.  He said in his sixth 
annual message, for instance, that all efforts had been “given by law to destroy all ardent 
spirits found in their [Natives’] country, without waiting the doubtful result and slow 
process of a legal seizure.”205 Jackson called for expediency and extra-legal means of 
removal.  Because removal took longer than Jackson anticipated, he encouraged 
southerners to speed up the process.206 He even exhorted a group of Cherokees in 1835: 
“you are now subject to the same laws which govern the citizens of Georgia and 
Alabama.”207 This presented an inconsistency with Jackson’s justification for removal 
predicated on federal administration, especially as reflected in the renewed Trade and 
Intercourse Act of 1834.208 
According to Finkelstein, Jackson’s administration supported “collaboration, not 
conflict” as the “touchstone of relations between the national government” and state 
settlers over the removal policy.  Jackson was using intruders “to force the tribes to cede 
their land” more expeditiously in the wake of the Indian Removal Act.209 The Cherokee 
Nation and Worcester cases involved, as a legal theme, the question of states’ roles in 
expediting Native removal.  Marshall queried how “to parcel out the territory of the 
Cherokees,” and to whom the responsibility of Native guidance would fall: the federal 
government or state governments?210 Marshall would clear up Jackson’s confusion by 
calcifying the federal government as the primary removal administrator. 
Jackson’s turn toward state sovereignty in removal clashed with the strong 
federalism upheld by the Marshall Court.211 Undoubtedly, Jackson’s political influence 
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in support of states’ rights affected the ways in which the high court dealt with 
constituting U.S. governmental and American Indian identities.212 At least from 
Jackson’s perspective, there existed divisive animosity between his administration and 
the Supreme Court.  Jackson worried in an 1832 letter that “if anything the Court can 
paralize [sic] the course of my executive … they [justices] have never ceased to endeavor 
to put me down and the supreme court [sic] in a late decision declaring the Cherokee an 
independent nation, have united to embarrass me.”213 When Jackson was running for the 
presidency in 1828, Marshall made an equally wry remark that “perhaps I should 
consider the election of Jackson as a virtual dissolution of the government.”214 There was 
no love lost between the men. The rift was personal, as well as sectional and partisan. 
Marshall certainly looked askance at heightened state sovereignty.  As Olken 
writes, he “imbued his analysis of the Constitution with principles of federalist politics 
detrimental to states’ rights.”215 Marshall underscored the need to protect the federal 
government from incursions by local authorities.  Specifically, Marshall disagreed with 
southern states over issues of internal commerce, slavery, state judicial power to abrogate 
Congressional and high court decisions, and state powers to forge treaties with American 
Indians.216 Marshall couched his rhetoric in a reliance on “constitutional intent” as an 
argument-by-authority.217 In so doing, he “further defined the relationship between the 
states and the federal government in terms of the Constitution.”218 The Supreme Court 
existed in the midst of a contentious maelstrom between Jacksonians’ move toward an 
insistence on state cooperation and the preservation of the federal government’s 
sovereignty involving Indian removal, evidencing further the competing views on the 
Native question. 
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Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and the “Domestic Dependent”  
 Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia (1831) strengthened U.S. dominance and 
facilitated territorial expansion by confirming the Court’s early construction of Native 
identities in Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) as moveable and dependent.219 Cherokee Nation 
retains importance to Native identities in that American Indians were actual parties to the 
case and American Indian sovereign “character” was at issue.220 The case also retains 
vitality as the Supreme Court valorized federalism through paternal control over 
American Indians.  The case came in the wake of the Indian Removal Act when Georgia 
began designing its own laws to expedite removal.  The state’s removal law claimed that 
“Indian lands” belonged to Georgia “absolutely” and “that the title is in her; that the 
Indians are tenants at her will, and that she may at any time she pleases, determine that 
tenancy, by taking possession of the premises.”221 
The grievance forwarded by the Cherokee Nation demanded that the Court enjoin 
Georgia from forcibly removing American Indians by allowing whites to overrun 
Cherokee land.  Cherokee attorney William Wirt noted “that the Cherokees were the 
occupants of and owners of territory in which they now reside, before the first approach 
of white men of Europe to the western continent.”222 Considering this, the Cherokee 
demanded to be recognized as “a nation of Indians, a foreign state, not owing allegiance 
to the United States, nor to any state of this union … other than their own.”223 
Georgia responded by asking the Court to recognize the Indian Removal Act as 
proof that the state removal laws were constitutional and commensurate with federal 
legislation.  To do this, Georgia hearkened to Article IV of the U.S. Constitution which 
states that “no new States shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other 
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State” as evidence that Native groups could not claim sovereignty and remain in 
Georgia’s limits.224 Marshall ruled in favor of the Cherokee: that is, the Court protected 
American Indians from any incursions into their land by states and their residents, 
evidencing once again the contradictions inherent in the logic surrounding the Native 
question.  But, the Cherokee victory was pyrrhic; Native nations would still be removed 
per the Indian Removal Act.  Moreover, the holding positioned Natives as “dependent 
wards,” securing territorial rights to the federal government, and not to individual states.  
Concurrently, American Indians become homogenized as a monolithic group.  The high 
court codified the practice of genericizing Native culture to the detriment of inimitable 
Native identities, reifying federal powers over the discursively homogenized group. 
In order to enjoin Georgia from touching Cherokee land, Marshall conflated 
American Indian dependent identities with a lack of civilization.225 He first argued that 
American Indians were once independent, but in the present remained subordinate to the 
“fatherly house” of the United States: “A people once numerous, powerful, and truly 
independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample 
domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts, and our arms, have 
yielded their lands by successive treaties.”226 Marshall also, though, hinted that 
American Indians were uncivilized by enjoying an “uncontrolled possession” of territory.  
However, while pro-removal advocates in the Senate argued that Native communities 
were still uncivilized, Marshall divorced contemporary American Indian identities from a 
naïve character and a “discovered” state.  Instead, Marshall constituted American Indians 
as childlike, eking out a new life in the West with the “aid of the General Government” 
within whose policy, arts and arms indigenous communities were harbored.”227 He 
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subverted Native constructions as savage or uncivilized to an American Indian identity as 
“perpetually” childlike.228 
Clarifying the paternal relationship between American Indians and the 
government, Marshall argued that the Cherokee Nation was neither a foreign entity nor a 
sovereign state, but rather a domestic “case of people” that the United States watched 
over.  He denied the injunction against Georgia not based on the Cherokee claim to 
sovereignty; rather, he saw it fit that the Court protect indigenous populations from states 
that could not care for “our red children.”  The possessive our referred to the federal 
government’s identity, not that of the individual states.  Marshall continued by depicting 
American Indians as needy:    
They may, more correctly, be denominated domestic dependent nations … they 
are in a state of pupilage …They look to our government for protection; rely upon 
its kindness and power; appeal to it for relief of their wants; and address the 
President as their great father. They [are] … completely under the sovereignty and 
domination of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form 
a political connexion [sic] with them, would be considered an invasion of our 
territory and an act of hostility.229 
The last sentence above presents an inconsistency between Marshall’s charge that a 
Native group was neither sovereign nor foreign and his charge that an attack on American 
Indians would qualify as an attack on the United States.  Seemingly, Marshall’s argument 
flowed from the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which was designed to protect U.S. interests by 
defending “foreign nations” from outside threats.230 And, yet, Marshall did not deem 
Native groups “foreign nations.”  Moreover, he did not label them domestic “states” that 
192
the United States would have a right to protect.  In this way, a dependent American 
Indian identity was solidified in opposition to any semblance of Native sovereignty.231 
Clearly, paternalism was trumpeted in Marshall’s discourse. 
 Marshall also codified the notion that American Indians could be neither 
landowners nor citizens.  Instead, they were to be considered ward-like occupants. He did 
this, first, by bivouacking the territorial identity associated with the U.S. government.  He 
argued that American Indians “occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent 
of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession 
ceases.”232 Since American Indian nations’ possession was tied to occupancy, not 
ownership, the U.S. government could seize Native territory writ large.  Further, 
American Indians could not be considered citizens as mere tenants, but rather their 
“relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”233 
The ruling in Cherokee Nation alluded to a hierarchy of sorts as it simultaneously 
constituted the identities of American Indians and the federal government as paternally 
subjugated and dominant, respectively.  Marshall, for instance, constructed the 
government as a strong federal power versus a confederation of states.   White argues that 
this constitutive function of the Supreme Court helped embody a central system.  He 
maintains that constituting nineteenth century identities was “not aimed … at using 
rhetoric in a self-conscious, community building way.”234 Marshall demonstrated this 
constitutive rhetoric by cleverly employing the Cherokee as a cipher, a vessel used for 
larger purposes, in order to trump federalism over state sovereignty.235 Wilkins argues 
that the Court declared American Indians “subject nations” not at the “mercy of the 
states.”  Instead, Marshall fortified the federal government as the primary benefactor of 
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Native communities.  Had he “more accurately acknowledged them as foreign nations,” 
writes Wilkins, “they would have been independent of federal control.”236 In this way, 
Marshall generated an extra-constitutional political status for American Indians by 
characterizing them as “domestic dependents.”237 
Apparently to Marshall it was enough to label American Indians “dependents.”  
As such, Native people would be protected at all costs – either from foreign invasion or 
from states wishing to annex tribal land.  Here, he hybridized the protector/protected 
relationship extant between Native and U.S. identities.  The United States became a 
parental unit “when their [Indian] right of possession ceased” due to their own 
willingness to trade land for security.238 
Infused throughout Marshall’s discourse was the homogenization of childlike 
American Indian identities.  The Cherokee, again as flat representatives of Native people, 
were seen as “domestic dependents,” in a continuing “state of pupilage.”  They were the 
“ward” to the American “guardian.”  They “relied” on the United States and “appealed” 
to a “great father” for permission, security, and mobility.  American Indians were “under” 
the sovereignty – “the dominion” – of the United States.  And, the United States wanted 
their land for expansionist purposes.  True, the Native lands were protected from 
rambunctious states, but Cherokee Nation v. Georgia reconfirmed the central and 
paternal stance of the United States in controlling American Indian territory and 
sovereignty. In the process, individual characterizations of Native nations were elided as 
the Court emboldened a monolithic construction of American Indians through the 
synecdoche of the Cherokee case.             
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Worcester v. Georgia and the “Distinct Community” 
The second “removal” case of the Marshall court focused on the transference of 
American Indian identity from “domestic dependent” to “distinct community.”  In 
Worcester v. State of Georgia (1832) white missionaries, who were previously arrested 
by state authorities for visiting the Cherokee tribe in Georgia, brought suit to demand 
visitation with their American Indian friends.  Missionary Samuel Worcester and the 
Cherokee Nation pleaded to the Court that the American Indians could be viewed as 
sovereign, and thus were not subject to state law.  This argument spawned from the 
injunction against Georgia issued in Cherokee v. Georgia. Incidentally, Georgia had just 
passed a law to prevent any white persons from meeting with the Cherokee. It was 
thought that anti-removal missionaries would inspire Natives to buck removal.239 
The rhetorical transformation undertaken from “domestic dependent” to “distinct 
community” represented Marshall’s strongest threat to Jacksonian states’ rights.  In an 
inconsistent ruling, at least per Johnson and Cherokee Nation, Marshall shifted Native 
identities to “distinct community” in order to stop Georgia from blocking Cherokee-
missionary relations.240 American Indians, once again, appeared to have won the day, as 
they seemingly were awarded limited rights under the U.S. court of law.  However, 
Marshall’s rhetoric pointed, yet again, to emancipating the Cherokee from a “dependent” 
label in order to quell states’ rights and strengthen the federal government.  
Moreover, Marshall’s rhetoric only reified American Indian dependence in order 
to elide individual states’ “custody” of American Indians.  For instance, he argued, “[t]he 
Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory … in which 
[state laws] can have no force.”  Therefore, he continued that states had “no right to 
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enter” unless consistent with treaties “and acts of Congress.”  The “whole intercourse” 
between the United States and Native nations “vested” in the federal government.241 
Here, Marshall denied Georgia access to Cherokee lands.  Why? Not because the 
Cherokee were sovereign – Marshall never deemed the Cherokee Nation autonomous, but 
considered them “distinct.” Instead, Georgia could not interact with American Indians; 
only the federal government enjoyed this role.  As a result of Worcester, “states were 
excluded from the Federal/Tribal relationship, and the tribes retained a very broad grant 
of sovereignty” inviolate save by federalist intervention.242 
Most poignantly, the new label of “distinct community” allowed a paternal 
“intercourse” between indigenous people and the United States, not between Native 
nations and sovereign states.  Marshall, basically, replaced the control bequeathed to the 
United States in the Cherokee “domestic dependents” label with another form of control 
– the U.S. government as sole administrator over American Indian territory.  The 
“distinct community” moniker served only to clarify the state- and federal- Native 
relationships; American Indians, thus, were not “domestic dependents” of the states.  
Instead of having two authorities to answer to, American Indians would eternally be 
controlled by one, “great father” – the president of the United States.243 Marshall’s 
prevention of states’ interaction with American Indians was so vehement that he, 
ironically, empowered the presidency – and particularly his arch-nemesis, Jackson – with 
control over Native communities.  Seemingly, Marshall was willing to grant this 
presidential role so long as the federal government trumped states’ interests.    
 Worcester is generally considered the strongest defense of Native sovereignty 
against Jacksonian localized government.  Wilkins argues that Worcester was, however, 
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simply a channel for the case that “can more accurately be understood as a defense of 
federal over state power” and of U.S. governmental paternal control over American 
Indian nations.244 He continues that Worcester was “the test case Marshall had been 
waiting for” to codify the power of federalism in Native affairs by way of the Supreme 
Court.245 Amusingly, Jackson was so incredibly angered by the Marshall decision to 
deem the Cherokee Nation a “distinct community” that he was known to have blurted, 
“Well, John Marshall has made his decision: now let’s see him try to enforce it!”246 
Jackson’s ire reflected the obvious reduction of state power vis-à-vis Indian Removal.  
 Also of interest in the Worcester case was the fashion in which Marshall vilified 
southern states through the issue of Native identity and sovereignty.  Notice in the 
following his insistence that Georgia’s interest in Cherokee territory was inconsistent: 
“…The Acts of Georgia are repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States. They interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States 
and the Cherokee Nation, the regulation of which … are committed solely to the 
government of the union.”247 Again, Marshall constituted a hybrid American dominance 
over Native nations.  He couched this nationalism in the language of paternalism, for 
while American Indian identities were no longer deemed “domestic dependents” or 
“wards” they were still relegated to the “settled principles of our Constitution.”248 
Marshall also concluded that the homogenized American Indians were still part of the 
nation, but were removed to the literal and symbolic margins of the U.S. nation.  As 
wards living as a “distinct community,” they would forever be subject to the policies and 
whims of the federal government.249 This subjugation continued into the late nineteenth 
century. 
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CONCLUSION 
The clarification of U.S. governmental and Native identities through the removal 
milieu ultimately led to dire consequences for American Indians.  For, as Bosmajian 
writes, “once the Indians were successfully defined as governmental nonentities” to be 
exploited at the whim of the U.S. government, “no more justification was needed to drive 
them off their lands” and to force them to emigrate across the Mississippi.250 And, the 
ideologies of expansion, paternalism, citizenship, territoriality and sectionalism 
undergirded the way the government crafted U.S. and Native identities during the 
removal era.   
Specifically, the many contestations over American Indian identities and the 
government’s roles in indigenous affairs shaped the removal policy.  The three branches 
of the federal government grappled with American Indian identities as childlike yet 
empowered; civilized and independent; and uncivilized and dependent.  To the 
government, the removal era’s ends demarcated American Indians as dependent on the 
federal government and, hence, part of the nation, yet marginalized both literally and 
symbolically.  Concomitantly, the policy ensured that Native communities would enjoy 
the protection and guidance of the government from afar – on the farthest stretches of the 
U.S. nation. 
Moreover, territory became a pivotal space for the contestation of Native 
identities.  The government considered land a vital standard for U.S. citizenship.  
Individuals could be included as a part of the U.S. citizenry if they produced on their 
territories, consequently contributing to the nation-state.  American Indians were 
considered too uncivilized to toil on their territories, and as a result, the government 
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discharged their ownership rights to land based on this lack of cultivation.  Natives were 
granted occupancy rights based on a lack of territorial productivity.  These diminutive 
characterizations of Native communities as too uncivilized and childish to work their land 
rationalized the government’s doctrine of discovery, which pressed the nation to 
discover, conquer and civilize any territory in its midst.           
The above analysis demonstrates how U.S. governmental discourse elucidated 
these contested characteristics of American Indian identity and made clear the ways the 
U.S. government would interact with Native nations.  This certainty was codified for the 
government, though not always accepted by American Indian communities. Such 
ideological lucidity was assisted by the government’s endorsement of: a paternal 
relationship that at once considered American Indian communities part of the U.S. nation 
while simultaneously removing them to far reaches of the nation; a view of territory that 
granted American Indians agency as land tenants and withheld full agency based on a 
lack of land ownership due to an improper use of the land; a policy that included 
American Indians in the U.S. nation as a commodity to quell states’ rights and Native 
sovereignty; and a strategy of homogenizing Native nations that elided individual 
histories, geographies and past relationships with the United States.  Throughout the 
removal milieu, the U.S. government constituted a paternal and hybrid relationship 
between American Indians and the United States that allowed the federal government the 
superior license to subjugate Native communities.  And, the presidency appeared at the 
helm of policies dealing with American Indian sovereignty and identities.   
Such ideological and political resolutions to the Native question solidified the 
terms of the U.S.-Native relationship for the federal government until the late nineteenth 
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century.  In the 1880s, westward expansion brought white settlers and American Indians 
closer together, thus motivating a need to augment the relationship.  Native nations came 
into near proximity with the U.S. polis, and the government averred that assimilation was 
the best way to “deal with the Indian question.”251 And, as the policy moved beyond the 
halls of Congress and into practice within Native territories, resistance from American 
Indians complicated the Indian Removal Act.  The power of Native agency and identities 
was evidenced in the difficulty of the government’s implementation of removal.  The Act 
cemented identities for the U.S. government in the Jacksonian era, but Native nations 
rebutted this seeming lucidity.     
The U.S. government, therefore, was not the only party to the U.S.-Native 
relationship endowed with the agency to constitute identities.  In fact, the government’s 
seeming certainty of American Indian and governmental identities following the Removal 
Act became the impetus for Native remonstrance – especially as American Indians 
disagreed with the clarification crafted through removal.  As the next chapter argues, 
American Indian groups enacted a hybridity whereby “within a single discourse one 
voice is able to unmask the other” and to create a self-sovereign voice.252 That is, 
indigenous communities, in part, employed Jacksonian ideologies to resist removal.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
NATIVE RESISTANCE AND CHALLENGES TO IDENTITIES: 
THE INDIAN REMOVAL ACT 
Though the Indian Removal Act clarified governmental and Native identities for 
U.S. leaders, it did less to satisfy American Indians.  Native disagreements with the Act 
heightened the intensity of American Indian reactions to U.S. expansion and 
territorialism, but it was not the first time that Natives had rebutted removal.  As the 
administrations of Washington, Adams and Jefferson crafted treaties for “protection and 
friendship” – beginning with the Delaware Treaty in 1778 – they also called for small 
land cessions.1 And, while American Indian nations often conceded this land for the 
preservation of peace, there exist in the historical record plentiful signs of Native protest.  
In 1790, for instance, Cornplanter (Seneca) appealed to U.S. officials in Philadelphia to 
restrict the carving-up of tribal lands.  He pleaded, “consider me and my people, and the 
many injuries we have sustained by the repeated robberies … and depredations 
committed by the whites against us.”2 Ostensibly, the chief worried that future treaties 
would contain similar provisions of Native removal.  He had experienced similar removal 
dealings as had Little Turtle (Miami) who exhorted the Treaty of Greenville (Ohio) 
council in 1795: “you take too much of their [Miami, Weas, Kickapoos and 
Pottawatamies] lands away and confine the hunting of our young men within limits too 
contracted.”3 Similarly, a year before, Joseph Brant (Mohawk)4 all but gave up on 
trusting the U.S. government’s promises to curtail removal.  He said at a council in 
Buffalo, New York: “our patience … is exhausted, and we are discouraged from 
persevering [and moving] any longer.”5
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The U.S. government continued the “voluntary removal” of American Indians 
between the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 to secure more land for settlers and in the 
aftermath of the War of 1812 to protect frontier borders.6 Following suit, American 
Indians tendered their worries about increased removals.  In 1817, a group of Eastern 
Cherokees told Andrew Jackson – then an Indian agent – that “[o]ur choice is to remain 
on our lands and follow the pursuits of agriculture and Civilization as all the presidents, 
our Fathers, have recommended and advised us to do.”7 The respondents, here, 
employed the government’s own arguments (to cultivate tribal lands in the east) and 
constructions of paternal language to combat voluntary removal.   
Other early Native responses explicitly called into question U.S. plans for 
removal.  When Indian agents under the Monroe administration attempted to negotiate 
the next in a series of many removal treaties with the Konze Nation in 1825, Allegawahu 
(Konze) told them: “you treat my people like a flock of turkeys. You come into our 
dwelling places and scare us out. We fly over and alight on another stream, but no sooner 
… you come along and drive us farther and farther.”8 Allegawahu recognized how the 
U.S. government constructed Natives as animalistic, expendable and removable.  Most 
vitally, though, to the government’s typical insistence that the most current treaty would 
represent the final request for removal (“the Indians may have full confidence in the 
justice of the United States, respecting their interests” to land), Allegawahu exposed the 
hypocrisy of such promises.9 Popular historical impressions that American Indians 
exemplified the mythos of the “silent Indian” crumble here when considering such 
responses to removal.10 
227
Examining American Indian voice – and recognizing its rhetorical relevance – is 
vital to understanding historical moments such as the U.S. government’s nineteenth 
century removal policy.  As Clemmons points out, Native perspectives “must be 
incorporated into the historical narrative before a more nuanced and complete story of 
Indian-white relations in the antebellum era can emerge.”11 What is more, however, 
American Indian voice in intercultural exchanges with the United States should not be 
tokenized as merely present. Native voice moves beyond incidence and toward agency,
or the socially determined capability “to act and make a difference,” and to co-construct 
identities.12 As Lake explains, we discover that American Indian discourse is also vital 
for “the purposes of gathering the like-minded” and for serving “consummatory purposes 
prescribed by traditional Indian … precepts.”13 Native protests and resistance ultimately 
necessitated that the U.S. government persistently reconfigure the means and 
justifications for removal. To such ends, Native discourse both reflected and contributed 
to the larger debate about removal that took place within the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches.  Native resistance likewise complicated the implementation of the 
Indian Removal Act, which compelled U.S. leaders to cajole, lie, and ultimately force 
removal on Native nations.   
This chapter analyzes American Indian discourse surrounding the U.S. 
government’s removal policy by contextualizing Native rhetoric in the crucible of such 
Jacksonian ideologies as expansion, citizenship, territoriality, paternalism and 
sectionalism.  The chapter unfolds, first, by considering discourses of four of the “Five 
Tribes of the Southeast” (Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw, and Seminoles) for the ways that 
these nations confronted the U.S. removal policy and attempted to retain independence 
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outside the scope of U.S. interference and citizenship.  These four were the first affected 
by the Indian Removal Act and, as Satz asserts, were the “test cases” for the policy.14 
The Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw and Seminole nations resisted removal by reshaping the 
ways that Jacksonian ideologies played into the U.S. government’s decision to undertake 
removal.  Of note, these Native nations punctuated how their territorial rights were tied to 
a morally inheritant connection to their homelands. In the process, they bolstered their 
identities as independent, worthy, responsible, stable, just and godly.  They also 
contributed inventional strategies to anti-removal opponents, signifying that the U.S. 
government had fallen short of, and would continue faltering in, its paternal promises.    
Next, the chapter analyzes the Cherokee Nation’s anti-removal rhetoric for its use 
of republican and assimilative rhetoric and appropriations of the sectional conflict 
between the federal government and individual states in response to the removal policy.  
The Cherokee Nation quickly learned from the Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw and 
Seminole examples that challenging U.S. conceptions of expansion, citizenship and 
territoriality proved difficult.  Instead, the Cherokee leadership sought a type of 
discursive “bricolaging” that reconstituted republican principles and, likewise, made the 
most of America’s sectional politics.15 The Cherokee Nation demonstrated its identities 
as sovereign, politically savvy and morally inheritant of their lands, while also combating 
removal by hearkening to the Cherokee’s republican and assimilative character.  These 
qualities, they averred, demonstrated their fitness as sovereign groups outside the 
purview of U.S. citizenship. Moreover, the Cherokee nation rebutted the government’s 
monolithic construction of American Indian identity by differentiating Cherokee citizens 
from other Native nations by highlighting Cherokee amalgamation with the United 
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States.  These republican and assimilative inventional tactics – found in both Cherokee 
petitions and memorials to Congress and Chief John Ross’s rhetoric – made their way 
into anti-removal positions in the Senate and House.  The Cherokee Nation’s assimilative 
efforts appealed to the National Republicans because both opposed states’ rights and 
Jacksonian Democrats.        
Finally, the rhetoric of American Indians in the northwest and northern territories 
will be examined for the fashion in which they worked through paternalism and familial 
constructions to petition the U.S. government.  These Native nations possessed the gift of 
retrospect; that is, they could see how the Five Civilized Tribes failed in their resistance 
to removal and, thus, sought a different path.  Instead, the north and northwestern nations 
worked from pathos appeals – such as memories to amicable U.S.-Native relationships, 
deferent surrenders and their morally inheritant bonds to their homelands – to rejoin the 
Indian Removal Act.  And, they demanded independence from the U.S. government’s 
influences.  In turn, they bolstered their identities within the familial relationship as 
friendly and morally certain and, oppositely, constituted the government’s paternal 
identity as untrustworthy, sinful and unjust.  Furthermore, northern and northwestern 
nations were known to band together periodically in a type of pan-Indianism – or unified 
fronts “across individual Native nations”16 – that appropriated the government’s 
construction of American Indians as monolithic to empower Native communities with 
unified identities in their resistance to removal.17 
Overall, this chapter argues that American Indians worked through the 
government’s discursive frameworks as they sought to reconstitute Native and 
governmental identities.  Simultaneously, they challenged the removal policy of the 
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United States.  The government’s discourse left an entrée for American Indian resistance 
by addressing Native identities.  And, part of this rupture involved the rift between pro- 
and anti- removal advocates in Congress and the initial contestation over the places of 
American Indians in the U.S. nation and the government’s relationship to indigenous 
communities.  In 1796 George Washington warned the battling Federalist and Republican 
factions that internal divisions would lead to difficulties.  He argued in his farewell 
address that the “unity of government … is a main pillar in the edifice of your real 
independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad; of your safety; 
of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize.”  Faction, he continued, 
endangered the United States by weakening its unification and preventing the nation from 
“consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels and modified by mutual 
interests.”18 Prior to the solidification of the “Indian question,” American Indians worked 
through this factionalism and lack of clarity regarding identities to challenge these 
identities and, thus, to combat the Indian Removal Act. 
Specifically, the Five Civilized Tribes, Cherokee Nation and northern and 
northwestern nations sought autonomy as separate entities – outside the scope of U.S. 
citizenship.  To accomplish this, they reconstituted their identities as independent, worthy 
of territory, just, godly, responsible, stable, assimilative, friendly, certain and unified.  
American Indians also elucidated U.S. governmental identities, at times, as 
untrustworthy, sinful, ungrateful and unfair, violating the very notions of representational 
government upon which the U.S. government was founded.  American Indians disagreed 
with the hybrid identities clarified by the Indian Removal Act among U.S. leaders, and 
thus addressed the U.S. government’s identities by transforming the government’s own 
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inventional strategies into fodder for resistance.  Native identities were strengthened by 
responding to, and re-conceptualizing, the ways that the U.S. government: configured 
excluded American Indians from the U.S. citizenry, used Native identity as a commodity 
to elevate federal power, employed paternalistic language to diminish American Indian 
identity and configured territoriality.19 And, Native discourse contributed to the rhetoric 
of anti-removal advocates in Congress by offering National Republicans additional 
identity constructions to employ in the debate. 
Regarding territoriality, American Indians framed their rights to homelands 
through moral inheritance.  Such an ancestral connection to territory stood in stark 
contrast to the government’s conception of land as a conquest to be won through the 
doctrine of discovery.  Native insistence on their land rights – a key conception of their 
spiritual and civic identities – helped them retain some semblance of possession of U.S. 
territories.  After all, reservations given to American Indians by the Indian Removal Act 
were to be occupied and used by Native communities.  Moral inheritance, too, functioned 
as a foray into their demands for a sovereignty outside the scope of U.S. citizenship. 
Though they ultimately lost title to their homelands in the East, moral inheritance allowed 
American Indians a justification of territorial possession in the West.  Moral inheritance 
was woven through Natives’ self-identities as rightful and deserving owners of the land.  
Concurrently, American Indians characterized the U.S. government as a perpetual thief of 
Native homelands.   
Native resistance, thus, complicated the implementation of the Indian Removal 
Act.  Jackson anticipated in 1830 that removal would reach “a happy consummation” 
within one year of the act passing Congress.20 Even though the Native question had been 
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resolved by the U.S. government, he was mistaken – at least in terms of the Act’s 
implementation – as American Indian responses slowed down the removal process.  The 
conceptualization of removal did not translate easily into practice as American Indians 
opposed the Native and governmental identities clarified during the removal debates and 
with the act itself.   
An example of hybrid discourse, American Indian rhetoric appropriated the 
United States’ identity constructions of American Indians and the U.S. government as 
entrées to communicate back to the executive, legislature and judiciary, creating a more 
empowered voice.21 Native discourse also moved into the removal debate to impact 
negotiations prior to the passage of the Indian Removal Act.  As Senier contends, 
American Indian voice reveals Native identities as “bulwarks against and conceivable 
responses to nationalizing Euro-American traditions.”  American Indians, here, envisaged 
their “resistance not exactly as oppositional, but as dynamic and mobile,” revealing the 
transactional dynamics of U.S.-Native discourses.22 Native resistance – and the verity 
that removal took nearly ten years to complete because of indigenous rebuttals – 
demonstrated the rhetorical impact of American Indians.  In the end, the clarification of 
identities would not be settled for the U.S. government until American Indians were 
finally removed to reservations.  While Native communities continued refuting the 
removal policy in the East, the cemented place of American Indians in the U.S. nation 
remained contested even as the ideological uncertainties that were a part of the removal 
debate among governmental officials was addressed with the Act’s passage. And, U.S. 
governmental and Native identities similarly remained unresolved until removal reached 
a consummation in 1838.      
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CHOCTAW, CREEK, CHICKASAW, & SEMINOLE RESISTANCE  
 The Indian Removal Act commenced through a series of treaties with American 
Indian nations.  And, the first targets of the removal program were the “Five Tribes” of 
the southeast: the Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw, Seminole and Cherokee nations.  These 
nations were targeted because their lands in North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, 
Mississippi, Arkansas and Tennessee were the most coveted for American settlers who 
already lived in these territories and hoped to increase their land base. The Indian 
Removal Act did not, theoretically, force removal on the “Five Tribes.”  Rather, as the 
bill’s enactive clause explained, the President of the United States – at the controls of 
U.S.-Native relations – could select western lands “to be divided into a suitable number 
of districts, for the reception of such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to 
exchange lands where they now reside, and remove there.”23 
According to the language, here, American Indian nations could opt to either 
remove or remain on their lands in the East.  Satz argues that Jacksonians wanted to 
“promote removal without doing anything that would alienate public support by 
appearing blatantly immoral.”24 This was a particularly salient political position given 
the contentiousness of the Congressional removal debates. The Jackson administration 
and pro-removal advocates in the legislature could not unilaterally compel Natives to 
remove, lest the policy appear too imperial.25 Indeed, in Jackson’s Second Annual 
Message (1830), he intimated that Natives had a right to choose without provocations 
from the U.S. government. “We have as little right to control them,” Old Hickory said, 
“as we have to prescribe laws for other nations.”26 Of course, he also introduced in his 
address an irony of this self-selection: “we will unite in attempting to open the eyes of 
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those children of the forest to their true condition … by a speedy removal.”27 To 
Jacksonians’ spurious contention that removal would unfold free from inveigling, one 
needs only to view Secretary of War John Eaton’s 1830 instructions to his Indian agents 
on how to entreat for removal following the bill’s ratification:  “The chiefs, however, 
may be bribed – and then the way to the West will be open to the Indians … appeal to the 
chiefs … [away from united crowds and] apart at their own houses … rouse them … 
obtai[n] their acquiescence.”28 Eaton’s instructions revealed how American Indians did 
not necessarily accept the Indian Removal Act and the identity certainties it codified. 
Thus, the government faced doubt about how to administrate removal.  Many American 
Indians questioned the integrity of the Removal Act and its seemingly inconsistent 
enforcement, attesting to the agency of American Indians in resisting the policy.29 
The U.S. government’s removal plans – along with the ideologies of expansion, 
citizenship, territoriality, paternalism and sectionalism – formed the core of American 
Indian protests to removal.  As Prucha argues, removal treaties were negotiated “under 
varying levels of duress between 1830 and 1835.”30 Still, that the Indian Removal Act 
allowed for Native agency in deciding on removal and given Jackson’s claim that the 
United States could not control Natives akin to “other nations,” provided the breach for 
American Indians to challenge U.S. removal plans and demonstrated the political power 
that they wielded in the larger debate.31 The opportunity to engage in treaties, prima 
facie, attributed an important sense of agency to indigenous communities, and they seized 
this break to solidify their separate autonomy from the government    After all, treaties 
were formal agreements “between two or more fully sovereign and recognized states 
operating in an international forum.”32 The government’s lack of clarity on American 
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Indian identities also fueled Native protests.  If the government was uncertain about how 
the U.S. government should consider and treat Native communities, then American 
Indians had an investiture through which to rebut removal.  The Choctaw, Creek, 
Chickasaw and Seminole nations worked through the government’s ideological 
constructs and internal contentiousness to constitute themselves as independent, worthy, 
just and godly.  Concurrently, governmental identities were characterized as iniquitous 
and criminal.   Furthermore, the enactment of moral inheritance by American Indians 
rationalized their connections to homelands, demonstrating their agency rooted in 
ancestral and historical ties to their territories.      
“A Crucial Test Case”: Choctaw Rebuttals to Removal33 
The Choctaw Nation became the first to begin the removal process.  Furthermore, 
the nation provided the first instance of post-Removal Act resistance to Native 
displacement.  In September of 1830, Secretary of War John Eaton traveled to 
Mississippi to entreat with the Choctaws for their removal to a reservation in present-day 
Oklahoma.  The Choctaws were chosen, writes De Rosier, because the Seminoles were 
too disparately located in Florida to “pin down,” the Cherokee were in the process of 
challenging the Removal Act in the Supreme Court, and the Creeks and Chickasaws were 
in the midst of preparing to confront state legislatures.34 Speaking to leaders Peter 
Pitchlynn (Choctaw), Colonel Webb (Choctaw), George Harkins (Choctaw) and others, 
Eaton suggested that the Choctaw “keep at peace and be happy by removing, otherwise 
you will soon become wretched and miserable indeed.”35 To ensure the benevolent result 
of removal – preserving the Choctaw’s fate from “misery” – Eaton distributed gifts to the 
Choctaw leaders and people, warned that Mississippi could exert its will without federal 
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protection should the Choctaw not emigrate, and bribed leaders “with inducements 
including the promise of [choice] land grants.”36 
Following such pledges of rewards and grave prophecies, the Choctaw Nation 
signed the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek in Noxubee County, Mississippi on 
September 27 and 28, 1830.  The treaty codified that the Choctaw would “hereby cede to 
the United States, the entire country they [Choctaw] own and possess in the east … [so 
that] the Government [could] extend to them the facilities and comforts” it was not able 
to offer the nation east of the Mississippi River.37 The connection between benevolent 
care towards American Indians and governmental expansion was stressed in this passage 
and throughout Dancing Rabbit Creek more generally. Like Jacksonian arguments for 
removal, the Choctaw treaty predicated expansion on some veneer or “extension” of 
protection and reassurance.38 
Though the Choctaw Nation eventually signed a removal treaty, numerous 
members of the Choctaw community protested the United States’ efforts to displace them 
from their Mississippi homeland.  Choctaw discourse – both during the removal debate 
and after – refashioned the identities confirmed by the U.S. government’s removal policy 
through the enactment of memories to past Native sovereignty and by hybridizing the 
government’s paternally constructed relationship.  In this way, the Choctaw Nation was 
able to demonstrate its independence and worthiness of territory.   
 A primary rhetorical strategy of Choctaw resistance involved asserting their 
independence through the building of memories to a shared past between the U.S. 
government and American Indians.39 These memories often involved the championing of 
“American Creeds.” 40 In this vein, Choctaw rhetors reshaped the pillars of American 
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political culture – figures such as Washington and Jefferson, and foundational texts like 
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution – to secure a sovereign identity.  
Similar to the ways removal proponents hearkened to these collective histories to justify 
removal (especially with regard to the doctrine of discovery) Choctaws reconfigured 
these memories to emphasize their rights to retain tribal homelands.  Ostensibly, Choctaw 
rhetors crafted homologous, or structurally and substantively similar, examples of the 
past to empower themselves against removal. 
 A quintessential example of Choctaw independence woven through memory arose 
in a newspaper editorial written by Ames (Choctaw).  Arguing that the Choctaw Nation 
had a right to choose against emigration, he reasoned that before Mississippi and the 
United States came into existence, “the Choctaws existed here, an independent nation, 
governing themselves.”  He continued, “the United States never attempted to impose laws 
upon them, but implicitly acknowledged their inability to do it by treating them as an 
independent nation.”41 Claiming temporal primacy, Ames directly challenged the 
doctrine of discovery upon which removal discourse relied.42 Therefore, Native 
conceptions of their rights to territories worked through moral inheritance to the land, 
versus discovery and conquest. And, Ames demonstrated how historical connections to 
territory became a foray into sovereignty apart from the U.S. government.  
This type of predominance related to Choctaw identity also resonated with 
Senator Peleg Sprague in his anti-removal speeches during the Indian Removal Act 
debate.  He mentioned then that American Indians were owed some semblance of rights 
to land because they “had existed since time immemorial” on them.43 The likelihood that 
congressional leaders at least had access to Native anti-removal arguments is enhanced 
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by the notion that the Cherokee Phoenix (a Native-based newspaper) was distributed to 
Congressmen and reprinted in major metropolitan newspapers during the 1830s.44 
Concurrently, Ames also employed the Constitution to demonstrate Choctaw 
sovereignty.  While Jacksonians contended the Constitution provided for interference into 
Native affairs – Congress was emboldened “to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
… and with the Indian tribes” – Ames insinuated that American Indians being paired with 
“foreign nations” nodded toward Native sovereignty.45 To this effect, Ames remarked 
that “the right to admission [to sovereignty for Native communities] is secured by the 
Constitution, and Congress cannot impose conditions … for the right of admission was 
absolute, and could not be restricted or clogged by any law of Congress.”46 
Having established the Choctaw Nation as historically “independent” from the 
United States, Ames next argued that American Indians, in general, were not exactly fully 
included in the U.S. nation.  Even if the Choctaw were not protected as sovereign under 
the Constitution, Ames wrote, the U.S. government could not force them because 
American Indians were not truly part of the U.S. citizenry.  After all, he argued, “Were 
the Indians ever considered, or treated as a part of citizens? … Had they [Indians] ever 
had any voice in establishing any State Government, or forming the General 
Government? Never!”47 Ames appropriated a memory of the Constitution and early 
U.S.-Native relations, in part, to call into question the U.S. government’s identities as 
dominant.  That the United States proposed to remove the Choctaw Nation for protection 
appeared, to Ames, a misleading hypocrisy.  Representative Isaac Bates, during the 
House removal debate, borrowed this argument, noting that Native protection was a 
“farce”; instead, governmental protection was a “mockery” and a “contrivance” for 
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Jacksonians to acquire more land.48 To the U.S. government’s self-professed identity as 
benevolent, Ames retorted: “I confidently assert then [when] the United States [said it] 
has the power to protect the Indians, and their present possessions, or the promise of 
future protection … it is illusory and vain.”49 
During the removal debates, Pushmataha (Choctaw) and Puckshunnubbee 
(Choctaw) crafted a memory of the “friendly” Jefferson administration to juxtapose the 
territoriality of the U.S. government and to hearken to Native independence.  The rhetors, 
here, challenged early governmental concepts of Native sovereignty to the land based on 
Jacksonian expansion: 
It is said we have no claim to the land here … How different is this from the 
language of the illustrious Jefferson, -- ‘go home,’ said this great and good man to 
our fathers, ‘build your houses, clear your fields, and cultivate the earth.’  Said he, 
‘as you live in peace with me and mine … you shall live upon your lands 
undisturbed.’50 
Pushmataha and Puckshunnubbee employed the memory of Jefferson as an authoritative 
argument to remain on their homelands.  As early as 1803, Jefferson asked American 
Indian nations to remain in the East in order to “improve.”51 The Choctaw Nation had 
taken his advice.  Thus, Pushmataha and Puckshunnubbee averred, “If ever the Choctaw 
character is renovated, here is the place to do it – if we are ever to experience the 
blessings of civilization, here is the place.”52 In addition, the tandem demonstrated a 
hybridity with the U.S. government’s argument that western lands were coveted by using 
what Deloria calls “Indian humor.”53 “If the country was so desirable,” they riddled, 
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“what keeps the white men from settling there?”54 Here, they demonstrated hybridity by 
turning the government’s arguments of territoriality against the United States.  
 George Harkins (Choctaw) similarly made an appeal against removal by 
refashioning U.S. governmental and Native identities – the latter as admirable.  He began 
by reflecting on how the Choctaw Nation attempted to fulfill its “duties” to the United 
States and, hence, was worthy of land.  He said, “[t]aking as an example from the 
American government, and knowing the happiness which its citizens enjoy, under the 
influence of mild republican institutions, it was the intention of our countrymen to form a 
government assimilated to that of our white brethren.”55 Employing the fraternal 
language of the U.S. government, Harkins had to admit that such assimilation was all for 
naught: “The man who said that we would plant a stake and draw a line around us, that 
never should be passed, was the first … to drew [sic] up the stake and wipe out all traces 
of the line.”56 Pessen remarks that Jacksonians understood such incongruity, for they 
“were fully aware that their doctrine [discovery] … was all the more specious because its 
assumption of Indian savagery was untrue.”  Jacksonians knew that members of the Five 
Civilized Tribes, of which the Choctaw Nation was part, had moved beyond this 
“savagery” when they had begun small attempts at assimilation – the Cherokee being the 
most successful at the assimilative task.57 And, removal opponents like Bates were quick 
to point out the assimilative efforts of the Five Civilized Tribes.58 
The concept of whites possessing “the right to take lands of ‘inferiors’” no longer 
jibed with American Indians because the Indian Removal Act had punished Native’s 
worthy efforts of assimilation.  Of this idea, Harkins lamented, “we hope in the name of 
justice, that another outrage may never be committed against us and that we may in the 
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future be cared for as children, and not driven about as beasts, which are benefited by a 
change in pasture.”59 Notice the way that Harkins borrowed the language of paternalism 
and animalism and used it against the United States through a revised history of events.  
He traipsed the line of pro-removal confusion over savage and childish identities.  In the 
process, the hybrid relationship of the government as controlling and American Indians 
as subjugated was called into question. The U.S. government was shown to have 
committed injustices; the government had violated its own dominantly imposed 
boundaries and had treated its so-called wards as objects.60 Here, Harkins resituated the 
hybrid connection cemented through the Indian Removal Act.  Such insecurities over the 
government’s actions in the removal debate reverberated throughout the debate in the 
U.S. Congress in particular.   
Though Harkins’ and others’ rhetoric came some eighteen months following the 
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek it is vital for the way it constituted identities and 
contributed to the anti-removal position.  Not only are such “voices of the excluded” 
important “to understanding controversy,” but they are also, prima facie, constructive.61 
American Indian voices in these instances demonstrate Bhabha’s concept that cultures 
“emerge within a range of discourses as a double movement.”  For instance, American 
Indian anti-removal discourse succeeded in refashioning the way that American culture 
and the U.S. government “read” the history and politics of identities surrounding the 
Indian Removal Act.62 If this were not the case, why then would Representative William 
Storrs, referring to a Choctaw memorial he had received, use the memorial to call into 
question the U.S. government’s benevolent identity in relating with American Indians?63 
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Rhetoric in this vein also did the same for how Native communities viewed the course of 
removal events. 
Choctaw discourse also constituted Native identities as worthy of consideration 
by hybridizing familial language and appropriating of the government’s constructions of 
identities.  Working through the paternal relationship crystallized in the removal bill, 
Choctaw rhetors turned the tables on the removal policy by appealing to the very 
language of paternalism and protection – as well as the constructions of U.S. supremacy 
and American Indian inferiority – codified by the removal policy.    For instance, at the 
Dancing Rabbit Creek counsel in 1830, Colonel Webb (Choctaw) redirected the United 
States’ justification for removal, based on a weakened Native identity, toward a reason 
for the Choctaw to seek help.  “Brother, when you were young, we were strong; we 
fought by your side …You have grown large and my people have become small,” Webb 
said, confirming U.S. might and exceptionalism. “Brother, my voice is weak; you can 
scarcely hear me … it is the wail of an infant. I have lost it in mourning over the 
misfortunes of my people.”64 Because the perception that the U.S. government was 
strong and Native identities were feeble, Webb intimated that the United States should 
take special care to uplift the Choctaw by leaving them alone.  This was Senator 
Theodore Frelinghuysen’s contention all along: that if the government’s identity was to 
include “benevolen[ce]” that it should act compassionately.65 This matter was especially 
resonant as Webb reminded the U.S. government that the Choctaw Nation had helped the 
government in the past and “taken you in while you were small … and broken.”66 
The hybridizing of paternal language also found an outlet in Pushmataha’s 
(Choctaw) discourse against removal.  Asking a council for protection against both the 
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state of Mississippi (which wanted to annex Choctaw land with or without the permission 
of the federal government) and pro-removal officials (who turned a blind eye towards 
Mississippi’s incursions), Pushmataha asserted:  
When we had land to spare, we gave it with very little talk … as children ought to 
do to a father. We hope our father will not be displeased; he has made us happy 
from our infancy; we hope the same protection will be found in the arms of our 
father as formerly. When a child awakens in the night, he feels for the arm of his 
father to shield him from danger.67 
Like Webb, Pushmataha contended that the United States “father” had always received 
what it wanted from its “children.”  He also illustrated the passing down of land from one 
family member to another – a key component of moral inheritance. As a result of this 
paternal relationship that seemingly benefited United States land demands and aided 
Choctaw protection, the chief used the very language of the U.S. government to ask, yet 
again, for more protection.  Pushmataha, also, intimated that the Choctaw Nation had no 
more land to spare, and that they gave what they had without confrontation.  To use the 
chief’s metaphor, when in the dark – that is, locked out of removal decisions between the 
state and pro-removal federal officials – the Choctaw Nation expected to find the U.S. 
government’s protection.  Again, this line of argument was reflected in the removal 
debate, especially as senators and representatives relied on Native accounts to make their 
points against the Jacksonians.68 After all, the federal government relied so heavily on 
paternal machinations to craft their own identities; the identities were bound to be 
questioned.69 
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Some have viewed Pushmataha’s conciliation as evidence that he agreed with 
removal.70 And, admittedly, he did fight with the United States against the British during 
the War of 1812 and was amenable to U.S. policy at times.  Still, though, his rhetoric here 
could be viewed as a hybrid, whereby he employed the structure, metaphors and identity 
constructions of the U.S. government to forge a request for retention of the Choctaw’s 
homeland.  Hoxie argues that American Indians’ use of hybridity does not presuppose 
accommodation on the part of Native communities.  Instead, “these were people who had 
been exposed” in some way “to the teachings of civilization” or American principles.  
They, obviously and therefore, could strategize within the parameters of western 
language and “pic[k] out its flaws.”71 This strategy carried over into the removal milieus 
of the Creek and Chickasaw nations.   
“The Middle Nations”: Creek and Chickasaw Defiance  
 The U.S. government next moved to negotiate removal treaties with the Creek 
Nation in Alabama and the Chickasaw Nation in northern Mississippi during the course 
of 1832.  In the case of the Creeks, several attempts at entreating had proven exhaustive 
and futile to U.S. Indian agents.72 The federal government then proceeded to allow 
whites in Alabama to encroach illegally on Creek lands.  When the Creek Nation 
petitioned the U.S. government for help in quelling Alabama’s territorial violations, the 
government strategically reiterated its argument that only removal could protect 
American Indians from state influence.73 The excusal of white encroachers, and the 
subsequent arguments for removal salving the state-Native conflict, proved cyclical.  In 
this way, Indian agent John Coffee chided a Creek council in September of 1830: “To 
these laws [Alabama’s], where you are, you must submit; there is no preventative – no 
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other alternative. Your great father cannot, nor can congress [sic] prevent it … Your great 
father’s earnest desire is, that you may be perpetuated and preserved as a nation … in 
your consent to remove to a country beyond the Mississippi.”74 Couched in a rhetoric of 
benevolence, Coffee hinged indigenous “perpetuat[ion] and preserve[ation]” on allowing 
whites to expand into Native territory. 
What is more disturbing about the Creek removal is the fashion in which tribal 
leaders were actually tricked into signing a treaty.  As Satz contends, the Treaty with the 
Creeks (March 24, 1832) “was not a removal treaty.”75 Instead, the treaty promised the 
Creek Nation that its land would be re-districted, and that “at the end of five years, all the 
Creeks … shall receive patents thereof in fee simple, from the United States.”  In fact, the 
treaty boldly and unequivocally outlined how “it shall not be construed so as to compel 
any Creek Indian to emigrate, but they shall be free to go or stay, as they please.”76 This 
demonstrated how the logic of removal did not translate easily into lived policy.  Instead, 
the U.S. government was forced to resort to lies and force to implement removal, thus 
alluding to American Indians’ resistive agency.  Still, however, the Creek Nation was 
compelled to emigrate as the U.S. government passively allowed even further white 
incursions.77 
The Chickasaw Nation suffered a similar deception.  Like their Creek neighbors, 
they, too, were flayed open to white encroachment as the U.S. government looked 
askance.  As Washburn argues, “the threat of state jurisdiction” and violence “was the 
club used to intimidate the Chickasaws.”78 The combination of breaches from northern 
Mississippians and the failure of the U.S. government to make good on its promises of 
protection finally forced the Chickasaw Nation to relent.79 The opening clause in, what 
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came to be known as, the Pontitock Creek Treaty (October 20, 1832) stated that “The 
Chickasaw Nation find themselves oppressed in their present situation; by being made 
subject to the laws of the States in which they reside … Rather than submit to this great 
evil, they prefer to seek a home in the west.”  And, the United States would grant them 
this “home” and uplift the Chickasaw Nation from federal “oppression.”80 Of course, 
these tinges of benevolence were quickly followed with the decree: “the Chickasaw 
nation do hereby cede to the United States, all the land which they own in the east.”81 
As with the Choctaw Nation, the Creek and Chickasaw communities attempted to 
refute the arguments for removal despite the dangers outlined by the federal government.  
Perhaps viewing the Choctaw people’s appeals against removal as unproductive, the 
Creek and Chickasaw nations crafted a rhetoric that differed from the paternal language 
of Choctaw rhetors.  Specifically, the following analysis attends to how these nations 
employed moral inheritance, providential authority and ironies of expansion as they 
crafted hybridized rhetoric to confront the U.S. government’s removal objectives and to 
resituate the identities of the symbiotic U.S.-Native relationship, more generally.  In so 
doing, they spotlighted their identities as responsible, stable, godly and credible as 
perpetual owners of their land.  U.S. governmental identities of benevolence were also 
restructured as oppressive. 
One way that these nations resisted the U.S. government’s removal discourse was 
through a moral inheritance that alluded to Native responsibility.  A type of memory, 
moral inheritance ensures that the efforts and struggles of one’s ancestors are sanctified 
through a community’s conscientious actions.  Moral inheritance pledges to take up the 
mantle of a culture’s forebears so that those “who came before did not suffer, die or resist 
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in vain.”82 Just as pro-removal advocates hearkened to their ancestors as a way to fulfill 
their manifest destiny or “errand into the wilderness,” so too did Creek and Chickasaw 
rhetors rely on reminiscences of their predecessors in order to resist removal.83 
In protesting the Treaty of Ponticock Creek, for instance, Levi Colbert 
(Chickasaw) couched his rhetoric in the Chickasaw’s responsible identity and territorial 
link to its ancestry.  He said, “we never thought of exchanging our land for any other, as 
we think that we would not find a country that would suit us as well as this we now 
occupy, it being the land of our forefathers.”84 This hybrid discourse related closely to 
the rhetoric of legislators like Senator Peleg Sprague, who argued that Congress should 
act “correctly” in order to preserve the honor of the U.S. government’s roots and to pay 
tribute to the United States’ national creeds built through foundational documents and by 
“founding fathers.”85 Colbert continued – perhaps speaking in the tongue of U.S. 
rebellion against the British Crown – “… we cannot consent to be under your 
Government. If we should consent [to removal] we should be likened unto young corn 
growing and met with draught that would kill it” should we not remain with “our father’s 
graves.”86 Clearly, the Chickasaw ancestors, here, sustained the tenor behind the “young 
corn” vehicle – the Chickasaw Nation itself.  Without “roots” – its ancestors’ “graves” – 
intact the nation was sure to be killed, said Colbert.  U.S. governmental identities were 
constructed alongside the reliance of Chickasaw national identity on its physical and 
spiritual territory.  Ostensibly, should the U.S. government succeed in removing the 
Chickasaw people, then it would effectively terminate Colbert’s people through a type of 
spiritual “drought,” representing the deprivation of territorial homeland. 
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When the Creek Nation received word that a Jackson representative would meet 
them to negotiate the Treaty with the Creeks of 1832, Posey (Creek) resisted the 
territoriality of the removal policy with arguments about Creek identities rooted in just 
connections to the land.  Posey delivered a poem to Jackson’s representative expressing 
imminent woe should his community be forced from its ancestral territory.  He opined: 
“Oh, to wander where/The grey moss clings/And the south wind sings/Forever low, 
enchantingly/Of islands girdled by the sea/… I’ll journey back to them/Someday.”87 
Posey predicated Creek roots on its association to the land; he hoped to “journey back” to 
his fathers’ graves.  Posey rebutted removal rhetoric, which tended to weaken Native 
sovereignty by calling it “tenancy” and disconnecting it from Native ancestry.  Another 
poet echoed Posey’s sentiments.  S/he wrote that “here in infancy we played/Here our 
happy wigwams made/Here our fathers’ bones are laid/Must we leave them all?”88 Again, 
territory was confirmed as a central component of Native culture and identity through this 
rhetoric of moral inheritance. 
Tuske-Ne-Hau (Creek), Hopithle-Ho-Lo (Creek) and others connected their 
ancestral territory to the future of the Creek Nation and constructed their identities as 
responsible for, and generative of, their own posterity.  Reminiscent of the Constitution’s 
Preamble (“to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity”)89 these 
protestors explained to citizens of Alabama and Georgia that the United States 
“acknowledged, recognized, and guaranteed to the Creek nation forever, all the land that 
we now hold … we never can think of moving from it. Our children are near and dear to 
us; we must cherish and support them … we wish our children to live in peace” with our 
fathers and after we, ourselves fill graves, and “are dead and gone.”  The notion of 
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connecting ancestors to posterity in an atemporal way90 was also articulated by an 
anonymous Creek community member in 1833, who wrote, “Bress God, di berry fine 
country. Fadder, mudder, live here and chil’n – we no want to go nowhere else ‘t all.”91 
The passages above remind readers today that territory for nineteenth century 
American Indians was connected ontologically to Native culture and identity.92 The U.S. 
government’s connection to land tended to relate commercial or subsistent use of the land 
to citizenship based in productivity.93 According to Strickland, after all, Native people 
consistently argued against removal from homelands on the grounds that they “should not 
relinquish the land of their ancestors” or the source of their spiritual worth.”94 To critics 
of American expansion, the so-called “settlement” of the continent’s southeastern 
territory, in particular, was terribly flawed.  Robbins argues, for instance, that the idea of 
the doctrine of discovery “refused to acknowledge the presence of others who already 
inhabited the regions.”95 Needless to mention, there existed during the Jacksonian era a 
substantial disconnect between governmental and Native perspectives of territory.96 
Creek and Chickasaw communities also spotlighted their godly identities by 
relying on divine authority to protect their homelands.  Recall that the United States 
bivouacked its “assumptions of racial and cultural superiority as well as an insatiable 
desire for land, expansion and empire” with providential permission and support of its 
“errand” into the wilderness.97 The U.S. government viewed American Indians and their 
territories through the lens of terra nullis, the notion that Native land was “an unihabited 
or unimproved wasteland” that a god wanted domesticated by Europeans, versus “merely 
inhabited by aboriginal peoples.”98 Creek and Chickasaws operationalized the “Great 
Spirit” argument by authority in order to demonstrate to the U.S. government how 
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providence could likewise stand by American Indians.  This hybrid rhetoric retains 
vivacity, especially when we consider that, first, the United States honored the Christian 
tradition and might have found difficulty refuting Native claims to a god and, second, that 
the conversion of American Indians to Christianity relied on “proving to Indians” that the 
Christian god could save them.99 This was demonstrated by the anti-removal advocate’s 
continual assertions that the government’s paternal character required that it consider 
American Indians part of god’s people.  Even removal proponent Wilson Lumpkin 
assumed Native communities to be part of a “divine structure” – albeit beneath the 
auspices of a “supreme” governmental persona.100 
To safeguard their property, a council of the Chickasaw Nation protested removal 
by creating identification between itself and the U.S. government regarding godliness.  
Mingo (Chickasaw), M’Gilvery (Chickasaw) and Stimoluet (Chickasaw) pleaded, “[w]e 
hope to be let alone where we are, and that your people will be made to treat us like men 
and Christians, and not like dogs.”101 Here, the council reconstructed its identity not as 
savage or animalistic – taking advantage of the factional split in Congress over Native 
identities of savage/childlike – but rather as closer to the godly precepts of the United 
States.  They implored the government to consider fulfilling its religious philosophy of 
the “golden rule.”  Arguably, since the U.S. government did, in fact, accomplish its 
removal of the Chickasaw Nation, the government could be critiqued as having violated 
its own precepts.  Speaking of such hypocrisy, a Chickasaw poet hybridized Christian 
warnings about sin, and directed to the United States a query as to the justness of its 
behavior.  S/he wrote, “White men tell us God is high/Pure and just in yonder sky/Will 
not, then, his searching eye/See the Indian’s wrong?”102 Here, the poet transposed the 
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typical label of Native “savagery” with U.S. governmental identity.  If the U.S. 
government failed to consider the wrongs (sins) it committed against the Chickasaw, 
perhaps it was the savage partner in the U.S.-Native relationship.  (Were not American 
Indians accused of violating the “civilization of Christianity” considered savage by the 
U.S. government?)103 To this question, Shullushoma (Chickasaw) reminded the United 
States that, “[t]here is some of our white brethren as much savage as the Indian.”104 And, 
Representative Bates concurred in his rebuttal of removal in the House debate that 
Jacksonians were “heathenish.”105 
In an 1830 memorial to Congress, Yoholo (Creek), Tuckaubatchie Hajo (Creek), 
Tustenuggee (Creek), Smut Eye (Creek) and others united natural rights and property to a 
reliance on godly identity in order to justify the Creek Nation’s right to its homeland.  
The group claimed that: 
[a]s far back as their tradition is disposed to tell, long before they saw the 
ancestors of this Great Council fire … we were a free people, in the undisturbed 
enjoyment of those rights held sacred among men, derived from the Great Master 
of Breath, who created mankind equal and in possession of an unmolested 
enjoyment of life, and the blessings of self-government.106 
Here, the Creek argument to remain on its Alabama territory divested not in European 
contact and “doctrines of discovery” but in a god for “all time immemorial.”107 
Moreover, the “Great Master of Breath” endowed them with the natural rights of 
equality, freedom, the “enjoyment of life,” and the “blessings of self government.”  
Frelinghuysen agreed during the Senate debates, asserting that Native natural rights 
should provide “common bounties of a benignant Providence.”108 That the Creek Nation 
252
rooted its sovereignty in Frelinghuysen’s “benignant Providence” and natural rights to 
property seemed homologically similar to the Declaration of Independence.  Consider the 
Declaration’s famous line – “All men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness” – alongside the passage above.109 Overall, the Creek Nation tended to 
hybridize its discourse through authoritative appeals to a divinity. 
 Finally, Creek and Chickasaw nations resisted the Indian Removal Act by 
pointing out the ironies of American expansion and, thereby, illustrating the sagacity of 
indigenous identities.  In his Annual Report of 1832, Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Elbert Herring claimed that the Creek and Chickasaw treaties would “greatly tend to the 
improvement of their [Natives’] condition, and, at the same time, be productive of much 
benefit to the State of Alabama within whose confines their wide and extended 
possessions are situated.”110 The latter clause in Herring’s report caught the attention of 
removal dissenters in Congress and the Creek and Chickasaw nations.  To the latter 
groups, the idea of states garnering benefits at the expense of American Indian territory 
was farcical.   
As Speckled Snake (Creek) skeptically put it, the east would soon catch up with 
the west and the U.S. government’s identity as honest would then be inverted.  Speaking 
to a group of Creek and Chickasaw communities and U.S. officials in 1830, he exhorted: 
When the white man had warmed himself before the Indian’s fire … he became 
very large … He said, ‘You must a little farther, lest I should, by accident, tread 
on you’ … I have heard a great many talks … and they all begin and end the same 
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… ‘Get a little farther … [the new land] shall be yours forever’ Now he says, 
‘The land you live on is not yours; go beyond the Mississippi.’111 
Speckled Snake pointed out how every removal treaty negotiated between the Creek 
Nation and the United States had not been the last, despite territorial “in perpetuity” 
clauses typically contained in such treaties.112 One of the ways to resist removal, then, 
was to question the reliability and honesty of the policy.  The question of whether the 
U.S. government would “come there also” and expand was not trivial.  Frighteningly for 
removed American Indians, their skepticism about Native sovereignty in the West proved 
visionary.  As Satz contends, Native territory became associated with the American 
frontier, especially as “the United States entered upon an unprecedented era of western 
expansion” in the late nineteenth century.113 
“No Intention to Remove:” Seminole Resistance114 
The Seminole Nation, at first, resisted removal through discursive means, but in 
desperation turned toward physical confrontation following 1833.  As Wright 
summarizes, the Seminole people “were the only southeastern Indians who in any 
significant way violently resisted removal.”115 The path to violent resistance, however, 
did not inhere in the Seminole community itself.  Rather, much like the Chickasaw and 
Creek nations, the Seminole people fell victim to a falsified removal treaty that the U.S. 
government refused to recognize as invalid.116 
In 1832, Secretary of War Lewis Cass visited Seminole territories in northwest 
Florida and noted the nation’s despondency.  “These miserable people are now reduced to 
the utmost necessities of life,” he wrote to Jackson. “[I]ndeed they have been in penury 
and wretchedness for years and many have perished from starvation.”117 In typical 
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fashion, Cass sent Indian agents to offer food and clothing as a way to motivate the 
Seminole Nation’s consent to a removal treaty.  The benevolent tactic worked – “the 
promise of food and clothing in the treaty eased the negotiations” – and on May 9, 1832, 
a group of Seminole leaders signed the Treaty of Payne’s Landing.118 The treaty 
undoubtedly was signed, but only with the provision that before taking effect that a 
Seminole envoy would be able to assess the community’s tract west of the Mississippi.  
At the same time, the treaty promised independent reservations for the nation, but a last 
minute article was added that demanded the Seminole Nation “agree to emigrate to the 
country assigned to the Creeks.”119 Though the Seminole community, in the main, 
generated from Creek roots, they were not inclined to share territorial space.120 
Returning from their prospective reservation, most of the Seminole leadership 
denied the Treaty of Payne’s Landing.  Still, a minority portion of the leadership had 
approved of the treaty.121 These individuals confirmed the treaty in a renewal document 
called the Treaty of Fort Gibson on March 28, 1833.122 This refreshed treaty demanded 
that the Seminole Nation remove by March 28, 1836; the Treaty of Fort Gibson promised 
that the U.S. government would “designate and assign to the Seminole tribe of Indians, 
for their separate future residence, forever, a tract of country...”123 
As the time drew nigh, Seminole removal opponents argued that an outlying 
minority had secured the treaty of 1833, not those representing the Seminole people.  The 
Seminoles, it seemed, had “suffered from the government’s policy of selecting the group 
supposedly representative of a tribe.”124 They also worried about collusion with the Creek 
Nation in the West, as the Treaty at Fort Gibson, despite granting “separate future 
residence,” would blend the nations onto one reservation.125 When the Jackson 
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administration repudiated Seminole requests to reconsider the treaty, Chief Micanopy 
(Seminole) staged a number of raids on U.S. military forts beginning in 1835.  In one 
instance, Micanopy and his warriors ambushed Indian agents at Fort King, near present-
day Tampa, Florida.  Overall, the Seminole Nation demonstrated a resistance that “kept 
the United States army occupied for seven years and that was never completely 
overcome.”126 Here, the Seminole Nation illustrated how American Indian resistance 
could, physically, hinder the implementation of removal. This seven year conflict was 
dubbed the Second Seminole War.127 
In exploring the Seminole Nation’s resistance to removal, of note are the ways in 
which Seminole rhetors hybridized and reconstituted the U.S. government’s language of 
savagery.  Seminole leaders worked through the lack of clarity of savage/childish Native 
identities to refract savagery back to the federal government.  They parleyed this 
rhetorical strategy to resist the hierarchical relationship that removal discourse 
instantiated between indigenous communities and the U.S. government.128 At the same 
time, the Seminole Nation repositioned its identity as just and stable. 
Perhaps due to the bellicosity between the Seminole Nation and the U.S. 
government, Seminole rhetors tended to craft harsh invectives against the removal policy.  
In the same fashion that the United States constituted American Indians as “savage,” so 
too did Seminole respondents resituate the label of “savage” to reflect U.S. identities.129 
No Seminole rhetor demonstrated this hybrid strategy – that anti-removal advocates like 
Bates also employed – more than Coacoochee who spoke to a group of U.S. Indian 
agents to rebuke Jackson’s policy.  Combating the false promises involved in the treaties 
of Payne’s Landing and Fort Gibson, Coacoochee constructed the government as evil and 
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wild: “still he [U.S. government] gave me his hand in friendship; we took it … he had a 
snake in the other; his tongue was forked; he lied and stung us.”130 In his estimation, the 
government represented the serpent in a veritable Garden of Eden myth.  An 
untrustworthy character, the United States – said Coacoochee – extended friendship, 
perhaps even familialism (“he said [U.S. government] he was my father; he said he was 
my friend”) on the one hand and “stung” on the other.131 The “forked tongue” with 
which U.S. Indian agents negotiated the treaties confirmed for the Seminole Nation the 
dishonesty extant in the government’s promises.   
Coacoochee continued his hybridized invective by further constituting U.S. 
identities as savage.  “If your hearts are bad let me see them now,” he demanded of the 
Indian agents.  “[L]et me know they are dark with bad blood; but do not like a dog, bite 
me as soon as I turn my back.”132 The war chief insisted that the U.S. government make 
known its motives.  Instead of lying – for instance about garnering a Seminole majority in 
the Payne’s Landing and Fort Gibson treaties – Coacoochee exhorted the government to 
face up to the Seminole Nation.  As it remained, though, the U.S. government appeared to 
wait until the Seminole Nation was not looking to “bite,” or renege, on its promises.   
In contrast to molding savagery into an embodiment of U.S. identities, 
Coacoochee constituted the Seminole community as stable and just.  He seemingly did 
this to challenge the ways that removal rhetoric cemented the identities of American 
Indians as weakened and in need of preservation.  He argued, “[m]y word … is true to the 
heart,” he reported.  “[We] are not boys” and we can “die like a man” knowing we have 
“strong hearts and heads.”133 Osceola also exercised this type of hybridized “back 
talk.”134 He said in 1834 to General Wiley Thompson, an Indian agent, “I have done 
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nothing to be ashamed of; it is for those [who passed the removal policy] to shame.”135 
The unjust government should feel, he intimated, embarrassed by its actions to break its 
many promises.  Again, Osceola’s rebuke of governmental identities as dominant and fair 
worked to call into question what the removal act clarified in terms of the U.S.-Native 
relationship. In the “Song of the Removal to Oklahoma,” a Seminole poet echoed 
Osceola’s sentiments: “They are taking us beyond Miami/They are taking us to the end of 
our tribe.”136 Here, the unscrupulous U.S. government was constituted as detrimental to 
the Seminole Nation in its removal efforts by prompting the Seminole Nation’s demise. 
Jumper (Seminole), one of Osceola’s primary lieutenants, appropriated the U.S. 
government’s propensity to naturalize American Indians to reconstruct the evils of the 
government’s identity vis-à-vis the removal policy.  Equating Native identity to “trees of 
the forest” (a common trope in Jacksonian discourse)137 Jumper said: 
If you then spoil the tree of its bark, will it not die? There is nothing to carry the 
nourishing sap to support the branches. And if you lop off the branches, will they 
not die also? Such then is the case with my people. Take them from their forests 
and woods, where from childhood they have wandered, will they not pine and die 
also? … If by force you separate them … on a distant and … will they not long to 
be again with their friends and fathers?138 
In this passage, Jumper again created the impression that the U.S. government sought to 
carry out murderous plans.  Analogizing the Seminole to a broken tree – disconnected 
and core-less – Jumper enacted a hybrid rhetoric whereby the attitudes and metaphors of 
the United States were employed to clarify just how lethal removal was for the Seminole 
Nation.  Land for American Indians was directly linked to existence – loss of territory 
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equaled a loss of life.  This loss of land was consequently connected to ancestry and 
history, which underscored the construct of moral inheritance.  
Perhaps borrowing from, or even informing, the rhetoric of pro-removal 
advocates like Senators John Forsythe and Robert Adams, Jumper co-opted natural 
metaphors for anti-removal purposes.  If the U.S. government continued to label 
American Indians as natural and fettered, then appropriating its language for resistance 
was a sanguine anti-removal tactic.  In this way, the Seminole Nation pulled at the 
Congress’ fractious knot by hearkening to natural/savage metaphors versus the eventually 
solidified childlike identity attributed to American Indians.   
REPUBLICAN AND SECTIONAL APPEALS IN CHEROKEE RESISTANCE139 
The Cherokee Nation represents a unique case study in American Indian 
resistance to removal.140 Since the close of the American Revolutionary War, the 
Cherokee community followed the United States in its republican political forms.  To the 
charge that American Indians should “introduce among themselves the habits and arts of 
civilization” in order to “provide against the further decline and final extinction of the 
Indian tribes,” the Cherokee Nation replied with aplomb.141 They, in fact, undertook a 
number of republican projects in crafting their government.142 In addition, the Cherokee 
Nation assumed the practices of western dress, marriage, Christianity and agriculture as a 
part of their culture143 These actions placed the Cherokee Nation in a curious position 
between the Indian Removal Act’s insistence that Natives had not advanced and the 
Cherokee community’s efforts in fulfilling the U.S. government’s requests for 
“civilization.”  All in all, their accommodationism came to underscore their insistence on 
a separate autonomy outside the aegis of U.S. citizenship. 
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For these reasons, the U.S. government’s justification for removal based on a 
failure of American Indians to assimilate to the political, social, religious and economic 
practices of the United States fell to Cherokee scrutiny as specious.  In 1835, in the midst 
of removal negotiations with the Cherokee Nation, Jackson declared in typical style: “I 
am sincerely desirous to promote your welfare. Listen to me therefore while I tell you 
that you cannot remain where you now … [you cannot] flourish in the midst of a civilized 
community.”144 Cherokee leaders like John Ross (Cherokee), Elias Boudinot (Cherokee), 
John Ridge (Cherokee), and William Hicks (Cherokee) were understandably confused.  
Ross and Hicks, in an oft-repeated line of rebuttal, pointed out the inconsistency in U.S. 
removal aims: “The truth is they have seen and see daily, the rapid advances of the 
Indians in the arts of civilization, as well as in morals and religion … Among the 
Cherokees, where the most efficient efforts have been made, the improvements are truly 
surprising … What is the result of all the efforts … to remove?”145 Freylinghuysen read 
this statement into the Congressional record in 1830 in asserting that it was possible to 
“civilize the Indians” while allowing them to exist on their eastern homelands.146 The 
tensions involved in the U.S. government’s choice to either include Cherokee people as 
civilized wards or segregate them from the U.S. nation added to the dilemma of the 
Cherokee Nation’s removal.147 
Moreover, the discrepancies of the U.S. government’s removal plans were further 
complicated by other political contexts involving U.S.-Cherokee relations.  The federal 
government and Georgia wrangled incessantly over the responsibility of removing the 
Cherokee Nation.  On the one hand, Georgia claimed this duty, especially because gold 
had been discovered in the northern hills, and because it considered the Cherokee “too 
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ignorant and depraved” to remain a part of the Georgia’s citizenry.148 Georgia considered 
federal plans of removal too bureaucratic, cumbersome and slow. The state sought, 
instead, to usurp the Indian Removal Act by expediently widening its “authority and laws 
over her whole territory” and single-handedly removing the Cherokee.149 The U.S. 
government, meanwhile, attempted to embolden its influence over both American Indian 
nations and individual states.  For instance, Native territories were – to the Marshall 
Court – “so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States that any 
attempt to acquire their lands … would be considered an invasion of our territory.”150 
Chief Justice Marshall’s holding, here, exemplified his position of centering American 
Indian removal at the federal level.  Ostensibly, the Cherokee Nation had to challenge 
state and United States’ removal while concurrently proving themselves worthy as 
civilized members of both of these local and federal bodies.151 
As with the other “Five Tribes,” federal Indian agents asked the Cherokee Nation 
to remove following the ratification of the Indian Removal Act.  And, similarly, the 
Cherokee resisted as long as possible.  The nation was particularly inclined to argue that 
“the United States and its predecessors had already recognized the autonomy of the 
Cherokee Nation” by entering into past treaties and by approving of its national council 
and constitution.152 Cherokee removal negotiations were withheld until the Marshall 
Court adjudicated the Cherokee Nation and Worcester cases.  The high court declared in 
1832 that the Cherokee Nation’s sovereignty “vested in the government of the United 
States” and that decisions about the community’s removal were “committed exclusively 
to the Government of the United States.”153 Thereafter, the Cherokee Nation became 
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legally “removable.”154 The nation was given “independent” status, but only when it 
came to fighting back the tide of state-led removal.155 It still faced federal removal.  
Negotiations with the Cherokee Nation began in 1832, but were not concluded 
until 1835.  In the face of physical threats from both the federal and Georgia 
governments, a portion of the Cherokee Nation agreed to a removal treaty.  General 
Winfield Scott admonished the Cherokee Nation in spring 1835, “Will you then … 
compel us to resort to arms? God forbid! … the blood of the red man may be spilt … 
spare me, I beseech you, the horror of witnessing the destruction of the Cherokees.”156 
These threats resonated with the Cherokee Nation as they witnessed increased hostilities 
committed by whites in Georgia.157 
When the U.S. government ratified the Treaty of New Echota on December 29, 
1835, the document was criticized along the lines of the Seminole Nation’s treaties of 
Payne’s Landing and Fort Gibson.  A minority faction – a group called the Treaty Party – 
had signed off on the proposal to “hereby cede, relinquish and convey to the United 
States all the lands owned, claimed or possessed by them east of the Mississippi 
[R]iver.”158 The U.S. government, here, enacted a hegemonic force by promising 
personal favors to the Treaty Party, thus, garnering their consent through wheedling.159 A
majority of the Cherokee people – who self-identified as the National Party – rebuked the 
Treaty Party’s concessions and nullified the treaty.  According to Prucha, “factionalism 
was used by the United States in negotiating with the tribe.”160 John Ross, a leader of the 
National Party and officially elected President of the Cherokee Nation, castigated the 
Jackson administration for entreating with an unrepresentative group of the Cherokee 
community.  He said in 1835, prior to the Treaty of New Echota: “as the duly authorized 
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delegation of the Cherokee nation, here, we do most solemnly protest against any such 
arrangements being entered into with these [Treaty Party] individuals … do not throw 
any of these obstacles in our way.”161 Ross’s resistance helped slow the implementation 
of the Treaty of New Echota, demonstrating the impact of such indigenous rebuttals to 
removal.   
The Cherokee Nation, though, took advantage of these breaches and crafted 
identities infused with republican and assimilative dispositions.  If removal advocates 
argued that a “failure to assimilate” necessitated the removal policy, then crafting an 
identity based on amalgamation and American precepts would, surely, undercut the 
Indian Removal Act.162 In this way, Cherokee discourse worked through U.S.-centered 
ideas to formulate a hybrid rhetoric of resistance to removal.  John Ross was fond of 
replicating an appeal to U.S. republicanism as he argued, “the good faith … of the 
General Government, whose precepts and profession inculcate principles of liberty and 
republicanism, and whose obligation are solemnly pledged to give us justice and 
protection.”163 The enactment of assimilative and republicanism appeals appeared to 
demonstrate accommodationism on the part of the Cherokee Nation.  Considering the 
hybridity embedded in aligning their rhetoric with the U.S. government, though, 
Cherokee discourse, here, can also be judged as resistive; the hybridity provided a means 
to pursue sovereignty detached from the government.  At first glance, argues Konkle, 
“invoking civilization looks like a capitulation to EuroAmericans’ ideas about their 
inherent superiority.”  However, civilization served “as a means for Native peoples to 
disrupt U.S. political authority and, once the historical contradictions” of the removal 
policy “were taken into account, reject it altogether.”164 At the same time, the Cherokee 
263
Nation differentiated its identities from the so-called “monolithic” Native communities 
whose identities Marshall had codified as “domestic dependent” and “unassimilated.”165 
Assimilative Discourse in Cherokee Memorials, Editorials and Speeches 
Certainly, the enactment of assimilation and republicanism indicated the 
Cherokee Nation’s predisposition toward hybridizing their identities with those of the 
federal government. That assimilation and republicanism were contained in U.S. 
governmental forms – such as Congressional memorials, communiqués to the executive 
and in newspapers – also demonstrated the hybrid resistance inhering in Cherokee anti-
removal discourse.  Clair argues, for example, that the Cherokee Phoenix (the nation’s 
newspaper) and Congressional memorials verified the “cultivated and acculturated 
condition” of the community and did so through mediums “privileged by the dominant 
white society.”  Simultaneously, the Cherokee Phoenix and Congressional appeals 
offered the nation a rupture wherein it could “speak out on issues concerning the 
injustices directed against them.”166 
The bulk of Cherokee anti-removal discourse centered appeals on the Cherokee 
nation’s assimilative identity.  A Cherokee council in 1829 wrote, for instance, that 
removal was “remarkable because it had been the professed object of the government … 
to teach them [Cherokee] knowledge and the arts of civilized life” and now “it is quite 
immaterial what course of life [we] pursue, provided [we] vacate our lands.” The council 
pointed out the irony in the federal government’s move to punish the Cherokee Nation for 
assimilating.  The group continued, “a million fingers will point at us and a million 
tongues will hiss at us, if it [the removal question] is decided in favor of oppression and 
injustice.”167 Having already proven themselves amenable to western culture, the council 
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next turned their acculturation against the U.S. government to demonstrate the absurdity 
of removal.   
Through their assimilative efforts, Cherokee councils also constituted their 
identities as righteous and just, while simultaneously constructing the U.S. government as 
inconsistent and cruel.  To the fear that the people would “point” and “hiss,” Wood 
Pecker (Cherokee), Roman Nose (Cherokee) and others opined: “We consider it 
exceedingly vexatious to be perpetually teased… to part with our inheritance, just as we 
are beginning to occupy a respectable standing in the estimation of the Christians who 
know us … Must our prospects be always blasted? We think [the U.S. government] will 
answer, no.”168 Here, Wood Pecker, et. al. appealed to a sense of moral inheritance – a 
right to their territories based on ancestral and historical connections. They also called 
into question the U.S. government’s aim to unite Natives and whites under the aegis of 
civilization.  The men appealed to their white neighbors with a “rhetorical question” that 
was self-answered in the hope of moving the American public to recognize the same 
“hypocrisy” the Cherokee Nation observed.169 
Moreover, Cherokee rhetors typically configured their relationships with whites 
as amicable and moral, especially as both groups were connected through 
“civilization.”170 For instance, a council in 1830, addressed the American public, noting 
“Shall we be compelled by a civilized and Christian people, with whom we have lived in 
perfect peace … for whom we have willingly bled in war, to bid a final adieu to our 
homes, our farms?”  Second, the rhetors then glossed their moral identification with a 
call/response to the white audience: “No … We are sure the American people will not fail 
… to sympathesize with us in our trials and sufferings.”171 Again, assimilation – which 
265
in the past may have hobbled Cherokee sovereignty – in this instance was used as a 
resistive tactic against removal from not just ancestral territory, but also from assimilative 
living itself.  Senators Sprague and Frelinghuysen brought up the Cherokee Nation’s 
assimilation incessantly as an argument against the Indian Removal Act.172 Though the 
anti-removal advocates in Congress failed – and just because American Indian anti-
removal rhetoric was often “exercised in futility” – the latter’s power to exert voice was 
not occluded.  Clair notes that the Cherokee Nation “challeng[ed] social conditions” in 
the United States by entering the removal debate and fighting the act’s ultimate 
success.173 
The Cherokee Nation, at times, resisted removal by separating itself from the 
monolithic identities of American Indians who the government said was in need of 
assimilation.  Elias Boudinot (Cherokee) admitted the Native communities’ past primitive 
character in his first editorial in the 1828 inaugural issue of the Cherokee Phoenix. He 
reasoned, “There was a time … when darkness was sadly prevalent and ignorance 
abounded amongst them … it was thought to be a disgrace for an [Indian] to appear in the 
costume of the white man.”174 Boudinot, though, juxtaposed the previous Native “dark” 
identities with contemporary civilized Cherokee identities to illustrate how far his nation 
had advanced.   
His non-monolithic rhetoric was enhanced by the metaphor of the “costume.”  
The vehicle (“costume”) referred to the material accoutrements of assimilation (clothing), 
but most vitally to Americanized habits.  The Cherokee people, Boudinot averred, built 
their identities around practices of republicanism, Christianity and agrarianism.  At the 
same time, though, the “costume” could be shed, revealing a Cherokee identity 
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hybridized between Native traditions and acculturated Americanism.  The power of his 
metaphor, flourished by the way he resisted outright assimilation for his Cherokee 
audience while concomitantly highlighting assimilative identity for his white audience. 
Boudinot further glossed his double-vocality175 by reminding his Cherokee audience to 
hold its culture tightly (“aris[ing] Phoenix like from their ashes”) while in tandem asking 
them to bury their past savageries “deep under ground.”176 
Assimilative rhetoric as a resistance to the Indian Removal Act also bolstered the 
Cherokee Nation’s claims to sovereignty.177 The community’s rise to civilization had, in 
one poet’s estimation, proven that the Cherokee people should be left to govern 
themselves in their homeland.  S/he declared, “No, never! we wear not the shackles of 
slaves/And our fathers’ stern spirits would start in their graves.” Oppression may have 
inhered in the Cherokee’s savage state, s/he intimated, but with acculturation there’s “was 
the land of the free, our sacred home.”178 These sentiments were echoed by Cherokee 
Councilperson John Ridge who admonished the U.S. government in 1831: “You asked us 
to throw off a hunter and warrior state – we did so. You asked us to form a republican 
government – we did so. You asked us to cultivate the earth … we did so. You asked us 
to learn how to read – we did so.  You asked us to cast away our idols and worship your 
God – we did so.”179 Here, Ridge’s discourse merged with anti-removal advocates who 
questioned a removal policy based on a lack of assimilation.180 Because of these 
assimilationist habits, Ridge and Boudinot (also) demanded “in this land of liberty” that 
“we claim privileges of free men, and wish to have the right of disposing our lands” as 
we wish.”181 Clearly, Ridge and Boudinot amalgamated American identity with their 
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Cherokee identity.  Focusing on “republican government” and the “land of liberty,” both 
rhetors predicated Native identities on U.S. governmental notions of civic life.   
B--DB (Cherokee), a farmer in northern Georgia, corroborated this hybrid identity 
predicated on the U.S. government’s republicanism.  He asserted, “I believe liberty is as 
sweet to a Cherokee as it is to a white man” and I would not want to be “shackled with 
the ‘iron grasp’ of a despot.”182 Hearkening to the American Revolution and the United 
States’ struggle against the British Crown, B—DB reminded the federal government that 
his rights were analogous to any American farmer in his position.  It was then 
“humiliating,” he said, “to think, after making exertions to raise myself above the level of 
the most degraded of the human race … it should be declared that I have made no 
progress.”183 Instead, B—DB demanded to retain his territory in Georgia; to emigrate 
would taint his progress toward acculturation with “misery and degradation.”184 
Not unsurprisingly, Ridge, Boudinot and B—DB’s resistive rhetoric seemed to 
contradict the U.S. government’s interpretation of the intersection of assimilation and 
sovereignty.  Indian Commissioner T. Hartley Crawford reported just prior to the Treaty 
of New Echota that “experience has shown that, however commendable the efforts to 
meliorate a savage surrounded by a white population, they were not compensated to any 
great extent by the gratification which is the best reward of doing good.”185 Boudinot 
responded that any failure on the part of assimilation fell to the U.S. government’s 
unscrupulous identity as hypocritical.  The government deprived Natives of “their rights 
– the sacred obligations of treaties and laws have been disregarded … [this has happened] 
for no other reason than that the Cherokees have so far become civilized as to appreciate 
a regular form of Government.”186 Once again, the Cherokee Nation’s assimilative 
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identity was punished by the removal policy.  The problem for the United States vis-à-vis 
the Cherokee community, however, was that they could – as Boudinot pointed out – 
recognize and “appreciate” a republican form of government.   
John Ross’s Republican and Sectional Resistance 
 Republican character became the frontispiece of Cherokee President John Ross, 
who was perhaps the most outspoken opponent of the Indian Removal Act.  As leader of 
the National Party and a mixed-descent Cherokee, Ross straddled the literal borderlands 
of white American and Cherokee nationalist identities.187 Concurrently, he toed the 
political line between selling the Cherokee Nation’s assimilation as a rhetorical tactic to 
dissuade the U.S. government from implementing removal and using the community’s 
assimilation – and distinctiveness from other Natives – as a form of resistance.188 
Working from his political acuity as a constant representative of the Cherokee 
council to Washington, Ross positioned his discourse against removal in republican 
language.  For instance, in his 1829 annual message, Ross argued not from Cherokee 
identities rooted in the soil or ancestry, but in the U.S. government itself.  He explained to 
the Cherokee Nation189 that “our treaties of relationship are based in the principles of the 
federal constitution, and so long as peace and good faith are maintained, no power, save 
that of the Cherokee Nation and the United State jointly can legally change them.”190 In 
part, Ross spoke to the tenuous issue of Cherokee “custody” between the U.S. 
government and the Georgia legislature.191 That is, he capitalized on the factious debates 
in Congress over federal power versus states’ rights to position Cherokee identity as 
sovereign.   
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Moreover, though, Ross relied on an allusion to the founding operational 
document of the United States to demonstrate the importance of including American 
Indian voice in federal Indian policy.  In this way, Ross too trumped federalism over 
states’ rights.  Abrogation of the U.S.’s own recognition of treaties as two-partied would, 
therefore, violate the Constitution’s tenets.  Of this Prucha writes, “[t]reaties rested upon 
a concept of Indian sovereignty or quasi sovereignty … treaties made no sense unless 
based on recognition of some kind of special legal status of the Indians.”192 Denying the 
Cherokee Nation’s sovereignty gravely stained American republicanism.  Appealing to 
the federal Constitution, Ross used states’ rights as a wedge issue to appear favorable to 
the U.S. government.  This tactic worked in two crucial ways.  First, it functioned to 
expel state efforts to remove the Cherokee Nation.  And, vitally, it plied the sectional 
conflict, thus placing the Cherokee community on the federal government’s side.  
Combined with assimilative appeals, his republican and sectional argument sought to 
change the conception – codified by removal rhetoric – that Cherokee identity rated 
below the government in a hierarchy of ward/warden.          
 In the year following the Indian Removal Act, and of the Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia decision, Ross increased his resistance through republicanism and sectionalism.   
The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia case involved Ross, and others, forwarding a proposed 
injunction to prevent Georgia from encroaching on their territory.  Marshall held that the 
high court was “of the opinion that an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is 
not a foreign state in the sense of the constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the 
Courts of the United States.”193 Ross reconfigured Marshall’s decision and rooted the 
Cherokee community’s right to petition the Supreme Court in a republican memory of the 
270
Washington administration.  He wrote in his annual message of 1831 that “President 
Washington and his successors well understood the constitutional powers of the General 
Government … and that the judicial power would extend to all cases of litigation that 
may arise under treaties … it was determined … to defend the rights of the [Cherokee] 
Nation before the Courts of the United States.”194 That Ross anchored Cherokee 
sovereignty in American law and memory problematized the U.S. government’s position 
on removal by bringing to bear a possible lack of moral inheritance – not to American 
Indian ancestors who welcomed Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – 
but to the United States’ own forebears.  Here, Ross demonstrated the force of Native 
resistance and how it complicated the realization of removal.  For this reason, 
Frelinghuysen worried that the United States would “deviate” from its epochal and 
foundational “ideals” should removal commence.195 
As the negotiations of the Treaty of New Echota neared, Ross shifted his 
resistance to a rhetoric of “moral suasion.”196 Perhaps out of desperation or due to the 
Cherokee Nation’s futile attempts at forestalling displacement, the Cherokee president 
wove criticism throughout his anti-removal discourse.  He sidled the federal government 
in 1834 with a criminal identity.  That is, Ross lamented “the liberty, the freedom, and the 
life of the Cherokee are placed in jeopardy because they are left at the mercy of the white 
robber and assassin to be taken with impunity.”197 Notice how Ross enlisted the aid of 
key republican ideographs (“liberty,” “freedom,” “life”) to construct the identities of the 
U.S. government and the Cherokee Nation.198 The former was a perpetrator, stealing and 
killing, while concomitantly trampling its own tenets.  Meanwhile, the Cherokee people 
were victimized as part of the republican enterprise through connection to the United 
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States, and yet deprived of the federal government’s paramount ideological principles. 
The deprivation of moral inheritance also inhered in this incongruence. After all, averred 
Ross, the U.S. government conferred these rights and privileges on the Cherokee Nation: 
“… ‘Father’ was bestowed on him [U.S. president]. Under the fostering care and 
patronage of this government the arts of civilization and Christianization were 
successfully introduced … [and] improvement soon spread its happy influence over the 
whole country.”199 Ross, thus, reminded his U.S. governmental audience of the Cherokee 
people’s progress, appropriated Jacksonian paternalism to bolster his rebuffing of the 
removal policy, and constituted the U.S. government as wholly inconsistent.200 At the 
same time, the U.S. government was constituted as a thief stealing American Indians’ 
moral inheritance to their homelands.  For these reasons, Ross concluded “[we] will 
never voluntarily consent to remove west of the Mississippi.”201 
Finally, Ross’s resistant rhetoric criticized the U.S. government for violating 
representative democratic doctrine by signing the Treaty of New Echota with an 
unrecognized Cherokee entity – the Treaty Party.  Rather than confront Treaty Party 
leaders, who most likely chose to sign a removal document out of fear or under duress, 
Ross focused his reprobation on the world’s exceptional example of democracy: the 
United States.  “The will of the people was not then expressed,” he told the Jackson 
administration, because “[t]hat meeting consisted only of a small faction.” What is more, 
Ross wishfully suggested, “we cannot suppose that [the U.S. government] would want us 
to disobey the known will of our constituents” by acceding to the falsified Treaty of New 
Echota.202 Ross’s approbation alluded to how nineteenth century U.S. exceptionalism 
depended on the government’s “status as the apotheosis of the nation-form itself and as a 
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model for the rest of the world” – a notion that complicated the hypocrisies of the U.S. 
removal policy.203 Part of the representative democracy supported by the United States 
involved “the will of the people.”  How could the U.S. government deny the same 
republican consideration to the hybrid Cherokee Nation?  For this reason, Ross closed his 
letter by advising that “all is lost if the agreements of a few who arrogate themselves to 
power to deal with the rights and liberties and future of the Cherokee Nation” win out 
over truly elected representatives like those comprising the National Party.204 
Though the Indian Removal Act may have reduced the inconsistencies of 
American Indian and governmental identities – and the “Indian question” more generally 
– for U.S. leaders, Native communities did not always accept this clarity.  In the end, 
Ross’s (and the Cherokee Nation’s) discourse revealed how Native resistance 
complicated the implementation of the act.  As a result, the U.S. government was often 
inspired to use spurious means – such as coercion and deceit – to achieve its removal 
ends. 
 PATHOS IN NORTHWESTERN AND NORTHERN NATIVE RHETORIC 
 Though the Indian Removal Act focused primary attention on opening the lands 
of the southeastern United States, the “old northwest” – areas east of the Mississippi but 
north of the Ohio River – were also cleared through the removal policy.  Simultaneously, 
the remnants of American Indian nations in northern areas were also subsumed under the 
Jacksonian removal policy and were, in kind, asked to emigrate west.  Prucha argues that, 
as with the “Five Tribes,” the territories of the Shawnee, Pawnee, Kickapoo, Sauk, Weas, 
Piankeshaw, Pottawattomie, Chippewa, Mandan, Seneca, Wyandot and Delaware peoples 
were similarly sought “by the expanding agricultural society of the North.”205 As Indian 
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Commissioner William Medill noted in an annual report, northwestern and northern 
removal had to be sought “to leave an ample outlet for our white population to spread and 
to pass towards” the west and beyond “the Rocky Mountains.”206 The post-Removal Act 
era in U.S.-Native relations in these areas was a continuation of the past seventy years.  
Sam Houston, one of Jackson’s confidantes, also foreshadowed in 1831 that American 
Indians in the northwest and north would be “pushed back as white advance [was] made” 
in the wake of the Indian Removal Act.207 Thus, there was little question that the 
government’s consuming aspirations of removing the “Five Tribes” would motivate 
comparable action in the northwest and north.208 
Small land cessions had been made with these Native nations since the 
negotiation of the Fort Stanwix Treaty in October of 1784, which ushered in territorial 
trade in the north, and since the Northwest Ordinance in July 1787 that established the 
precedent of the U.S. government negotiating peace for land in the northwest region.209 
It was not uncommon during this period to discern in northwestern and northern Native 
discourse expatriate sentiments such as those noted in the Chippewa’s “removal song”: 
“The sound is fading away/Freedom/The sound is fading away.”210 American Indians 
tended to reflect the loss of homeland resulting from removal treaties.     
 The removal of northwestern and northern nations in the 1830s, however, proved 
difficult.  Whereas the “Five Tribes” lived on clearly demarcated land – territory that was 
familiar to the government – the northwest and northern territories included “enclaves of 
natives subsisting on agriculture and governmental annuities” in widespread and 
unknown areas.211 Adding these territories to the American land base promised to “create 
an extensive interior and a series of administrative headaches with which the existing 
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bureaucratic structure was unequipped to deal.”212 As a result, the U.S. government 
created a new bureaucratic agency – the Department of Indian Affairs – in June 1834 to 
“exercise a general supervision and control over the official conduct and accounts” of 
Native dispossession.213 
Another problem with these removals was that northwestern and northern Native 
communities witnessed from afar removal’s depredations for the “Five Tribes.”  
Removing the small pockets of remaining northern American Indians would take more 
effort; these nations, after all, knew the U.S. government’s strategies and oft-elusive 
treaty methods. To this effect, a group of Wyandot chiefs told U.S. Indian agents in 1832 
that “we express a distrust of the sincerity of the President in making them [treaties] and a 
disbelief that the Country to which we are invited to remove is such as has been 
represented.”214 Therefore, the U.S. government performed a face-saving task in 
transferring Indian Affairs to the new Department of the Interior.215 The “supervisory 
and appellate powers” previously exercised by the “tainted” War Department would 
move to the Interior.216 The transfer attempted to start anew with American Indian 
nations in the northwest and north.217 
Regardless, the U.S. government’s removal policy came home to the American 
Indian communities of the northwest and north as Jacksonians found success with the 
southeastern nations.  And, American Indian removal in these areas subsisted into the 
1850s through the 1870s with the “sudden leap of the nation’s [United States’] 
boundaries … in the Trans-Mississippi West.”218 The “Five Tribes” became symbols of 
removal’s achievements.  That is, if the federal government could compel the so-called 
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obstinate southeastern nations to remove, then – surely – removal was viable 
elsewhere.219 
The following analysis considers how the northwestern and northern nations 
designed memories of cordial and familial contact between Natives and Europeans as 
well as the neighborliness fostered between American Indians and the U.S. government 
to challenge removal.  This strategy hybridized the U.S.-Native relationship by 
hearkening to pathos and paternalism as a last resort to challenge the identities clarified in 
removal rhetoric.  By co-opting and creating hybrid memories, these nations were able to 
point to the inconsistencies that were part of removal.  And, such inconsistencies aided 
their demands for independent status far from the influences of the government and U.S. 
citizenship. Throughout their discourse, northwestern and northern communities 
constructed U.S. governmental identity as sinful and untrustworthy.  Concomitantly, 
these American Indians resituated their identities as friendly and morally certain.   
Northwestern and northern nations also appropriated the Indian Removal Act’s 
homogenization of Native cultures in order to build a unifying pan-Indianism, or a 
“commitment to bond” across tribal borders to create “an Indian confederacy” of sorts.220 
Their discourses did so by parrying individual community language and referring, 
instead, to American Indians as a whole.   
“Like Outcasts Upon the World”: Northwest and Northern Resistance to Removal221 
Cordial and familial memories between the U.S. government and Native 
communities comprised a great deal of northwestern and northern resistance to removal. 
The Mandan Nation – which had been friendly with the United States since Lewis and 
Clark traveled among them in 1804 – justifiably crafted this hybrid discursive tactic of 
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memory to elevate its identity as friendly.  They thought that convincing the government 
of this identity would save them from removal.222 The Mandan people supported 
President Jefferson’s explorations into the “old northwest.”223 Bearing this context in 
mind, it would make sense then that Four Bears (Mandan) crafted familialism with the 
U.S. government through a retelling of their joint histories.  He said, we have always 
“loved the whites … to the best of my knowledge” and have “always protected them 
from the insults of others, which they cannot deny.”  Not only that, but the Mandan 
“never saw a white man hungry but what he [Mandan people] gave him to eat, drink, and 
a buffalo skin to sleep on.”224 Four Bears equalized the hierarchical relationship of 
ward/warden and protected/protector hybridized by the U.S. government’s removal 
discourse wherein American Indians were considered weakened.  Instead, the Mandan 
were stable and had “done everything that a redskin could do for them [Americans].”225 
At this point, Four Bears argued that the United States had not lived up to its side 
of the familial relationship.  To his own question, “How have they [U.S. government] 
repaid it?” Four Bears responded, “with ingratitude!”  He pronounced that the United 
States “had deceived me.”  Historically thought to be fraternal, the United States – the 
chief continued –  “had turned out to be my worst enemies … but today I am wounded … 
by the same [whom] I have always considered and treated as brothers!”226 In this 
passage, Four Bears clarified how the U.S. government’s removal efforts violated a 
memory of the governmental identity as familial.   
 Red Jacket (Seneca) employed a similar construction of Native identity as 
friendly by protesting the removal of the Seneca and Delaware nations in 1830.  The 
Seneca was part of the Six Nations, a group that entreated with the U.S. government at 
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the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1794, and who were relatively affable with the United 
States.227 Red Jacket began his speech to U.S. Indian agents by hearkening to a “contact” 
myth: “Brothers, in the time long past, all of your red brethren owned all this great island. 
Your ancestors came over … then asked us to give them some land … We done to you as 
we would have wished you to have done with us … We did help you … it seems to me as 
if you [now] wrench the last portion of land away from us.”228 Like Four Bears, the 
Seneca chief narrated the past with constructions of fair and helpful Native identities in 
contrast to European neediness.  This relationship illustrated the Native consideration of 
land as a gift – part of moral inheritance – to be bestowed in exchange for peace, versus 
taken outright through force   Similarly, the United States had failed to fulfill its 
friendship with both the Seneca Nation and “all” of the government’s “red brethren.”  
Moreover, linking numerous Native nations together not only improved the Seneca 
community’s condition by demonstrating power in numbers, but consummatorily it also 
showed other indigenous groups that the Seneca was determined to stand together in 
opposition to the removal policy.  He seemingly channeled monolithic Native identities 
into a powerful bloc – a collective pan-Indianism. 
 Speaking of territoriality and the difference between Native and U.S. 
understandings of land value, Red Jacket also relied on a divine creation myth to link 
Native identity with moral inheritance. He argued in the same discourse (as above): “I 
cannot believe the Great Spirit ever intended that there should be a class of men raised 
up, pre-emption holders who should have exclusive privilege of buying lands.”229 Recall 
that American Indian conceptions of land – nearly across individual indigenous cultures – 
tended to value territory as a homeland and as spiritual harbors.230 Red Jacket’s 
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discourse, here, was reverberated by Sosehawa (Seneca) who reminded his white 
audience in 1855 that “The Great Spirit, when He made the earth, never intended that it 
should be made merchandise.”231 Sosehawa, as well as Red Jacket, exemplified well the 
position of American Indian territory.  Interestingly, both of their discourses manifested 
through a memory of rights by providential design.   
These certain natural rights were not restricted to the Seneca Nation.  Rather, the 
godly right to land was shared by all American Indians as a whole. Sosehawa reminded 
his governmental and Native audiences that “the Earth” was created for “all of the Great 
Spirit’s red children.”232 Though not overt as Pontiac’s 1763 pan-Indian discourse or 
Tecumseh’s 1811 recruitment rhetoric, Sosehawa did co-opt removal rhetoric’s 
cementation of American Indians as a monolith and directed it into a unifying rhetorical 
tactic.  If the U.S. government was going to elide individual Native cultural identities, 
then Sosehawa and like-minded leaders seemed to parley the derision into a cohesive 
resistance. 
 Providence, as an appeal to authority, furthermore undergirded American Indian 
hybridization and led to the enactment of “sin” as a tactic of resistance.  Akin to U.S. 
governmental charges against “savage redskins” as ungodly, William Apess (Pequot) 
transposed the purveyors of sin, and saddled the U.S. government as sinful and, perhaps, 
uncivilized.233 In his 1831 biography, Apess questioned, “Can you charge the Indians 
with robbing a nation almost of their continent, and murdering their women and children, 
and then depriving the remainder of their lawful rights, that nature and God require them 
to have? … If all the nations of the world were put together, and each sin had its national 
crimes written upon it … which skin do you think would have the greatest sin?”234 In 
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this passage, Apess demanded that the United States view itself self-reflexively; given the 
government’s past treatment of American Indians, he queried, how the United States 
could burden Native identity with the weight of sinfulness?  Apess illustrated hybridity 
by, first, accepting the U.S. government’s negative construction of the Pequot as weak – 
indigenous people could not, for instance, deprive “lawful rights.”  Second, however, 
Apess used the U.S.-directed weakness as a resistive rhetoric to scrutinize the abuses of 
power practiced by the U.S. government. And, he couched this in the agency of “Indians” 
as a unified community. 
 Kănakûk (Kickapoo) similarly labeled the U.S. government’s territoriality as 
“sinful.”  He reminded General William Clark, Indian agent at St. Louis, that “the Great 
Spirit told me – the land belongs to him. The Great Spirit told me that no people owned 
the lands – that all was his.”235 Kănakûk argued against removal by recrafting the 
“errand into the wilderness” component of U.S. expansion.  Just as a godly presence 
spoke to the U.S. government and allowed it to charge into the frontier, so too, did the 
Kickapoo chief claim god spoke to him with the opposite request.236 Softening his 
charge against the government, Kănakûk continued: “The Great Spirit holds all the world 
in his hands … everything belongs to the Great Spirit.”  The chief worried, though, that 
should the United States commit the sin of removal – interfering in the Kickapoo 
Nation’s natural rights to their homeland – that the Great Spirit would “make the earth 
shake, or turn it over” and that “all skins, white and red, can not stop it.”237 Both 
American Indians and the United States would suffer for the sins of the U.S. government.  
As a last resort, Kănakûk admonished the U.S. government from lying about its removal 
aims.  “If you write anything wrong,” he exhorted, “the Great Spirit will know it.”238 
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Here, the government’s deceitful abridgement of Natives’ moral inheritance to their 
territories became a sin against God. 
“That Disgraceful Affair”: The Case of Black Hawk239 
Some northwestern and northern nations surrendered to removal when all hope 
appeared lost.  Their gift of hindsight likewise became a detriment to overt resistance.  
However, surrenders also challenged the hierarchies hybridized by removal rhetoric by 
pairing irony with moral certitude.  Black Hawk’s (Sauk) surrender rhetoric represents a 
key example of this veiled resistance. Though Black Hawk’s surrender unfolded through 
mortification,240 he simultaneously preserved Sauk sovereignty through his newly-
acquired Native/American hybrid identity that allowed him to offer a defiant double-
tongued rhetoric. 
Black Hawk’s conciliation to U.S. ascendancy allowed the chief an entrée into the 
American imagination.  That is, his surrender made him a “safe” subject for the American 
public to approach and consume.  Black Hawk’s objectification did not singularly harm 
him through a weakening of ethos, as historians have argued.241 Rather, his widespread 
and passionate American audience commanded a new presence for the chief.  Black 
Hawk funneled his newly recognizable agency into an opportunity to address the public 
outside the scope of Indian agents.  He accomplished the task of talking directly to the 
U.S. government and the American public through the publication of his autobiography.   
In the spring of 1832 the Sauk Nation journeyed back east to their former Rock 
River, Illinois, home.  Violating their removal treaty they sought a reprieve from the 
separation suffered following their new life on the reservation.242 The return was 
instigated as a peaceful means of survival.  Black Hawk harbored no plans to assault the 
281
U.S. settlers already squatting on the Sauk’s former territory.  The U.S. government, 
however, viewed the homecoming as a sign of an “aggressive warpath.”243 Major 
General Edmund Gaines exhorted the Sauk: “I came here, nether to beg nor hire you to 
leave your village,” Gaines exhorted. “My business is to remove you, peaceably if I can, 
but forcibly if I must!244 Still, Black Hawk’s nation refused to budge.  U.S. troops, then, 
engaged them in a bloody battle that ended with the Sauk Nation displaced from its 
home.245 
According to popular reports, Black Hawk surrendered in early September 1832 
under a veil of despondence.246 But, Black Hawk’s surrender also marked a point of 
resistance.  He crafted a rhetoric of moral certainty that reconfigured Sauk Nation’s 
identity as just and the government’s identity as evil.  Moral certainty worked, here, as a 
veritable Trojan horse.  That is, the chief, having secured the eyes and ears of the 
American reading public, cloaked his moral defiance in sardonic benevolence.  For 
instance, in contrasting his present and past conditions against the current state of the 
United States he related that: 
I am now an obscure member of a nation that formerly honored and respected my 
opinions. May the Great Spirit shed light on your’s – and that you may never 
experience the humility that the power of the American government has reduced 
me to, is the wish of him, who … was once as proud and bold as yourself.247 
On its face, his discourse appeared to be a sobering resignation.  However, alternate 
explorations of Black Hawk’s rhetoric reveal how dastardly the U.S. government 
functioned: it reduced character, weakened honor, dissipated respect and diluted pride.  
He identified with his audience by praying to the “Great Spirit” that they would never 
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have to suffer the disgraces and oppression lobbed by the United States at the Sauk 
Nation.  The moral certainty of pairing his own kindness with the U.S. government’s 
tyranny allowed Black Hawk a chance to issue a resistance that, Bhabha argues, “enables 
a form of subversion” that “displaces the space” of the dominant.248 
Black Hawk also wove a morally certain Native identity throughout his 
autobiography in less covert ways.  This, simultaneously, pegged the U.S. government as 
sinful and untrustworthy.  In discussing the Sauk Nation’s displacement from its ancestral 
land – a violation of moral inheritance – the chief crafted an invective against U.S. land 
squatters.  Black Hawk, here, reversed the roles of American settlers and Sauk members.  
He insisted, “The whites were complaining at the same time that we were intruding upon
their rights! THEY made themselves out to be the injured party, and we the intruders!
And, called loudly to the great war chief to protect their property.”249 Appealing to the 
U.S. public’s senses of reason and justice, Black Hawk called into question the justness 
of the Indian Removal Act.  He closed his resistance by charging the Americans with 
double-crossing: “How smooth must be the language of the whites, when they can make 
right look like wrong, and wrong like right.”250 Black Hawk’s use of antithesis – the 
pairing and conflation of “right” and “wrong,” in this case – scrutinized whether the 
removal policy was, indeed, fair.  And, Sauk identity was crafted as innocent and morally 
certain. 
 The elevation of the Sauk Nation as morally certain formed the centerpiece of 
Black Hawk’s autobiography.251 As a strategy of resistance, moral certitude worked on 
both veiled and superficial levels to refashion the hybrid relationship built through 
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removal rhetoric.  Clearly, for instance, Black Hawk offset his nation’s identity as moral 
from the United States’ depravity: 
It has always been our custom to receive all strangers that come to our village or 
camps, in time of peace, on terms of friendship – to share with them the best 
provisions we have, and give them all the assistance in our power … the white 
man will always be welcome in our village and camps, as a brother …We will 
forget what has past – and may the watchword between the Americans and [Sauk] 
and Foxes ever be – Friendship!252 
The Sauk were positioned as helpful and humane in addition to morally inherent of their 
homelands. In addition, despite being oppressed through removal and indignity, Black 
Hawk and his community were willing to forgive the past degeneracy of the United 
States.  This implied criticism was conspicuously confirmed when Black Hawk wrote: “I 
had not discovered one good trait in [Americans] …They made fair promises, but never 
fulfilled them!”253 Black Hawk promoted the morality of his people above the impiety of 
the Americans, thus challenging the hierarchy of identities codified in the Indian 
Removal Act.  
 Perhaps the most robust fashioning of a moral Native identity came with Black 
Hawk’s censuring of the United States for its unashamed and impertinent acts of 
violence.  He related to the public, for instance, “Our people were treated badly by the 
whites on many occasions. At one time a white man beat one of our women cruelly for 
pulling a few suckers of corn out of his field.”254 Also not lost in Black Hawk’s 
translation was the notion that “whites were not satisfied until they took our village and 
our grave-yards from us and removed us across the Mississippi.”255 Such deprivation of 
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American Indian moral inheritance to their territories spotlighted the U.S. government as 
a thief. 
Under the aegis of moral certitude, Black Hawk’s rhetoric tendered a resistance 
by revising the historical narrative of the Black Hawk War and the chief’s surrender 
milieu.  Black Hawk’s ability to speak as a so-called ward provided him the hybridized 
license to “unmask” the government’s language.256 Use of his new-found agency – 
allowed through ruptures in the government’s agreement over Native identities – also 
helped him resist American domination through self-constitution. 
Black Hawk’s moral appeals gave the Sauk Nation, more generally, a chance to 
refashion a just self-identity.  It was no surprise that Black Hawk’s narrative opened with 
a singular, yet complex, motive: “Before I set out on my journey to the land of my 
fathers, I have determined … to vindicate my character from misrepresentation.”257 The 
chief aimed to resituate the Sauk Nation’s moral fiber and to recover its honor in 
opposition to the weakened character afforded it through the removal milieu.258 
According to Black Hawk, peace became the primary maxim of the Sauk Nation.  He 
said, for instance, “I must contradict the story of some [American] village criers … This 
assertion [that the Sauk murdered] is false … my nation never killed a white woman or 
child. I make this statement of truth, to satisfy the white people among whom I am 
traveling.”259 Even in the midst of removal, Black Hawk said his people were willing to 
“remove peaceably” had it not been for American atrocities.  Eschewing the common 
mythic storyline of the Sauk Nation’s belligerence, then circulating within the U.S. 
public, Black Hawk reminded his audience that “[we] were determined to live in peace.”   
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CONCLUSION 
Although the institutional rhetoric of removal neither uplifted nor sustained 
Native sovereignty, it ironically “provided a mechanism for resistance to [governmental] 
authority and an opening for critique on the part of Native intellectuals and leaders in the 
nineteenth century.”260 American Indians resisted removal by using “an identity … 
constituted in terms of the dominant system of representation” as a conduit to reflect back 
and refashion U.S. governmental and Native identities.261 Krupat argues that such 
enactment –whether by a Native rhetor or through a white interpreter – suggested a 
concealed defiance by mingling nineteenth century American Indian voice within 
“Western traditions.”262 Or, as Harjo and Bird put it, indigenous communities reinvented 
the “enemy’s language” in order to “turn the process of colonization around.”263 
Simultaneously, anti-removal advocates in the House and Senate appropriated or 
mirrored American Indian rebuttals to removal in their own discourse.  This transactional 
discursive relationship alludes to the hybridity at work concerning U.S. governmental and 
Native identities.  
Prior to the Indian Removal Act, American Indian identities and the fashions in 
which the U.S. government related to indigenous communities remained contested and 
ambiguous.  Through the debate over, and codification of, the act, however, Congress 
constituted a hierarchical relationship that allowed the federal government superiority 
over American Indian nations that were deemed weakened and dependent.  This was only 
strengthened once removal was consummated.  As the government crafted these hybrid 
identities, American Indian sovereignty was limited, federal power to entreat with Native 
nations was elevated above states’ rights to do the same and American Indian individual 
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cultures were homogenized into a monolith to be dealt with identically.264 While the 
Act’s codification, and the actualization of removal, lessened the ideological 
contestations within American institutions, the Removal Act faced considerable 
resistance when U.S. leaders attempted to implement its stipulation in practice. 
 The foregoing analysis revealed the ways that American Indian communities 
resisted the relationship hybridized by the Indian Removal Act and its attendant rhetoric.  
Native resistance worked through the ideologies that the U.S. government set as guiding 
frameworks: – expansion, territoriality, paternalism and sectionalism.  In so doing, Native 
nations challenged the removal policy while concomitantly reconstituting governmental 
and American Indian identities through the transformation of the government’s 
inventional strategies.  Native resistance, too, emphasized a conception of sovereignty as 
involving independence outside the sphere of U.S. citizenship.  And, American Indian 
discourse influenced the removal era debate and complicated the practices of removal.  
At the same time, American Indians contested the U.S. government’s framing of 
territory through the doctrine of discovery with a discourse of moral inheritance.  
Natives’ ancestral connection to territory did not prevent removal, but it may have 
ensured that they would be able to occupy some land on their western reservations.  
Simultaneously, moral inheritance allowed American Indians a route to insist upon a 
sovereignty outside the scope of the U.S. civis. Vitally, moral inheritance was enacted 
through Natives’ self-identities as rightful and deserving territorial owners.  And, Native 
communities constituted the U.S. government as a robber of indigenous land. 
 Moreover, American Indian resistance challenged removal by slowing down the 
implementation of the policy and often motivating the U.S. government to resort to 
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cajoling, deceit and – at times – force to accomplish removal.  As the U.S. government 
engaged in these unethical means of removal it provided further evidence for American 
Indians who challenged governmental identities as paternal, benevolent and civilized.  
Instead, the government was shown by Natives to be untrustworthy, sinful and excessive.  
Such challenges to the clarity of identities created through the Indian Removal Act speak 
to the impact of Native agency.   
 The codification of American Indian and governmental identities resolved the 
inconsistencies of the U.S.-Native relationship for the United States.  And, this was fully 
realized once American Indians were removed to reservations. However, the 
government’s resolution of identities did less to satisfy American Indian nations, as 
demonstrated in the foregoing discussion.  While ultimately succumbing to removal, 
though, the power that Native agency sustained through removal was the ability to talk 
back to U.S. leaders, thus impacting constructions of both indigenous and governmental 
identities and establishing a commitment to resistance that would remain part of the 
debate’s legacy.   
Through removal, American Indian communities were constituted by the 
government as dependent and, yet, culturally and spatially segregated from the U.S. 
nation by the end of the removal era.  As manifest destiny caught up with removed 
Native nations in the West, however, the U.S. government was faced with another 
challenge.  With no more land to which American Indians could be removed, the 
executive, legislature and judiciary had to decide how American Indian identities figured 
in the expanding U.S. territory and citizenry.  The government opted for a new 
assimilation program predicated on Natives’ dependency.  As the next chapter 
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demonstrates, American Indian identities as dependent and childlike would be fortified 
through the government’s allotment policy.  The government promised U.S. citizenship, 
but such pledges deflated, thereby weakening Native sovereignty more.   And, Chapter 
Five, then, indicates how American Indians were split on whether to pursue U.S. 
citizenship as state-like residents through allotment or to seek a separatist sovereignty in 
the vein of foreign national status.  In either case, allotment era Natives entered into pan-
Indian bonds to resist the inconsistencies of the Dawes Act of 1887. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GOVERNMENTAL RHETORIC AND THE SOLIDIFICATION OF 
IDENTITIES: GENERAL ALLOTMENT (DAWES) ACT 
 By the post-bellum period, the residues of the Indian Removal Act had seemingly 
clarified the hybrid identities between the U.S. government and Native communities for 
the federal government.  American Indians were considered dependent wards of the 
government, but existed apart from the U.S. nation on segregated reservations.  
Concurrently, the government’s paternal identity allowed it the license to influence and 
manage Native territories and affairs.     
However, the late nineteenth century expansion of the United States reopened 
questions of identity by bringing western settlers ever closer to the reservations staked 
out for the removed Native nations.  Recall that George Harkins (Choctaw) resisted 
removal by arguing that the policy would only temporarily separate the U.S. government 
and Native nations.  He predicted in 1832 that the United States would plant “a stake and 
draw a line around us, that never should be passed,” but that as the nation expanded it 
would draw “up the stake and wipe out all traces of the line.”1 Harkins’ words proved 
prophetic as encroachments into reserved Native territories increased, yielding some 100 
million acres for the United States by the end of the 1880s.2 The United States caught up 
to the reservations in the West and every removed Native community was “encircled by a 
rising tide of farmers, miners and entrepreneurs.”3 President Grover Cleveland put the 
Native nations’ position bluntly, noting: “Civilization, with the busy hum of industry … 
surrounds these people at every point.”4 While, during the removal era, American 
Indians were isolated on the far reaches of the U.S. nation, “all of this now changed” as 
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no indigenous community was “outside the bounds of organized government and 
society.”5 This renewed contact between whites and American Indians posed new 
questions about Natives’ places in the civic sphere.   
As a result of the “opening of the western frontier,” the U.S. government and 
American Indian nations traditionally located in the West were forced to confront one 
another. Suddenly, Frederick Jackson Turner’s “meeting point between savagery and 
civilization” came to bear as roads, railways, settlers and industries traversed areas west 
of the Mississippi.6 The meeting of western Native nations and the U.S. government 
involved a number of skirmishes instigated by continued American expansion.  With 
“shocking speed” American Indians who had previously “avoided American contact” 
suffered a “complete military defeat.”7 With each U.S. victory between the 1850s and 
the 1880s came more efforts to place Natives on reservations.8 After some thirty years, 
with most western American Indians removed to reservations, General William T. 
Sherman concluded in 1883 that “I now regard the Indians as substantially eliminated as 
a problem of the Army” and that the government’s victories in what came to be known as 
the Indian Wars had “settled forever the Indian question.”9 However, Sherman was 
incorrect in his assumption that the end of the Indian Wars resolved the “Indian 
question.”10 
During the 1840s through the 1880s, such contact caused a great deal of inquiry 
over how the United States would interact with American Indians.  As Dippie argues, “an 
impending crisis in Indian affairs had been mounting since the 1840s when continental 
expansion fatally compromised the theory of Indian isolation out west.”11 The question 
of “what to do with the Indian” troubled the government, especially as the United States 
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continued to subsume territories west to the Pacific Ocean.12 The question soon became 
how to treat American Indians; should they be left to their own tribal independence on 
reservations or should they be brought into the U.S. nation as productive citizens – albeit 
on reservations – owing an allegiance to the United States (versus individual tribal 
nations)?  One thing was sure: “the West was won; the wilderness and its Indian 
population were confined to reservations … the land was used up … the Indian had 
stubbornly refused to vanish,” and white settlers desired American Indian land.13 
Furthermore, the government supposed that Native labor could contribute to both the 
widening of agricultural and industrial enterprises in the West and American Indians’ 
own assimilation into U.S. culture.14 
Few governmental officials and public citizens advocated for American Indian 
independence on the reservations.  The fear therein was that, alone, “they will continue in 
so dispersed a condition [away from ‘civilization’] that it will be difficult to do anything 
towards their permanent improvement.”15 In turn, the government thought that Native 
communities might hold tight or revert back to their so-called ills of “apathy, barbarism 
and heathenism,” therefore engaging in more warfare.16 Instead, Jefferson’s assimilation 
program reappeared as a possibility now that the U.S. government and American Indians 
were, once again, in such close contact.  The government’s assimilation policy – versus 
outright isolation – was “about to be tested for the last time.”17 
The government’s stance was that assimilation would benefit American Indians 
by converting them into productive members of the U.S. nation.  Such goals differed 
from the government’s segregationist discourse during the removal era, wherein 
American Indians were to remain dependent, yet separated from the U.S. nation.  Native 
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assimilation and citizenship in the late nineteenth century was unsurprising, however, as 
American Indians now lived in closer proximity to the civic spaces.  Concomitantly, the 
United States worked to assimilate new European immigrants; a wave of assimilationist 
ideology certainly took hold nearing the twentieth century, impacting U.S.-Native 
relations in the process.18 Enacting paternalism, the government was “to take [the 
Native] by the hand and set him upon his feet and teach him to stand … then to walk, 
then to dig, then to plant, then to hoe, then to gather, then to keep” in order to prepare 
Natives for citizenship.19 
American Indians, especially the western nations, were no longer enemies.  There 
were fewer threats in the West as U.S. settlers and industries expanded outward with the 
aid of military protection.  Now, however, the government sought ways to siphon more 
land from the reservations and to protect its interests while concomitantly “uplifting” 
indigenous communities.20 An 1874 article in the Republic illustrated the hybrid role that 
would reemerge with this invigorated policy of assimilation: “They are wards, children in 
their minority, to be cared for as such, and fitted to become citizens by education, 
civilization and a practical knowledge of industrial pursuits.”21 The reification of U.S. 
paternalism demonstrated here punctuated the U.S. government’s efforts of “civilizing” 
American Indians during the 1880s. 
Assimilation was to be achieved mostly through the policy of allotment.  
Allotment redrew reservation lines and sectored tracts to individual American Indians.  
The rationale therein was to divide “collectively held Indian lands into individually 
owned parcels” to discourage communalism and the continuation of so-called 
“uncivilized” modes of living such as hunting, gathering and subsistent farming.22 
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Through the practice of “individualizing” American Indians, the government hoped to 
“civilize them piecemeal” by eventually eliminating “tribal” structures and ceasing 
socialistic practices of shared land.23 The latter was a hazard to the capitalism flourishing 
in the West through agricultural, mining and natural resource industries.  The allotment 
policy – passed in 1887 as the General Allotment (Dawes) Act – also provided that if an 
individual Native “adopted the habits of civilized life” he could be “declared a citizen of 
the United States.”24 As will soon be discussed, this new law – as the Fourteenth 
Amendment proved for African Americans against the backdrop of Jim Crow – was 
legalized, yet ignored.   
This chapter situates the government’s discourse concerning the policy of 
allotment, and the Native and U.S. governmental identities it helped crystallize, in the 
ideologies of expansion, citizenship, territoriality, republicanism and paternalism vital to 
the late nineteenth century United States.  The chapter opens by exploring the pre-Dawes 
Act discourse espoused by the U.S. government’s executive and legislative branches as 
both sought to implement allotment.  This analysis argues that the Interior Department, 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, and U.S. presidency during the 1870s and early 1880s 
continued the removal era’s discursive formations of American Indian identities as 
dependent.  Native identities were also reduced to a problem that could only be solved 
with dependency on the government.  However, whereas the removal era witnessed the 
government enacting paternalism to separate American Indians from U.S. culture, the 
allotment era involved the use of paternalism to integrate Native communities as they 
came in closer contact with the U.S. nation.  This integration hinted at Native agency, but 
also further homogenized American Indians as an administrative problem.  Part of the 
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paternal discourse couched the language of allotment in the justification of protecting 
Native communities from white encroachment and against “extirpation.”  Concurrently, 
the government constituted itself as a paternal and dominant force in “uplifting” its 
“American Indian wards.”25 
Based on the paternal hierarchies constituted by the executive branch, the Senate 
took up the Coke Bill in 1881 to implement allotment as a civilizing device.  I contend, 
here, that the legislature’s rhetoric of allotment channeled the problem/administrator 
relationship into a way to exert federal control over American Indian communities to 
open more land for settlers.  The executive and legislative rhetoric of the pre-Dawes Act 
era diminished Native sovereignty and identities by continuing the removal era trend of 
cordoning off American Indian communities into even smaller tracts of land.    
Next, the chapter examines the Congressional deliberations on the allotment bill, 
the Dawes Act and Indian Commissioner reports about the allotment policy.  I argue in 
this section that the Dawes Act itself and the discussions surrounding its passage (which 
centered mostly on cost) reduced American Indian identities to commodities; that is, 
American Indians could only be considered civilized “citizens” if they produced on the 
land that was allotted to them. The land, thus, was constructed as a space for 
commodification that functioned as a civilizing agent and the means to U.S. citizenship.  
In this way, the U.S. government created a hybrid relationship that symbiotically 
provided civilization and education for American Indians only in exchange for what they 
could generate for the U.S. government.  Speaking to this point, Fixico asserts that Native 
communities were part of the “larger colonized cultures of the mainstream … [they] were 
victimized in numerous ways as, with land to sell and lease, they were forced into a 
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capitalist economic system” despite their proclivities towards communalism.26 At the 
same time, the Dawes Act predicated citizenship on a “severalty” process that likened 
American Indians to untrustworthy children. Commodification also reified a monolithic 
Native identity created during removal, ensuring that their diminution was static across 
reservations.  Indian Commissioners took a step further by ensuring the end of tribal 
structures and assimilation to the U.S. nation. Here, the U.S. government worked from 
paternal and administrative roles to hybridize a hierarchical “American family” that 
weakened American Indian sovereignty. 
Finally, the chapter analyzes the way that the U.S. Supreme Court cemented the 
hybrid identities between American Indians and the U.S. government in order to elevate 
federal power over all future U.S.-Native relations.  I argue that the Court’s intrusion into 
Native affairs and its reliance on the plenary doctrine27 occluded the nation’s “wards” 
from any future decision-making.  Moreover, Native sovereignty was eroded as the so-
called citizenship granted through allotment proved futile as both a legal defense and in 
public practice.  Overall, the Supreme Court further codified the exclusive right of the 
government to act on behalf of American Indians and clarified the homogenized moniker 
of “ward” for Native communities – both of which contributed to the U.S.-Native hybrid 
relationship.  The Supreme Court erased any vestiges of Native citizenship and, instead, 
buttressed the removal era’s construction of Native identities as dependent and separate. 
Ultimately, the chapter argues that the allotment policy worked to further clarify 
the place of American Indian identities in the newly expanded U.S. nation.  The 
government enacted a role as republican father that sought to train American Indians for 
possible citizenship.  This citizenship could only be had through toil and proper use of the 
322
land, which would contribute to the broader American family. Land, here, functioned as a 
space of commodification which, when cultivated, constituted a pathway to citizenship 
for American Indians – a means of civilization.  During the removal era, the government 
viewed territory through the doctrine of discovery or the conquest and productive use of 
the land.  This discovery notion fell away in the 1880s, shifting instead to images of 
productivity and citizenship for American Indians.  In a sense, the shift evidenced the 
conflation of citizenship and territory made vital in the removal era.  Concurrently, the 
possibility of Native toil on their allotted reservations and, hence, their prospects as U.S. 
citizens pointed to the ways that Natives’ moral inheritance came to bear in the Dawes 
era.   
Though the Dawes Act promised individualism and citizenship should Natives 
follow this republican path, allotment further braced a hybrid and hierarchical 
relationship through which the government retained a dominant place in deciding Native 
affairs, therefore continuing the diminution of American Indian sovereignty and identities 
that began with the Indian Removal Act.  To this point, Porter asserts that the “the shift in 
federal Indian policy [to allotment] worked to bring about an erosion of inherent 
sovereignty” and so-called “uplift.” 28 Government discourse also demonstrated a 
retrenchment of executive authority as the Interior Department and Bureau of Indian 
Affairs managed the bulk of Native policy.  Again, the increase in executive influence 
over Native affairs worked from the legacies of the removal era.  
In the end, allotment fell short of granting sovereignty and civilization as its 
pledge of citizenship faltered.  Instead, American Indians were further constituted as a 
homogeneous group left to the whims of the federal government.  The hybridized 
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relationship solidified between American Indians and the U.S. government represents the 
ideological and rhetorical residues of the removal policy.  And, this hybridity exhibits the 
identity duality of U.S. citizenship, especially for groups of color, where such individuals 
were pledged to shun past national (or tribal) commitments in exchange for citizenship 
rights. Land functioned as the spaces where such economic productivity and citizenship 
possibilities were cultivated and expected to flourish. Such individuals, however, were 
nonetheless still removed from the civic spaces of power because of such past national or 
tribal commitments regardless of attempts to perform the nation’s expectations of 
citizenship.  Though the government typically segregated American Indians, the hybrid 
U.S.-Native relationship held out the promise of citizenship.  The ideological aims of 
assimilating Native communities to republicanism – a key tenet of allotment – spoke to 
this promise.  Yet, the implementation of the federal government’s policies regarding the 
material practice of Native citizenship ultimately contradicted the government’s 
assimilationist ideals.29 For American Indians during the Dawes period, the further 
containment and control over their land signified the enhanced containment of their 
citizenship rights. The racism integral to U.S. nationalism precluded full Native 
citizenship – at least until the twentieth century.30 Before addressing these arguments a 
discussion of both the growing U.S.-Native relationship and Dawes era ideologies is 
needed to contextualize the analysis. 
U.S-NATIVE DEVELOPMENTS & IDEOLOGIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Expansion, citizenship, territoriality, republicanism and paternalism blended to 
characterize, partially, the state of U.S. nationalism near the end of the nineteenth 
century.  As with removal, these Dawes Era31 ideologies solidified the government’s 
324
control over American Indian communities. The ensuing discussion spotlights the 
identities of American Indians and the U.S. government that were affected through late 
nineteenth century ideologies.  
Expansion certainly did not wane in the post-Jacksonian nineteenth century.  
Instead, the U.S. nation’s extension into the West exploded as populations in the East 
outgrew their areas, demanded more land on which their agricultural, commercial and 
ranching industries could thrive and, thereupon, relocated in fulsome numbers.32 This 
expansion was a continuation of what Frederick Jackson Turner deemed the age of 
“American development.”  He noted in 1893 that “this perennial fluidity of American 
life, this expansion westward … furnish[ed] the forces dominating American 
character.”33 Seemingly, the “limitless frontier” of the West drove the nation into areas 
beyond the Mississippi River.34 And, along with the public’s demand for this additional 
territory came an increased effort on the part of the U.S. government to satisfy the need 
by opening up more terrain.   
The ideological thrust of manifest destiny certainly took hold during the 1840s 
and 1850s as the government forged ahead in the Mexican War.  Part of the outcome of 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) involved the transferal of territory in the present-
day southwest from Mexico to the United States.  These lands were “comprehended for 
the future within the limits of the United States” and were thereafter “under the control of 
the Government of the United States.”35 Moreover, just prior to the nation’s victory over 
Mexico, the Oregon Treaty (1846) with Great Britain extended U.S. borders to “limits 
west of the Rocky Mountains” south of the “forty-ninth parallel of north latitude.”36 The 
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opening of these lands, and the expulsion of so-called foreign (but especially European) 
interests in North America, led to a dire need for some semblance of organization. 
 Soon after the acquisition of lands from Mexico and Great Britain the U.S. 
government set its sights on the systemization of western territories.  Efforts to 
consolidate western American Indian communities onto reservations in order “to free the 
region of Indian title and thus open it for settlement” comprised the frontispiece of this 
systemization.37 At the same time, as whites came into increased contact with American 
Indians already removed to reservations, they chipped away at reservation boundaries.38 
For western Native nations – recently defeated by the U.S. military – the 
reservation system became a way to organize the government’s newly acquired western 
lands.  Indian Commissioner William Medill told Congress in 1848 that “material 
changes will soon have to be made” to account for American Indians in these territories 
“so as to leave an ample outlet for our white population to spread and pass towards and 
beyond the Rocky Mountains.”39 Once American Indians were cordoned onto 
reservations, settlers could freely move about those areas once occupied by the removed 
Native communities.  The ideology of expansion and the reservation system was not to 
end with territories gained through the Mexican War and the Oregon Treaty.  As Indian 
Commissioner George Manypenny predicted in 1858, the United States would soon 
inhabit all areas of the West.  This time, he said, “is at our very doors, ten years, if our 
country” continues forging ahead.  Complete expansion, which would perpetuate some 
“great physical changes” in the western landscape, was “impending.”40 Manypenny’s 
forecast proved accurate, and American Indian removal to reservations formed the core 
of the government’s Native policy.  “Their removal from place to place as our population 
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advanced,” wrote Indian Commissioner Charles E. Mix, was “necessary for settlement” 
to unfold in the West.41 
The 1860s and 1870s experienced an upsurge of expansion into the West, though 
the Civil War years slowed growth for a short time. 42 Following the war, a number of 
factors converged to increase U.S. settlers’ emboldening of their providential errand.  An 
1867 report on conditions in the West reported that “two railroad lines are rapidly 
crossing the Plains” and that the settlement of farmers and miners and the destruction of 
forests and buffalo following them would soon “put an end to the wild men’s means of 
life.”43 At the same time, and perhaps in conjunction with the upsurge in railroads, gold 
and silver had been discovered in California.  Thereafter, emigration into California, 
Oregon and Washington territories was “filling every valley and gorge of the mountains 
with the most energetic and fearless men in the world.”44 With open routes to the West 
via railroads and trails came increased expansion and, in some cases, settlers never made 
it to the gold and silver collieries.  Instead, they hunkered down on lands between the 
Mississippi River and the Pacific Coast, eking out their sustenance in farming and mining 
on the Great Plains.  Overall, these changes “moved at new speeds” and “tied the nation 
together into a unity” glossed by manifest destiny.45 
All of these factors affected American Indian nations by bringing the U.S. 
military and white settlers closer to Native communities.  And, following some type of 
violent exchange, Native communities were typically removed to reservations.  Yet 
another report on the West illuminated the inevitably of Native removal in the wake of 
these exchanges.  An “Indian Peace Commission” was sent along westward railroad 
routes in 1868 to reconnoiter for Congress and report on how the government should 
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proceed with reservationism.  The conclusion was unequivocal: “As our settlements 
penetrate the interior, the border [comes] into contact with some Indian tribe. The white 
and the Indian must mingle together … and one of them must abandon” the territory.  In 
every case, the commission reported, “to make secure our frontier settlements and the 
building of our railroads to the pacific [sic] … we will declare authority over [our] 
subjects” by removing them “to a southern district selected by us.”46 
Western expansion in the late nineteenth century predictably led to a connection 
between citizenship and territory. White settlers were guaranteed lands for reasonable 
prices if they could demonstrate to the federal government that they would produce on 
them.  Just as in the Jacksonian era, as U.S. citizens moved westward, they could confirm 
their citizenship rights as republican landholders to benefit the nation’s economy and 
safety.  As Theodore Roosevelt put it in 1883, frontier settlers owning land would do 
their duty to the United States by working for U.S. progress. He said then, “[T]he man 
who wishes to do his duty as a citizen in our country must be imbued through and 
through with the spirit of Americanism” and should do so “to the measure of his 
individual capacity to work out the salvation of our land.”47 Jefferson’s call for a yeoman 
spirit did not fall on deaf ears.48 Instead, government’s responsibility to provide its 
“children with an economic base” and to “train them” in the “character traits needed to 
get ahead in life” grew in importance with western expansion.49 
Similarly, as European immigrants followed the railroads across the Mississippi, 
they could prove their worth as citizens by working for the “betterment” of the “U.S. 
nation.”50 The government thought that by assimilating and bestowing citizenship on 
recent immigrants – thus increasing the nation’s population – that western frontier 
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borders would be fortified from Native confrontations and any possible incursions into 
the United States by Mexico or European powers.  The “stock” of European ancestry did 
not matter – at least to Roosevelt.  He argued that “questions of race origin, like questions 
of creed, must not be considered: we wish to do good work [especially on western lands] 
and we are all Americans, pure and simple.”51 
A number of acts were passed to open up western lands for production and 
citizenship purposes to the detriment of Native land – constituting an extension of the 
doctrine of discovery.  In 1862, for example, the Homestead Act was implemented to 
“secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain.”  Settlers who were “citizens 
of the United States, or who shall have filed his declaration of intention to become such, 
as required by the naturalization laws of the United States” were granted up to 160 acres 
at a “rate of one dollar and twenty five cents per acre.”52 Speaking of the act, Secretary of 
the Interior Columbus Delano argued that homesteading would dually open land for 
white settlers and displace American Indian sovereignty: “An extension … will rapidly 
break up tribal organizations and Indian communities; it will bring Indians into 
subjugation to our laws, civil and criminal.”53 Similarly, the Oklahoma Organic Act of 
1890 gave “settlers … the rights and privileges of American citizens” and placed them 
under the protection of law if they promised to use the land for the national good.54 The 
act also allowed settlers to encroach on Native lands; thus, the government had “broken 
the barrier and beg[un] their legal invasion of the once sacrosanct region.”55 These acts 
permitted U.S. citizens and immigrants to carry out the republican mission to populate 
and produce for the benefits of the U.S. nation.56 
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Whites, whether of American or European ancestry, generally had little problem 
securing citizenship.  However, African Americans, in particular, experienced difficulties 
in attaining citizenship.57 The U.S. government figured that any non-Europeans settling in 
the West would poison the familial purity needed to secure a republican nation in the 
outer reaches of the frontier.58 Though the Fourteenth Amendment ensured that “all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States … are citizens of the United States” and 
that “no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens,” the law was not always carried through to practice.59 
African Americans seemed to be caught in the blurred boundary between the old 
Dred Scott decision and the emancipatory tenets of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.60 In Dred Scott, Justice Roger Taney held that African Americans were 
not U.S. citizens: “we think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not 
intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore 
claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to 
citizens of the United States.”61 The Thirteenth Amendment remedied this diminution by 
ending slavery and eventually enabling citizenship for African Americans.  Jim Crow 
laws, however, tested and hindered this progress.62 The racialist dynamics of the Plessy 
v. Ferguson case shored up the barricades to African American citizenship.  With Plessy,
the separation of races was shown to neither “abridge the privileges or immunities of the 
colored man” nor deprive “him of his property without due process of law.” And, it was 
purported to grant African Americans “equal protection of the law.”63 Still, the opinion 
of Justice Henry Brown cemented a hierarchy between white and black communities, 
especially in his assertion that “if the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, 
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it must be the result of natural affinities.”64 His use of the future tense assumed that the 
races had not yet achieved equality.  Due to such precedent, combined with the elevation 
of white settlers as the “flag-carriers for the republic,” African American citizenship in 
the West was constrained, if not occluded.65 
In contrast, as American Indians were removed to reservations the U.S. 
government “civilized” them to American culture.  There exist several theories as to why 
the government believed that American Indians were viable subjects for assimilation.  On 
the one hand, American Indian populations were smaller in number and could be easily 
controlled.  When Geronimo (Apache) surrendered his Chiracahua Apache Nation in 
1886, all Native nations were accounted for on some semblance of a reservation.66 With 
American Indians pinned down to determined boundaries, the government could act 
easily to instill in Native communities the tenets of Americanism.67 
Also, American Indians had been a threat to the U.S. government and its 
communities both in the East and the West for nearly 100 years.  If the government could 
“civilize” them and offer citizenship then, perhaps, future dangers would be quelled 
through Native allegiances to the U.S. nation.68 At this point, American Indians were not 
a hazard, but rather an “opportunity” for U.S. identity building.69 According to Hoxie, 
the assimilation of Natives “would carry few political costs” because, in a sense, they 
were “native born.”  Natives would be “proof positive that America” was growing into 
“an open society” and could potentially “accommodate nonwhite people.”70 
Similarly, assimilating Native communities spoke to the power of territory as it 
intersected with citizenship.  Whereas African Americans had typically not owned land – 
and therefore did not possess a connection to American soil – Native communities had 
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historically linked their identities to territory through a rhetoric of moral inheritance.  
While there was a difference of opinion between American Indian nations and the U.S. 
government regarding how to treat the land political leaders sensed that Native 
communities might be better suited to engage in citizenship because – although often 
characterized as childish tenants – they harbored a republican honor of territory.  Still, 
Native citizenship was limited as the government continued to see American Indians’ 
connection to land as “mere occupation” versus ownership – a view that did not change 
much from the removal era.71 
Once the U.S. government realized that whites would come into close proximity 
with Natives due to expansion, the only way to answer “the Indian question” seemed 
their assimilation and education as citizens.  The government, conceived of in 
paternalistic terms, came to embody the agency of such civic preparedness through a 
construct I call republican fatherhood. This ideological role allowed the government to 
teach “its Native wards” citizenship through the practice of cultivating the soil.72 Here, 
the republican father “guided his children in the choice of occupational calling,” property 
holding and standards of morality all through laboring upon the land.73 
Republican fatherhood brings to light the ideological configuration of “republican 
motherhood.”  According to Kerber, republican motherhood is the “proposal that women 
… play[ed] a deferential political role through the raising of a patriotic child” during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.74 Women, here, were ascribed the non-
governmental responsibility of nurturing the next wave of white republicans.  As Beasley 
points out, women’s “true place was by the hearthstone … rocking the cradle of 
American childhood.”75 The purpose of raising the polis’s next generation of American 
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leaders or, in the least, patriotic participants, was the continuation of the U.S. nation’s 
virtues.  And, republican mothers allowed their sons, in particular, to grow independently 
within the value system punctuated by the U.S. nation.  Republican motherhood involved 
tutoring American children in the honor of public duty.  Kerber argues that the 
“Republican Mother’s life was dedicated to the service of civic virtue … she educated her 
sons for it.”76 Mothers’ efforts and energies were sacrificed to empower their children as 
self-sufficient republicans.77 Such children were typically biological offspring and 
overwhelmingly European or European American in ethnicity.  
Republican fatherhood, especially regarding American Indians, functioned 
differently in a number of ways.  First, as the U.S. government – particularly the 
executive – assumed an entrenched paternal role in American Indian lives, it codified this 
position.  Whereas republican motherhood was a non-governmental activity, republican 
fatherhood was cemented through legislation such as the Indian Removal Act and the 
Dawes Act.78 Hence, the construct was reified, further normalizing the affinitive 
connection between American Indians and the U.S. government.    
Second, republican fatherhood did not typically take into account the promotion 
and concerns of the government’s Native wards.  Republican mothers were “outspoken 
advocate[s] on behalf of the nation’s children” – at least within the home – and 
altruistically dedicated themselves to perpetuating their children’s growth and the 
nation’s civic character.79 In contrast, avers Jackman, the role of fathers in the early 
republic featured “paternalistic authority over their children” without “selflessly 
evaluat[ing] the best interests of the child.”80 Instead, the nation’s earliest fathers 
demanded that their children owe an allegiance to “father’s” paternal whims.  Children’s 
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“personal interests were defined, at best, as inseparable from those of their families … 
[and were] subjugated to the … interests of the family.”81 Republican fatherhood 
ceaselessly constituted American Indians as children, which justified the U.S. 
government’s control over Native production and uses of land.  In turn, the government 
expected American Indians to sacrifice and “produce” for the nation’s “greater good” – 
this involved apportioning land to the U.S. government and contributing to the U.S. 
nation’s agricultural economy.  Johansen notes that these expectations of children and 
“wards” to produce for the larger family comprised part of “a father’s authority over his 
children” during the nineteenth century.82 
Third, though republican fatherhood – like republican motherhood – elevated 
education as the zenith of civic preparedness, it limited the involvement of childlike 
wards.  For instance, no matter how educated in the agricultural arts they became, 
American Indians were considered by the government “perpetually under aged” and 
incapable of outright citizenship.83 Native communities might be assimilated through 
their toil on the land, but their “reservations” were still far flung from the centers of the 
U.S. nation, reflecting the incongruous bind of U.S. citizenship for groups of color with 
simultaneous and competing commitments to assimilation and segregation.  Such 
citizenry contradictions constituted the identity duality inherent in U.S. nationalism that 
held out the possibility of Native citizenship, yet did so through a racialist severance that 
barred inclusion.  American Indians, therefore, remained segregated outside the spheres 
of citizenship, and despite the Dawes Act’s promises of citizenship, Natives never 
achieved this distinction during the allotment era.  Rather, they were offered a restricted 
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citizenship that kept them “productive and safe” members on the nation’s periphery, 
though never fully vested in the rights and privileges of U.S. citizenship.84 
Home was the primary location of republican motherhood, and this translated into 
full inclusion into the U.S. family.85 For republican fatherhood, arable soil isolated from 
the family’s center became the fundamental location for the paternal U.S.-Native 
relationship.86 As such, American Indians – including their tenancy on reservation land – 
were parcel, but not fully part of the U.S. nation.  The hybrid relationship, thus, was 
reified in familial and republican terms, reinforcing white supremacy and Native 
inequality as part of the identity duality of the national imaginary.          
The program of assimilation and citizenship for American Indians in the late 
nineteenth century was multi-dimensional.  Overall, the government sought to achieve 
what Theodore Roosevelt outlined in 1894 as the essence of “Americanism.”  He wrote 
then that “We must Americanize [immigrants and newcomers] in every way, in speech, 
in political ideas and principles” and in work.87 As Dorsey and Harlow argue, 
Roosevelt’s “mythic narrative of the true American … served to help citizens and 
immigrants alike with the means to accept assimilation as the nation’s destiny and its 
hope for greatness.”88 One way the government would inspire this Americanism and 
amalgamation for American Indians was to constrict reservation land.   
Work as a motivation was made distinct as a part of assimilation with Jefferson’s 
goals for American Indians during the turn of the nineteenth century.89 As communal 
cultures, most American Indian nations on reservations shared resources, worked as 
groups to grow crops and hunt, and raised families together as a close-knit “village” of 
sorts.90 Such communalism, the federal government maintained, was not conducive to 
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U.S. citizenship.  American character involved a type of “rugged individualism” that 
concomitantly contributed to a community, but did so through the isolation of one’s work 
as a benefit to personal wealth and well-being.91 Indian Commissioner Luke Lea clarified 
the government’s republican fatherhood, contending that Natives “be placed in positions 
where they can be controlled, and finally compelled … to resort to agricultural labor … 
Considering, as the untutored Indian thinks that labor is a degradation … it is only under 
such circumstances [labor] that … wild energies can be trained to the more ennobling 
pursuits of civilized life.”92 Instead, work for individualism’s sake became the 
government’s republican goal for Natives.   
 The government’s insistence on “uplifting” others through civilization and 
protection hearkened to its self-professed character as a republican father.93 The late 
nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the government’s paternalism, regarding both 
American Indians and international communities, as a central part of the nation’s identity.  
Concerning the latter, the Spanish-American War – through which the United States 
“aided” Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and other Pacific territories against the 
staggering Spanish Empire – exemplified well the government’s paternalism.94 To this 
effect, the Platt Amendment (1901), which dictated the ultimate terms of the U.S.-Cuban 
relationship following the war, noted that “the United States may exercise the right to 
intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government 
adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.”  Here, the 
government was shown to lead Cuba out of degradation and to “protect the people thereof 
[Cuba]” as a parental surrogate.95 President William McKinley’s views on assisting the 
Philippines, furthermore, alluded to an empowered U.S. paternalism.  Reflecting on his 
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administration’s 1900 seizure of the Philippines as a protectorate, McKinley asserted that 
“there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos, and 
uplift and civilize them.”96 As Hoganson argues, the government predicated its protection 
over Cuba and the Philippines on the U.S. nation’s “fatherly character” to shield what it 
viewed as “weaker” nations.97 
These civilizing programs likewise guided U.S.-Native relations.  Ostensibly, late 
nineteenth century paternalism strengthened the discursive formations of Natives 
wrought by the Jacksonian period and solidified the executive’s active role in civilization 
efforts.  As with the Jacksonian executive, this paternalism braced a hybrid relationship 
between American Indian nations and the U.S. government.  Indian Commissioner 
Manypenny highlighted this construction, noting that the executive would act 
compassionately toward “the Indian tribes now left to its oversight and guardianship, so 
that they shall be intelligently and generously … cared for in all that makes life useful 
and happy.”98 On the other side of the hybridized relationship, however, American 
Indians were constituted as dependent.  Grant, for instance, summarized this view of 
Native identity: “They are wards of the nation – they can not be regarded in any other 
light than as wards.”99 As will be discussed in the analysis that follows, the paternal 
hierarchy reasserted by the U.S. government vis-à-vis American Indians in the 1880s, 
specifically, clashed with the government’s promises of independence and sovereignty 
for Native nations.   
THE ROAD TO ALLOTMENT 
 Allotment worked through the government’s crafting of hybrid identities between 
itself and American Indian nations along a hierarchy of dominance-to-subjugation.  
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Vestiges of this relationship were found throughout the pre-Dawes reservation system.  A 
Congressional commission, for instance, assumed in 1867 that American Indians could 
not decide on “sufficient tillable or grazing land” for themselves.  Instead, the 
commission recommended that “said districts” would be selected “and approved by 
Congress.”100 At the same time, Congress legalized its intrusion alone onto Native 
reservations should the need arise.  Settlers could not enter “without permission of the 
tribes interested” – a part of reservation law that justified the system by protecting 
American Indians from overzealous whites – but this security came with a price.   All 
non-Natives were barred from reservations “except officers and employees of the United 
States.”101 American Indian sovereignty could not be granted if the government came 
and went at its own pleasure.102 
Part of pre-Dawes era paternalism involved the creation of a Board of Indian 
Commissioners to help the executive oversee the duties of reservation management.103 
The Board guided the assimilative efforts of the federal government and was asked “to 
promote civilization … and to encourage their [work] efforts of self-support.”104 
Moreover, the Board clarified the relationship between the executive and American 
Indians regarding assimilation.  Working from the Board’s annual report and speaking 
through the republican fatherhood construct, Indian Commissioner Nathaniel G. Taylor 
told Congress that assimilation efforts were “beyond question our most solemn duty to 
protect and care for, to elevate and civilize [Indians] … our duty is plain; let us enter 
upon its discharge without delay.”105 The establishment of the Board demonstrated the 
paternal hybridity between the government and American Indians justified through a 
language of control. 
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The final steps toward assimilating American Indians – thus leading to allotment 
– was the elimination of the treaty system and the codification of governmental privilege 
regarding reservations.  With the treaty system, American Indians had retained some 
semblance of sovereignty as their consent was needed to make laws and changes to 
Native territory.  Prucha notes that though treaty consent was a ruse to justify 
governmental superiority in negotiations, treaties “made no sense unless based on some 
kind of special legal status of the Indians.”106 This legal status of American Indians was, 
according to Chief Justice John Marshall, “domestic dependent.”107 As such, Natives 
“were held as the wards of the government” and “the only title the law concedes to them 
to the lands they occupy or claim is a mere possessory one.”  They could not boast 
“absolute title” to the land they “inhabited.”108 According to Schmeckebier, the cessation 
of the treaty system in 1871 ended the legal conception that American Indians had any 
sovereignty to the land whatsoever.  Instead, as the government could decide Indian 
policy without Native consent, American Indians became “neither citizen nor alien” and 
were instead “perpetual wards.”109 Overall, the abolition of treaty making proved that 
“no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged 
or recognized as independent … or [a] power with whom the United States may contract 
a treaty.”110 
The U.S. government rounded out its path toward allotment by interceding into 
the internal affairs of American Indian nations.  In the process, the government 
hybridized the paternal relationship discussed above.  For instance, the Department of the 
Interior declared that, since treaties were no longer needed, the government could 
establish by order “the bounds of a reservation.”111 The government bolstered this 
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privilege to intervene by relying on a justification of guidance and administration – both 
of which could not be had by “dependent Indians” alone.112 Premised on an ideology of 
republican fatherhood, the combination of the end of treaty making with the advent of 
governmental privileges intensified the paternal relationship between American Indians 
and the U.S. government, holding out the promise of citizenship that would not come to 
fruition for decades. 
PATERNALISM IN PRE-DAWES EXECUTIVE & CONGRESSIONAL DISCOURSE 
By the 1880s, the pieces were in place for an allotment policy.  In 1876, with 
most Native nations cordoned onto reservations, Indian Commissioner John Q. Smith 
argued that “it is doubtful whether any high degree of civilization is possible without 
individual [use] of the land.”  An American Indian, he continued, “had to feel that his 
home is his own … and needs a direct personal interest in the soil.”113 Such connections 
to the land, a central component of republican fatherhood, promised to protect American 
Indians “by the power of the Government, in [Natives’] life, liberty, property and 
character.”114 Bearing this in mind, the U.S. executive and legislature measured 
allotment as a policy and, in so doing, reified the hybrid identities between American 
Indians and the government. 
This section examines how the executive and Congress wavered between 
American Indian identities as dependent (a legacy of removal discourse) and, yet, self-
sufficient enough to eventually become autonomous as white settlements moved Natives 
closer to civic spaces.  Ultimately, the executive solidified identities for American 
Indians as problematic and perpetual wards of the United States, thus heightening the 
constructions of paternalism spotlighted in the removal era and further weakening Native 
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sovereignty.  Following suit, Congress considered an allotment bill that increased the 
executive’s administrative role over American Indian “problems.” The identities 
crystallized by the Commissioners vis-à-vis American Indians constituted Natives as 
controllable, degraded and in need of the U.S. government’s guidance.  Seemingly, 
because Natives did not respond appropriately to the republican father, such identities 
from the removal era were extended in the late nineteenth century.   
Executive Constructions of a Hybrid U.S.-Native Relationship 
The executive branch was the first to consider allotment as a viable policy option.  
Executive discourse vacillated between constructions of American Indians as dependent 
and autonomous while rationalizing allotment.  In the end, the executive constituted 
American Indians as “problems” whose solvency depended on the guidance of the U.S. 
government expressed through the ideology of republican fatherhood.  Such executive 
discourse homogenized all American Indians as problems and, in so doing, relied on a 
characterization of the government as a paternal administrator led by the Interior 
Department and the Bureau of Indian Affairs; this was first actualized during the removal 
era.    
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ezra Hayt’s 1879 proposal for an allotment 
policy exemplified the positioning of American Indian identities for the U.S. government.  
First, allotment was to be implemented under the guise of protection.  To Hayt, “all 
former methods” of safeguarding American Indians were “entirely unadequate [sic] to 
protect the Indians against the encroachments of the whites.”115 Constituting American 
Indians as dependent, he instead asserted that the “government can only retain control 
over [Natives]” by enacting an allotment policy that would constrict and demarcate more 
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clearly Native lands while concurrently offering white settlers the reservation land they 
desired.116 Here, like removal, allotment was predicated on a paternal hybridity whereby 
the government controlled a dependent American Indian monolith.   
President Rutherford B. Hayes echoed Hayt’s suggestion of a paternal 
governmental-Native relationship in his third annual message by noting how American 
Indians could only survive if they were “wisely and fairly guided.”117 Part of this 
paternal identity for the government, which assumed a dependent characterization of 
American Indians, allowed a situation where the government would protect Native 
communities while siphoning-off more land at whim.  Or, as Hayes wrote, allotment gave 
license “to consider in what manner the balance of their lands may be disposed of by the 
Government for [Natives’] benefit.”118 According to Mead, such a sacrifice on the part of 
wards was a core element of paternalism.119 Certainly American Indian uplift was 
reflected in Hayes’ sentiments.  But, he also acknowledged that “the westward movement 
of our population looks still more eagerly for lands to occupy” and that Natives would 
“do well to prepare for such a contingency.”120 Preparation revolved around the promise 
of allotment.  In other words, the paternal relationship cloaked the government’s desire to 
obtain Native territories in a shroud of benevolence, which ultimately resulted in a policy 
of allotment.121 
At the same time, Hayt’s generative proposal for allotment demarcated American 
Indian character as capable of self-sufficiency.  This complicated the eventual allotment 
policy as Native identities were shown to fluctuate between dependency and autonomy – 
a break from the government’s removal rhetoric.  Otis argues that allotment – and the 
ways that it allowed for Native communities’ independent production of land and 
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individual responsibility for their homesteads – presupposed “stability” and “self-
governance.”122 Hayt demonstrated this more enlightened view of Native identities by 
averring that allotment would leave Natives “to their own resources to maintain 
themselves as citizens of the republic.”123 Allotment would, he continued, prompt 
American Indians to “make a most encouraging improvement.”124 As Hayt’s proposal 
wound into the hands of Interior Secretary Carl Schurz in late 1879, the construction of 
American Indian identities as independent was noticeable in early conceptions of 
allotment.  Schurz, for instance, reported to Congress that allotment would “make 
[Natives] self-supporting” and, as such, the government would “treat the Indians like 
other inhabitants of the United States, under the laws of the land.”125 Such self-support 
was not part of the government’s removal era discourse, mostly because American 
Indians were therein corralled to the farthest stretches of U.S. territories and, hence, 
would not come into contact with whites. There was no reason to demand assimilation if 
Natives were safely removed from the nation’s centers. In this way, allotment – at first – 
appeared to offer a glimmer of sovereignty for American Indians.  As allotment rhetoric 
moved further through executive discussions, however, the dual Native identity 
construction of dependency clouded this autonomous characterization.  
 The conflation of dependent and self-sustaining identities would come to bear 
even more as the Board of Indian Commissioners deliberated over Hayt’s proposal.  The 
Board constituted the executive, once again, as a mentor of sorts for American Indians.  
For example, the allotment policy assured that U.S. leaders could “go resolutely to work 
at making [Natives] safe” on their reservations.126 Closely related, Native identities were 
highlighted as dependent and weakened as the Board deliberated over the paternal 
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dynamics of allotment.  With “mental faculties dwarfed and shriveled” American Indians, 
the Board argued, were seeking “to adjust” to the “glare of civilization above and beyond 
his comprehension.”  Such adjustment and cultural uplift, the report asserted, involved 
Natives seeing “that the knowledge possessed by the white man is necessary for self-
preservation … he [Natives] needs it to save him …”127 And, the government as a 
paternal and controlling force – as a republican father – was willing to step up and 
“appreciate as it never has before our duty and responsibility in this respect.”128 
Concomitantly, however, the Board intimated that American Indians also 
possessed the ability to progress and embrace self-sufficiency.  For instance, Native 
communities were reckoned as empowered with the “promise” of overcoming and 
reversing “the habits of life and thought which for generations have held him in 
bondage.” The homogenous Native was considered enabled enough to “save him from 
himself” and to fight back “old currents of habit” that threatened to “sweep him to certain 
destruction.”129 This construction of American Indian identities as independent and 
capable clashed with the alleged dependency simultaneously applied to them by the U.S. 
government.   Again, such hints at autonomy were not present in the removal era, 
especially as some twenty years hence Jefferson’s yeoman and assimilation plans for 
Natives were shown to have faltered.         
 Seemingly, with allotment, Natives’ eventual autonomy would mature through a 
paternal U.S.-Native relationship that punctuated Native identities as dependent.  This 
dependency was a residue of the removal policy.  In the end, the Board of Indian 
Commissioners recommended that American Indian independence be achieved through a 
paternal connection with the government.  As Marshall codified in 1832, indigenous 
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communities were “domestic dependents” yet “independent communities” – in either 
case, however, the U.S. government would supervise their progress and affairs.130 And, 
allotment pointed the way toward urging American Indians to assimilate to the U.S. 
nation, just as citizenship pledges urged Europeans to assimilate during the late 
nineteenth century.  As the Board concluded, “to expect them to attain civilization 
without these advantages [U.S. teachings] is to look for impossibilities.”131 
The government’s quandary over American Indian identities, and the uncertainties 
surrounding how to engage in a Native policy in the West, led to a diminutive 
construction of American Indian communities as “problems” to be solved.   American 
Indian identities, themselves, became a synecdoche of the ambiguities involved in a 
general policy guiding the U.S.-Native relationship.  Hence, Native communities were 
metonymically reduced to the root of the difficulties plaguing a viable policy.  When the 
government was overwhelmingly mired in the competing dependent and independent 
constructions of Native cultures, it resorted – writes Dippie – to condensing American 
Indians to impediments.132 An 1881 article penned by Schurz in the North American 
Review demonstrated this diminutive move.  In arguing for allotment he noted that the 
policy would solve the “Indian problem … in such a manner that they no longer stand in 
the way of the development of the country as an obstacle.”133 Allotment, then, became 
not just a way to aid “the progress and security of our Indian wards”; and, it was not 
solely a conduit for obtaining Native territories to alleviate the “pressure of white 
immigration and settlement.”134 
Instead, allotment was also about solving a predicament for the U.S. nation.  
Indian Commissioner Hiram Price summarized this diluted characterization of American 
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Indian identities by suggesting that allotment was a way to mollify “the lasting disgrace” 
that a reservation policy alone would continue exacerbating.  Alternatively, allotment 
would “in a few years rid the government of this vexed ‘Indian question,’ making the 
Indian a blessing instead of a curse to himself and our country…”135 Allotment, therefore, 
promised to solve the “Indian problem” for the U.S. government and would do so by 
constituting Native identities as a challenge to be overcome through allotment and 
civilizing activities on behalf of the U.S. government.     
Such a construction of Native identities as problematic concurrently presumed 
that the U.S. government had the fortitude to solve the problem, thus heightening its self-
professed exceptional identities.  The government, in addition to reifying its paternal 
characteristics, became an administrator of the “Indian problem.” As President Chester 
Arthur asserted in his first annual message, “prominent among the matters which 
challenge the attention” of the executive “is the management of our Indian affairs.”136 
The management/administration metaphor peppered the government’s allotment 
discourse.  Prior to the allotment policy, “fatherliness” inhered in the presidency and its 
role as leader of U.S.-Native relations.137 As the government’s Native policies took more 
and more bureaucratic shape, however, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Interior 
Department strengthened presidential privileges to deal with American Indians as 
managers.138 Part of this, most certainly, spawned from the abolition of treaty-making, 
whereby the president ultimately decided Native policy by approving treaties and issuing 
executive orders.139 Moreover, with the increased profundity of “interior” issues in the 
late nineteenth century – especially as the U.S. nation expanded – the president delegated 
responsibilities such as Native affairs, timber and resource supervision, railroad and road 
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management and the like to the Department of the Interior and its attendant bureaus, of 
which the Bureau of Indian Affairs was part.140 
The administrative metaphors employed by the government in defining itself 
combined with the problematic identities accorded to American Indians to reify a 
paternalistic conception of U.S.-Native relations.  Similarly to the removal era, childlike 
and parental metaphors still circulated throughout the administrative rhetoric of the 
Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  Arthur, for instance, insisted 
that the Interior Department’s “administration of the Indian” be accomplished by 
“protecting them” and “conforming their manner of life to the new order of things” and to 
introduce among them “customs and pursuits of civilized life” as was required of “just” 
republican fathers.141 Schurz, too, couched the administrative identity of the executive in 
paternal language.  “Nothing is more dispensable,” he wrote, “than the protecting and 
guiding care of the Government.”142 And, Native identities were still constituted as 
dependent: “he [Natives] naturally looks” to the government “to take him by the hand and 
guide him on.”  This hearkened to the republican father’s role as a demagogue in his 
relations with wards.143 
Legislative Control through the Coke Bill 
Members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs took Interior Secretary 
Schurz’s suggestion of an allotment policy to heart.  In his 1880 annual report, Schurz 
concluded that an allotment bill would be “the most essential step in the solution to the 
Indian problem” and his political ally, Senator Richard Coke (Texas), quickly drafted 
allotment legislation.144 Known as the Coke Bill, Schurz’s plan made its way through the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs and onto the Senate floor.  The bill was debated for 
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several days in early 1881 and passed the Senate.  The Coke Bill was then sent to the 
House where it never quite made it out of the House Committee on Indian Affairs based 
on costliness.145 Though the bill never passed Congress, according to Hoxie, it “initiated 
a six year public debate” that by 1887 produced the Dawes Act.146 
The following analysis discusses the Senate debate surrounding the Coke Bill for 
the ways that American Indian and governmental identities were crafted through the 
Senate’s justification of allotment.  Pro-allotment senators channeled the 
problem/administrator and child/parent identities solidified by pro-allotment executive 
discourse to justify assimilating American Indians as a monolithic group through an 
allotment policy.  Meanwhile, anti-allotment senators argued that allotment could never 
work – not because American Indians required sovereignty, but because they were not 
“civilized enough” and “had no fitness or inclination” for amalgamating with the U.S. 
nation.147 In the Coke Bill’s wake, the government constituted Native identities as both 
problematic and dependent – just as they were during the removal period.148 
The Coke Bill sought to parcel out reservation land and convert Natives into 
farmers.  Through agricultural labor, American Indians were to develop stronger 
connections to their territories and, thus, the government – as republican father – 
reckoned that it would be easier to assimilate them.149 Allotment was “to prove one of 
the most powerful agencies in the advancement of the race.”150 At the same time, 
allotments would provide numerous benefits to the United States.  First, individual Native 
land occupancy – versus tribal and communal holdings – pledged to “extend over Indians 
… the laws, both civil and criminal” of the government.151 Allotment, then, made it 
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easier for the government to control Native populations as republican children—the 
allotted land then functioned as the spaces of such control. 
Second, the government retained the right to intrude into both individual allotted 
lands and the excess land freed up by breaking apart large reservations.152 The Coke Bill, 
hence, “did not overlook the undoubted fact that it is neither wise nor right to let these 
great solid blocks of reservations stand in the way of traffic and settlement.”  Therefore, 
the bill enacted an early example of eminent domain, as the “right of way through Indian 
land can be granted at any time to railroads, highways and telegraph companies.”153 
Also, American settlers were to receive any excess reservation land they desired, so long 
as they offered “proper compensation” to the federal government.154 
Finally, allotment extended federal protection on two levels.  On the one hand, it 
protected American Indians “against the greed of the whites” who incessantly threatened 
reservation territories.  Also, though, the government offered white communities 
protection against unified Native communities.  Large pockets of American Indians 
pledging loyalties to pan-Indianism empowered American Indians with unification, thus 
endangering white expansion.155 Allotment promised the “blotting out of the reservations 
as fast as it can be safely done” to ensure the security of Natives and settlers.156 
Pro-allotment senators relied on a number of diminutive Native identities and 
exceptional governmental characterizations to justify the Coke Bill.  These advocates 
operationalized the problem/administrator relationship outlined by the executive into 
policy.  Senator Richard Coke demonstrated this hybridized relationship in his opening 
arguments for passage of the allotment bill.  American Indians, to Coke, were a 
“problem” and a “question” that confronted the U.S. government.157 He said Native 
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nations and their reservation lands had made it “impossible to preserve peace between the 
Indians and the whites” especially because their “immense bodies of land” spread tribes 
out, thus making it difficult to assimilate them “piecemeal.”158 Here, American Indian 
identities were reduced to obstacles.  Their presence on reservation lands was “found to 
be inexpedient and impolitic” to their cultural uplift and to amicable relations.159 Instead, 
Native “problems” led to “collisions between whites and Indians.”160 
Notice that the U.S. government, just as during the removal era, was shown to 
share no responsibility in the clashes between American Indians and the U.S. nation.  
Rather, Native obstacles were to be subverted by the government, which was constituted 
as a manager of Native affairs.  The government was a problem-solver, not an 
“impediment” to success, as pro-allotment senator, George Vest (Missouri) claimed.161 
Addressing the construction of the government as a manager of the “Indian question,” 
Vest asserted that “if anything is to be done which shall solve the problem, it must be a 
broad and general systematic work.”162 Not only was the government characterized as a 
manager capable of systemizing its solution, but American Indians were constituted as 
monolithic – a “broad and general” policy was going to be applied to the “problem,” thus 
eliding any individual context or characteristics of separate Native nations, just as pro-
removal legislators similarly homogenized Native communities in the 1830s.  Seemingly, 
the Coke Bill sought a way to swipe broadly at the “problem.”163 The homogenous 
“masses of Indians” and “blocks of reservation land” would be treated wholesale as a 
human predicament to be surmounted and the spaces in which Native actions would be 
furthered controlled.164 
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At the same time, Senate allotment proponents fortified a paternal connection 
between American Indians and the federal government.  The Native problem was 
personified in these instances as American Indians were revealed to be childish 
dependents in need of the U.S. government’s republican fatherhood.  Arguing for the 
advantages of converting American Indians to agriculturalists and extending federal laws 
over Native communities, for example, Senator Alvin Saunders (Nebraska) asserted that 
allotment would “punish them all the same” and “protect them all the same.”165 In so 
doing, he not only homogenized American Indians under a Native sameness, but also 
demonstrated the government’s paternal role as “punisher” and “protector” – both of 
which, according to Sevitch, encapsulated components of paternalism.166 Moreover, 
Saunders alluded to the government’s responsibility to protect Native communities 
through allotment: “this law which shall be enacted … will virtually prevent” the 
encroachment of their territories by “sharp and designing persons.” Saunders claimed that 
American Indians were too “young” in development to “protect themselves.” 167 Whereas 
the dependents of republican mothers would grow and mature into their civic roles, 
Natives seemed here to be stuck in a perpetual identity formation as childish – too 
infantile to fulfill their republican duties.   
Similarly, Coke predicated allotment on the government’s need to uplift and 
protect American Indians.  Allotment would, he said, persuade them that assimilation was 
the best way “to place them on the highway to American citizenship.”168 He reminded 
the Senate that the bill would “aid them with stock and agricultural implements” and the 
building of “housing upon their allotments of land” – both of which would “break up 
tribal relations and pass them under the jurisdiction of the Constitution and laws of the 
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United States.”169 Certainly, Coke’s language alluded to the supremacy of the 
government over Natives and the government’s republican character in advancing Native 
communities.  Also, American Indians were homogenized into a monolithic “them” who 
could, ironically, be converted into a statically individualized American.   
But, the argument that allotment would lead to “citizenship” under the 
“Constitution” marked an emancipatory moment for American Indians that differed from 
the removal era’s language of separation.  When Coke said that allotment would force 
Natives “to be self-supporting, to be cultivators of soil” he intimated at Native agency 
and independence.170 Just as land had complicated the U.S.-Native relationship in the 
early nineteenth century, it also became a potential means of extending citizenship to 
American Indians in the 1880s.  These types of openings into the possibilities of Native 
sovereignty allowed American Indians, in part, to “talk back” to the eventual passage of 
the Dawes Act in 1887, as will be shown in the next chapter.171 This autonomy, though, 
could only come by way of the government’s protection and support, therefore 
constituting American Indians as dependent and placing the federal government – 
especially the executive – in control of the U.S.-Native relationship.  
 Allotment opponents in the Senate disdained the Coke Bill – not due to worries 
about a loss of American Indian independence – but because they felt American Indians 
lacked the skills necessary to assimilate.  The rhetoric of these antagonists represented the 
status quo.  They wanted the reservation system to remain intact because the government 
could exert its will without having to expend the time, money and efforts required by 
allotment’s assimilation mandates.172 Senator Henry Teller (Colorado), for instance, 
predicted that allotment would fail as American Indians would “eventually [get] rid of the 
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land.”  Agricultural allotments, he continued, “have been of no particular benefit to 
them.”173 Natives could not assimilate because they are “undeveloped … wanderers over 
the face of this continent” and are not suitable for “practical common sense.” American 
Indians would never “know what [allotment] is … certainly, very few Indians [would] 
understand it.” 174 Here, Teller lessened American Indian identities to childishness; they 
seemingly were unresponsive to the forces of republican fatherhood. Underdeveloped, 
they were represented as too meager to occupy their own territories and lacked a 
comprehension of a policy that, supposedly, benefited them.      
As with Senator Theodore Frelinghuysen’s rebuke of the removal bill, though, 
Teller expressed some semblance of agency for American Indians.  For instance, he 
argued against the Coke Bill by admitting how a “blanketed” allotment policy could 
never appeal to the diverse Native communities it purported to protect, uplift and 
assimilate. He asserted that proponents “lay down a rule to be applied to every tribe of 
Indians and every individual Indian alike … The Indians differ as much from one another 
as the civilized and enlightened nations of the earth. Legislation that is proper and just for 
one class of Indians will fail …to civilize them.175 Tellers’ reproach of a monolithic 
indigenousness created a rupture that provided Natives with an inventional strategy; and 
Native arguments about individualism likewise affected Teller’s comments on the Senate 
floor.  The latter is so because Teller is said to have gathered Native memorials about the 
Coke Bill.176 Still, in arguing against a homogenous American Indian identity, Teller 
assumed that Natives were not civilized, thereby contributing to the same type of 
diminution that pro-allotment rhetors buttressed in their support for the Coke Bill.   
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Other anti-allotment senators likewise diminished American Indian identities in 
their opposition to the Coke Bill.  John Morgan (Alabama) insisted that the Coke Bill’s 
“system [would] not work.”  His rationale included the need to “march very slowly and 
take up tribe after tribe, section by section of the country.”177 Morgan was not so much 
opposed to allotment as he disagreed with Coke’s timeline for a “speedy” process.178 
Morgan still assumed Natives were too dependent for self-sufficiency and argued that the 
U.S. government was a paternal force in leading American Indian communities toward 
uplift.  Morgan hoped “an honest and patriotic effort for the devising of some system by 
which we could bring the Indian in reach of civilization” would be pondered.  And, he 
reified the construction of American Indians as problematic in wishing for a paternal 
policy of “guidance” and “guardianship”: “we need to lead the Government of the United 
States out of the difficulties,” he said, of “dealing” with its “problem” and “question.”  
Here, he referred to Native communities as barricades to a “just policy.”179 
Overall, the Senate debates over the Coke Bill channeled the diminished 
American Indian characterization as problematic and dependent championed by pre-
Dawes executive rhetoric into a workable policy.  Though the bill never passed the House 
– due to timetable and funding issues – the ideas forwarded in the debate led to the 
eventual passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887.180 
Ultimately, executive discourse during the pre-Dawes period clarified how land 
became a commodity that functioned as a pathway to U.S. citizenship for American 
Indians.  It also cemented American Indian identities as problematic for, and dependent 
on, a managerial and parental United States, thus reifying the paternal connections 
between American Indians and the government.  Executive discourse also further limited 
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Native autonomy by homogenizing Native communities.  Following suit, the Senate’s 
consideration of an allotment bill heightened the government’s administrative and 
guiding role over the “Indian problem” and bolstered monolithic Native identities, which 
succeeded in stripping Native individuality as far as the government was concerned.  In 
turn, the federal government’s republican fatherhood was firmed up as authoritative, 
exceptional and benevolent.  Also, executive authority was fortified by the Interior 
Department and Bureau of Indian Affairs, as both took the administrative lead in 
allotment. Overall, allotment discourse preceding the Dawes Act codified a republican 
fatherhood for U.S. leaders that involved problem/administrative and dependent/paternal 
identities for Native communities and the government, both of which led to consideration 
of the Dawes Act.       
COMMODITY & ASSIMILATION IN DAWES ACT RHETORIC 
 The justifications for allotment proffered by the pre-Dawes Senate did not 
disappear during the latter years of the 1880s.  In fact, as Prucha and Otis argue, the issue 
of allotment was discussed during every Congressional session until another bill was 
procured in 1887.181 As time drew on, the failure of the reservation system to assimilate 
American Indians to the U.S. nation sparked a renewed interest in “legislating for an 
allotment policy.”182 President Grover Cleveland recognized the public outcries for an 
allotment policy in 1885 and – based on the advice of the Interior Department – urged 
Congress to adopt a bill to this effect.  Employing the Native identity of dependency, he 
noted in his first inaugural: “[Indians] need to be protected from purloining schemes 
…The conscience of the people demands that the Indians … shall be fairly and honestly 
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treated as wards of the government and their education and civilization promoted with a 
view toward their ultimate citizenship.”183 
A number of things are of note in this quotation.  First, Cleveland homogenized 
American Indians as a monolith in need of protection.  And, the government was 
constructed as a republican father to lead Native communities to civilization; the U.S. 
nation, Cleveland intimated, was already “promoted” to “citizenship” and civilization.  
These sentiments reflected the legacy of removal era discourse.  Second, though, he 
suggested that American Indians possessed the fortitude to assimilate to, and be 
productive “citizens” of, the United States.  The possibility of citizenship was particular 
to the allotment era and was steeped in conceptions of republican fatherhood.  American 
Indians would soon capitalize on such justifications of allotment to resist a policy that 
ostensibly reduced Native autonomy.  Finally, Cleveland’s discourse demonstrated that 
the presidency was not solely responsible for Native policies.  In contrast to Jackson’s 
inaugural – where Old Hickory noted that he, personally, would oversee a removal bill – 
Cleveland shifted the executive responsibility for allotment legislation to the Interior 
Department.184 Here, Cleveland underscored the increase in executive power over U.S.-
Native affairs by locating such administrative duties to the president’s cabinet.    
J.D.C. Atkins, Cleveland’s Commissioner of Indian Affairs, outlined an allotment 
bill in his 1885 annual report.  In it he aimed to solve the “Indian problem” by managing 
a new system of redistributing Native territories and converting American Indians to 
farmers.  He wrote, “everything done with reference to the Indian should be with a view 
of impressing upon them that this is the policy which has been permanently decided … in 
reference to their management.”185 In this instantiation, Atkins constructed the executive 
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as an administrator and “Indians” as a “problem.”  He then went on to outline some of the 
tenets of, what would eventually become, the Dawes Act.  First, American Indians were 
to “abandon their tribal relations and take land in severalty.”186 The point therein was to 
break up the power in numbers that Native communities held as communal nations and to 
convert each individual Native into a sharecropper of sorts – part of the republican 
fatherhood construct. This insensitive plan also held emancipatory promise.  That is, 
through individualism and “complete success in agriculture” American Indians could 
embrace “self support” and “personal independence” – the decisive pathway to 
citizenship.187 
Second, however, this pledged autonomy came with a cost.  The U.S. government 
would still enact paternal control over Native communities by “protecting them” and 
“retaining the right to their lands.”188 Basically, the government would lease the land to 
American Indians and, in the process, control American Indian interests because Natives 
had yet to achieve civic maturity as republican children.  According to Wilkins, the 
government would simultaneously assimilate American Indians, thus eliminating any 
threats of violence from them.  In addition, the government served “the interest of the 
burgeoning [white population] who could purchase the ‘surplus’ land … for settlement 
purposes.”189 Allotment sought to accomplish these tasks under the benevolent 
justification that American Indians would be assimilated as “citizens” through labor and 
working the land.  In the end, this pledge fell short.190 
This section argues that Dawes Act deliberations, and the act itself, continued 
homogenizing American Indian identities by reducing Natives and their allotted lands to 
commodities whereby they could only appear as part of the U.S. nation if they produced 
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on such commodified territories.  The government channeled its hybrid relationship with 
American Indians into a symbiosis that provided citizenship to American Indians in 
exchange for producing as republican children on behalf of the U.S. nation.  
Commodification was an avenue used by the government to solve the “Indian problem” 
while also assimilating American Indian communities.  The section also asserts that – 
though indigenous labor and use of lands appeared to offer Natives sovereignty – 
allotment entrenched this so-called autonomy in a dependence on the federal government.  
Concurrently, the Dawes Act’s focus on a “severalty,” or trust, component likened 
American Indian identities to children, thereby diminishing Native sovereignty even 
further.  Indian Commissioner reports, thereafter, precipitated Native assimilation by 
separating them from tribal structures.  Overall, republican fatherhood forever 
constructed Native communities as children, which justified the government’s control 
over their land and their own livelihoods.  As republican children within the U.S. family, 
American Indians were expected to toil for the betterment of the United States as they 
strove for civic participation.   
Such ends were never achieved in the same ways that they were for the (white) 
dependents of republican mothers, thus revealing the incongruous bind of U.S. 
citizenship where the U.S. commanded assimilation yet ultimately blocked it through 
segregationist policies.  Functioning as a residue of the hybrid U.S.-Native relationship, 
such identity duality spotlighted the contradictions between the material practice of 
Native segregation and the ideals set forth within a rhetoric of citizenship predicated on a 
commitment to assimilation as a means to the ends of equality. 
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The General Allotment (Dawes) Act Deliberations 
 Senator Henry Dawes (Massachusetts) had long been involved in American 
Indian affairs as a politician and remained in close contact with Senator Coke following 
the failed attempt at allotment in 1881.  With some renewed encouragement from 
President Cleveland and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Dawes pursued a new bill “because 
he despaired of any other answer.”  To Dawes, “the individualization of the Indian” 
through labor was the pinnacle of the government’s assimilative plans.191 Indeed, the 
time was ripe for an allotment policy.  There seemed very little opposition to the measure 
in the public; in fact, Utley contends that the American public thought allotment 
“afforded the ideal incubator” for the “process” of assimilating Natives and siphoning off 
more land for settlers in a humane way.192 And, any genuine “debate” on the issue within 
the federal government only involved cost and timelines.193 In sum, Congress was in 
relative agreement regarding allotment.194 
Within this context, Dawes introduced his bill that “extended the protection of the 
laws of the United States and the territories over the Indians” through allotted lands upon 
which indigenous communities would toil and, assumingly, reach citizenship.195 The 
analysis that follows considers how Dawes’ insistence that laboring on leased lands – the 
cornerstone of allotment and proposed citizenship – reduced American Indian identities 
to commodified laborers.  Such logic resonates with the nineteenth century image of a 
father insisting that his children prepare for agricultural productivity to provide free labor 
to the family unit.196 The debate surrounding the Dawes Act in the House then reveals 
how government-led identities of problem/administrator and dependent/ward weakened 
American Indian sovereignty by predicating Native importance through service to, and 
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tutelage under, the republican father.  Mostly clearly, the executive department was 
granted such citizen oversight by congressional leaders debating the tenets of allotment.    
In his opening comments to the Senate, Dawes argued that only productive use of 
reservation land could elevate American Indians to U.S. citizenship.  The point of labor, 
he said, was to lead Natives “out from the darkness and into the light” to “citizenship.”197 
Such republican justifications pointed to American Indians as dependent in accordance 
with pre-Dawes rhetoric. Moreover, American Indians, Dawes insinuated, could only be 
redeemed and considered important by subjugation to a type of yeomanship, as first 
suggested by Jefferson:  “what [an American Indian] earns on the farm will help him 
learn the value” of participation in the “nation.”198 Therefore, the promises of American 
Indian citizenship did not derive from their centuries-long connection to territory or from 
their past relationship with the U.S. government.  Instead, citizenship could only be 
established if the government assimilated Natives through, and molded them from, “the 
best material out of which citizenship was ever made”: agricultural toil.199 Dawes 
continued by asking Congress if there was “any better work than … to make citizens 
worthy of this republic.”200 Here, citizenship through work undergirded Dawes’ plan for 
allotment.  And, there were no variations of this plan for individual Native nations, for as 
Dawes was fond of repeating: “The whole thing must undergo a change.”201 In the end, 
the Dawes bill promised to end the “Indian problem” by assimilating American Indians 
into a capitalistic agricultural system. This, however, would reduce them and notions of 
the land that they toiled on to productivity alone.  Dawes’ plan differed from the Indian 
Removal Act’s discourse as the Jacksonian period repudiated the idea that American 
Indians could actually assimilate.  Now, however, whites and Natives were in closer 
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contact, and Jefferson’s yeoman plan came to bear as a way to meld settlers with 
indigenous people in the West.         
Meanwhile, Congress was tasked with crafting a law that allowed the executive to 
uplift dependent Native through allotment and labor.  With allotment, the executive could 
“put him [Indian] on his own land, furnish him with a little habitation, with a plow, and a 
hoe, and a rake, and show him how to go to work to use them.”202 Though agricultural 
labor promised to move American Indian individuals into public participation and 
autonomy, Dawes’ discourse linked this liberty to a “dependence on the federal 
government.”203 The executive, in particular, would not only administrate the policy, but 
according to Hoxie, would “take Indians by the hand” in selecting their tracts and 
deciding which crops to grow.204 To this point, Dawes contended that the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs “would select men, true men, to go and point out to [American Indians] 
these homesteads … [we] will then furnish [American Indians] with a homestead on 
which he is” to “work.”205 Here, the executive republican father was constructed as 
fortitudinous and strong  (“true men”) in addition to paternalistic (“Indians who are to 
step out of the darkness … look to you [government] to tell them the way wherein they 
shall go”).206 
Dawes, though, offered American Indians a rupture for resistance by noting that 
Native communities choosing to toil on their allotments “might” reach independence.  
Ostensibly, the predications of citizenship and autonomy were the outward benevolent 
rationales for the Dawes bill and differed tremendously from removal era constructions of 
Natives as separated wards.  Dawes looked forward to the possibility that “they [would] 
stand upon the reservations no more” – a time when “they will stand upon their 
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homesteads as citizens of the United States.”207 Native individuals, in this instance, held 
the promise of sovereignty that could feasibly “open to him the doors” of the U.S. 
nation.208 This potential, however, only came with dire consequences for American 
Indians.  For example, Native communities would be forced to “abandon” their 
traditional identities and heritages.  Upon allotment, Dawes asserted that Natives “would 
pass away as an Indian … He is to disappear as an Indian of the past.”  This 
disappearance was reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt’s discourse, wherein he asserted 
that (European) immigrants should “shed” their previous nationalities and “meld together 
into one people” under the aegis of the United States.209 
Assimilation – one half of the citizenry dualism – was a definitive component in 
matters of European immigration, as well.  For American Indians, independence meant 
complete alignment with the U.S. government through labor.  Of Native identities 
resembling “vagabonds and tramps” – referring to roaming and hunting subsistence – 
Dawes said, “there is no longer any room for such an Indian in this country … the Indian 
of the past has no place to live in this country.”210 Native resistance, as detailed in the 
next chapter, addressed the possibility of citizenship, but did so with the contention that 
yeomanship and capitalism did not have to supplant Native heritages and traditional 
identities.  
Dawes’ introduction of the allotment bill set the tone of the debate.  He glossed 
the need for allotment with paternal and administrative identities for the executive and 
dependent identities for American Indians.  And, in republican fatherhood form, he 
linked any scintilla of Native sovereignty and citizenship on what American Indians 
could produce as agriculturalists. Following suit, the Senate passed the Dawes bill easily 
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and quickly, with very little discussion of the bill’s merits, excepting the cost involved.211 
Next, the bill traveled to the House where, according to Hoxie, the cost of the policy 
became the genuine point of contestation.212 Regardless of the House’s complicity 
regarding the bill’s substance and efficacy, deliberations radiated with Native diminution.  
The following analysis demonstrates how American Indians were both reduced to their 
labor and further infantilized as the allotment bill became the Dawes Act.     
The most outspoken Dawes bill supporter in the House, Representative Thomas 
Skinner (North Carolina), began the deliberations by reifying the problem/administrator 
identities first initiated by pre-Dawes executive and senatorial discourse.  In the process 
he also exemplified the reduction of American Indian character to commodity. To 
Skinner, the Dawes bill would “lead to a correct solution to the Indian problem.”213 By 
redistricting Native territories for agricultural use, he thought the government could 
assimilate American Indians and open excess reservation land to white settlers.  An 
ancillary result of the allotment policy, he averred, was the economic value that Native 
labor would add to the expanding U.S. nation. “Let [Natives] become a citizen of the 
United States,” Skinner said, “and the Indian will soon cease to burden the Government 
and in good time will help to bear its burdens and add to the material wealth of the 
country. The Indian problem will [then] be solved”214 Skinner’s discourse reveals the 
fashion in which American Indians were diluted as problems.  Native communities 
“burdened” the government, and the government as an administrator likewise held the 
duty of “enactment of a bill” that “managed” Native groups.215 He also illustrated how 
Natives, as wards, would toil for the republican father.   
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Simultaneously, Skinner noted that the introduction of agricultural labor 
potentially benefited the U.S. economy.  Native labor offset the government’s aid to 
American Indians on reservations (they would “help bear” the U.S. nation’s “burdens”).  
Moreover, though, with allotment Natives would also add to the domestic product by 
supplying tax dollars to the U.S. economy: “[Indians] shall be converted into a civilized 
taxpayer” therefore “contributing toward the support of the Government and adding to 
the material prosperity of the country.”216 In this way, American Indian assimilation 
through agricultural labor condensed their importance to the U.S. nation in terms of 
commodity.  And, this commodity was framed in paternalistic terms, especially as Native 
“sons” toiled on tenant land for the executive as a republican father. 
The assimilation and citizenship of American Indians remained a crucial 
component of the Dawes bill as it moved further through the House.  And, the 
constitution of American Indians as commodity undergirded the allotment policy’s 
pledge of citizenship and participation in the U.S. nation.  Representative Bishop Perkins 
(Kansas), speaking homologically to Senator Dawes, argued that American Indians 
“should be enabled and required to qualify themselves for the duties of American 
citizenship, and to support themselves by industry and toil.”217 Though such aims of self-
support seemingly emancipated American Indians from dependent characterization, the 
aims “failed to elevate” Native identities to sovereignty.218 That is, as allotted Natives 
“learned the habits of thrift and industry” through their labor, they were expected to do so 
“by associating with the white man” especially as whites possessed the ideal character for 
citizenship.219 They were also to be treated as monolithic through the Dawes bill, as the 
“policy under examination” would “totalize” all Native communities as allotted 
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“workers” under the proposed legislation. Nowhere included in the House deliberations 
were indications of individuality among Native nations.220 In fact, Skinner railed that the 
bill allowed the “Indian to shake off the shackles of tribal authority” and that they could 
work for the “United States without the hindrance from the tribe to which he belongs.”221 
Seemingly, associations with the U.S. economy were supplanting connections to Native 
nations and commanding a pledge of nationalism in exchange for their use of the land.                 
 Furthermore, representatives worked from pre-Dawes discourse in terms of 
reifying dependent/warden identities for American Indians and the U.S. government.  
Joseph Dolph (Oregon) reminded fellow legislators that “there are some 250,000 Indians 
in the United States who are the wards of the government.”  Not only were Native 
communities considered childlike, here, but also the government could oppress them at 
whim as a republican father.  For, as Dolph concluded, “We control their persons, to a 
certain extent, and their property.”222 The government’s paternal control would not 
change with the administration of the Dawes bill – a similarity to the removal era.  
Rather, governmental influence would increase, despite the policy’s prospects of 
American Indian autonomy.  James Weaver (Iowa) thought that the government could 
only “guide” its “wards” by reducing their land through allotment.  So unable were 
Natives, he asserted, that “[we] will sooner civilize them if [we] confine them to less 
area.”223 To this effect, confining Natives to smaller tracts of land, forcing them to live 
among whites, and assimilating them through farming could only be decided by the U.S. 
government as a paternal figure.  As Skinner argued, “we, as [Natives’] guardians must 
choose for him” what his “destiny is.”224 In the end, these decisions were to be made and 
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carried through by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, thus enhancing executive power in 
administrating Native affairs.225 
Rhetoric of the Dawes Act of 1887  
The House passed Senator Dawes’ allotment bill without much substantive debate 
beyond funding specifics.  However, the Dawes Act of 1887 – the finished product of 
some seven years of deliberation on allotment – came to represent the new shape of 
Native affairs and of the U.S.-Native relationship.  Overall, the act demarcated for 
American Indians an enforced move away from traditional indigenous roaming, hunting 
and gathering subsistence.  It also signified the cessation of communally owned tribal 
lands.226 Instead, the Dawes Act compelled an assimilationist commitment that led to a 
“compulsory turning toward white social and economic values and laws to which the 
individual Indian was to be increasingly subjected.”227 The brief analysis that follows 
explores how the Dawes Act combined the reduction of American Indian identities to 
commodities and wards into a policy that, ultimately, left the U.S. government in control 
of Native territories as a paternal administrator and republican father, ultimately 
segregating American Indians in ways counterintuitive to the assimilationist logic 
underscoring the bill’s justification. 
The Dawes Act allowed the executive branch through the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs and the Interior Department the authority to “cause said reservations, or any part 
thereof, to be surveyed … and to allot the lands in said reservation in severalty to any 
Indian located thereon.”228 Severalty involved a “trust” process wherein the federal 
government enacted paternalism by overseeing the conversion of American Indian 
“wards” to assimilated agricultural laborers.  According to Clark, the severalty dimension 
366
of the Dawes Act should have cemented the notion that Native communities were never 
fully granted citizenship and autonomy through the allotment policy.229 Instead, the 
severalty process provided that: “the United States does and will hold the land thus 
allotted for a period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and benefit of the 
Indian.”230 American Indians, thus, remained dependent on the U.S. government for a 
period of no less than twenty-five years – about the length of time needed for an 
American boy to mature.231 Only following the patenting of lands after the trust period – 
and with proof that an individual Native “has adopted the habits of civilized life” – could 
American Indians be considered U.S. citizens.232 Moreover, the executive through the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and Interior Department might decide, following the trust 
period, to extend the interlude should Natives “not have achieved productive and 
respectable” status as a republican farmer.233 
Overall, the severalty clause upon which the Dawes Act relied channeled the 
paternal and administrative identities constituted by pre-Dawes rhetoric in 1881 and the 
Dawes bill debates of 1886 and 1887 into a hybridized and hierarchical relationship.  
American Indians were alluded to as unfit to occupy their newly allotted lands without 
governmental intervention; they were treated as infants in terms of their civic 
preparedness and were forced to toil minimally for 25 more years in order to demonstrate 
their citizen suitability. As the Dawes Act’s header noted, allotment would “extend the 
protection of the laws of the United States … over the Indians.”234 In the meantime, the 
U.S. government was characterized as an administrator of both Native cultures and 
territories – the government “executed,” “contracted,” “conveyed,” and “regulated” all of 
“the lands in Indian Territory” and the “rights of any such Indian.”  Concomitantly, the 
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Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs were to “direct,” “foster,” 
“guide,” and “manage” the new policy, as well as to “protect” those “Indians within 
jurisdiction.”235 
An extension of the Dawes Act – the Burke Act of 1906 – emboldened the 
hybridized administrative and paternal identities enjoining American Indians and the U.S. 
government.  Ostensibly, the Burke Act codified that the executive could extend the 
severalty trust period for “longer” than twenty-five years “as deemed necessary.”236 The 
Act claimed that the administrative and paternal duties of the U.S. government over 
American Indians would exist “until the issuance of fee simple” or until the government 
gave Natives a controlled deed to their allotments.  Again, though, until the government 
decided that citizenship was earned “all allottees to whom trust patents” were offered 
would be “subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”237 
According to Wilkins, the Dawes Act’s severalty clause and its permutations 
blighted the movement of American Indians toward citizenship.238 Hybridizing a paternal 
relationship between the U.S. government and American Indians, the Dawes Act also 
diminished indigenous sovereignty by reifying Native dependency on a parental and 
managerial Bureau of Indian Affairs and Interior Department.  In the process, the Dawes 
Act concurrently homogenized American Indians as a static group sharing the same needs 
of protection, management and guidance.            
Indian Commissioners and Assimilation 
During deliberations over the Dawes Act, Congress punctuated the significance of 
allotment with the necessity of shedding “the old Indian.”239 Indian communalism on 
reservations, in particular, was argued to have “dwarfed [Natives’] minds and … 
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clog[ged] his energies.”240 As Indian Commissioners gauged the implementation of the 
Dawes Act, they averred that American Indian assimilation could be hastened by 
breaking up Native communalism, therefore linking American Indian loyalty to the U.S. 
government and occluding any future tribal influence.  Such assimilation with white 
citizens, the logic suggested, would help foster enlightened individuals laboring for 
citizenship rights and privileges. According to Indian Commissioner Thomas Morgan’s 
1889 annual report, for instance, “tribal relations should be broken up and socialism 
destroyed.”241 The thought, here, was that tribal influence on a mass scale challenged 
allotment and its attendant goal of assimilating American Indians.242 This also 
undergirded Roosevelt’s desire to assimilate European immigrants into a “bold and 
hardy” American nation.243 The government reckoned that such influences could be 
diminished with the strengthening of assimilation through the allotment of lands 
constituting one part of the incongruous bind of U.S. citizenship. As Roosevelt was fond 
of commenting: “Allotment … is a vast pulverizing engine to break up this tribal 
mass.”244 And, yet, the government still channeled its hybrid relationship with Natives 
into a segregated and contained citizenship as the allotted lands functioned as the spaces 
of control. 
 Indian Commissioners fortified the dependent/ward relationship by tying 
assimilation to a weakening of Native communalism.  Speaking one year after the 
passage of the Dawes Act, Commissioner John H. Oberly, for instance, asserted that the 
“guardian must act for the ward … The Government must then, in duty to the public, 
compel the Indian to come out of his isolation … and into assimilation with the 
masses.”245 Here, the executive possessed a hierarchical identity in directing the childlike 
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Native toward “American life.”  This guidance worked by diminishing the power of 
Native nations.  That is, American Indians were to be “imbued with the exalting egoism 
of American civilization.”246 The government sought to banish tribalism – especially as 
Native unification became popular among Native communities – thus reducing 
indigenous influences that otherwise clouded assimilation.  Moreover, the “breaking up 
of the tribal mass” allowed American Indians to “find pleasure in the consummation of 
that patriotic enjoyment which is always to be found in the exercise of the high privilege 
of contributing to the general welfare.”247 In this way, Clark contends, capitalistic 
production of the allotted lands would dually assimilate Native individuals and “add” to 
the U.S. nation’s “wealth.”248 In this instantiation, American Indians were reduced to 
their labor and, though the government intimated at Native “individuality,” American 
Indians were nonetheless homogenized through a blanketed assimilation program.249 
To the issue of American Indian assimilation through allotment, Indian 
Commissioners and Interior Secretaries also predicated the reduction of tribal structures 
on Natives’ agricultural work as republican children.  Therefore, just as in the Dawes bill 
discussions in the House, American Indians could only show the promises of assimilating 
and becoming citizens if they contributed to the U.S. national economy.  U.S. leaders 
supported allotment by asserting that Natives be “trained to habits of industry, thrift and 
self reliance.”250 According to Interior Secretary Ethan Allen Hitchcock, labor preserved 
Natives “from extinction, not as an Indian but as a human being.”251 They could only be 
viewed as worthy “human beings” and as “participants” by “abolish[ing] tribal relations 
… and in the sweat of his brow and by the toil of his hands, carry out, as his white 
[neighbor] has done, a home for himself and his family.”252 In this quotation, American 
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Indian culture was eschewed in favor of western conceptions of work and homesteading.  
This construction also homogenized Native identities.  
Again, labor worked both to assimilate American Indians and to enhance the 
government’s wealth.  Indian Commissioner William A. Jones wrote to this effect in 
1901, claiming that the American Indians would “discover the dignity in labor.”  This 
pride involved “uplifting … his race” but also understanding that “the more useful he is 
the more useful he will be to society.”253 And, the hybrid identities created between the 
paternally administrative U.S. government and dependent Natives undergirded American 
Indians’ transformations to commodified laborers: “he must have aid and instruction … 
until he can get a start and his labor become[s] more productive … we will teach him 
how to work and how to live.”254 Native citizenship could only be attained through their 
labor and productive use of the land.  As a republican father, the executive emphasized 
the connection between the two as vital to Native uplift. This identity construction 
predicated on capitalistic conversion, and their status as wards, reduced American Indian 
agency to their labor.  Furthermore, the identities of American Indians as problems 
similarly inhered in the plan to assimilate Native communities through allotment.  
According to Morgan, “[Indians would] be removed from the contaminating influences of 
tribal life” 255 The Dawes Act solved the “Indian problem” – which tribalism and Natives, 
themselves, propagated.  Communal subsistence and tribal culture had “proven 
inadequate” for the uplift of American Indians.256 Moreover, tribal customs had “shown 
themselves to be a hindrance to the progress of the Indian … an obstruction in the 
pathway of civilization.”  Indian Commissioners, therefore, requested that tribal 
connections “be utterly destroyed and entirely swept away.”257 American Indians, here, 
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were constituted as problematic; and, the federal government garnered the administrative 
identity and acuity to remedy the situation by codifying an assimilationist decree.  After 
all, the government orchestrated “the great forces of legislation, administration and 
institutions” necessary to eradicate the problem by allotting American Indians and 
severing their tribal loyalties.258 
Despite the clear areas of agreement, there did exist some ruptures in Bureau of 
Indian Affairs rhetoric surrounding the Dawes Act’s efficacy.  And, as with institutional 
removal rhetoric, these moments simultaneously generated from American Indian 
viewpoints and provided entrees for Native communities to resist allotment.259 In arguing 
for the “destroy[ing] of tribal relations” and of dealing with American Indians “not as 
nations or tribes or bands,” Morgan also alluded to Native agency.260 First, he made 
explicit that American Indian communities may have – even if in the past – held the 
promise of sovereignty.  This was born out by his inclusion of “nations” among those 
structures he wanted to eliminate.  In the end, that he sought to destroy these “nations” 
weakened American Indian sovereignty.  But, Morgan’s admission that Natives may have 
once been considered sovereign allowed Natives an opening to resist allotment.  Morgan 
also claimed that the supplanting of tribalism pledged to move American Indians into the 
status of “American citizen” and granted “full participation in all the riches of our 
civilization.”261 Such questions of citizenship were a predictable outgrowth once the 
Natives were living within the spaces of the expanded U.S. nation in the West rather than 
on the farthest reaches of the nation’s border.     
 In the end, Indian Commissioner reports worked through a hybrid hierarchy to 
facilitate the Dawes Act, diminishing in the process Native sovereignty by eliminating 
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tribal authorities and homogenizing American Indian identities as assimilative. Overall, 
Dawes Act deliberations and the Dawes Act and Indian Commissioner reports reduced 
American Indian identities to commodities whereby they could only appear part of the 
U.S. nation if they produced on the land as republican children.  In this vein, the 
government fortified its administratively paternal hybrid relationship that provided 
assimilation and citizenship to American Indians in exchange for what Natives could 
produce for the U.S. nation.  Again, this modeled the father-son relationship of nineteenth 
century families.262 Also, the Dawes Act’s focus on a “severalty,” or trust, clause 
diminished American Indian identities to childish, thereby further limiting sovereignty.  
Finally, Bureau of Indian Affairs reports punctuated the hybrid relationship by 
assimilating Natives, hence separating them from tribal structures and moving them 
towards labor and prospective citizenship as individualized citizens producing upon the 
small tracks of land. 
JUDICIAL RHETORIC & THE CODIFICATION OF HYBRIDITY 
 The Dawes Act, however, never fulfilled Native citizenship promises.  Instead, 
the executive capitalized on the homogenized constructions of American Indians as 
dependent, commodified and assimilated to expand into Native territories.263 In the 
process, the government constituted itself as paternal and administrative in deciding 
American Indian affairs.  These identity constructions reflected the ideology of 
republican fatherhood, which allowed the paternal figure to permanently restrict the 
independence of his wards who were not allowed to achieve a level of independent and 
thus surpass the threshold of citizenship in the initial decades following the Act’s 
codification.       
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This section contends that the Supreme Court codified dependent and 
homogenized American Indian identities by allowing for the government as a republican 
father figure to reign supreme in directing all future U.S.-Native relationships.  The 
Court’s encroachment into American Indian communities and its solidifying of the 
plenary doctrine divided American Indians from any vestiges of independence and U.S. 
citizenship.  While congressional and executive discourse suggested that American 
Indians might be sovereign, the high court reified the diminished and dependent Native 
identities assumed by the removal era.  With sovereignty hindered by the allotment 
policy’s assimilative edicts, American Indians were basically left with a wholesale 
dependence on the U.S. government and with an empty promise of citizenship based on a 
hierarchical and hybridized relationship with its republican father.  This section explores, 
first, how the U.S. government heightened its interventions into allotted Native 
territories, by way of the Court, even though American Indians who acceded allotment 
were said to be “independent” and “immune” from federal encroachment.264 Then, a 
reading of the Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock case demonstrates how the government – via the 
high court – channeled its hybrid relationship with American Indian communities into a 
codified hierarchy of dominance-to-subjugation.  In the end, American Indian citizenship 
was shown to fail as Natives were reified as dependent, commodified, and ill-equipped 
for citizenship rights, once again segregating them from the spaces of citizenship. Lone 
Wolf, thereby, further weakened American Indian sovereignty. 
Assimilation and Legal Hierarchy 
 According to Schmekebrier, the end of treaty-making marked a pivotal moment in 
U.S.-Native interactions.  What had once been a mutual “supreme law in the relations 
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between Indians” and the government was suddenly superseded by Congressional, 
Interior Department and Bureau of Indian Affairs directives.265 American Indian agency 
was quelled as the government could administrate Native policy with very little American 
Indian input.  To the latter, the Congress only “considered” American Indian opinions, 
but the executive retained the definitive “say” in codifying policies.266 The end of treaty-
making, therefore, ushered in a number of intrusive laws that consequentially reified the 
dependent/warden hybridity between American Indians and the U.S. government.  Such 
laws, supported by the Supreme Court, also homogenized Native identities as submissive 
republican children and, similarly, raised suspicions about whether the citizenship 
promises included in the Dawes Act were viable. 
 One of the first legal cases that threatened American Indian sovereignty during 
the allotment era was Elk v. Wilkins (1884).  In the case, John Elk (Omaha) was denied 
voting privileges in Nebraska, despite his claims of assimilation through agricultural 
labor and assumptions of citizenship based on his tax revenue and contributions to the 
nation’s economy.267 The question for the Court remained: “whether an Indian born a 
member of one of the Indian tribes within the United States” having engaged in 
productive use of the land was protected “by the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”268 The Fourteenth Amendment stated that “all persons born … in the 
United States … are citizens of the United States” and that “no State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens.”269 Indeed, 
Elk satisfied the “republican” demands of “citizenship” and appeared eligible for 
protection under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment, which 
secured voting rights for citizens.270 However, the high court ruled that Elk could not vote 
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because American Indians were held as “no more ‘born in the United States’ than 
children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain” of the United 
States.”271 The plaintiff, “not being a citizen of the United States” was denied such status 
due to his Native identity.”272 In this instance, American Indians were constituted as 
outside the spaces of political participation in the U.S. nation even though they held claim 
to the physical properties of what became the nation-state.  Such ruling exemplified the 
incongruous bind of U.S. citizenship whereby the executive and Congress pushed for 
assimilation while the U.S. Supreme Court reified segregationist precedents, an 
inconsistency of the hybridization presaged in the government’s assimilation demands. 
Moreover, Native identities were equated with both childishness and “foreign 
governments.”  According to Clark, this case set the stage for the denial of American 
Indian citizenship rights during the allotment era, despite the Dawes Act’s insistence that 
assimilated Natives could attain citizenship.273 The case, combined with Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896), also indicated how the government committed to the assimilation of 
persons of color yet did so through the principles of segregation.  In the case of American 
Indians, this segregation meant cordoning them off onto allotted lands outside the scope 
of the U.S. nation – but close enough to be controlled by the republican father overseeing 
their agricultural production.  
Next, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government could justifiably seize 
and try Natives for crimes per federal law, hence limiting the autonomous character of 
American Indians who had begun to assimilate to the U.S. nation.  In United States v. 
Kagama (1886), Kagama (Hoopa) was accused of murder and had been tried under the 
Major Crimes Act of 1885, which subjected American Indian criminals “either within or 
376
without an Indian reservation” to federal criminal law.274 With the act, American Indians 
committing murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary and 
larceny were “tried in the same manner … and with the same penalties as are all other 
persons charged with the commission of said crimes.”275 The inconsistency of the law, 
however, clouded the act’s vitality.  That is, American Indians could not be considered 
citizens or enjoy the “privileges” of “American law” but could be tried and punished 
under this very legal system.276 Kagama brought his case to the Supreme Court to 
challenge the act’s contradictions.  Ultimately, the high court ruled that the Major Crimes 
Act was equitable because “Indians are wards of the nation … They are communities 
dependent on the United States.”277 Therefore, the U.S. government owed a duty to 
protect those “wards” who might be threatened by such Native criminals.  The Supreme 
Court’s language, in addition to constructing American Indians as dependent, reified 
governmental identities as dominant and paternal.  “The power of the General 
Government … over the … now weak and diminished [Indians],” the court averred, “is 
necessary to their protection.”  The right of criminal intercession was extended to the 
government – above the sovereignty of American Indians and their supposed autonomous 
territories – because such power “never has existed anywhere else … the government … 
alone can enforce its laws on all tribes.”278 Such monolithic holdings weakened the 
agency of American Indians to retain independence.   
Simultaneously, the federal government was granted the dominant identity to 
control Natives at whim.279 As Native land was apportioned, the boundaries between 
whites and American Indians were maintained, reminiscent of the Indian Removal Act.  
Granted, Native communities were in closer contact with whites in the late nineteenth 
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century.  However, removal’s precedent of excluding Natives from the spaces of 
citizenship continued into the allotment era as American Indians were still cordoned onto 
demarcated and limited territories. The U.S. government, thus, commanded assimilation 
while creating the boundaries necessary for such citizenship integration. 
Finally, two more decisions heightened the ability of the U.S. government to 
intervene in Native affairs following the Dawes Act.  In Cherokee Nation v. Southern 
Kansas Railway Company (1890), the Supreme Court ruled that the government could 
allow railroads to traverse Native allotments without American Indian consent.  This was 
so, writes Clark, because the allotment policy still left American Indian lands in the 
government’s hands through the severalty, or trust, clause. Thus, the government “could 
uphold eminent domain through Indian reserved lands.”280 The hybridized paternal 
relationship between the government and American Indians was clarified, once again, as 
the court argued that Congress and the executive “could exercise the power of eminent 
domain … in a territory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe [because] the members … 
are wards of the United States, and directly subjected to its political control.”281 This 
same type of supremacy was enacted in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation (1899) wherein the 
high court affirmed the Dawes Act’s severalty clause.  The judgment claimed, “we repeat 
that in view of the paramount authority of Congress over the Indian tribes” that the 
federal government can hold Native property and decide who was “entitled to 
citizenship” and when.282 American Indian land, allotted through the Dawes Act, was not 
“owned” by Native individuals; rather, “the lands and moneys of these tribes are public 
lands and public moneys and are not held in individual ownership.”283 Both the Kansas 
378
Railway and Stephens cases revealed how the Dawes Act’s pledges of autonomy and 
citizenship for American Indians fell short of the allotment policy’s goals.   
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock and Plenary Power 
The Supreme Court clarified the limited reach of American Indian independence 
and citizenship – as well as governmental supremacy over Native affairs – in Lone Wolf  
v. Hitchcock (1903).  The 1903 decision ended all challenges to the Dawes Act as 
intrusive and granted Congress – at the executive’s behest – the ultimate “plenary power” 
to abrogate Indian treaties without any limits or duties.  The Court also ruled that 
American Indian communities had to rely on the federal government in “good faith” as a 
republican father. The high court averred that “protecting [Natives] is within the 
competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are 
communities dependent on the United States … The power of the general government … 
is necessary to their protection.”284 
Many have questioned the plenary doctrine, which constituted American Indians 
as dependent and the federal government as, once again, supervisory.  For instance, Estin 
charges that the case allowed Congress to impulsively enlarge the nation’s territory.  To 
this effect, “the plenary power rule … effectively [left] the tribes at the mercy of shifting 
congressional moods and majorities …  the rule’s function was to facilitate continued 
congressional appropriation of tribal lands and resources.”285 Moreover, Clark asserts 
that plenary power solidified eternally the dependent/warden identities of Natives and the 
government; he notes that Lone Wolf is “the hallmark of federal paternalism over the 
Indian.”286 
379
The analysis that follows considers the Lone Wolf decision for the ways that 
Native autonomy and citizenship were throttled by the plenary doctrine.  In the end, the 
Dawes Act’s promise of independence and participation in the U.S. nation for American 
Indians fell short of its aim.  As Senator Matthew Quay commented in 1903 after the 
Lone Wolf ruling, “It is the Dred Scott decision number two, except that in this case the 
victim is red instead of black. It practically inculcates the doctrine that the red man has no 
rights, which the white man is bound to respect, and, that no treaty or contract made with 
him is binding.”287 Ultimately, the case solidified the identity constructions instantiated 
by institutional discourse in the removal era.  
The case derived from a Kiowa Nation challenge to the Dawes Act.  In June 1900 
Congress ratified the Jerome Agreement between the federal government and the Kiowa 
community for the allotment of their reservation.  According to Lone Wolf (Kiowa), the 
agreement violated a provision of the earlier 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge that 
required three-fourths of all Kiowa men to agree on allotment.  Lone Wolf asserted that 
“[this] act of Congress is unconstitutional and void because it will deprive [the Kiowa] of 
their lands without their consent and against their protest.”288 Lone Wolf contended that 
Congress had forged Indian signatures and “tricked” leaders into signing the allotment 
agreement.  This tactic, of course, alluded to the power of Native agency in resisting the 
Dawes Act.  That Congress had to resort to spurious tactics meant that allotment suffered 
only partial complicity from Natives.289 Lone Wolf took his protest to the high court to 
determine if the Jerome Agreement was “a null and void act of Congress … upon the 
ground that the agreement was procured from the Indians by fraud and deception” and 
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whether Natives had “vested rights” and autonomous use of their land or whether they 
simply held “the right to occupy [their] land at the will of the government.”290 
The Supreme Court responded that it could not confront Congress when it came 
to “wardship” issues with American Indians.  Of this, Justice Edward White wrote, 
“plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress 
from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to 
be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”291 With the Kiowa Nation’s 
legal challenge quashed, White suggested that “all Indians” (this phrase demonstrated the 
Court’s view of Native identities as monolithic) had to have “good faith” in Congress as 
“protectors” and “possessors” of “plenary power.”292 Given this hierarchical identity 
construction, Congress retained the right to abrogate the Treaty of Medicine Lodge if the 
executive deemed this action necessary for the safety of American Indian communities.293 
In the process of cementing the plenary doctrine, the high court supported a 
dominant/subjugated relationship for the federal government and Native communities.  
White asserted that, “the power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty 
[when] … the interest of the country and the Indian themselves, indicates that it should 
do so.”  Due to Congress’s benevolent character, the Court “never doubted that the power 
to abrogate existed in Congress …particularly if [it was] consistent with perfect good 
faith towards the Indians.”294 At the suggestion of the executive, then, Congress could 
change Native policy, including older treaties negotiated with American Indians. 
Moreover, congressional identity was constituted as celebrated and moral. 
White’s holding claimed that “it is to be presumed that in this matter the United States 
would be governed by such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people 
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in their treatment of a … dependent race … a moral obligation rested upon Congress to 
act in good faith in performing” its ratification of the Jerome Agreement.”295 The federal 
government, here, was considered benevolent and controlling; American Indians, 
oppositely, were characterized as “dependent” and susceptible to congressional and 
executive privilege.  To the latter, Clark laments, “Indians’ state of pupilage in the eyes 
of the justices necessitated the guardian’s use of stern measures to lift the Indian charges” 
in line with the government’s assimilation program.”296 Indeed, claiming a self-righteous 
and morally superior character assisted the Court in justifying plenary power and, more 
generally, the ideology of paternalism. What is more, the ratification of the Jerome 
Agreement and the high court’s championing of plenary authority were shrouded in the 
rhetoric of “good faith” – a legal tenet that remained difficult to disprove.297 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s plenary doctrine reduced American Indian 
territoriality to tenancy, therefore solidifying the diminished identity constructions 
inherent in the Dawes Act’s severalty clause.  White relied on this construction to justify 
Congress’s abrogation of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge.  He argued, “Such lands and 
reservations are held by the Indians subject to the control and dominion of the United 
States, and such Indian tribes … have no title in the lands they occupy … their right is 
simply to occupy, at the will of the Government and under its protection.”298 Ostensibly, 
American Indians were legitimate for the ease with which the government could remove 
them if more settlers came along looking for western land.  Like a cipher that can be 
manipulated to “mean different things at different times”299 for economic advantage, 
Natives were used as tenants, producing goods for the American economy (even if 
Indians did not sell produce, they would consume goods, thus reducing the Bureau of 
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Indian Affair’s subsistent food programs to reservations) until a rightful white settler with 
vested rights moved westward.     
Even with the promises of independence for American Indians through allotment, 
the Court nonetheless ensured that “the will of the government” would always trump 
Indian occupancy rights.  Throughout the Lone Wolf decision, White reminded the Kiowa 
that no “Indian [could] assert any individual right as a vested right in the lands against the 
Government.”300 In the end, the federal government’s power to manipulate American 
Indian communities and their lands weakened the promise of independence and 
citizenship.301 Citizenship was difficult to maintain if Native identities were never 
elevated to self-governance.  Instead, as White noted, the Jerome Agreement was really 
“a mere change in the form of investment of Indian commodity.”302 The allotted 
territories functioned then as spaces of further control of Native agency and political 
power. 
Ultimately, Lone Wolf – representing all American Indians – was unsuccessful at 
overturning the Jerome Agreement.  In the process of the case American Indians were 
demonstrated to possess little protection against a dominant republican father.  And, the 
promise of independence and citizenship through allotment and its attendant republican 
farming was obscured by the ease with which the Supreme Court allowed the executive 
branch to encroach on American Indian lands.  As Wildenthal puts it, the Lone Wolf 
decision suggested “plenary on steroids.”303 That is, the case simply announced a policy 
of governmental supremacy without checks or balance.  Even Congress, the most 
representative branch of government, was granted the power to constitute American 
Indian citizenship rights and identities while providing limited access for a redress of 
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grievances, exemplifying the substance of the hybrid relationship. As a whole, judicial 
discourse supporting the Dawes Act cemented dependent and homogenized Native 
identities and elevated the U.S. government’s identity as perpetually controlling and 
paternalistic.  The Supreme Court’s incursions into American Indian affairs through Elk,
Kagama, Southern Kansas Railway and Stephens along with the plenary doctrine, itself, 
severed Native communities from any vestiges of sovereignty and citizenship – a residue 
of the Indian Removal Act.     
CONCLUSION 
In the end, the allotment policy clarified the place of American Indian identities in 
the newly expanded U.S. nation.  The government, especially the executive branch, took 
on the role of republican father and sought to train American Indians for citizenship.  But, 
inclusion in the U.S. citizenry could only manifest through the proper use of land for the 
benefit of the republican father’s larger family. The Dawes Act promised autonomy and 
citizenship if Natives accomplished their republican tasks on the allotted land, but these 
promises fell flat.  In fact, the Dawes Act seemingly bolstered a hybrid and hierarchical 
relationship through which the government retained dominance in controlling American 
Indian affairs, thereby reifying the weakening of Native sovereignty and identities 
instigated by the government’s removal discourse.   Simultaneously, the Dawes Act 
privileged – and emboldened – the executive branch as the quintessence of republican 
fatherhood.  The enlargement of presidential influence into the Interior Department and 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs remained an entailment of the Indian Removal Act’s legacy 
of shoring up executive power over American Indian affairs.    
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Moreover, land during the allotment era existed as a space of commodification 
which, when produced upon, constituted a corridor to citizenship for Native communities. 
The Jacksonian era doctrine of discovery was supplanted in1880s, changing instead to 
conceptions of territory that included productivity and citizenship for American Indians.  
Ostensibly, the change indicated the conflation of citizenship and territory, which was 
crucial to discourse surrounding the Indian Removal Act.  Concurrently, the prospect of 
Native labor on their allotments and, subsequently, the possibility that they could qualify 
as U.S. citizens showed how Natives’ moral inheritance influenced the policies and 
identity formations of the Dawes era.   
Ultimately, the allotment era opened up the question of whether or not American 
Indians could attain citizenship and exemplified the identity duality of U.S. citizenship 
logic for persons of color wherein the government posited a rhetoric of assimilation 
alongside a policy of segregation.  This question was answered by the Supreme Court in 
its decision to block Native empowerment through full inclusion in the U.S. civic sphere.  
And, the further reduction of American Indian land to isolated (and allotted) areas of the 
U.S. nation underlined this segregation.  The high court, instead, solidified hybrid 
identities that linked American Indians and the U.S. government by way of a familial 
hierarchy – a structure that remained entrenched until 1924 when Congress passed the 
Indian Citizenship Act.304 Such hybridity held out promises of Native citizenship, but in 
the end was precluded by racism fundamental to U.S. nationalism that sought American 
Indian separation from the U.S. civis. However, the executive’s and legislature’s 
suggestions of American Indian assimilation through yeoman farming and a republican 
commitment to the soil – even if anemic – empowered Native communities with a sense 
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that they could attain some veneer of sovereignty. The issue of land, thus, was envisioned 
as a pathway toward citizenship for Natives, too. 
The next chapter explores how American Indian communities questioned the 
Dawes Act by employing various pan-Indian strategies and by challenging the firmness 
of identities heartened by the U.S. government’s allotment policy.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PAN-INDIANISM AND CHALLENGES TO U.S. AND NATIVE IDENTITIES:   
THE ALLOTMENT ERA 
The ratification of the Dawes Act amplified American Indian responses to the 
government’s policies, but Native nations had been employing their voices throughout 
the course of the pre-Dawes reservation system.  The primary point of contention for 
American Indian communities at that time was the growth of governmental influence 
over protected reservations.  Many disagreed with relocating to reservations and suffering 
the federal government’s paternal supremacy in its hybridized relationship with American 
Indians.  In 1854, Quinney (Mohican) argued that the U.S. government had promised 
autonomous reservations in exchange for Native removal: “A residence was given – 
territory offered – and covenants of friendship exchanged.”1 In the end, however, 
Quinney lamented the ways that the government had violated its pledges by remaining 
involved as a “Great Father” and limiting Native sovereignty as U.S. states or as separate 
nations.  He asserted that governmental intervention into indigenous affairs, “convey to 
my mind the recollection of the transfer of the miserable weakness and dependence of my 
race from one great power to another.”  Quinney surmised that the government’s 
deceitful identity and “vacillations of policy” on the reservations were “hurrying” 
American Indians into subjugation.2
Moreover, some Native communities railed against the government for allowing 
settlers to encroach on reservation lands and for providing miners and railroads traversal 
rights through preserved Native territories.  Red Cloud (Oglala Sioux), speaking at a 
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lyceum in 1870, told his audience that his nation was “already … driven onto a [sic] very 
little land” and that to allow “strange people” to violate reservation boundaries only made 
American Indians “even more poor and ignorant.”3 As a result, Red Cloud pleaded to the 
government to prevent settlers and industries from intruding further: “I don’t want any 
more such men sent out there … [to] fill their own pockets; he ultimately called for 
“preserv[ation] … and autonomy … in our reserves … we want honest men, and we want 
you to help to keep us in the lands that belong to us.”4 His discourse, in this iteration, 
pointed to the manner in which American Indians reconstituted themselves as 
independent – even in the wake of their forced removal – while simultaneously 
portraying the U.S. government as untrustworthy. 
Still other American Indians averred that the end of the treaty system limited their 
access to self-determination and, therein, provided the U.S. government with an 
unchecked privilege to decide Native affairs.  In 1871, Satank (Kiowa) asserted that the 
government – who “once came to trade” reservation land for peace – had “come now to 
fight” for the occlusion of American Indian influences within Native policies.5 Because 
it eradicated the treaty system’s tenets of Native consent, the U.S. government was 
characterized, here, as unjust.  For instance, Satank opined that the government “tells us 
to begone [sic] … as the offended master speaks to his dog.”  He considered the absence 
of treaties debilitating to Natives and maintained that the government’s respect for 
American Indian consent “like the wind … soon dies away and leaves the sullen calm of 
unheeded oppression.”6 According to Hoxie, such American Indian rebukes to the 
reservation system helped motivate the government to reform its Native policy.7 In this 
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vein, American Indian discourse retained the power to, in the least, slow down the 
deleterious consequences of the government’s identity constructions.    
Assessing American Indian voice for its discursive power is crucial to 
understanding the allotment era.  Reading these Native rhetorics for resistance highlights 
Rich’s assertion that “although documents from the late nineteenth century provide 
access to the ways in which an emerging American identity depended on a particular 
history and a specific perception of American Indian people,” they also exemplify how 
Native discourses boldly faced down “the colonial record and challenged it.”8 One of the 
ways that American Indian discourses confronted the government’s policies and identity 
constructions was through the reconstitution of these identities.  Overall, Native dissent 
obligated the U.S. government to reconfigure the rationales for allotment and to reassess 
the hybrid U.S.-Native relationship.  And, this hybrid relationship exposed the identity 
duality of U.S. citizenship that promised independence and citizenship, yet segregated 
American Indians (and other persons of color) from the civis. To this effect, American 
Indian rhetoric added to the larger discussion of the Dawes Act that occurred within the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches.  As the ensuing analysis reveals, indigenous 
responses to the allotment policy also complicated the implementation of the Dawes Act, 
thereby necessitating that the government revert to lying, wheedling and forcing 
allotment.   
Governmental discourse surrounding the Dawes Act continued the paternal and 
hybrid identities of the U.S.-Native relationship stimulated by the Indian Removal Act.  
And, just as they had done with the removal policy in the 1830s, American Indians 
likewise challenged the implementation of allotment during the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth centuries.  Hoxie argues that one of the most widespread myths that “distorts 
our understanding of the Native American experience” is that the allotment policy 
“caused the destruction of the Indians’ culture” and the eradication of Native voice.9
This mythic conception of the “vanishing” Native is an erroneous generalization that 
typifies American Indian agency as diluted and invisible.10 Contrary to this mythos, the 
following analysis demonstrates that American Indians neither disappeared nor lost their 
voices to oppose the U.S. government’s policies and hybrid identity constructions during 
the Dawes era.11 
This is not to say that American Indians faced few difficulties in empowering 
themselves against the government’s policies and identity constructs.  Maddox argues 
that the “combination of social and legal controls” placed over Native communities 
encumbered their abilities to “speak and act for themselves.”  Indeed, the government’s 
“manipulations of Indian people made increasingly necessary a public articulation of 
Indian perspectives and responses.”12 As the U.S. government enacted the allotment 
policy through hybridized identity structures, American Indians faced a seismic rhetorical 
situation.  That is, as American Indians were constituted as wards, the U.S. government 
commensurably deemed their rebuttals childlike and peripheral.  Ironically, though, the 
government’s insistence on supporting such a relationship opened up spaces for Native 
protest.  This breach gave them a foothold and an audience by prompting a “breakdown 
or defiance of the monolithic system of order” supported by the government’s Native 
policies. This empowered American Indians to respond to a policy and relationship that 
many Natives considered “oppressive.”13 
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This chapter analyzes American Indian rhetoric regarding the allotment policy by 
contextualizing it at the interstices of the late nineteenth century ideologies of expansion, 
assimilation, citizenship, republicanism, territoriality and paternalism.  The chapter opens 
by exploring Dawes era discourse in the form of Native petitions and memorials to 
Congress. 14 American Indians’ choice of Congress as the key audience for these 
petitions and memorials underscored the primacy of Congress’ role as the “peoples’ 
representative.”15 And, memorials and petitions as an “official” genre of discourse 
served, in part, to highlight Natives’ acuity in addressing Congress on its own terms.  
Ostensibly Native nations worked through appeals to the government’s identity duality, 
or the inconsistency of insisting on assimilation while segregating American Indians.  
Importantly, these direct remonstrations to Congress reflected the differing conceptions 
of “pan-Indianism”16 and Native citizenship extant between the Five Civilized Tribes and 
western and northwestern American Indian nations.   
First, the Five Civilized Tribes – because of their long relationship with the U.S. 
government and their efforts of assimilation – exhibited a rhetoric of pan-Indianism that 
strengthened their positions as prospective citizens. The Choctaws, Creeks, Chickasaws, 
Cherokees and Seminoles unified to craft republican appeals.  Their goal was 
accommodationist in the sense that they were willing to assimilate further and take on the 
duties of U.S. citizenship.  Their goal was also resistive as they contested allotment as a 
means to citizenship. The Five Civilized Tribes’ appeals constructed American Indians as 
worthy in fulfilling their duties as republican tenants and occupants of their own land, 
while the U.S. government was depicted as untrustworthy in failing their own republican 
tenets. 
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In contrast, western and northwestern Native nations – because of their limited 
contact with the government compared to the Five Civilized Tribes – championed a pan-
Indianism that advocated separatism.  Their conception of sovereignty involved 
American Indians as entities outside the scope of the U.S. government. These petitions 
and memorials endorsed a separatist pan-Indianism based on the trope of oppression that 
punctuated how allotment endangered Native traditionalism.   
Next, the chapter explores the ways that Native rhetoric in the form of pan-Indian 
popular publications reprobated identity dualism and protested the Dawes Act through 
collective memories.  According to Konkle, these public appeals were meant to 
complement American Indian rhetoric geared toward the government.17 The strategy 
therein was to capitalize on the caché of the public’s renewed interest in “safe” Natives to 
garner support for indigenous autonomy. Two genres of popular publications – 
biographical and literary accounts – produced varying collective memories, which 
encumbered the Dawes Act’s implementation by appealing directly to the American 
public.  Working through non-governmental means, these publications reconstituted a 
resistive Native history in the mass market for both themselves and the U.S. public.   
Pan-Indian memories in biographies employed familialism as a way to advocate 
for equal citizenship with other U.S. communities.  Familial appeals followed 
hegemonically from the ideology of republican fatherhood, especially as Natives 
consented to familial hierarchies supported by the federal government.  However, these 
appeals simultaneously displayed a resistive strategy by appropriating the government’s 
language and using it against itself.  Meanwhile, biographies contested identity duality by 
hearkening to the Indian Removal Act as a way of analogizing removal and the negative 
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consequences of the Dawes Act.  In the process, these memories unmasked how both 
policies fortified diminutive constructions of Native identities.  Native biographies 
suggested to the U.S. public that the government could fulfill its ideology of republican 
fatherhood by granting a familial citizenship. Appropriating and hybridizing the 
government’s monolithic view of American Indians, biographies expressed to the public 
that pan-Indian Native identities were strong.  
Oppositely, memories depicted through Native literary publications enacted a 
pan-Indianism that sought a separatist break from U.S. citizenship.  Biographies, perhaps 
because they were tied to authors’ personal character, called into question identity duality 
through amiable familialism.  However, literary publications – as fictional expressions – 
held more leeway in the magnitude of their reproaches to identity duality, and thus 
centered their severance from the polis on the government’s past ungodliness and 
violence.  Literary memories also memorialized Native autonomy—an idealism 
expressed in the creative imaginations of the authors—thereby suggesting for Natives’ 
popular audiences that allotment was unnecessary.18 
Furthermore, public oratory (both external and internal) interrogated the identity 
duality of U.S. citizenship by working through economic appeals and radical separatism. 
The section, first, assesses how integrationist American Indian speeches to the executive, 
in particular, scolded the presidency and its cabinets for violating the ownership of land 
promised by the Dawes Act.  Here, moral inheritance was once again called upon – as it 
had been during the removal era – and the U.S. government was shown to be thieving in 
its encroachment of Native territory. This contestation on economic grounds 
demonstrated both Natives’ demands for a remedy to the relationship by granting 
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citizenship and the ascendancy of the executive as the principal governmental agent in 
administrating Native policy.  Land, thus, functioned as key pathway to citizenship in the 
imaginary of Native nations as well.  Moreover, these Native speeches highlighted the 
unified identities underscoring pro-citizenship Native protest.    
Alternatively, pan-Indianism was shaped into a radical separatism by the internal 
rhetoric of the Ghost Dance Movement, a collective that sought inter-tribal strength by 
working constitutively to build concordance across Native nations.  Here, the section 
focuses on how Ghost Dance leaders challenged the Dawes Act through the language of 
internal unity and through governmental devil terms.  Finding power in unanimity, 
internal Ghost Dance rhetoric went so far as to advocate a violent resistance in order to 
separate from the U.S. citizenry.  Pan-Indianism was a larger framework for the Ghost 
Dance movement than for other unified Native groups.  The movement linked the past, 
present and the future – working through moral inheritance – while other pan-Indian 
groups worked through the present alone.    
Ultimately, the chapter argues that American Indian resistance to allotment 
worked through pan-Indianism and challenged the identity duality of U.S. inclusion. 
Vitally, such discourse evidenced the presentism and the empowerment of Native voices 
in the co-construction of U.S.-Native identities as pan-Indian rebuttals infiltrated the 
allotment debate.  American Indians gave voice to the dualism at work in identity 
constructions, signifying both the hybrid relationship between Native communities and 
the U.S. government and the power of indigenous voice in exposing nationalist 
contradictions.  Puncturing the mythos of republicanism and paternalism, American 
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Indians revealed the incongruity in assimilating Native communities for possible 
citizenship, only to segregate them from the centers of U.S. public life.   
At the same time, American Indians came to view territory as a rationale and 
means to achieve either citizenship or sovereignty outside the scope of the U.S. civis. The 
use of territoriality as a topoi, here, was similar to the U.S. government’s suggestion that 
land existed as a corridor to civilization.  Of course, the difference was that American 
Indians predicated their rationale of land as a pathway on a moral inheritance that was 
exhibited in arguments during the removal era.  For the government, land was distinctly 
connected to notions of U.S. citizenship and commitments to commodification of 
homelands – the latter of which was also visible during the removal era.   
In the end, American Indian responses to the Dawes Act checked the expediency 
and influence of the allotment policy and its alleged citizenship promises – promises that 
were contested about and within the spaces of terrioriality. During the Dawes era, the 
government’s discourses of allotment and (empty) citizenship offered a rupture for 
American Indians to forward their protests.  In this vein, Hoxie asserts that “Indians 
began to talk back … Natives made it clear that they rejected the self-serving 
nationalism” they heard from the federal government.19 Concomitantly, American Indian 
rhetoric alluded to the hybrid structures of discourse as their arguments affected the 
Dawes milieu.   
Indeed, Native pan-Indianism resituated the homogenizing impact of 
governmental rhetoric. This unification, writes Prucha, aimed at enhancing the 
independent identities of American Indians.20 But, the ends of such sovereignty were not 
always similar among Native groups.  One side enacted pan-Indianism to encourage the 
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government to extend to them citizenship akin to U.S. residents.  These Natives hoped 
that the Dawes Act’s pledge of citizenship would empower them with equal status among 
other American communities – status derived, at least in part, from their moral 
inheritance to the land.  The other side, a more nationalist gathering of American Indians, 
employed pan-Indianism in the service of separating from the U.S. government.  These 
Natives encouraged autonomy grounded in traditional identities and did not aspire to U.S. 
citizenship.21 Their moral inheritance to the land justified independence for Native 
nations.  A discussion of key changes in Native discursive spaces is necessary to 
contextualize these varying forms of American Indian agitation against the Dawes Act.        
CHANGING CONDITIONS IN NATIVE DISCURSIVE SPACES 
 A number of contextual strands intersected during the late nineteenth century to 
transform the powerful spaces through which American Indians communicated with both 
the U.S. government and public.  Moving beyond tribe-specific discourse – as was the 
archetype of Native rhetoric in the removal era – American Indians in the late nineteenth 
century addressed the government and public as pan-Indian groups and often through 
means such as petitions, memorials, biographies, literatures and performances.22 Public 
speeches were, indeed, still employed during the Dawes era, but forays into different 
rhetorical mediums diversified Native messages.23 The allotment policy and its 
entailments of indigenous assimilation created new opportunities for Native agency that 
were, during the removal era, limited or absent altogether. The following discussion 
highlights the changing conditions in Native discursive spaces due, in part, to the 
government’s assimilative efforts, the homogenization of Native nations, the public’s 
fascination with the “taming” of American Indians,24 and progressive reform efforts 
423
underlining the late nineteenth century.  These conditions motivated pan-Indianism as 
Natives found themselves in closer contact with each other, in similar predicaments and 
empowered with new entrees into the civis. This section also sketches the differences in 
American Indian conceptions of citizenship.  Some American Indians – those 
integrationists – sought independence based on U.S. citizenship.  Others pursued 
sovereignty outside the scope of the U.S. government; this latter group desired a 
separatist autonomy.  Regardless of their views on citizenship, the legacy of their 
presumed moral inheritance of the land inspired their political positions.       
 Though the assimilative goals and homogenous residues of the Dawes Act 
weakened American Indian sovereignty, they also ironically empowered Native 
communities to communicate their dissention of the allotment policy to the U.S. 
government.  Hoxie asserts that such “talking back” created a rupture in the government’s 
allotment discourse.  He clarifies that “by criticizing the actions of the government, using 
the lessons they had been forced to learn, these Natives turned the table on their 
tormentors.”25 Therefore, American Indians hybridized the paternalistic dynamics of 
allotment – including the government’s persistence in assimilating Native communities to 
the English language, yeoman farming, American domesticity as republican children, and 
land as a pathway to citizenship – into a rhetorical strategy of protest.  Senier concurs, 
noting that American Indians, “some of whom had been forced to learn how to speak, 
read and write in English” as a part of the assimilative efforts surrounding the Dawes Act, 
“capitalized on this strategy.”26 
The government’s propensity to homogenize American Indians by “dealing” with 
the “Indian problem” as monolithic and eliding individual tribal identities also, 
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paradoxically, worked to the advantage of Native communities.27 Recall that, with the 
passage of the Dawes Act, the “American government … sought to apply a single model 
of transformation to all tribes, regardless of their differences.”28 As once-disparate 
American Indian nations mingled in closer proximities to each other, some developed a 
bond that increased their argumentative and collective power.  The U.S. government’s 
insistence on dismantling tribal structures actually helped American Indian communities 
“come together … after they were confined to a reservation.”29 The result of 
homogenizing American Indians under one wholesale allotment policy was a pan-
Indianism that – though eclipsing individual tribal identities – transformed the weakening 
of Native agency through the very construction that tore down such sovereignty. In the 
process, the allotted lands, which placed them in close proximity to one another, 
functioned as a key mobilizing force for pan-Indianism.  
Thus, integrationist Native communities seeking citizenship were able to 
challenge the Dawes Act’s inconsistent identity duality by using the very contrivances 
that the allotment policy forced upon them.  And, these American Indians complicated 
the government’s diminutive constructions of indigenous identities and paternal 
characterizations of the U.S. nation by emphasizing their new status as “possible 
citizens,” republican participants and a people “worthy of assimilation.”30 This type of 
inclusive authority could not be enacted during the removal era, as American Indians in 
the 1830s were pushed away to the far reaches of the U.S. nation and were, likewise, 
considered “a race not admitted to be equal to the rest of the community.”31 Their 
continued occupancy of the land further enhanced their rights to citizenship, especially as 
the larger civis began to envelop the Native reservations. 
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Similarly, separatist Native groups challenged the Dawes Act and called into 
question the identity duality of U.S. citizenship by alluding to the government’s implied 
admission that American Indians could sustain themselves.  These Native nations argued 
not from republican appeals to citizenship, but to the autonomy that the allotment policy 
carved out for American Indians to support their own land holding, economies and social 
life.  This separatist argument was part of the removal era’s legacy wherein Native 
nations sought a detached independence from the U.S. government. Separatist American 
Indians, therefore, supported pan-Indian unification to organize their own governments 
outside the aegis of the U.S. nation-state, working the lands that were rightfully theirs.       
At the same time, new mediums for American Indians opened up during the late 
nineteenth century.  Part of this derived from the expansion of white settlers into the 
West.  As American Indians experienced both the government’s assimilative plans and 
local settler cultures they were brought into closer contact with schools, courts, art 
museums, publishing houses, newspapers and stage performances.32 Consequently, these 
institutions of the U.S. nation “inspired Indians to explore new forms of communication 
and cultural expression.”33 
The U.S. public in the late nineteenth century also was intrigued by American 
Indian cultures, identities and representations.  This was so because American Indians 
were looked upon as “safe” subjects for study and inquiry.  Just as allotment and 
assimilation could only begin once the “Indian wars” (1850s-1886) had ended and Native 
communities were cordoned onto pronounced reservations, so too did public 
consumption of the “safe” American Indian flourish during the late nineteenth century.34 
As permanent wards of the U.S. government – dependent and nearly assimilated – the 
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public felt secure in approaching, what Frederick Jackson Turner called, the “conquered” 
and “accounted for … Indians” as a part of the mystique reverberating throughout the 
“taming of the West.”35 American Indian dangers, averred Theodore Roosevelt, had been 
eliminated with the end of the Indian wars, the advent of reservationism and the policy of 
allotment.  Native threats were, he wrote, “gone, gone with the lost Atlantis … gone to 
the isle of ghosts and of strange dead memories.”36 With an increase in public attention 
toward Native expressions, American Indians held the eyes and ears of both the U.S. 
government and the citizenry.  Therefore, Native communities were able to exert their 
voices more resonantly than they could in the removal era during which they were 
constituted as isolated and undeserving “anomalies.”37 
This discursive opening granted integrationist American Indians the license to 
command an audience that consumed their allotment protests and calls for republican 
citizenship. And, this promise of citizenship legitimated their abilities to talk back.  
Overall, the public’s attraction to Native issues permitted integrationist American Indians 
to articulate their desire for citizenship through popular means of communication.  They 
were, as Bahktin argues, able to use “within a single discourse,” one voice to “unmask 
another.”38 In the end, the new discursive forms available to integrationist American 
Indians along with the public’s intrigue about the “safe Indian” led to changes in 
communicative venues and Native agency.     
American Indians seeking separatism also benefited from the additional 
governmental and public attention.  According to Senier, indigenous nationalists parleyed 
their desires for autonomy “into white terms” which was a “necessary rhetorical strategy 
for securing some kind of cross-cultural sympathy and respect for Indians.”39 This is not 
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to say that separatist pan-Indianism was unequivocally successful in convincing the U.S. 
government to abandon the Dawes Act and allow for detached Native communities.  It 
was, however, instrumental in demonstrating Native agency.  As Shanely concludes, 
challenging the dominant public was a “prerequisite to redefining that space – actual and 
intellectual – as Native American.”40 Overall, nineteenth century popular channels of 
communication allowed American Indians – both integrationist and separatist – to do just 
that: reconstitute their places in the expanding nation and punctuate the identity duality of 
U.S. nationalism. To that end, American Indians helped debunk the mythos of republican 
rhetoric surrounding U.S. citizenry. To that end, American Indians helped debunk the 
mythos of republican rhetoric surrounding U.S. citizenry, insisting that their rights to the 
land likewise parlayed into their rights as citizens or separate nations. 
Finally, the ascendance of progressivism as a socio-political movement changed 
Natives’ rhetorical spaces.  Gould demarcates the time period between 1890 and 1914 as 
the “Progressive Era,” an epoch that ushered in an ideology of “social critique and 
reflexivity” on the part of the U.S. government and public.41 According to Hoxie, the 
Progressive Era was a backlash to the industrialization of the United States and the 
government’s emphasis on work and business.42 Communities, he argues, were made 
dilapidated and tangential to the throes of commerce and industry at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Consequently, a group of “farmers, industrial workers and urban 
activists” gathered to “demand changes” to the commodification of American life.43 Part 
of these changes involved reforms to the American economy and labor system thriving 
under the Industrial Revolution.  Another plank of progressivism was social change, 
which loosened immigration restrictions, increased suffrage for African Americans and 
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women, restructured the work day and minimum wage for laborers, urged a graduated 
income tax and prohibited alcohol and other social “sins” (i.e., gambling, prostitution).44 
Overall, the progressives sought new ways to “solve social problems,” which also 
included how the U.S. government would treat allotted American Indians as the twentieth 
century dawned.45 
Historians often trace American Indians as a “subject” of reform during the 
Progressive Era to the 1881 publication of Helen Hunt Jackson’s A Century of Dishonor,
an exposé on the state of Native communities throughout the whole of the nineteenth 
century.  Jackson argued in her book that “the history of the United States Government’s 
repeated violations of faith with the Indians thus convicts us, as a nation …of having 
outraged the principles of justice … and of having laid ourselves open to the accusation 
of both cruelty and perfidy.”46 Her critique of broken treaties and “robberies done by our 
Government” opened the door to “friends of the Indians” type of groups around the 
nation.47 These groups enriched the U.S. government’s ideology of republican 
fatherhood and efforts to assimilate Native communities through yeoman farming, 
American domestic life, Christianity, the English language and capitalism.48 Indian 
reformers adopted the basic tenet of the Society for American Indians, an all-white 
organization created to “transform …the condition of a savage nomad to that of an 
industrious American citizen.”  The group based its purpose on the justification that it 
“should break up the tribal mass, destroying the binding force of savage tribal custom, 
and bring families and individuals into the freer, fuller life where they shall be directly 
governed by our laws, and should be in touch with all that is good in our life as a 
people.”49 Clearly, the progressive movement to “kill the Indian and save the man” – an 
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oft-quoted slogan of Richard Henry Pratt, a progressive and founder of the reformist 
Carlisle School for Indians – reified, and fed into, the U.S. government’s construction of 
a dependent American Indian population.50 The discourse of progressives, here, 
represented the popular view that assimilation would cloud, and perhaps also erase, 
Native national identities.  Concomitantly, progressive reformers characterized the 
federal government as a dominant force in motivating assimilation.51 
Though the “friends of Indians” groups only fortified the government’s identity 
constructions of Native communities, the progressives’ concerns left “an opening for 
critique on the part of Native intellectuals and political leaders of the nineteenth 
century.”52 Integrationist American Indians, at least, capitalized on the additional wave 
of reform to combat the policies and interrelated identity formations of the Dawes Act.  
The advent of the Progressive Era, combined with the influx of new rhetorical venues for 
American Indian discourse and the public’s interest in Native subjectivities, to draw 
attention to American Indian issues.  As the U.S. government, the public and reform 
organizations sought to resolve the “Indian problem,” the necessity for American Indian 
voices “to communicate with white audiences, especially with those white elites with 
access to forms of political power, was pressing and acute.”53 
For American Indians seeking sovereignty outside the scope of U.S. citizenship, 
the progressive movement’s assimilationism did not help them, and actually seemed to 
work against a separatist pan-Indianism.  For instance, Konkle argues that such reform 
efforts did not necessarily “make life easier for Native people” or solve the problem of 
lost sovereignty.54 However, Progressivism did “provid[e] a mechanism for resistance to 
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EuroAmerican authority.”  The climate of social change allowed separatist Natives a 
breach to critique the allotment policy.55 
For all the changes in discursive spaces, pinning down Native responses to the 
Dawes Act – whether integrationist or separatist – is complicated due, primarily, to the 
government’s homogenization of Native identities.  As a result, argues Warrior, 
uncovering both Native agreements to “become citizens” and tribal “forms of 
nationalism” that compete with and “counter the dominant ideology of integration” 
remain “hard to find.”56 Hence, the totalizing of several distinct Native nations 
complicates the task of studying discourse by specific nations (i.e., Seminole versus 
Kiowa).57 To this end, the analysis that follows examines Native remonstrances by 
rhetorical forms that transcended tribal discursive (and physical) boundaries.  Just as the 
government’s monolithic constructions of American Indians forced Natives to work 
through pan-Indianism, so too do these constructions necessitate the study of Native 
responses by alternatives to tribally-specific rhetoric.58 
REPUBLICANISM, CITIZENSHIP, OPPRESSION & SEPARATISM: 
PAN-INDIANISM IN PETITIONS & MEMORIALS  
 The Dawes Act commenced through a battery of agreements between the 
executive and Native nations.  As the law was ratified, allotments were to “be selected by 
the Indians” and decided in a land-tenant “contract” between the Interior Department and 
American Indians.59 However, Wilkins argues that this sense of self-selection was a 
“legal mask” added to the Dawes Act to make allotment appear contractual and 
consensual.60 His assertion is supported by the inclusion of plenary articles in the Dawes 
Act.  American Indians, for instance, were forced into allotment regardless, for if “they 
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failed to make an [allotment] selection within four years … the Secretary of the Interior 
may direct the agent of such tribe … for that purpose.”61 Moreover executives seized and 
allotted Native territories if in their “opinion any reservation or any part thereof of such 
Indians is advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes.”62 The executive, as a 
republican father, held the power to enact this seizure without Native approval.  
In sum, the so-called agreements for allotment were futile and unnecessary.  The 
government had its way, writes Dippie, in spite of Native opinions.  Layering the promise 
of Native decision-making over the government’s plenary implementation reveals how 
“internally inconsistent, ill-conceived and short-sighted” the deterministic policy was in 
practice.63 With the government’s plenary power codified by both the Dawes Act and the 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock decision, Indian Commissioner Francis Luepp ensured the 
Interior Department in 1910 that “the Indian problem has now reached a stage where its 
solution is almost wholly a matter of administration.”64 
Still, the Dawes Act’s clause requiring American Indians’ consent to participate in 
the allotment policy – along with the act’s pledge to bestow “the benefit of” citizenship 
upon “Indians … who ha[ve] adopted the habits of civilized life” – alluded to an 
empowered status for American Indians.65 Whereas during the removal era American 
Indians were asked to relocate to the far stretches of the U.S. nation or remain on their 
lands and suffer from “dire extirpation,” late nineteenth century American Indians were 
viewed as potentially fit for, though ultimately unworthy of, citizenship.66 And though 
treaties as a form of Native voice were eliminated by the allotment era, the Dawes Act’s 
pledge of contractual agreements heightened the Native agency.  Such permeability in the 
policy’s language, and the legacy of the moral inheritance rights to U.S. land, allowed 
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Native nations an entrée into the public discussion about allotment.67 With this new 
opportunity American Indians found hybridized investitures into the government’s Native 
policies.  And, they used these openings to interpose the inconsistencies of the 
government’s identity duality related to inclusion and citizenship. 
This section explores American Indian protests of the Dawes Act through 
petitions and memorials to Congress.  Congress was chosen as an audience because it 
purportedly represented the “voice of the people” and because it worked outside the 
executive channels with which Natives disagreed.68 American Indians’ choice of 
memorials and petitions, a bureaucratic genre of governmental discourse, demonstrated 
their integrationist approach to calling for change. The following analysis argues that 
American Indians refuted the allotment policy by maneuvering through appeals to the 
government’s inconsistencies, demonstrating how Native communities had fulfilled the 
promise of civilization and, yet, were still considered dependent and segregated.  In the 
process, pan-Indianism was employed to counteract the government’s negative identity 
constructions of American Indians.   
First, the anti-allotment rhetoric of the Five Civilized Tribes is assessed for the 
fashion in which they employed republican appeals to question the U.S. government’s 
allotment promises.  Throughout their objections to the Dawes Act, these nations 
constructed themselves as worthy, just and unified in contrast to their depictions of the 
U.S. government as untrustworthy and sinful.  Nations within the Five Civilized Tribes 
chastised the government for violating its promises of Native sovereignty.  Furthermore, 
they desired a citizenship equal to U.S. citizens residing in states – a right granted to them 
by the land upon which they lived within the nation-state.  Next, the section considers the 
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petitions and memorials of western and northwestern Native nations for their use of an 
appeal to oppression that resisted the allotment policy and worked through pan-
Indianism. Their conception of sovereignty involved a separate autonomy outside the 
bounds of U.S. citizenship.  Peppered throughout these rebuttals are negative 
constructions of the U.S. government as fraudulent and devious as well as images of 
American Indians as unified.  
Republicanism and Citizenship in the Five Civilized Tribes’ Protests and Memorials  
 The Dawes Act, initially, excluded the Five Civilized Tribes from the allotment 
policy.69 This was so, writes Prucha, because the nations had confirmed to the U.S. 
government that they had assimilated as agricultural and republican wards since the 
1830s.70 Arguments of the Five Civilized Tribes, therein, demonstrated the impact that 
their initial resistance had on complicating and slowing the Dawes Act’s implementation.  
Thereafter, the government became far more concerned with assimilating western and 
northwestern American Indians who had only recently – following the Indian wars – 
come under the U.S. government’s tutelage.   
Conditions for the Five Civilized Tribes changed in 1889, however, as white 
settlers, railroads, progressives and entrepreneurs urged the Interior Department to reduce 
their territories.  Hoxie contends that “there were thousands of settlers gathered on these 
unassigned lands … and these ‘boomers’ and the business men who supported them 
demanded that Washington open up the land to white settlement.”71 Industrialists argued 
that the Five Civilized Tribes were being deprived of “controlled” assimilation by 
existing outside the bounds of the Dawes Act.  For instance, David Payne, a “land 
boomer,” justified the extension of allotment by working through the government’s 
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paternal hierarchy: “the highest obligation of a government towards a helpless, conquered 
people … is to infuse into them the spirit of self-reliance and industry which underlies all 
civilization.”72 Progressives even agreed with this paternal need to “uplift” the Five 
Civilized Tribes.  At a gathering in 1895, the Lake Mohonk group argued that the United 
States “possesses a supreme sovereignty over every foot of soil … and it is under the 
sacred obligation to exercise its sovereignty” over Native lands.73 Of note, here, is the 
construction of a superior U.S. identity through the plenary doctrine.  
Capitulating to pressures from expansionists, Congress passed the Curtis Act in 
1898, which pledged citizenship for those of the Five Civilized Tribes who offered proof 
of “civilizing.”74 At the consummation of citizenship, however, “the laws of the various 
tribes or nations of Indians shall not be enforced” and “tribal structures shall be” 
eliminated.75 Seemingly, the Five Civilized Tribes would lose their sovereignty through 
the Dawes Act, as would other Native communities.         
 The Five Civilized Tribes disagreed with the U.S. government’s assessment that 
they needed to assimilate further; they claimed to be assimilated already. For instance, a 
Choctaw memorial to Congress in 1894 appealed that “We are doing well, we are 
progressing; we are pressing on to higher education; we are following in the way of 
progress.” The memorialists concluded by asking, “Why not just let us alone [as 
citizens]?”76 These nations already considered themselves civilized and assimilated, and 
could prove their case with evidence of learning English, adopting Christianity, working 
the land, memorizing U.S. citizenship exams and instituting their own state-like courts 
and legislatures based on the American model.77 For this reason, they crafted their 
remonstrations against forced allotment with references to their own republicanism.  
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Republican appeals, prima facie, may appear to demonstrate an acute 
accommodationism on the part of anti-allotment Native communities.  Considering the 
tactical importance of aligning their rhetoric – both in homology and in venue – with that 
of the U.S. government, however, Native discourse can also be judged as strategically 
resistive in its accommodation.  At first glance, argues Konkle, “invoking civilization 
looks like a capitulation to EuroAmericans’ ideas about their inherent superiority.”  Such 
a tactic, though, served “as a means for Native peoples to disrupt U.S. political authority 
and, once the historical contradictions” of the allotment policy were “taken into account, 
reject it altogether.”78 That the Five Civilized Tribe’s republican rhetoric was contained 
in petitions and memorials also demonstrated the hybrid resistance visible in their anti-
allotment discourse.79 
A primary way that the Five Civilized Tribes protested allotment through 
republican appeals involved reiterating to the government that reservation treaties 
promised Native autonomy derived from the land that they now occupied.  The Creek and 
Choctaw nations banded together and reminded the government in 1889 that, “the United 
States gave and guaranteed us, forever, [our] country west.” They continued, “we were 
told that [if we removed] that no white man would molest us … We was [sic] to live long 
as the grass grow [sic] and the sun stand [sic] and the water runs.”80 Having discussed the 
government’s promises, they contended that they would “not agree to allotment. If they 
[U.S. government] allot our lands this is breaking the treaties.”81 In these quotations, the 
Creek and Choctaw nations held the U.S. government – along with its republican ideals 
of honor and justice – accountable to its pledge of allowing a “country for a future 
residence forever,” as well as citizenship.82 
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Similarly, an 1890 memorial to Congress sent by the Creek and Seminole nations 
openly called into question the U.S. government’s fulfillment of republicanism.  Akin to 
the Creek and Choctaw nations’ petition, these memorialists reminded the government 
that “the right of unrestricted self-government has been guaranteed to our people” 
throughout the nineteenth century.  “You have recognized and respected that guarantee 
for many years,” they argued.  The groups worried that allotment would “affect the 
autonomy of our governments.”83 Clearly, the Creeks and Seminoles constructed 
themselves as sovereign and self-governing in this iteration.  Moreover, the groups 
attempted to persuade Congress that they had already amalgamated and, thus, were not in 
need of forced assimilation and allotment through the Dawes and Curtis Acts.  They 
contended, “our people have advanced in all arts of civilization … our people are making 
commendable and satisfactory progress, and [our] pride and ambition are stimulated to 
increased efforts for higher and greater achievements.”84 The Creeks and Seminoles 
proclaimed that they had followed the government’s mandates and should be “given 
citizenship” as U.S. residents, especially their republicanism had been “encouraged by 
the example of your liberal institutions.”85 Thus, the Dawes Act’s involuntary demands 
for allotment seemed to them only “intended to destroy our local governments.”86 
Also, the Five Civilized Tribes targeted the Dawes Act itself, directly confronting 
the citizenship promises therein enshrined.  Such empty guarantees seemed to the 
Choctaw, in 1897, a lapse in the U.S. government’s republicanism.  The Choctaw 
community had witnessed how allotment failed to elevate other American Indians to 
citizenship.  Instead, the Dawes Act fell short in providing “for the future welfare and 
upbuilding” of Native people.87 According to Lewis, this was so as allotment faltered on 
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the “barren soil of the reservations” and proved futile to hunting and gathering cultures, 
therefore forcing many Native communities to sell their lands to white settlers.88 In the 
end, opines Utley, the allotment policy weakened American Indian sovereignty by both 
forcing them to depend on the federal government and swindling them into selling their 
reserved territories.89 Because of the inconsistencies related to the Dawes Act’s promises 
of citizenship, the Choctaw Nation was reluctant to accept land allotments.  They decided 
to hold out until they “could enjoy all the rights, privileges and immunities of other 
citizens of the United States.”  This enjoyment involved “independence” and “freedom of 
action” as state-like residents – both of which could only be obtained with the U.S. 
government’s recognition of Native independence and the historical notion that land 
constituted the guarantee of U.S. citizenship.90 
Some members of the Five Civilized Tribes addressed republicanism through 
forced agriculture.  A different Choctaw memorial worried that making “a few dollars 
[from Native farming] weigh[ed] more with U.S. officials than the breach in the honor 
and common honesty of any Nation as a result of breaking treaties.”91 Involuntary 
allotment, in this instance, characterized the government as looking inward.  Not only did 
the Choctaw think that U.S. leaders desired allotment for monetary advantages to the 
economy and white settlers, but they also suspected an “impurity of their [government’s] 
intentions.”  These petitioners concluded that allotment supporters had “a secret or 
mental reservation that Indian treaties are not part of the laws of the United States.”  As 
such, they perceived that the Dawes Act allowed the government to “put her judicial arms 
around us  … with the ultimate view of securing our lands.”92 The Choctaw Nation, in 
this quotation, openly interrogated the government’s role as republican father.  Recall that 
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allotment was justified, in part, with protection for American Indians against “white … 
acts of violence.”93 According to the Choctaw Nation, the government’s purpose with 
allotment was “to fix our lands in severalty so that we can never be robbed.”  Instead, the 
Choctaw continued, “you [government] had not kept … your solemn obligations,” 
reiterating images from the removal era of the U.S. government as robbers of the land .94 
Furthermore, this Choctaw memorial exemplified the fashion in which the Five 
Civilized Tribes reconstituted their republican identities. First, the Choctaw Nation 
conveyed a sense of pan-Indian strength.  In “firmness” and “stubbornness,” they 
asserted, “we have a combination that cannot be moved.”  Such fortitude inhered in “any 
Indian” whether “Choctaw or full blood or half breed.”95 For these reasons, it was “no 
idle word or boast when the Indian says that we are opposed to land in severalty or 
sectionizing [sic].”  Maneuvering through the general figures of “Indian” and “we,” the 
Choctaw Nation demonstrated to the government that the Five Civilized Tribes were 
united against any further endorsements of the Dawes Act.  They continued that the 
government might be able to convince individuals “to divide their personal property” or 
“to work instead of hunt,” but “no Indian” would consent to allotment.  Rather, 
“whenever you touch our ‘land in common’ we will meet you with all the opposition in 
[our] power.”96 In this memorial, the Choctaw Nation appropriated the government’s 
homogenization of Native identities to empower American Indians in their resistance to 
allotment.  Their arguments were also steeped in an implied moral inheritance to the land 
that dominated the removal era.  
A Seminole Nation memorial in 1897 echoed the Choctaw’s republican 
sentiments.  Seminole leader John F. Brown argued therein, “the Indians are a patriotic, 
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religious, industrious and self-supporting people, loyal and faithful to the United 
States.”97 They claimed to “have given the United States no cause of complaint.”  
Therefore, the Five Civilized Tribes questioned what it was about their republican 
identity and its fulfillment of governmental expectations that led U.S. leaders to “deeply 
wound” them with “punitive legislation” when they “had done nothing to justify harsh or 
ungenerous treatment.”98 This “wicked waste” – as a Cherokee memorial dubbed 
allotment in 1897 – conflicted with the government’s duty “to protect our people” from 
the “grave wrongs” of denying assimilated Native nations any semblance of sovereign 
U.S. citizenship, as codified in the Dawes Act.  The Seminole Nation asked that a “fair 
opportunity for [citizenship] be given our people.”99 
Overall, the petitions and memorials of the Five Civilized Tribes worked through 
republican appeals to question allotment’s citizenship promises. Appealing to the 
government’s republican sensibilities, these nations influenced the Dawes Act by 
delaying its implementation in their territories for eleven years, until the passage of the 
Curtis Act.100 Simultaneously, they reconstructed pan-Indian identities as unified and 
strong; they argued that they were united in their pursuit of U.S. citizenship based on 
their assimilation.  Meanwhile, the government was asked to remedy the ways it had 
“departed from the trust” bridged between itself and “the worthy Indians.”101 
Oppression and Separatism in Western and Northwestern Protests and Memorials 
 The U.S. government also expected assimilation of the western and northwestern 
Native nations, who were the most recent indigenous communities cordoned off onto 
reservations.102 The reservation system expanded in large part prior to the Dawes Act 
because the government sought a way to control these so-called “hostile” Natives.103 
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Reservationism was to, in the words of Indian Commissioner George Manypenny, 
“designate suitable tracts for reservations of land, in proper localities, for permanent 
homes for, and provide the means to colonize, them, thereon.”104 The reservation system 
magnified in importance and swelled in scope during the course of the Indian wars.  
Consequently, as the western and northwestern nations were “subdued by warfare” they 
were removed to constricted areas under the paternal eye of the U.S. government.105 
According to Hoxie, by the time the Dawes Act was passed, the western and 
northwestern Native nations were relatively “new” wards of the U.S. nation; the wounds 
from decades of intercultural warfare with the U.S. military were barely healed when 
allotment ascended as a “solution” to the “Indian problem.”106 
Because the U.S. government was convinced that the Five Civilized Tribes were 
relatively “safe” they were considered immune from the Dawes Act, as first passed in 
1887.  The western and northwestern nations, however, were the primary targets of the 
allotment policy.107 With allotment, these indigenous communities would “conform to 
the white man’s ways, peaceably if they will, forcibly if they must.”  Indian 
Commissioner Thomas Morgan certified that allotment was “the best the Indians can get. 
They can not [sic] escape it, and must either conform to it or be crushed by it.”108 This 
context, especially the Dawes Act’s temporal proximity to the Indian wars and forced 
reservationism, explains why western and northwestern nations protested allotment by 
enacting a pan-Indianism that sought separatist sovereignty.109 To them U.S. citizenship, 
as espoused by the Dawes Act, would reify the government’s paternal hierarchy. These 
Native nations’ rebuttals included appeals through a trope of oppression and, thus, 
reconstructed the government as fraudulent and damaging.  Overall, western and 
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northwestern American Indians based their separatism on the inconsistency of the 
allotment policy regarding Native sovereignty and their continued belief in a moral and 
autonomous inheritance to the land.  
 One component of the Native rhetorical strategy of labeling allotment oppressive 
involved analogizing the government’s disastrous reservationism to similar conditions of 
allotment.  The Winnebago Nation’s petition to Congress in 1889, for instance, linked the 
reservation system to the Dawes Act through a negative perception of the U.S.-Native 
relationship.  Instead of lauding the paternal identities constituted by the federal 
government, the community asserted that the treatment of “the Winnebagos [since 
reservationism] as it related to the dealings of the government … has been for the most 
part one of oppression, wrongs and fraud.”  Why then, the petitioners asked, should the 
Winnebago Nation assume the allotment policy would lead to different results?  Though 
the reservation system sought to “promote civilization by giving them [Winnebagos] a 
fixed habitation … the course of that has been a reverse of that intended, and has tended 
to make them more nomadic, illiterate and lazy – to degenerate instead of regenerate 
them.”110 Here, the Winnebago resisted allotment by saddling the government with an 
oppressive identity. 
Partly scrutinizing the “justness of Congress” and couching resistance in 
reservationism’s shortcomings, the Winnebago Nation next argued against allotment 
because the thought of further oppression – especially propagated through U.S. 
citizenship – would be disastrous.  Allotment, they avowed, would “keep and maintain 
the Indians in a state of serfdom and hence, [the U.S. government] would neglect” the 
Winnebago Nation.111 They continued that the “evils and wrongs snffered [sic] and 
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endured” on the reservations would percolate through the Dawes Act, henceforth 
shunning the sovereignty “to which their [Winnebago] conditions, needs, law and justice 
require.”112 This quotation demonstrates how the Winnebago Nation challenged the U.S. 
government’s “just” character by linking governmental identity to the failures of previous 
Native policies.  In the end, the government was depicted as a degenerative leader.  And, 
the Winnebago demanded that “all Indians” have a right to retain their autonomous tribal 
governments on their own land outside the scope of U.S. citizenship. They wanted the 
autonomy to engage in their “own labor in agricultural pursuits” and thought that giving 
them “our own fixed habitation” was what the government’s “equity and good conscience 
require.”113 
Such separatism was also carried into western and northwestern nation’s 
characterizations of the U.S. government as oppressive and deceptive in securing 
allotment contracts.  These contracts, writes Wilkins, were supposed to place American 
Indians on an “equal plane” with allotment negotiators.114 Governmental plenary power, 
though, trumped any decision contrary to the Dawes Act made by American Indians.115 
However, the Dawes Act’s insinuation of a contract allowed the pan-Indian Kiowa, 
Comanche and Apache nations in 1903, for instance, to refute the government’s 
persistence that they take up allotted lands.116 These moments of resistance, in fact, 
oftentimes complicated the Dawes Act’s implementation by forcing the government to 
resort to lying and inveigling.117 To this governmental strategy, the Kiowa, Comanche 
and Apache nations exhorted the government: “[we] were induced by false interpretations 
and misrepresentations to sign what purported to be an agreement between [us] and the 
United States.”118 This agreement – what would become the “Jerome Agreement” that 
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Lone Wolf (Kiowa) later challenged in his Supreme Court complaint119 – included forged 
American Indian signatures and redacted territorial terms that benefited both the 
government and white settlers.120 Because of U.S. leaders’ fabrication of the Jerome 
Agreement, the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache nations deemed the government 
“oppressive” in “forcing against the Indians” a harmful act that diminished Native 
sovereignty.121 Then they rejected the Dawes Act and, instead, demanded an independent 
status akin to foreign nations, asserting that they desired territory “in common … of 
validity and force.”122 
The Rosebud Sioux, writing for the Hunkpapa Sioux and Minneconjou Sioux 
nations, enacted a similar pan-Indian separatism in an 1897 petition in response to 
allotment’s oppressive residues.  In 1889 the government promised the Sioux that they 
would never be displaced again following their removal to a reservation.123 However, as 
the allotment policy gained steam, Brown notes, the government demanded that the 
Rosebud Sioux “slice off … a fifty mile strip” of land, participate in yeoman farming and 
assimilate to U.S. customs and ways of living.124 The Rosebud Sioux responded that “our 
treaties provide that our lands shall not be taken from us without our consent … yet these 
oppressive provisions of law [allotment contract] ignore our rights, and appropriate 
portions of our land to others … without our consent.”125 They wanted an “independent 
… holding” of territory outside the “arm” of the United States.126 The Bureau of Indian 
Affair’s abrogation of these territorial rights, wrote the Sioux, “stood there as a disturbing 
cause to our people.”  In the process of their admonishment of the government’s 
promotion of “disquietude and unrest,” the Rosebud Sioux depicted the U.S. government 
as “unconcerned” with Native “lands and rights.”  In fact, the government’s character 
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was argued to be “counter” to and “against” the “work of improving our condition upon 
the lands that have been set apart for our use.”127 Although they communicated a 
continued entitlement to the land, citizenship through allotment, to these nations, would 
spell out further oppressive control on the Interior Department’s part.  Congress, as an 
audience, garnered importance here as it became an alternative governmental sounding 
board outside the aegis of the executive, with whom Natives conflicted.  
Some pan-Indian western and northwestern nations likewise demanded separate 
autonomy by calling into question the government’s benevolence as oppressive.  
Congress rationalized allotment, and its related aim to assimilate American Indians as 
commodity farmers, based on the objectives of “uplifting Indians to the exalted egoism” 
of U.S. citizenship.128 To Native nations like the Leech Lake, the Dawes Act’s purposes 
were spurious.  And, as the government supported the allotment policy so fervently, 
American Indians linked the federal government’s republican fatherhood to the 
hollowness of identity duality.  The Leech Lake Nation asserted in 1898 that “we firmly 
believe that the proposed [allotment] of our land is more in the interests of a certain Rail 
Road [sic] corporation than in the interests of our people.”129 According to Prucha, the 
Leech Lake Nation was onto something.  He writes that lands throughout Minnesota – 
where the Leech Lake settled – were targeted as prime railroad real estate.130 The Leech 
Lake Nation worried that consolidating their territories through the Dawes Act “would 
deteriorate” their tribal “value” and that the government would benefit most from “the 
standing pine timber” and “railway land” made available from the surplus land siphoned 
off through allotment.  In this petition, the government was constituted as “oppressive” in 
its pursuits of “devouring” the Leech Lake’s territory.  Citizenship, they averred, would 
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not help “Indians’ conditions” (note the pan-Indian construction) but rather would “harm 
us further.”131 Only separate statuses as sovereign political bodies controlling their own 
land and borders would prevent such damage to Native culture, identity and agency. They 
argued that “we singly and collectively offer our strongest protest” against integration.132 
Furthermore, the federal government’s enactment of plenary power – codified by 
both the Dawes Act and the Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock decision – was an impetus for 
western and northwestern Native nation’s separatist demands.  For instance, a memorial 
from a Pueblo confederation – representing some nineteen Pueblo sub-groups in New 
Mexico – protested that the government’s intrusion into Native lands lacked “fair play 
and justice” – it was “oppressive.”133 The government’s identity duality, herein, was 
represented as caustic: “this oppressive bill will deprive us of our happy life by taking 
away our lands … [it] will destroy our Pueblo government and our customs which we 
have enjoyed for hundreds of years.”134 Simultaneously, the Pueblo demonstrated how 
allotment, and the government’s paternalism, was demoralizing to their sovereignty as 
separate nations.  “The bill will take away our self-respect,” they contended.  “We cannot 
understand why the Secretary of the Interior have [sic] deserted us and failed to protect us 
this time.”  Finally, the pan-Indian confederation surmised that the government, 
reminiscent of the removal era, was a “killer” of “common life” and a “robber” of 
“everything we hold dear; our lands, our customs, our traditions.”135 They no longer 
wanted to be “dependent on the government” and instead wanted to be “self-supporting,” 
to regain “self-respect” and to “keep our old customs” as sovereigns.136 
Ultimately, American Indian petitions and memorials to Congress summoned 
pan-Indian unity to refute the allotment policy by revealing the government’s 
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incongruence in extending further jurisdiction over Native lands despite contrary treaties.  
The Five Civilized Tribes maneuvered through republican appeals to the federal 
government’s foundational tenets.  Throughout these appeals, they affirmed their 
actualizations as assimilated, and insisted on citizenship in the vein of state residency.  
Western and northwestern Native nations also dissented from the Dawes Act by pointing 
to the discrepancies inhering in the government’s identity duality.  These nations, 
however, moved directly to a separate autonomy in their response to the government’s 
oppressive character.  Instead, these nations banded together and protested through a pan-
Indian nationalism outside the parameters of U.S. citizenship. Both derived their 
arguments about citizenship and autonomy, though, from moral rights to the land that 
were the underpinnings of Native resistance. 
MEMORIES, CITIZENSHIP & SEPARATISM: 
PAN-INDIANISM IN BIOGRAPHIES AND LITERATURE 
The identity duality present in the U.S. government’s allotment policy did not 
escape American Indians who expressed their discontent with the Dawes Act in print.  
Senier argues that American Indians’ printed remonstrances garnered attention and 
popularity as white settlers came into closer contact with the recently domesticated – or, 
in the least, “safer” – Native communities in the West.137 To this latter point, Roosevelt 
claimed that by the turn of the century “peace” had been secured in the West “by 
imposing” on the “barbarian races … the armed force of a superior race.”138 American 
Indians – once conceived by the American public and U.S. government as dangerous – 
therefore became subjects of interest for the United States.  During the late nineteenth 
century, in particular, alternatives to direct American Indian resistance through petitions 
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and memorials attracted the masses and were “influential” in representing Native cultures 
and identities.139 
American Indians took advantage of this new-found agency and public curiosity 
to express their disapproval of the government’s treatment of Native communities, 
especially through the enactment of the Dawes Act.  American Indians also used the 
popularity of their viewpoints in print to reconstruct their own identities and those of the 
U.S. government.  This was accomplished through a reconstitution of their histories by 
addressing non-governmental audiences, freeing them from the constraints of formality 
and possible repercussions. Concerning this new opportunity for published protest, 
Warren asserts that American Indians “shaped their performances to subvert, reinforce, or 
otherwise influence American ideas of Indianness.”140 
The primary way that American Indian publications articulated their dissent of the 
allotment policy, and took umbrage with the government’s constitution of a 
dependent/paternal relationship, was through the production of collective memories.  
Collective memory, according to Zelizer, refers to “recollections that are instantiated 
beyond the individual by and for the collective … [it] comprises recollections of the past 
that are determined by the group.”141 In this way, memory served a constitutive function 
for indigenous communities protesting the allotment policy.  American Indian memories 
summoned past events of the U.S.-Native relationship to shape Native “ethos and 
sense[s] of identity” as resistive.142 In addition, indigenous resistance to the Dawes Act 
inspired an “atemporal” sense of history that eschewed a linear flow of time for a 
“mingling of amorphous memories.”143 Remembrances of past Native policies and 
conditions evoked “a past to frame a present,” thereby allowing American Indians to 
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analogize and challenge the U.S. government’s questionable identity constructions during 
the allotment era with historically similar examples.144 
Memory as a site of resistive rhetoric was familiar to nineteenth century American 
Indian communities.  According to Lake, Native discursive struggles have always been 
“infused with temporal concerns: thoroughly (and painfully) cognizant of the history of 
native/Euramerican [sic] relations on this continent.”145 American Indian rhetorics of the 
past, though, were not solely “consummatory” or reflective.146 In addition to helping 
build community, identity and a shared vision, collective memories were simultaneously 
“pragmatically utile.”147 That is, Native collective memories appealed to the U.S. 
government for change.  Not only did Native voices reorganize a shared U.S.-Native past 
linked to images of ancestry and homeland – they also constructed Native and 
governmental identities.  One historical era, Rich argues, can stand “for the pattern of 
abuses by the U.S. government of American Indian groups, it identifies a common 
ground … that powerfully calls into question assumptions about the interests guiding 
U.S. colonial expansion.”148 In this way, Native resistive memories during the allotment 
era illustrated how “one story becomes discredited as a new narrative takes over” while 
jointly restructuring identities.149 
This section explores how American Indians responded to the Dawes Act and its 
weakening of Native autonomy through collective memories targeted to the public in the 
form of popular publications.  These memories capitalized on the U.S. public’s 
fascination with Natives, and worked through pan-Indianism to challenge the 
implementation of the allotment policy by resituating positive Native identities 
throughout the span of U.S.-Native relations.  These identity formations included the 
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unified character of American Indian nations.  Concurrently, these memories also 
configured governmental identities as fraudulent, thus further exposing the identity 
duality of U.S. citizenship.  Additionally, the notion that the government had stolen 
Native territories during removal only to replicate the same transgression during the 
allotment period resonated throughout these memories. 
The first genre considered – biographical accounts – hearkened to memories of 
the Indian Removal Act as a way of linking the disparaging impact of removal to the 
prospective dangers inherent in the allotment policy.  Natives offering these pan-Indian 
accounts enacted familial appeals to argue for a Native citizenship equal to citizens 
residing in U.S. states.  Such appeals punctuated the hegemony of the republican 
fatherhood ideology, as American Indians came to consent to the government’s familial 
hierarchies.  Familial appeals also, however, exhibited a Native resistive strategy by 
using the government’s language against itself.150 Another genre – literary publications – 
employed memories and pan-Indianism to advocate for separatist sovereignty.151 In the 
process, these literary memories, working through fictional accounts, centered their 
separation from the U.S. nation on the government’s past ungodliness and violence.   
Familialism and Citizenship in Printed Biographical Memories 
American Indian biographical accounts and opinions were especially resonant 
during the late nineteenth century.  This is so, writes Scheckel, because Native 
communities were seen as such anomalous “liminal figures” that many in the U.S. nation 
wondered how American Indians viewed their own ambiguous conditions in the West.  
She continues that Natives were “neither citizens nor aliens, at once symbolically central 
and politically excluded.”152 Because of this unique position, the public viewed them as 
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worthy topics of interest necessary to reconciling their own understandings of the “tame 
frontier West.”153 
The resurrection of Native citizenship questions, part and parcel to the Dawes 
Act, only heightened the public’s desire to learn about these “American wards.”154 
American Indians used this discursive opportunity to protest allotment by crafting 
collective memories of the Indian Removal Act and correlating the injurious impact of 
the removal policy with the Dawes Act.  Ostensibly, they did this by championing a pan-
Indian unity that called for a consummation of the Dawes Act’s citizenship promises.  
Because this sub-genre of Native publications tied protests to personal identities 
biographies tended to work through amicable appeals, such as familialism, to secure U.S. 
citizenship for American Indian communities.  These familial appeals evidenced the 
hegemony of republican fatherhood while concomitantly alluding to Native resistance in 
appropriating the government’s domestic language. 
One strategy that American Indians employed through biographical memories 
was the questioning of the government’s republican father role and its self-professed 
paternal goals in sustaining allotment.  The Dawes Act was related to the deleterious 
Indian Removal Act in these memories as a way to show how Native citizenship had yet 
to unfold.  The promise was there, however, if Natives could be included as residents 
equal to other U.S. citizens. For instance, Young Joseph (Nez Perce) emphasized in a 
North American Review article that the removal policy was falsely benevolent to “all of 
us Indians.” The U.S. government had given protection to American Indians for sure, but 
– said Young Joseph – “our father [executive] did not say anything about white men 
wanting to settle on our lands [afterward].”155 Suddenly, Young Joseph wrote that, 
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regardless of removal treaty stipulations of Native autonomy, “a number of white people 
came into your children’s country and built houses and lands” during the late nineteenth 
century. Within the removal era the Nez Perces found that “the white men were growing 
rich very fast, and were greedy to possess everything the Indian had.”156 The Nez Perce’s 
consent to the promises of republicanism exhibited both the hegemonic components of 
republican fatherhood and the emptiness that such familial promises contained, especially 
in offering Natives new and permanent homelands during the removal era.   
With the coming of allotment Young Joseph and others worried that their graven 
memories of removal would come to life in the 1880s.  “I have learned,” he grieved, “that 
we are but few, while the white men are many … We are contented to let things remain. 
They are not and would change the rivers and mountains if they did not suit them.”157 
Young Joseph suggested that U.S. citizenship would set Natives on an “equal … level” 
with these “white brothers.”  Appealing to a sense of familialism and fairness with the 
land, he asked “my father in Washington” to consider allowing the Dawes Act’s promise 
to come to bear as “we all in your family” had assimilated as the executive requested.  
Young Joseph’s father-child metaphors and familial strategy suggested that he considered 
American Indians part of the government’s family.158 
His resistance also showed how strong and unified Native communities were 
despite being threatened by another wave of land encroachers supported by the allotment 
policy.  Recall that Section Five of the Dawes Act allowed “the United States the sole 
purpose of securing homes to actual settlers” by taking up the surplus land left by Native 
allotments.159 This clause threatened the sanctity of American Indian lands initially 
protected by removal treaties.  In the 1880s, the government abrogated its promises of 
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protection with the implementation of the allotment policy. Native citizenship, and the 
parity it engendered, was thought to salve this inequity among “red brothers” and “white 
brother.”160 
Young Joseph’s interrogation of the Dawes Act through memories of the 
government’s dubious republican fatherhood during the removal era resonated in Simon 
Pokegon’s (Pottawattamie) biographical resistance. He started by crafting familial 
metaphors in his call for a salving of the “Great Father’s” wrongs.  He noted that U.S. 
citizenship was the benefit traded by the government for Native lands and that this was 
the “proper” exchange between “child and father.”161 Without citizenship fulfillment, he 
said the government would appear as “strangers” demanding that Natives “‘Give us gold, 
give us gold.’ ‘Where find you gold? Where find you gold?’”162 The image of the 
government failing its promises as a republican father by surrounding Natives as 
“strangers” without the extension of U.S. citizenship, the Dawes Act was anything but 
benevolent.  Also unmistakable in Pokegon’s discourse were capitalist constructs that, he 
averred, “led” the government to “pursue” allotment.163 In sum, the government’s aim to 
usurp white violence and to assimilate Natives seemed a sham, especially as citizenship 
guarantees fell flat.  But, wrote Pokegon, the inclusion of American Indians as “family 
members” and citizens of the U.S. civis could alleviate this problem.164 
However, he then shifted his discussion of U.S.-Native relations from familialism 
to a rhetoric of home-wrecking on the part of the government. To accomplish this 
Pokegon employed natural metaphors – once popular in the government’s own removal 
discourse – throughout his removal memories.  Pokegon, though, refracted the U.S. 
government’s use of natural imagery in a more conspicuous way.  He overtly pinned 
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these metaphors back on the government.  For instance, reflecting on the removal era he 
said of the government: “locust-like they swarmed on all our coasts … then they robbed 
our homes of fathers, mothers, sons and daughters.”165 The period of the Indian Removal 
Act, it appeared to Pokegon, had shown American Indians just how pestilent the 
government had acted throughout its expansive errand and encroachment on Indian land. 
His memory also suggested that, in spite of paternal and familial promises of 
benevolence, the government managed ironically to destroy the Native family unit. Here, 
his appropriation of familial language revealed a resistive strategy of turning the 
government’s paternal rhetoric around on itself through notions of moral inheritance to 
the land. Therefore, Pokegon was suspicious of the U.S. government’s allotment policy 
with its purported benevolent aims.  The United States was not being helpful in allotting 
Native land, said Pokegon, if U.S. citizenship was not extended to American Indians (his 
totalizing of Natives pointed to a pan-Indian expression of indigenousness).  Of inclusion 
in the U.S. citizenry he noted that “so we stand upon the seashore, chained hand and 
foot” waiting for “the incoming tide of the great ocean of civilization” to “welcome 
us.”166 Like the U.S. government, integrationist American Indians conflated their land 
rights with their rights of citizenship. 
Some biographical memories hearkened to how American Indians remained 
strong and united even in the direst conditions of the removal era.  Because Native 
communities had survived removing from their original homelands, these memories 
intimated that American Indians as a pan-Indian family could also survive the late 
nineteenth century challenges of allotment.  Such memories bolstered the strength of 
unified Native communities in their contemporary protests of the Dawes Act.  For 
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instance, Carlos Montezuma’s (Pima) essay in the Quarterly Journal insisted that the 
removal policy and its subsequent reservationism had done nothing but “debar us as a 
race from acquiring that knowledge to appreciate our property.”167 Removal did “not 
make them [Natives] free any more than you can … free those prisoners who are in the 
penitentiary.”168 However, American Indians were able “to free themselves” by binding 
together as “brothers” and fighting back further white encroachments.  He continued, 
“Our peoples’ heritage is freedom. Freedom reigned in their whole make-up.”169 He 
insisted that Native resistance had slowed down the destructive impact of the removal 
and reservation policies.  And, working as a family, across Native nations, helped these 
efforts.    
Similarly, in his autobiographical experiences with the Dawes Act, Montezuma 
perceived the allotment policy to continue a similar denigration of autonomy within 
Native territories.  Though Natives had consented to the hegemonic ideology of 
republican fatherhood, they were still denied rights. Therefore, he configured the 
government as a greedy “father” by denying U.S. “citizenship”: “the Indian Department 
has drifted into commercialism at the expense of our poor benighted people.  So, the 
father [goes] on and [says] ‘let us not allot those Indians on that sweet flowing water 
because there are others who will profit by damming it up and selling it to white 
newcomers.’”  In this quotation, Montezuma referred to the government’s emblematic 
tactic of allotting Natives to barren or undesirable lands.170 Though threatened by the 
Dawes Act, he exhorted American Indian nations as a whole (his use of “us,” “we” and 
“all Indians” alluded to his pan-Indianism) to resist further allotment and assimilation.  
He wrote, “being caged up and not [able] to develop our facilities has made us a 
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dependent race.” The paternal government looked upon them “as hopeless to do anything 
for ourselves” and, therefore, justified taking more Native lands.171 
Montezuma, then, urged American Indians to take up their forebears’ mantle to be 
independent “in the whirl” of allotment and to aspire to equal citizenship with “other 
Americans.”  He suggested that they unite and “get into [the land] … and use it … and 
live up to its requirements and take our chances” as sovereign “family” and “residents” of 
the United States, clearly conflating ties to the land with the rights of citizenship.172 In 
the end, his rhetoric pointed to a deconstruction of the identity duality surrounding the 
allotment policy and its attendant negative depictions of Native character.  That is, 
Montezuma called into question the uniformity of the government’s support of both 
assimilation and segregation.  However, he also “reconstructed” American Indian 
empowerment through unification and strength.173 He left his Native family with a final 
thought to this end: “We must be independent!”174 In this memory, Montezuma clarified 
for his public audience how, despite the devastation of allotment – and the government’s 
caustic identities and aims – that American Indians remained strong and worthy of 
independence akin to other U.S. citizens.  But, the memory also suggested that American 
Indians could exist as a part of the U.S. family, as long as it could boast some semblance 
of “independence” outside the scope of infantilization. Their continued moral and 
ancestral ties to the land were integral components of their identity. 
 Finally, biographical memories linked together the removal and allotment eras to 
demonstrate how the Indian Removal Act’s failed promises of civilization for American 
Indians were similarly reified by the Dawes Act’s pledge of Native citizenship.  In the 
process of this resistive strategy, the government’s paternalism was resituated as 
456
conniving, while American Indians were shown to be united and accommodating, despite 
the apparent fraudulence of Native policies.  Native communities also constituted 
themselves as savvy in recognizing the “Great Father’s” cycle of broken promises first 
instantiated during removal and potentially visible, once again, during the allotment 
era.175 
Arguing against allotment, for instance, Hollow Horn Bear (Oglala Sioux) said 
that in the 1840s his ancestors “had believed what the white people told him.”  The 
government promised civilization and money in exchange for Native self-sustenance on 
their new reservations.  But, the government – as a “father” – had “lied” and “forgotten” 
its part of the bargain during the removal period.176 Constructing the government – both 
during removal and allotment – as fatherly and yet specious, he continued: “this 
[allotment] is only another trick … to take our land away from us, and they have played 
these tricks before …They come to us with sweet talk, but they do not mean it. We will 
not sign any papers for these white men.”177 Hollow Horn Bear reminded his Native and 
white audiences that the “father’s” promises of money and “civilized things” never 
materialized during the removal and reservation eras.  Consent to the ideology of 
republicanism had yielded American Indians little in the way of independent and equal 
rights. Why then, he wondered, should American Indians believe the Dawes Act’s 
guarantee of U.S. citizenship?  He chided the government: “You have not fulfilled any of 
the old treaties. Why do you now bring another one to us? Why don’t you pay us the 
money you owe us first? Then, bring another treaty.”178 Seemingly, Hollow Horn Bear 
worked through the language of familialism – therein using the government’s own 
language – to resist allotment.     
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Hollow Horn Bear linked the government’s removal era duplicity to the allotment 
policy’s aim of Native citizenship, thereby both poisoning and resisting the Dawes Act.  
In the process, he reconceived Native and governmental identities contrary to those 
constructions offered by U.S. leaders in the Dawes Act deliberations.  Though he desired 
to “be like others” in “equal” citizenship with ties to U.S. territory, he protested an 
allotment policy that failed to follow its own republican promises.  Furthermore, he did 
not rebuke familialism, but rather suggested that “we … and the white brothers” could be 
united as independent kin-like citizens.179 Again, he channeled familial language into a 
way to contest the theretofore empty promises of the government as a republican father.  
Overall, the comparison of the removal era’s lapsed promises with the allotment 
era – through lived memories and familial connections  – offered a route of protest for 
American Indians.  And, in some cases, these biographical memories affected the larger 
public debate over the condition of American Indians.  In this vein, Konkel concludes 
that American Indian anti-allotment rhetoric influenced progressives, Indian reformers 
and the U.S. government: “[Natives] redefine[d] public and institutional spaces by first 
establishing their ability, and their right, to inhabit these spaces alongside other 
Americans.”180 In so doing, they “changed the nation” and perceptions of American 
Indianness for themselves and the broader American public.  Moreover, they 
demonstrated that they desired sovereignty as U.S. citizens and landholders, but that the 
Dawes Act had, thus far, faltered in this assurance of inclusion into the U.S. “family.”181 
Written from a unified stance, American Indian biographies taught the U.S. public that 
pan-Indian groups demanded citizenship as a requisite of acceding to allotment and the 
U.S. family.                 
458
Ungodliness, War and Separatism in Printed Literary Memories 
 As American Indians in the West assimilated further throughout the late 
nineteenth century, they also learned the value of disseminating their viewpoints through 
literature.  According to Harjo and Bird, literature allowed American Indians to “reinvent 
the enemy’s language” by assembling resistance in a form that was accepted by the 
masses as art or entertainment.  They assert that “to speak, at whatever cost” was, for 
Dawes era Native communities “to become empowered rather than victimized by [the] 
destruction” inhering in the allotment policy.182 Literary accounts – or, what Nabokov 
deems, “personal recoveries of native [sic] histories” – also allowed American Indians to 
reconfigure the U.S.-Native relationship through collective memories to their joint 
pasts.183 Literary channels provided for higher degrees of radicalism as individual 
authors’ identities were not tied directly to such invective and separatism. Thus, working 
outside of familialism – which Native biographies utilized as a palpable tactic – literature 
was freer from governmental constraints and could actually discuss the topic of 
separation with an external public audience.  
Given this freedom, American Indian rebuttals to allotment worked through 
literature to brand the government’s side of the U.S.-Native relationship ungodly and 
violent. The memories enacted therein reshaped the identities of Native communities and 
the U.S. government within the context of the Dawes Act’s dismal consequences for 
American Indian sovereignty.  American Indians promoted a pan-Indian resistance in 
these literatures that demanded a separatist sovereignty.  That is, whereas biographical 
accounts pursued U.S. citizenship, literary memories sought independent tribal status 
outside the aegis of the government and U.S. citizenship. 
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Women penned most of American Indian literary resistance to allotment.  The 
proliferation of women’s literary accounts was prompted by two primary factors.  First, 
government-run boarding schools during the allotment era tended to teach Native men 
agricultural and mechanical skills while instructing Native women in domestic projects 
such as sewing, cooking, housekeeping and child rearing.  According to DeJong, part of 
the “child rearing” project involved teaching American Indian children how to read.184 
Boarding schools taught American Indian women to read in order for them to train their 
children in a mastery of the English language.  This certainly demonstrated the impact of 
republican motherhood on Native families.  Literature became a primer of sorts for 
literacy and, hence, women were familiar with literature as a discursive form.  Second, 
Native women who published literature tended to be considered “safe” subjects.185 
Publishers often approached women – versus their male counterparts – to give their 
accounts of U.S.-Indian affairs.  This is so, writes Nabokov, because Native men, 
especially those of western and northwestern nations who were recently “conquered,” 
were still linked to the “warrior” persona in the American popular imaginary.186 Thus, 
Native women were looked upon as “tame” compared to men who might resist story-
telling or cooperating with the white public.187 
The inclusion of Native women only as literary voices undoubtedly underscores 
the diminutive gendered dynamics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
However, literature demonstrated a new turn in Native resistance for women.  During the 
removal period Native women were rarely given the chance to speak against 
governmental policies.  With literary accounts, though, Native women held a crucial role 
in engaging the American public.188 To this effect, women speaking against allotment 
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(typically the daughters of chiefs or husbands of tribal leaders) employed literature as a 
way to resist the Dawes Act and the identity duality it inspired.  They did this by crafting 
narrative memories surrounding spiritual and familial issues.  These substantive topics 
certainly reflect an overlap of American Indian women’s voices with what Dow and 
Tonn call the feminine style, or “a synthesis of form and substance that works to promote 
an alternative political philosophy reflecting traditionally family values.”189 Part of the 
feminine style includes a reliance on examples and anecdotes regarding the personal 
sphere, which includes subjects such as spirituality and family.  Whether deriving from 
the feminine style, memories of the familial U.S.-Native relationship or a conscious 
resistance using the government’s paternal language against itself, American Indian 
women punctuated the power of indigenous voice, especially in support of separatism – 
the more radical Native conception of sovereignty.      
These literary memories characteristically reflected back to creation and U.S.-
Native contact myths to reconstruct the government as ungodly, while reshaping Native 
identities as affable.  According to Hoxie, authors spotlighted optimistic Native 
characteristics as a way to persuade the U.S. public that involuntary allotment was not 
needed.190 Instead, American Indians, they averred, could support themselves by 
sustaining economies, governments and tribal traditions. These myths were used to 
evidence how allotment and assimilation violated both providential mandates and 
harmonious relationships between the United States and American Indian communities.  
As a case in point, Sarah Winnemucca (Piute) illustrated in her 1883 denunciation of 
proposed allotment just how dastardly the U.S. government had breached God’s covenant 
of peace and Native friendship.  She ironically pointed out:  
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Of, for shame! … Yes, you, who call yourselves the great civilization; you who 
have knealt upon Plymouth Rock, covenanting with God to make this the land of 
the free and brave. Ah, then you rise from your bended knees and seizing the 
welcoming hands of those who are the owners of this land, which you are not, 
your carbines rise upon the bleak shore, and your so-called civilization sweeps 
inland … but, oh, my God! leaving its pathway marked by crimson lines of blood, 
and strewed by the bones of two races: the inheritor and the invader.191 
This passage reveals how Winnemucca connected her present exigence of allotment to a 
memory of the U.S. government’s encroachment into Native lands. She argued that 
allotment and U.S. citizenship would only embolden this oppression. In the process, she 
invoked removal era assumptions of the Natives’ moral inheritance to the land that was 
inexcusably stolen from her ancestors. Her commentary, like most in this genre, claimed 
that the United States seemingly defied its precepts of republicanism as the “land of the 
free and brave” over time, demonstrating the means by which Natives spotlighted the 
identity duality inherent in U.S. nationalism.192 
Concurrently, Winnemucca juxtaposed the identities of American Indians and the 
U.S. government.  Native peoples were “welcoming” and “godly” and had, as “owners” 
of North American lands, offered the United States the aids of subsistence and territory. 
Puncturing the mythos surrounding a national imaginary predicated on providence, the 
U.S. government, she charged, rewarded such friendship with “violence” and 
“ingratitude.”193 So-called “equal status with whites” would not change this; rather, a 
“return” to separate nationhood as the only way to refurbish Native sovereignty.194 When 
Winnemucca wrote, “we beg of you to give us back our people” and “let us have our own 
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homes” she spoke of such separatism.  These arguments evidence the sustenance of the 
U.S.-Native hybrid relationship, as Natives served to challenge the image of the 
exceptional and moral U.S. nation.                  
 Dawes era memories of the federal government’s godly depravity in its relations 
with American Indians potentially resonated with U.S. audiences for a number of 
reasons.  Recall that the United States bolstered its “assumptions of racial and cultural 
superiority as well as an insatiable desire for land, expansion and empire” with 
providential permission and heavenly support of its “errand” into the wilderness.195 That 
is, the U.S. government viewed American Indians and their territories through the lens of 
terra nullis, the notion that Native land was “an unihabited or unimproved wasteland” 
that God wanted to be populated by Europeans, versus “inhabited by aboriginal 
peoples.”196 Winnemucca appropriated the “manifest” argument by authority steeped in 
moral inheritance, here, in order to demonstrate to the U.S. government how providence 
could likewise turn away from the United States in the face of the government’s violence.  
This rhetoric retains vivacity, especially considering that, first, the United States honored 
the Christian tradition and might have found difficulty refuting Native claims to a God.  
Second, the conversion of American Indians to Christianity relied on “proving to 
Indians” that the Christian God would never allow harm to befall indigenous people.197 
And finally, the U.S. government rooted its republican fatherhood in these Christian 
principles; to violate God’s guidelines was, then, to violate the U.S. nation’s “own 
foundational ideologies.”198 
American Indian literary memories also indicated a sober guardedness toward, 
and separation from, the violent government as a way to protest the allotment policy. This 
463
distrust rested on Native interpretations of their bellicose historical relationship with the 
government.  Zitkala Sa (Yankton Sioux), for instance, wrote in her 1900 “Impressions of 
an Indian Childhood” that prior to allotment “we were once happy.”  She referred, here, 
to her own Yankton Nation and its neighboring Sioux groups.  Following the Dawes Act, 
though, she argued, “there is what the paleface has done! … [He] has stolen our lands and 
driven us hither … and has killed.”199 Sa contextualized her resistance to allotment in the 
forced reservation system and the historical images of the U.S. government as a land 
thief. “Having defrauded us of our land” and “hurt us” and “forced us” to assimilate, she 
said, “[now] the paleface is forcing us away [again].”200 Sa’s caginess regarding 
allotment rested on this tale of a mother imparting to her daughter the importance of 
refusing allotments and the assimilation that resulted from farming and the elision of 
American Indian cultural traditions.  Citizenship, she argued, would only “make strong” 
the government’s continued “violent” control.201 
In her literary classic, Wynema, S. Alice Callahan (Muscogee/Creek) reverberated 
Sa’s suspicion of the U.S. government’s benevolent intentions in the Dawes Act due to 
past violence and thievery of Native homeland.  And, she glossed her mistrust of the 
government’s scurrilous identity with hints of a sturdy and bold pan-Indianism.  Her 1891 
fictionalized account of a Creek woman’s uncertainty over choosing assimilation 
predicated Callahan’s resistive doubts of the Dawes Act on the wisdom of other Native 
elders. Writing of an aged Cherokee neighbor’s advice on dealing with the U.S. 
government, Callahan’s protagonist (Wynema) recounted, “[t]hey told me we had 
suffered long enough at the hands of the white man … they told me to fight the palefaces 
… but, they told me to never, NEVER listen to a tale of peace, even if told by a friend. 
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Peace! Let those talk of peace who live in quiet homes … peace is no watchword of the 
oppressed.”202 In this quotation Wynema refused to negotiate with allotment officials 
based on other Natives’ rebukes of assimilation and its dire effects on American Indian 
well-being.  Instead, she promoted independence in the form of a separate pan-Indian 
group that would exist apart from U.S. citizenship and the violence that came with 
struggles to achieve it.  According to Senier, Callahan hoped to persuade other American 
Indians – through cultural identification – to reject allotment.203 Callahan said that 
Natives desired “a home like unto the one of [sic] your forefathers owned before the form 
of the white man came upon the scene and changed your quiet habitations into places of 
business and strife.”204 Natives were already, Callahan insinuated, self-sufficient and 
“solid”; increasing their reliance on a violent federal government – by way of citizenship 
– would only bolster Native “suffering” and victimization.205 
The empowerment spotlighted in Callahan’s narrative of diverse Native 
communities coming together to resist the Dawes Act demonstrated her persistence in 
working through the government’s monolithic American Indian identity constructions.  
Moreover, Callahan’s pan-Indian sentiments reminded the U.S. public and federal 
government that American Indians possessed unified identities in their fused reprobations 
of the allotment policy.  According to Callahan, for all the benevolence the U.S. 
government’s allotment plans promised, there was levied upon American Indians, as a 
whole, only “oppression” and “violence” – precipitations of identity duality.  Callahan 
also indicated the power dynamics of peace.  That is, it remained far easier for those in a 
comfortable position (i.e., U.S. leaders) to call for harmony.  Peace was more difficult for 
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American Indians to support because they were not, wrote Callahan, “surrounded by 
friends and loved-ones [and] the happiness and affection … of the American people.”206 
Native anti-allotment literature also restructured American Indian identities 
through a memory of warfare.  Warfare was not a safe subject in biographical accounts, 
as biographies sought citizenship through familialism; memories of violence would 
hinder such arguments.  Reservationism – and the need to assimilate “Indians by 
piecemeal”207 through the Dawes Act – was predicated on the (past) violent character 
supposedly inhering in Native people.208 To this stereotypic identity formation, 
Winnemucca appealed that American Indians were usually drawn into battle by the 
government.  She wrote, “Now you must not suppose that my people are weak or 
uncourageous. They are not what you call ‘slouches’ … We helped the Bannacks and the 
Umatillas in war, because we are all kindred.  They are our cousins … Now you say, 
Why [sic] did they make war? I will tell you: You white men are too greedy.”209 In this 
iteration, Winnemucca revised the history of U.S.-Native warfare and did so by 
reconstituting American Indian identities as united while portraying the government as 
gluttonous.  Akin to Callahan, she emphasized the empowerment of American Indians as 
they gathered in numbers as “Indians,” revealing to her audiences how resistance to 
allotment was shared among previously separate nations.  Simultaneously, her rhetoric 
alluded to the power of appropriating the government’s homogeneous construction of 
Native identity to the ends of fortifying rebuttals to the Dawes Act.210 
Winnemucca continued that assimilation, especially allotment, was therefore not 
needed.  Such a policy was not so much a matter of controlling “so called blood-seeking 
savages” as it was a precipitation of the government lying to the public and violating 
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Native communities.  “Year after year,” she lamented, “they [Americans] have been told 
of the wrong doings of different tribes of Indians.  Yet it goes on, just the same as if they 
did not know it.”211 Citizenship, she wrote, would not help end these lies; instead, it 
would only increase denigration “year after year.” Instead of citizenship, she demanded: 
“give us homes to live in, for God’s sake and for humanity’s sake” apart from “the 
[Indian] agency system.”212 Ostensibly, she saddled the government with administrating a 
corrupt system that maligned Native identities to motivate encroachment on the 
reservations.  The Bureau of Indian Affairs was said to employ agents “who easily get 
corrupted, and can be hired by [the government] to do or say anything.”213 Sa, similarly, 
considered such governmental agents “bad palefaces … sickly shams.”214 
To contest these disputed identities of Native bellicosity circulated by the 
government as a justification for allotment and assimilation, Winnemucca appealed 
directly to her audience through a memory of historical amicability: “we have always 
been good friends to you people.”215 Therefore, she implored her audience: “oh, dear 
friends, I am pleading for God and humanity” that allotment would not “commit … 
horrible outrages” and “drive [us] around like dogs.”216 Breaking from familial 
metaphors and, instead, employing friendship and animal imagery, Winnemucca 
illustrated her view that Natives were not part of the U.S. citizenry – the American 
family.  Instead, they were united as their own separate family.  If the government 
continued to occlude American Indians, then – she asserted – we will “be together” as 
sovereign kin.217 
Overall, American Indian memories fashioned through popular publications 
challenged the allotment policy and its diminution of Native identities. Publications 
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allowed American Indians a form of protest by providing “an opportunity to address the 
public outside the scope of the federal government” and by parleying “a resistant 
counterstatement” against the Dawes Act through agencies that the U.S. public’s interest 
in Native issues afforded.218 Memories in biographical accounts of allotment functioned 
by hearkening to the Indian Removal Act as a way of analogizing the negative 
consequences of removal with the Dawes Act’s shortcomings.  In so doing, Natives 
developed a united rhetoric that demanded U.S. citizenship based on appeals to 
familialism. Native memories found in literature employed historical evidence to argue 
against the allotment policy as just and the government’s identity as ungodly, violent, and 
robbers of Native ancestral rights to the land. In the process, they fashioned a pan-
Indianism dedicated to achieving separatist independence from the government.   
Throughout both forms of publications, the U.S. government (especially the 
executive branch) was shown to be in violation of its own republican fatherhood 
promises by promoting allotment.  Seemingly, in both biographical and literary 
memories, Natives appropriated the government’s homogenization of indigenous 
identities to empower American Indian resistance to the Dawes Act. In the process, such 
discourse posited the identity duality at work in the U.S. government’s citizenry 
constructs, evidencing the empowering and hybrid contribution of Native voices. 
ECONOMIC APPEALS, CITIZENSHIP, RADICALISM & SEPARATISM: 
PAN-INDIANISM IN PUBLIC ORATORY AND GHOST DANCE RHETORIC 
 As with Native responses to the Indian Removal Act during the 1830s and 1840s, 
American Indian anti-allotment discourse also coalesced through oratory.  Some of these 
speeches were externally directed to the executive as the principal republican father. 
Whereas Native communities in the removal era typically accessed the executive through 
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Indian agents and translators, though, American Indians in the late nineteenth century 
took their messages directly to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Interior 
Department.219 Another type of oratory was issued to internal Native audiences and 
involved the building of core aims to “raise the consciousness level” of American Indians 
across indigenous communities.220 
Whether external or internal, American Indian anti-Dawes oratory organized a 
pan-Indianism among various, and oftentimes historically separate, Native nations.221 
Native orators hybridized the government’s monolithic condensation of American Indian 
identities as diminutive and dependent, hence reworking it to foster unity.  According to 
Morris and Wander, the degree to which the government “has displaced tribal identities 
in favor of the ‘Indian’ has at times been so severe that Native Americans become 
unrecognizable.”222 Their critique, ironically, limits the empowerment of Native 
alliances.  American Indians during the allotment era actually channeled the 
government’s homogenization into a way to build resistant blocs, thereby directing their 
rhetoric at “other Indians for the purpose of gathering the like-minded” and only 
tangentially addressing “the [governmental] establishment.”223 This consummatory 
function of Native public oratorical protest, though pointing inward, still alluded to the 
power of Native voice. 
This section explores the way that Native pan-Indian oratory questioned how the 
Dawes Act dually limited Native identities and failed to grant American Indians 
sovereignty, punctuating the identity duality of U.S. nationalism.  Ostensibly, this oratory 
communicated Native worries about the Dawes Act’s fortification of paternal connections 
between indigenous nations and the government.  And, it showed how American Indians 
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conflated land and citizenship, just like the U.S. government; but Natives did so through 
a moral inheritance to their territories, not by suggesting a commodification of these 
lands.    First examined are integrationist American Indian speeches that resisted the 
executive’s paternalism as injurious to American Indian autonomy through economic 
appeals.  Instead, these integrationist speeches suggested that economic self-sufficiency 
through state-like citizenship statuses would remedy the despair of paternalism.  
Moreover, these rhetors’ choice of audience demonstrated the pre-eminence of the 
executive as the foremost republican father.224 Pan-Indian oratory was also part of the 
Ghost Dance Movement that sought unity to “regain their lands” by rebutting the 
allotment policy and, thereupon, to lead a renewed “virtuous and peaceful life.”225 Ghost 
Dance leaders challenged the Dawes Act by gathering Natives to craft a radical 
separatism that not only purported to detach Natives from U.S. citizenship, but also to 
remove American influence from the West. Ghost Dance rhetoric did so by depicting the 
government as devilish and virulent; Natives herein contended that allotment and its 
promise of citizenship would only bolster this characterization.  In the main, anti-
allotment oratory evidenced the sturdy and unified identities of American Indians, as well 
as the inconsistency of the government’s role as republican father.  
Economic Appeals and Citizenship in Speeches to the Executive 
During removal, American Indians typically did not address the executive 
directly.  However, as white and Native communities came into closer contact – and as 
both the Interior Department and the Bureau of Indian Affairs set up shop on the 
reservations in the 1880s – Natives gained the access to speak directly to the executive. 
This modification in protest channels between the eras brings to mind two vital points, 
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aside from the observation that Natives began mastering English.226 First, it underlines 
the consolidation of governmental “centralization” and “management” of Native affairs 
within the executive branch, which intensified the importance of presidential authority.  
According to Prucha, the heightening of executive influence “formalized [the executive] 
as an institution – and its bureaucracy grew tremendously” with regard to Native 
policies.227 Second, Native abilities to address the executive directly speaks to the 
enlargement of discursive agency granted to American Indians in the latter stages of the 
nineteenth century.  Part of this agency derived from governmental promises – albeit 
false until the ratification of the Indian Citizenship Act in 1924 – to bestow citizenship on 
American Indians. 
The Dawes Act’s citizenship guarantees provoked a breach in the executive’s 
language, which allowed American Indians a foothold in their oratorical resistance.  
Hoxie argues, in this vein, that “Indian political leaders” used this rupture to define “a set 
of ‘rights’ they believed Native Americans should enjoy as citizens of their communities 
and residents (albeit prior to 1924 usually as noncitizens) of the United States.”228 
Therefore, integrationist Native leaders typically protested the Dawes Act by pointing out 
how allotment’s weakening of American Indian sovereignty through the government’s 
dependent/paternal identity constructions clouded their prospects as U.S. citizens.  
Generally, integrationist American Indians who spoke to the executive argued that 
the Dawes Act’s assurance of Native citizenship had, thus far, produced appalling 
economic results. They queried, then, how the government could expect American Indian 
cooperation with the allotment policy when land ownership “still rested with the 
government” through the Dawes Act.229 Washakie (Shoshone), for instance, asked in 
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1888: “Knowing all this [how allotment still diminished Native sovereignty], do you 
wonder, sir, that we have fits of desperation and think to be avenged?”230 Washakie, 
however, did not stop with his rhetorical question about failed uplift through agricultural 
labor.  He provided an answer that positioned his resistance to the Dawes Act at the 
interstices of both the allotment policy’s alleged civilizing efforts for American Indians 
and the act’s opening of homesteads for settlers.  He, therein, noted that “the white man’s 
government promised that if we … would be content with the little patch allotted us … 
[the federal government] would see that no white man should cross our border … But it 
has not kept its word!”231 Allotment’s citizenship pledge still did not protect Native 
rights to territories or economic self-sustenance. Washakie, thus, made it clear why 
Native communities had fits of desperation: “I say again, the government does not keep 
its word!”232 Hence, he demanded that a U.S. citizenship predicated on Native self-
sufficiency through cultivation of the land and equal to state residents be extended to “all 
of us … Indians.”233 Exhibiting the homology of governmental logic, Native leaders 
likewise suggested that the cultivation of land constituted a pathway to Indian citizenship. 
American Indian anti-allotment speeches rarely failed to question the 
inconsistencies of the Dawes Act.  That is, assenting to allotment seemed largely to reify 
diminished Native land holding and a lack of self-control over their economies.234 With 
such rebukes of the Dawes Act’s faltering citizenship and land promises, American 
Indians constituted the U.S. government as fraudulent and inconsistent – especially as 
Native labor contributed more and more to an expanding U.S. economy.  According to 
Xitha Gaxe (Omaha), by virtue of having “consented” to allotment “on good faith,” 
472
American Indians also characterized their own self-identities as accommodating and 
“capable of citizenship.”235 
The inconsistencies of identity duality also resonated for other Native rhetors as 
they interrogated how labor had failed to stand as a true test of citizenship.  This 
resistance exposed the government’s allotment policy as devious in its “masking” of 
“economic gain” in the act’s alleged efforts to “uplift” American Indians to citizenship.236 
For Thomas Sloane (Omaha), allotment was just another falsehood tendered by the 
federal government.  Akin to reservationism, he asserted that allotment could not be 
trusted to support Native sovereignty, civilization or independence.  To this effect, Sloane 
addressed a gathering of executive officials in 1912: “it became evident that the Indian 
could not rely upon the statements of the Indian Service officials, the laws made by 
Congress for their protection, nor the treaties made…”237 With the Dawes Act, he 
continued, “these lands are administered in a manner that is a shame and disgrace to any 
civilized nation … and we ought to ask for such reform as will guarantee to us the 
protections and laws promised” by the United States.238 That Sloan felt compelled to ask 
for protection signified how the policy’s pledge of “citizenship” for all “Indians” who 
could prove their “civilization” had not yet transpired.239 Sloan was willing to accept the 
commodification of Native citizenship: that U.S. inclusion could only come about 
through “labor in the fields.”  But, when such labor produced little results in terms of 
proving Natives’ assimilation, Sloane argued that allotment was a “complete” charade.240 
In the process of his economic critique, Sloan transposed the executive’s self-
deemed benevolent character and republican fatherhood with its production of negative 
Native identities.  The executive representing a “civilized nation,” he said, had become 
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discomfiting and “wrong.”241 He asserted that the Interior Department and Bureau of 
Indian Affairs’ failure to honor its guarantees of Native citizenship was rooted in a desire 
to make more room for white settlers and, concomitantly, to make more money.  The 
executive, constructed by Sloane as scheming, enacted “the most extreme disregard for 
property rights and interests … and decency” in its implementation of the Dawes Act.  
Interestingly, Sloan’s and others’ speeches – which wound their way into Interior 
Department and Bureau of Indian Affairs reports – helped persuade the federal 
government to investigate the efficacy of assimilation on allotted lands.242 Citizenship 
(or what he called “inclusion”) was “desired,” Sloan said, but allotment was not the 
means through which Natives were receiving the warranty of equal inclusion in the U.S. 
family.  This was especially so because assimilation through labor had yet to satisfy the 
executive that American Indians were ready to become citizens.    
Another protestor, Dewitt W.C. Duncan (Cherokee), spoke to the government’s 
inconsistency in taking American Indian lands – under the guise of granting citizenship – 
for economic gain.  He asserted at a 1906 Interior Department meeting that “the 
Government of the United States knows that these allotments of the Indians are not 
sufficient” and that the system as a whole “absolutely destroys” Native progress and 
“labors.”243 Both Sloan’s and Duncan’s discourses resonated with the executive.  Sloan’s 
exhortation to “investigate for the benefit of the Indian” the allotment system was 
accepted by the Interior Department, which promptly sent agents to the reservations.244 
Other Native rhetors protested the allotment policy by pointing to how the U.S. 
government’s plenary doctrine (or ultimate decision making power) buttressed the 
paternal relationship hybridized by the government’s allotment discourse and 
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simultaneously abused Native labors.  According to Wa Thishnade (Omaha), allotment 
was eventually accepted by his community despite being viewed as “trouble” as a result 
of its overt paternalistic aims.  To Thishnade, the taking of allotment demonstrated the 
agreeable and economically sufficient identities of “grouping of Indians.”245 Ostensibly, 
he was able – with the government’s aid – to “live on the reserve ... with certificates of 
allotment” and he believed “that the land was theirs [Natives] and that they can always 
keep it.”246 However, the government’s enactment of plenary power to allow railroads 
and settlers leeway for economic gain, even in the wake of allotment’s promise of Native 
citizenship, prompted Thishnade to interrogate these economic assurances in ways that 
reflected removal era images of Native moral inheritance and governmental deceit: “I 
went on my farm with a certificate. I believed the land was mine. I have found out the 
land is not mine; that the Government can take it away.”247 
But, Thishnade would support neither the identity duality of U.S. citizenship nor 
the government’s violation of the Dawes Act’s promises.  Instead, he told Bureau of 
Indian Affairs officials that Native groups were merging in a pan-Indianism to dispute the 
allotment policy’s unscrupulous pledge of Native citizenship in exchange for labor: “we 
are going to ask for out titles [back] … As long as the Government does not give them, 
we will ask until the Government gets tired.  We won’t stop asking until we get out 
titles.”248 In this iteration, reliant on the legacy of Native ancestral rights to the land, he 
exhibited the strength and unity of American Indian identities (to the latter construction, 
note the repetition of “we” throughout his quotation).  Concurrently, he demonstrated 
how American Indians were empowered against the executive that, they maintained, 
would weaken and tire of Native protest emboldened by their own ancestral histories.   
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American Indian efforts to defy the allotment policy stand as a testament to the 
growth of Native agency during the late nineteenth century.  Furthermore, these efforts 
revealed the Progressive Era’s tendency to “self-critique” the U.S. government for its 
lapses in social rights and responsibilities.249 This was not the U.S. government of the 
Indian wars – “feared” and singularly powerful – that closed off American Indian voices 
with violence.250 As Turner averred, the “wars” were over and the “Indians” were 
“domesticated and conquered” along with the West by the time of the Dawes Act.251 
Instead, the “anarchy of empire” involved in inviting American Indians into the U.S. 
nation – even if only as ancillary and faux-citizen wards – offered Natives the sanction to 
talk back without “fear of retribution.”252 And, the changing conditions for American 
Indian discursive agency helped Native communities in their dissent.                
 Vital in American Indians’ anti-assimilation oratory were efforts to unify diverse 
American Indian nations into a pan-Indianism.  The thought therein was that with a 
decrease in population – resulting from the Indian wars and low birth rates due to disease 
and malnutrition on the reservations – citizenship could only be gained by traversing 
tribal boundaries and challenging the allotment policy as a front.253 Not only was the 
“power in numbers” formula vital here, but also American Indian unification 
appropriated the government’s own homogenous discourse to, instead, embolden Native 
identities.  According to Maddox, this type of hybrid rhetorical strategy helped the 
government identify with American Indian protest because it was crafted through similar 
substantive and structural means.254 
Native anti-allotment oratory reminded U.S. leaders that American Indians were, 
indeed, working through the government’s homologous Native identity constructions in 
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order to fight for U.S. citizenship.  Albert Yava (Hopi), for instance, told the executive 
that it could “individualize” and force “him to consider ‘I’ instead of ‘we’” all it wanted, 
as Indian Commissioner John Oberly avowed in 1888.255 Regardless, Yava said 
American Indians were banding together to fight back allotment’s failure to provide 
sovereignty in exchange for economic and social assimilation.  Prior to the reservation 
system, he noted, “villages never had a tradition of working together. Each one 
considered itself to be an independent group … as separate village communities … 
separate political entities.”256 With the collapsing of Native lands and the genericizing of 
Native identities, though, “none of us [want] that our lands should be measured into 
separate lots, and given to individuals.”  Rather, Yava explained that American Indians 
hoped to preserve Native-centered identities and lands by “gathering” and developing 
“one continuous boundary ring enclosing all” Native lands.257 
These pan-Indian groups sought a quasi-state that would exist under the purview 
of U.S. citizenship.  Mitchel Deroin (Otoe) echoed Yava’s sentiments, claiming that he 
would rather be “naked and have our toes sticking out” than to lose independence by a 
failed citizenship promise.  Without citizenship, Deroin feared remaining economically 
dependent and reduced, therefore “running after a home like calves running on a 
prairie.”258 If it took unification – even among former “enemy” nations – then he was 
willing to do that which was necessary to ensure that the Dawes Act “granted equal 
citizenship” and prevented Natives from being cordoned on “a piece of land about as big 
as a hog pen.”259 
In the end, American Indian anti-allotment oratory challenged the Dawes Act’s 
diminution of Native identities and spotlighted how the act failed in its pledges of Native 
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citizenship by way of the identity duality construct.  Native speeches worked through 
economic appeals to resist the government’s allotment policy as injurious to American 
Indian autonomy. And, they stressed the unified and empowered identities associated 
with American Indian nations and their moral rights to the land in their pursuit of 
citizenship.   
Radicalism and Separatist Pan-Indianism in Ghost Dance Oratory 
While integrationist American Indian anti-allotment oratory united to demand 
citizenship through economic appeals, the Ghost Dance Movement sought to transform 
that unity into separatism.260 Protestors of assimilation were not always “primarily 
interested in representing tribal practice for the non-Indian … who comprised much of 
their audience.”  Rather, some Native rhetoric was “most interested in restructuring the 
relations [among] Indians” as an internal rhetoric.261 According to Brown, the Ghost 
Dance movement built a pan-Indianism that united American Indians by an investment in 
a joint “messiah” and through shared stakes to territory and cultural traditions.262 This 
type of unity was important to contesting the allotment policy and urging for independent 
American Indian entities outside the scope of U.S. citizenship.  Unity was especially 
resonant as the worship of indigenous deities was viewed by nineteenth century U.S. 
leaders to “retard the advancement of the Indians and what effect it has on their 
morals.”263 Thus, the Ghost Dance, with its emphasis on fusing Native nations through 
the “Great Spirit,” functioned, concomitantly, to resurrect American Indian spiritualities 
displaced by the Dawes Act’s emphasis on assimilation.   
Pan-Indianism represented a larger ideological construct for the Ghost Dance 
movement than for other unified Native groups.  In essence, the movement united the 
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past, present and the future – working through notions of ancestry and moral inheritance 
to indigenous territory in the process.  Other pan-Indian discourses tended to be rooted 
solely in the present and did not transcend the past through to the future.    
At the same time, the Dawes Act’s oppressive impact on Native identities and 
independence was channeled into an empowered venue for Native resistance.  The Ghost 
Dance Movement resisted allotment based on a radical separatism that not only sought to 
detach Natives from U.S. citizenship, but also aimed to displace American communities 
from areas West of the Mississippi. Ghost Dance rhetoric did so by depicting the 
government as devilish and virulent.  To achieve this end, Ghost Dance leaders raised the 
allotment policy as a flag issue, or an “event … susceptible to the charges made against 
the establishment by the agitator’s ideology.”264 In the end, Ghost Dance advocates 
championed separate Indian nationalism, not U.S. citizenship.      
Briefly, the Ghost Dance instigated a return of American Indian lands and 
political sovereignty.  Participants, literally, danced while building unification through 
pleas to both the “Great Spirit” and deceased Native forebears (called “fathers” by the 
movement).   The movement also encouraged the expulsion of Dawes era influences, 
such as yeoman farming and the adoption of American customs – as well as white settlers 
on a larger scale – from Indian Country.  The latter was a radical departure from the pro-
citizenship discourse of Native oratory and even the pro-separatist rhetoric of western and 
northwestern memorials and petitions and literary publications.265 Self-professed disciple 
Wovoka (Piute) began the pan-Indian movement by summoning American Indian leaders 
to his Utah reservation in 1890 where participants committed themselves to resisting the 
allotment policies and spreading the communal dance among their respective nations.266 
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At the council, he foretold of “a promising new world, a world in which all the white 
people would soon disappear and the buffalo would return and all the dead Indian 
ancestors of long ago would rejoin the living in a new way of life.”267 His peers believed 
that dancing in the fashion that he taught would usher in this new world of Native 
empowerment.  According to Wovoka, the more participants danced, the sooner the Great 
Spirit and the Native “fathers” would descend to the earth, thus ousting the government’s 
“impediments” to American Indian autonomy.268 Such images not only linked pan-
Indianism in the present but also the past and future as its memories collectivized the 
binds of Indian ancestry as one people forever removed from the encroachments of 
whites. 
Ghost Dance rhetoric, above all, united American Indians through providential 
identities, a hybridized version of the U.S government’s self-entitled “manifest” ethos.  
Kicking Bear (Minneconjou Sioux), for instance, told a gathering of the Cheyenne and 
Sioux nations that we “are [God’s] chosen people for all future time.”269 As the chosen 
people, American Indians were encouraged to perform the Ghost Dance as a way of 
doing away with governmental influences.270 He identified with other American Indians 
by offering them a spiritual errand.  “He [Wovoka] told us to return to our people,” 
Kicking Bear narrated, “to tell them, and all the people of the red nations” to unite and 
only then “the ghosts of our fathers … meet us” and bring us sovereignty.271 Only 
through the communitarian undertaking of the Ghost Dance could American Indians, he 
said, overcome the deleterious and hierarchical effects of the Dawes Act.  He exhorted 
them, therefore, to join together against the “wave” of governmental reforms “plaguing” 
Native reservations.272 Instead of taking up allotments and “individualizing” on 
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separated plots of land, Kicking Bear suggested re-adopting the communalism on their 
ancestral lands that remained such a vital component of Native identities prior to the 
ratification of the Dawes Act.273 
Ghost Dance rhetoric especially as espoused by Kicking Bear – its most notable 
leader – furthermore constructed the U.S. government as evil in having encroached onto 
American Indian reservations through the Dawes Act.  As a result, Kicking Bear related 
that the “Great Spirit” would “cover the earth with new spoil to a depth of five times the 
height of a man, and under this new soil will be buried all the whites, and all the holes 
and rotten places will then be filled up.”274 Kicking Bear, here, inverted the allotment 
policy’s denigration of Native identities with a reduction of white character to malevolent 
“ground dwelling.”  He sought both separation from the government and, in time, the 
eradication of American settlers in Indian Territory.  So adamant was he in his arguments 
for Native unification, and governmental remonstration, that he averred the Ghost Dance 
would “fill in …the rot and dirt” of allotted territories, leaving in its wake “sweet-grass 
and running water and trees, and herds of buffalo and ponies.” Engaging in the separatist 
pan-Indian movement also promised to refurbish American Indian autonomy over their 
morally inherited homelands and senses of identity.275 
Finally, Ghost Dance discourse united American Indian nations against allotment 
by suggesting that Native communities owed a moral inheritance to the Great Spirit and 
their “fathers the ghosts.”276 This internal rhetorical strategy was successful at garnering 
unity for American Indian protestors during the removal era by tightening common 
bonds.  To this end, Wovoka’s message urged other American Indians that the Great 
Spirit had “neglected the Indians for many moons, but … will make them my people now 
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if they obey me in this message.  The earth is getting old and I will make it new for my 
chosen people, the Indians, who are to inhabit it and among them will be all those of their 
ancestors who have died.”277 Wovoka said, though the Great Spirit may have sided with 
the U.S. government in the past, that a unified pan-Indianism would win over the Great 
Spirit.  Wovoka then argued that “we should unite now” lest “our ancestors, who died 
fighting” back the ebb of white encroachment “will have perished” in vain.278 
Ostensibly, American Indians were bonded through their common ancestries.  If they 
united, their ancestors would return to them “avenged and satisfied” and, therefore, 
“bring with them” a return of sovereignty and self-sustenance.279 
Ultimately, Ghost Dance rhetoric challenged the allotment policy by uniting 
American Indians into a pan-Indianism that strengthened the more radical Native 
argument for a separate nationalism.  According to Nabokov, radical Native oratory – 
such as that extant in Ghost Dance appeals – is said to be “more important than [simply] 
the counterpart of the white man’s written record.”  Instead, this type of American Indian 
consummatory discourse, in and of itself, “reasserts the powers of Indian mythology” and 
resistance.”280 Pan-Indianism, in this vein, constituted American Indian identities as 
strong and connected – versus dependent and problematic, as U.S. leaders had 
constructed them through governmental allotment discourses.  Simultaneously, Ghost 
Dance leaders reshaped the government’s citizenship promise as harmful to American 
Indian autonomy.   
Overall, Native oratory resisted the Dawes Act by questioning the policy’s failure 
to promote Native citizenship through economic appeals (integrationist oratory), and by 
encouraging pan-Indian independence through a radical separatism (Ghost Dance 
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rhetoric).  American Indians argued that conciliating to the U.S. government’s allotment 
and assimilation plans functioned contrary to the Dawes Act’s goals.  That is, they called 
into question the hypocritical identity duality of inclusion and segregation. In fact, both 
integrationist and more radical American Indians articulated that the government’s 
promises of independence only strengthened the paternal connections between Natives 
and the U.S. government.  American Indian oratory constituted governmental republican 
fatherhood as questionably benevolent, while reconfiguring American Indians as united.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has contended that Native resistance to allotment enacted a pan-
Indianism that challenged the cementing of identities supported by the Dawes Act.  Hoxie 
contends that the government’s blending of several Native nations together under a 
blanketed identity construction allowed American Indians to find an invigorated common 
ground “where they could be heard.”  Unification made it possible “for Indians to 
communicate with outsiders and each other in new ways”281 and to reconstitute 
governmental and Native identities.  And, in the end, American Indian remonstrations 
against allotment slowed the implementation of the Dawes Act, thereby spotlighting the 
strength of Native agency.  American Indians also addressed the identity duality of U.S. 
citizenship, demonstrating the hybrid relationship between indigenous communities and 
the U.S. government.  The power of Native voice was exhibited by exposing the 
government’s contradictions, thus perforating the ideologies of republicanism and 
paternalism.  Ostensibly, American Indians unearthed the hypocrisy of assimilating 
Natives, yet segregating them from the core of the U.S. civis. In the end, Natives, like 
their governmental counterparts, envisioned land as the pathway for either Native 
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citizenship or autonomy. Such constructions reveal a fusion of historical commitments—
the U.S. government’s conflation of land/citizenship with American Indians’ assumptions 
of moral inheritance to land. 
The government’s Dawes era discourses of allotment and supposed citizenship 
issued a break through which American Indians forwarded their resistance. American 
Indian dissenters also hearkened to hybrid structures of discourse as their rhetoric 
affected allotment’s state of affairs by providing inventional material to governmental 
debates on the Dawes Act.  Likewise, the government’s allotment discourse fed into 
Native resistance.  Concurrently, Natives considered territory as a justifiable means to 
citizenship or sovereignty outside the scope of the U.S. government. Territoriality as a 
theme was similar to the U.S. government’s notion that land existed as a pathway to 
civilization.  The difference was that Native communities predicated their rationale of 
land as a conduit on a moral inheritance articulated during the removal era.  
Alternatively, land was markedly connected to notions of citizenship and commitments to 
commodification of homelands by the U.S. government – this was also a residue of the 
removal era. 
All in all, American Indians rallied around a pan-Indianism, thus appropriating 
the government’s homogenization of Native identities in the late nineteenth century.  The 
ends of pan-Indianism, though, were oftentimes different among Native groups.  The 
integrationist side encouraged unity to persuade the government to extend them state 
resident-like citizenship.  These Natives sought equal status among other members of the 
U.S. family through the Dawes Act’s granting of citizenship.  A more radical and 
nationalist Native group employed pan-Indianism to bolster their separation from the 
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U.S. government.  Their view of sovereignty was entrenched in an American Indian 
identity connected to traditional tribal governments and traditions.282 The separatist pan-
Indian groups did not strive for U.S. citizenship.  
In 1894 the Choctaw Nation appealed to Congress to – simply – listen.  Though 
they and other Native communities opposing the Dawes Act failed to impede allotment at 
that time, the Choctaw Nation’s sentiments alluded to the importance of resistive 
discourse.  The group bewailed, “If we do speak and speak the truth and you don’t listen 
to it and are not governed by it, then you have literally denied us the right to be heard. 
Justice as against rapacity, patience as against ruthless force, and humanity as our 
common bond, is our last request.”283 The Choctaw people and other Natives helped 
shape an understanding of American Indian positions on the Dawes Act during the 
1870s-1890s.  Not only were these “voices of the excluded” important “to understanding 
controversy,” but they were also constructive.284 Native allotment discourse 
demonstrates Bhabha’s concept that cultures “emerge within a range of discourses as a 
double movement.”  For instance, American Indian anti-allotment discourse succeeded in 
refashioning the way that governmental and Native identities were “read.”285 
Nowhere was American Indian discursive impact made more resonant in the 
Progressive Era than in the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.  The act was 
closely aligned with the integrationist pan-Indianism that demanded citizenship through 
the Dawes Act.  Later, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was passed, which stripped 
away the allotment policy altogether, allowing for quasi-separate tribal status.  This latter 
change was more parallel to pan-Indian arguments for separatist autonomy.  Within this 
ten-year period, the amalgam of pan-Indianism (integrationist and separatist) influenced 
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the statures and identities of American Indian communities.  American Indians became 
quasi-citizens: included in the U.S. nation, but likewise permitted to reorganize as 
independent nationalist bodies.  As Calloway asserts of this change from the whole of the 
nineteenth century,  “in spite of past population losses and legal constraints, the [early] 
twentieth century was to be a time of endurance and survival, not decline and 
disappearance …Surviving the dark years … built resources” for later resurgence.286 
But, American Indians were not in the clear from governmental influence.  To the 
contrary, Senier writes that despite Natives’ efforts, “the United States remained centered 
on managing … Indians.”  She continues that whether Natives “were envisioned as 
potential yeoman farmers … or as a permanent underclass … they were always to be 
contained within Euro-American norms.”287 In other words, the U.S. government granted 
American Indian communities a controlled citizenship and controlled sovereignty that 
grew from the identity duality construct. The afterward assesses this state of U.S.-Native 
affairs in the early twentieth century. 
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CONCLUSION: 
THE LEGACY OF U.S. NATIONAL AND NATIVE VOICES  
IN THE INDIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT AND THE INDIAN NEW DEAL 
 In 1906, after eight years of working his land through allotment, Dewitt Clinton 
Duncan (Cherokee) concluded that the Dawes Act had not improved his condition as 
either a self-sufficient American Indian or a U.S. citizen.  Duncan took particular 
umbrage with how the Interior Department intruded on Native lands, thus violating any 
semblance of sovereignty or citizenship.  Of this territorial travesty, he exhorted a 
congressional committee: “suppose the federal government send [sic] a survey company 
into the midst of some of your central counties of Kansas or Colorado or Connecticut and 
run off all the surface of the earth into sections and quarter sections … rescinding and 
annulling all title.”1 Appealing to a sense of fairness and equity he then queried, “Would 
Colorado submit to it? Would Kansas brook such an outrage? No! … There is not an 
American citizen in any of these states should submit to it, even if it cost him every drop 
of his heart’s blood.”2 In expressing his discontent with the government’s license to 
encroach on Native lands as a dominant force, Duncan concluded that such oppressive 
actions would ultimately amount to “ruin, immeasurable ruin; devastation.”3
Vitally, Duncan’s resistance also represented one of the ways that American 
Indian remonstrations to allotment contributed to the hybrid identities extant in the U.S.-
Native relationship.  He worked through the policy’s pledges of citizenship to construct 
American Indian and U.S. citizen identities as equally included.  To this end, Duncan’s 
scenario linked Native communities to “American citizen[s] in any of these states,” 
drawing the two together as joint identities under the government’s aegis.  Emancipating 
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opportunities like these – in addition to the fact that Duncan even had a chance to voice 
his opinion – allude to the empowerment that American Indians experienced in the 
twentieth century.  According to Hoxie, political leaders such as Duncan demonstrated 
how Natives had a “say” in U.S.-Native affairs along with their governmental 
counterparts. This type of “talking back to civilization” actually “produced results” and 
eventually led to both American Indian citizenship and an eventual retraction of the 
Dawes Act.4
Around the time of Duncan’s rebuke of allotment, Ruth Muskrat Bronson 
(Cherokee) was experiencing the same lag in the so-called benefits of the Dawes Act.   
As with Duncan, she addressed the government’s lapses in fulfilling its republican aims 
by parceling Native lands and assimilating American Indians.  According to Nabokov, 
Bronson’s 1910 essay to the Interior Department likely sparked some thought about 
“revising the allotment policy,” especially when combined with other “Indian protests” 
from the era.5 In her essay she told the story of Jim Runningwolf who “typical of much 
of the Indian population” lost his land to the U.S. government.6 The failure of American 
Indians to work the land did not factor into the government’s rationales for the Dawes 
Act.  Similarly, an extraction of Native territories was not part of the government’s 
benevolent justification for allotment.7 But, Bronson argued that the Interior Department, 
in particular, prompted these difficulties.  She wrote that, “the Indian agent [came] along” 
and said to Runningwolf: “‘you are not using your land … why don’t you let me lease it 
for you to that white farmer who was looking it over the other day?’”  Wheedling away at 
Runningwolf’s land, the empowered government cajoled him to “live in idleness on an 
annual rent” from the Interior Department that was “barely sufficient to hold off 
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starvation – never enough to lift the shadow of malnutrition from their households.” 8 
From the perspective of hybridity, Duncan’s and Bronson’s resistance contributed to the 
formation of U.S. Native policy alongside the federal government’s rhetoric of control as, 
according to Nabokov, such voices were “integrated into” discussions of the U.S.-Native 
relationship.9
In Culture and Imperialism, Said sets the groundwork for this prototypal 
understanding of hybridity reflected in the sentiments of Duncan and Bronson.  Therein 
he argues that “all cultures are involved in one another; none is simple and pure, all are 
hybrid, heterogeneous … and unmonolithic.”10 From Said’s standpoint, such hybridity 
undergirds all cultural identities.  Not even dominant actors are occluded from the 
immeasurable influence of other groups on their identities.  Bhabha – working from 
Said’s theory – posits that hybridity indeed exists among interfacing cultural groups, and 
that such melding together of discourses ironically unsettles as it collages identities.  He 
writes that hybridity becomes the moment in which a discourse’s “univocal grip on 
meaning” is loosened so that “it finds itself open to the trace of the language of the 
other.”11 Thus, as hybridity brings into amalgamation numerous identities, it also 
“deforms the structures” of the identities involved in the exchange.12 
Research by many cultural scholars indicates that discursive exchanges often 
weigh heavily in favor of dominant identities, while also realizing the empowering 
dynamics of hybridity for subaltern identities.13 Regarding the power of the dominant 
forces, the logic suggests, hybridity tends to be instigated by contact initiated and desired 
by the dominant group.  Part of this contact benefits the dominant group by encouraging 
assimilation.  At the same time, however, the hybrid exchange empowers the subaltern 
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groups to resist the dominant culture through cultural interactions.  This interactive pose 
of hybridity demonstrates how intercultural dealings “are sedimented in identity changes 
(or hybridization) on the part of both partners in the exchange.”14 
The double-voiced nature of commingling discourses challenges the prevailing 
idea that subaltern cultures suffer a complete erasure at the hands of dominant cultures.15 
Moreover, such hybridity defies the suggestion that dominant identities are only scantily 
shaped or, oppositely, interminably reconfigured by subaltern cultures.16 Hybridity 
appears less deterministic and polarized in its understanding of cultural contact and 
transformation; hybridity, along these lines, is more a spectrum than a dichotomy.   
And, if Bakhtin is correct, identities never vanish; rather, they undergo a 
transformation of sorts.  Bakhtin argues that “the processes of centralization and 
decentralization, of unification and disunification” in the “limen” lead to an “intersection 
of utterances” that changes those entering a cultural exchange.17 Also, identities – as 
reflected in hybrid discourses – are fluid and multivalent.  For instance, Campbell 
contends that “because they are linked to cultures and collectivities,” subject-positions 
must “negotiate among” other positions and “are best described as ‘points of 
articulation’” rather than monolithic or unproblematic constructs.18 Hybridity and the 
amalgamation or syncretism of singular cultures overlaps with identities.19 If the 
interaction of cultural groups opens the “borderlands” allowing for “shifting, not fixed 
identities” among groups, then identity change is a likely outcrop of such interactions.20 
These transformations exist within the “network of relations” as the period of interaction 
lengthens.21 
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An analysis of this “network of relations” throughout the removal and allotment 
eras reveals a number of entailments about the hybrid relationship between the United 
States and American Indians.  First, the hybrid relationship was constituted by both 
governmental and Native discourses.  Both commingled and helped construct the 
identities of the U.S. government and American Indian communities. At the same time, 
the voices influenced the debates over U.S.-Native policies.  American Indians 
appropriated the rhetorical structures employed by the government in their rebukes to 
such policies.  Similarly, the government incorporated American Indian discursive 
strategies in adapting its policies to Native communities.  In this way, U.S. governmental 
and American Indian voices did not bypass each other, but blended into a relationship 
that came to underscore identities and produce policies.          
A second entailment involves the U.S. government working through the ideology 
of republican fatherhood to assimilate Natives.  The government endorsed and predicated 
Natives’ civic preparedness on their cultivation of the soil.  Seemingly inclusive, this 
construct actually limited the involvement of American Indians as childlike wards.  As 
the analysis has shown, no matter how closely they followed the government’s republican 
tenets, Natives were considered “perpetually under aged” and incapable of participation 
within the U.S. civis.22 
But, the analysis also reveals that American Indian communities did not accept 
this construct without compunctions.  Natives called into question republican fatherhood, 
demonstrating how the U.S. government violated the tenets of its own paternalism.  
Moreover, American Indians worked through the familial relationship imbricated by 
republican fatherhood to illustrate the amicable identities of Native nations.  Such 
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conciliation to republican fatherhood became fodder for American Indians to challenge 
how the U.S. government’s paternalism failed to uplift indigenous groups.  The way that 
the government and American Indians worked through republican fatherhood exemplifies 
the hybrid nature of their relationship – it was interactive and flexible, rather than one-
sided and deterministic.  Such Native “back talk” to the policies and identity formations 
bolstered by the U.S. government spotlighted how they enacted homologies as resistive 
rhetorical strategies. 23 That is, American Indians asserted time and again how they had 
fulfilled their duties as so-called wards by assimilating and relating amicably to the “great 
father” and their “white brothers.”24 Government-induced characterizations of Natives as 
uncivilized and savage were challenged in these instances.  Moreover, the reworking of 
such institutional language helped American Indians resituate governmental identities.  
Third, the ascendancy of the executive branch as the government’s key actor 
affected the U.S.-Native hybrid relationship.  The government’s elision of the Congress 
as a primary actor in U.S.-Native affairs influenced the means by which American 
Indians redressed grievances.  The normalization of governance in the executive undercut 
Natives’ representation in Congress – the governmental branch “of the people.”25 As part 
of the normal transition of power, Interior Department secretaries, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs commissioners and U.S. presidents brought new expectations for the 
administration of Native affairs.  Hence, American Indian affairs were left to the whims 
of whichever republican father was in power, which disrupted continuity and exacerbated 
uncertainty over the salience of Native issues and exigencies. In addition, the checks and 
balances of the “people’s” branch were weakened, minimizing congressional oversight 
and reducing the republican underpinnings of Native citizenship.  Such a move toward 
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“executive supremacy” latently sidestepped the notion that American Indians could be 
represented in Congress.26 As the previous chapter shows, however, American Indians 
still petitioned the Congress for changes to policies.  Natives certainly worked through 
the executive branch, but also enacted a similar sidestep around the executive to forward 
their remonstrations to the branch that supposedly represented their interests as 
assimilated wards.  American Indian efforts to address Congress indicated their 
dedication to the republican precept of maneuvering through representative democratic 
modes of governance.          
Fourth, the government’s tendency to concurrently assimilate American Indians to 
the U.S. citizenry while also segregating them on secluded reservations points to the 
identity duality of U.S. nationalism and citizenship.  The endeavor to amalgamate Native 
communities to republicanism spoke to a pledge of inclusion.  In the end, though, the 
implementation of Native segregation contradicted the U.S. government’s assimilationist 
ideals, as American Indians were moved to the farthest stretches of the frontier (removal 
era) and to the corners of their reservations (allotment era).  American Indians gave voice 
to this identity duality by exposing the hypocrisies of assimilation and segregation.  The 
U.S. government’s efforts to account for such hypocrisies by offering citizenship and 
sovereignty to Natives in the twentieth century speak to the power of American Indian 
voice.  They also demonstrate how Natives contributed to the hybrid relationship. 
Fifth, throughout the removal and allotment eras, land functioned as a pivotal 
space of contestation over American Indian rights and identities.  During the removal era, 
the U.S. government viewed territory as a central criterion for citizenship; prospective 
citizens were to inhabit and cultivate the land in productive ways in order to qualify for 
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citizenship.  American Indians were considered by the government, therein, too 
uncivilized or childish to cultivate their territories.  Hence, Native communities were 
dismissed from land ownership and citizenship and were, instead, granted only tenancy 
under the watchful eye of the U.S. government.  (The land occupancy/tenancy granted to 
Natives, however, was a bestowment not given to other peoples of color.)  Such a lack of 
productive use of territory eventually motivated the removal policy and justified the 
government’s encroachment into Native lands.  This encroachment worked through the 
doctrine of discovery that assumed territory was something to be conquered and civilized.  
In the process, the doctrine linked expansion and progress to U.S. identities.   
Conversely, American Indians utilized the rhetoric of moral inheritance to counter 
the Indian Removal Act and to justify connections to their homelands.  Standing in stark 
contrast to the government’s doctrine of discovery, Native moral inheritance was 
channeled into an insistence on land rights – a key construction of their civic and spiritual 
identities. Moral inheritance allowed Natives some rights to territories west of the 
Mississippi, though it did not protect their homelands in the East.  At the same time, 
moral inheritance provided them with a foray into a separate sovereignty.  Therein, 
American Indians constituted themselves as historical and rightful owners of the land, 
while characterizing the U.S. government’s identity as thievish.   
By the time of allotment, the U.S. government moved from the doctrine of 
discovery to the commodification of land that required prospective citizens to toil 
properly on lands.  Such cultivation of land functioned as a pathway to citizenship – a 
vital means of civilization. The government shifted its viewpoint to images of 
productivity and citizenship for American Indians if they worked their allotments 
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successfully, contributing, in the process, to the national economy.  This shift 
underscored the conflation of citizenship and territory resonant during the removal era.  
Simultaneously, Native moral inheritance came to bear with the Dawes Act as American 
Indians were offered some tie to territories.  American Indians, hence, came to view 
territory as a rationale to pursue either U.S. citizenship or sovereignty outside the aegis of 
citizenship. They appropriated the use of territory to such ends, but whereas the 
government worked through commodification, American Indians predicated their use of 
land on a moral inheritance. In the end, land for Native communities was framed as a 
constitutive force of indigenous identity.           
Sixth, and related to the above entailments, the government offered American 
Indians a middle-road identity between U.S. citizenship and separatist sovereignty.  Here, 
the government’s granting of a controlled citizenship – promised in the Dawes Act and 
continued with the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 – allowed Native communities limited 
access to citizenship.  The government’s management of Native lands functioned as a 
synecdoche of this controlled citizenship. American Indians were occasionally able to 
vote and file lawsuits in U.S. courts.  Still, such rights and privileges were often ignored 
or abridged; and, the government’s plenary doctrine permitted the Interior Department 
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs to encroach on these rights at whim.  The allowance of a 
controlled sovereignty comprised the second half of the middle-road subjectivity of 
American Indians.  Controlled sovereignty – promised in the Indian Removal Act and 
continued with the Indian New Deal of 1934 – sought to allow Native communities to 
govern themselves.  Such guarantees were problematized as the government reified its 
own paternal identity in conjunction with Native identities as dependent.  In the end, 
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American Indians experienced a double status that existed between tribalism and 
Americanism.        
Ostensibly, the executive branch abridged these autonomous rights if a case could 
be made that such encroachment benefited the United States, Native communities or 
both.  American Indians’ limited access to U.S. citizenship and tribal sovereignty 
buttressed the U.S. government’s self-professed control over Native communities. 
Territory figured in here, too, as land became a space to manage American Indians; 
predicating the pathway to citizenship and land rights on productivity, the government 
buttressed its control over Native groups.  In the process, Native identities were totalized 
as monolithic; individual Native nations were reduced to a homogenous identity of 
“Indian” that occluded the histories, cultures and territories of particular indigenous 
communities.  But, Natives were not vulnerable and powerless within the hybrid 
relationship.  
In fact, the ways American Indians structured their responses to policies, along 
with the identity constructions that the government helped constitute, contributed to the 
hybrid relationship.  One such strategy channeled the government’s monolithic identity 
constructions of American Indians into an empowered unity.   Here, Native communities 
joined forces and gathered strength in numbers to rebuke the U.S. government’s policies.  
This pan-Indianism drew together previously disparate Native nations, which helped 
demonstrate their unity, strength and agencies in opposition to the government’s 
diminutive Native identity constructions.  Pan-Indianism fused Native nations into groups 
of “we’s,” “us’s” and “Indians” that helped them organize a dedicated effort to stem the 
tide of governmental policies.  While still holding onto their individual tribal identities, 
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these groups viewed a relational connection in their statuses as governmental wards.  
Pan-Indian groups were able, in part, to motivate the Indian Citizenship Act and the 
Indian New Deal, exhibiting the symbolic power of Native agency.      
As the following analysis demonstrates, these hybrid entailments inundated the 
acts.  This conclusion addresses hybridity in the co-construction of U.S. governmental 
and Native identities within the acts and the discourses surrounding them.  The Indian 
Citizenship Act and the Indian New Deal granted U.S. citizenship to American Indians 
and repealed the Dawes Act, respectively.  The acts featured American Indian and 
governmental arguments from the removal and allotment eras, and punctuated how these 
discourses made visible the hybridity underscoring the U.S.-Native relationship.    
The acts indicate how American Indian agency influenced U.S.-Native relations 
by working through the government’s homogenization of Native identities, republican 
appeals, territoriality and paternal language.  They did so by exposing the mythos of 
identity duality and by calling into question the benevolent and republican identities of 
the U.S. government.  Such rhetorical strategies were residues of Native discourses 
during the removal and allotment periods.  Simultaneously, American Indians 
reconstituted their own identities as worthy, united and just – oftentimes through the 
construct of pan-Indianism.27 They also worked through moral inheritance that, in the 
end, provided them some link to territorial occupation, but concurrently failed to protect 
their ownership rights to homelands.  American Indian rhetoric from the removal and 
allotment eras affected U.S.-Native relations in the early twentieth century by urging U.S. 
citizenship for Natives and helping to repeal the Dawes Act.  Hence, writes Hoxie, 
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passage of the two acts is a testament “to the success of Native talking back” over the 
decades.28 
Along with the acts’ empowering effects came signs of governmental dominance. 
That is, the Indian Citizenship Act granted American Indians a controlled citizenship as 
part of the U.S. nation, while the Indian New Deal concurrently offered Natives a 
controlled sovereignty as members of their own tribal cultures.  These proscribed statuses 
developed from the influences of removal and allotment era ideologies and manifested 
through the identity duality of U.S. nationalism.  American Indians could not fully enact 
citizenship in the U.S. civis as segregation worked to thwart the enactment of citizenship 
rights.  Yet, they could not fully enjoy separatist sovereignty because assimilation 
functioned to stymie their autonomy.  As a result of the acts, Natives were “recognized as 
federal and state citizens” though “they were not guaranteed the most basic constitutional 
protections” therein.  But, they were allowed to maintain their tribal citizenship.29 This 
multi-layered subjectivity amounted to an “anomalous” bi-culturalism.30 
This chapter first traces American Indian agency as it influenced the hybridized 
U.S.-Native relationship through the Indian Citizenship Act.  This first section also 
examines the U.S. government’s oppressive constructs embedded within the act that led 
to a controlled citizenship over American Indians.  Next, the chapter explores the 
emancipatory dynamics of Native voice during the Indian New Deal milieu. Then, this 
portion investigates how the 1934 legislation – along with governmental discourse 
surrounding it – ultimately granted Natives only a controlled sovereignty.  Governmental 
discourses in both sections are comprised of Indian Commissioner reports, Congressional 
speeches and Supreme Court decisions.  Before delving into an analysis of the acts – and 
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the discourses surrounding their passage – a discussion of the Dawes era’s legacy is 
needed.     
EMANCIPATORY AND OPPRESSIVE LEGACIES OF THE DAWES ERA 
 The Dawes Act produced a number of legacies involving the U.S.-Native 
relationship, which ranged from the empowerment of American Indian voices to the U.S. 
government’s enhanced control over indigenous communities.  This spectrum of 
outcomes, and the mingling of Native and governmental voices therein, demonstrates the 
vigor of hybridity as it came to frame interactions and identities among American Indian 
nations and the U.S. government. The following discussion highlights three of these 
residual contexts.  First, the introduction of U.S. citizenship for American Indian veterans 
of World War I is shown to reveal the agency of American Indians in demanding equal 
citizenship rights.  But, military service as a prerequisite to citizenship also pointed to the 
government’s hegemonic control over American Indians as republican fathers.  Second, 
the partial malfunctions of the Dawes Act are shown to have precipitated changes to the 
government’s Native policy in the form of the Indian New Deal.  However, the 
malfunctions of the allotment policy were simultaneously linked to Native identities as 
pitifully unsuccessful, which further buttressed the government’s call for assimilation.  
Finally, a brief examination of the Meriam Report of 1928 – an exposé that prompted a 
repeal of the Dawes Act – uncovers the power of Native agency in motivating the Indian 
New Deal.  Concomitantly, though, the Meriam Report constituted American Indians as 
dependent and in need of increased assimilative efforts.  In the end, this discussion of the 
legacies of the Dawes era accentuates both the challenges to the allotment policy wrought 
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by American Indians and the reifications of identities and disempowering ideologies 
bolstered by the U.S. government.                 
Citizenship for Native Veterans of World War I 
American Indians demonstrated their empowerment as citizen-dependents during 
the throes of World War I.  To integrationist Natives, if fully inclusive citizenship could 
not be had through laboring on allotments, perhaps it could be gained by participating in 
U.S. war efforts.  In 1917, American Indian men were given the opportunity to join the 
U.S. military during World War I in exchange for U.S. citizenship. (Separatists typically 
opposed sending American Indians to the war as, what they deemed, “hired wards.”)31 
The U.S. government codified citizenship for Native World War I veterans in 1919, 
noting that an American Indian “if he so desires, shall, on proof of discharge and after 
proper identification before a court of competent jurisdiction … be granted full 
citizenship.”32 The government’s commitment to including these Native veterans 
exhibits the power of nineteenth century American Indian discourses in support of U.S. 
citizenship.  
Furthermore, Native troops – unlike African Americans – were integrated with 
white troops during the Great War.33 This was so, reported Indian Commissioner Cato 
Sells in 1917, because military segregation involving Natives was “not in harmony with 
our plans for developing Indian citizenship.”  Here, American Indian appeals for 
inclusion in the U.S. nation during the Dawes era came to fruition.  Instead of being 
segregated from other Americans, Natives fought in integrated units, “side by side with 
the white man, not as Indians, but as Americans.”34 Of this, the New York Times declared 
in 1917 that “it may seem strange to see an Apache in a sailor’s blue uniform … but it 
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merely shows that he has become an American and has passed the tribal stage.”35 So 
robust was the notion of Native inclusion in this effort that, even in the midst of Jim 
Crow segregation, steps were taken to incorporate them as citizen-soldiers.36 
At the same time, such a militaristic connection to citizenship highlighted the 
notion that Native dependents had to fulfill the republican father’s mandates for inclusion 
by fighting for the nation.  In this way, military service replicated the U.S. government’s 
hegemonic control over American Indians as commodities in the Dawes era.  According 
to Smith, military participation prepared dependent persons of color for citizenship by 
“affirming a supreme loyalty” to the government; such civic education would then help 
“shape who and what future American citizens would be.”37 Citizenship through military 
service illustrated how American Indians had to “serve” a dominant power in order to 
attain possible inclusion in the civis.38 
While citizenship brought American Indian veterans one step closer toward the 
assimilation side of the identity duality of U.S. nationalism, it did not completely 
emancipate them.  Inclusion for Native veterans equated to a controlled citizenship that 
classified them as veritable second-class citizens.  They received territorial privileges and 
voting rights on paper, but there existed a disconnect between the theory and practices of 
U.S. citizenship for American Indians. With the allotment policy’s dictates, the U.S. 
government continued to interfere in Native affairs by holding onto allotments, per the 
trust clause in the Dawes Act.  To this contradiction, veteran Joseph Claymore (Sioux) 
argued that “I thought as a citizen of the United States I could manage my own affairs … 
but I found that the Indian Bureau still held on to seven sections of land I had by 
inheritance.”39 In addition to conveying a sense of the inconsistency of U.S. citizenship, 
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Claymore’s discourse referenced the vitality of the executive branch as the key 
administrator of U.S.-Native relations – even well into the twentieth century.   
Moreover, the Interior Department and Bureau of Indian Affairs – who sanctioned 
the granting of Native citizenship – could deny voting rights based on American Indians’ 
“mere” occupancy of their allotments.40 Of this governmental control, Red Fox 
Skiuhushu (Blackfoot) wrote in a 1918 Literary Digest editorial that “If the red man can 
fight, why can’t he vote? … the Indian’s grand and noble” contribution to both the war 
effort and the American economy through allotment “ought to cause every [white person] 
to reciprocate … by urging a bill in Congress to have the Indian free, and bestow upon 
them full citizenship.”41 This iteration evidences how Native veterans were offered a 
controlled citizenship that did not always involve voting rights and visibly limited their 
freedom.         
Shortcomings of the Dawes Act 
The Dawes Act’s difficulties in converting American Indians as capitalistic 
agrarians also evidenced Native empowerment.  The apparent collapse of allotment was 
linked to the U.S. government’s identity as a corrupt and overzealous land-grabber. Or, as 
Indian Commissioner John Collier put it, the government was “unjust” and greedy and 
had passed “the Allotment Law – the agony and ruin of the Indians.”42 Collier’s 
characterization indicates how American Indians’ constructions of governmental 
identities transcended Native discourse to impact the government’s self-identities as well. 
The government’s failure with the Dawes Act spawned from two crucial factors.  First, as 
Native lands were allotted, the government sold the surpluses to migrating settlers 
wishing to homestead in former American Indian territories, thus ensuring that the 
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territory had “passed into white hands.”43 This was one of the justifications for the 
allotment policy – to guarantee that white settlers would get the lands they desired 
without committing violence.44 Second, a number of bureaucrats and private white 
interests convinced American Indians to sell their territories to make some semblance of 
money from the land.  The trade-off was, of course, that American Indians had to give up 
rights to their allotments.  Speaking to Commissioner Collier about the inveigling of 
white interests in Native allotments, Antonio Luhan (Taos Pueblo) lamented that “our 
white neighbors are all around the edge of us, they always look … And, maybe they see 
gold.  They might see coal … they might begin to loan money … or buy acres … and 
[Indians] will lose their land in a few years because they have borrowed on it.  That is 
enough to finish the Indians.”45 Here, Luhan spoke of the fashion in which Natives were 
cajoled and in some ways forced into selling their lands in order to survive in the wake of 
the Dawes Act.   The Dawes Act’s malfunctions allowed Native protestors like Luhan an 
entrée to reconstruct governmental identities as fraudulent.     
Separatist American Indians – those wishing sovereignty outside the bounds of 
governmental influence or U.S. citizenship –found empowerment through a loop-hole in 
the policy.  That is, the Dawes Act required Native communities to vote on allotments.  
Separatist Natives put off such a decision, claiming a need for further tribal 
“deliberation” (evidence of republican engagement), thus hampering the allotment 
process. Clinton Rickard (Tuscarora) and his nation was able to postpone allotment, 
claiming that the policy left Natives in a “strange limbo” wherein they were neither 
autonomous nor integrated.  They needed more time to “discuss” allotment among 
themselves as sovereigns.46 In a rebuke of the Dawes Act, he contended that “we had a 
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great attachment to our style of government … we wished to … preserve our ancient 
rights.  There was no rush among my people to go out and vote in the white man’s 
elections.”47 So, the Tuscaroras did not vote; by the time allotment ended as a policy in 
1934 they had managed to avoid signing an agreement with the Interior Department. 
Even if American Indians could attain U.S. citizenship through the Dawes Act, 
separatists such as Rickard, were adamant about controlling their own communities as 
nations equal in status to the United States.        
Granted, Natives were also harmed as the Dawes Act faltered.  Ostensibly, 
American Indians were constructed as pitiful and needy dependents, which were residual 
identity constructions from both the removal and allotment eras.  As Prucha argues, they 
were “caught in a complex net of dependency.”48 Unable to transition from communal 
living to individual farming, they “had not learned to preserve and exploit their individual 
property in the white man’s world as assimilated citizens.”49 Worse still, nearly three-
quarters of the lands allotted to American Indians were taken from their possession.  
Indian Commissioner John Collier asserted in his 1935 annual report that the reduction of 
“Indian land holdings from 138,000,000 acres to 47,000,000” signaled a loss of “dignity 
in private property” of “our dependents.”  Moreover, he claimed that the allotment policy 
“had rendered whole tribes totally landless” and “had thrown more than a hundred 
thousand Indians virtually into the bread-line.”50 American Indians found it difficult to 
assimilate through republican attachments to the land while their identities were 
characterized as undignified, dependent and destitute.  
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The Meriam Report of 1928 
Because of its difficulties in assimilating Natives through yeoman farming and in 
granting U.S. citizenship, the Dawes Act came under heavy scrutiny from American 
Indians and reformers within the government.  The reform efforts leading to the allotment 
policy’s collapse represent one of the pinnacles of American Indian empowerment and 
nineteenth century Native influences on U.S. policies. To Luther Standing Bear (Ponca), 
the “Indian Problem” of unsuccessful integration and citizenship was created by the 
Dawes Act.  He contended that allotment “has caused a reaction more destructive than 
the war … Tyranny, stupidity and a lack of vision have brought about the situation now 
alluded to as the ‘Indian problem.’”51 Senator William King (Utah) agreed with the gist 
of Standing Bear’s assessment.  In a speech to Congress, King wrote that “No system … 
could be more cynically devised to strip [Natives] of their property under the shadowy 
form of law than the allotment system.”52 He condemned the government’s performance 
as a benevolent republican father.  King surmised that “unless fundamental changes are 
instituted at once, the Indians are a doomed race.”53 King’s indictment feasibly came 
from his reading of Standing Bear’s autobiography and demonstrates most vividly the 
legacy of Native constructions of the U.S. government as deceitful and fraudulent.54 
Here, Native constructions of U.S. governmental identities were visible within the 
government’s own discourse, illustrating the constitutive impact of American Indian 
discourse on the government’s own image. 
As a result of these types of Native remonstrations against the Dawes Act, Interior 
Secretary Hubert Work requested in 1916 that the Brookings Institute undertake a study 
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“in a thoroughly impartial and scientific spirit with the object of making the result of its 
work a constructive contribution in this difficult field of government administration.”55 
In other words, the time had come to investigate the Dawes Act’s shortcomings based, in 
part, on American Indian requests.56 The executive branch’s pursuit of such a study 
accentuated the power of Native agency in the early twentieth century.  For as 
Commissioner Collier noted of his meetings with scores of Native nations in the late 
1920s, “these [gatherings] were palpable proof that the Indians … was [sic] ready to 
receive a voice in the management of their own affairs, and that the period of arbitrary 
autocratic rule over the tribes by the Indian Service had come to an end.”57 
The study, referred to as the Meriam Report or the The Problem of Indian 
Administration, was published in 1928 with the recommendation that the Dawes Act be 
phased out.  According to Calloway, the report “called for an end to allotment” 
predicated on the notion that “the minimum standards” of assimilation had not been 
achieved.58 These goals, he writes, had not been met mostly because “the Allotment Act 
had weakened the communal and family basis of Indian life,” thus leading to deleterious 
effects on American Indian adjustments to capitalistic agriculture and integration into the 
U.S. civis. The Meriam Report asserted that the U.S. government “had assumed that 
some magic in individual ownership of property would in itself prove an educational 
civilizing factor, but unfortunately this policy has for the most part operated in the 
opposite direction.”59 In the end, the report claimed that allotment caused “deplorable 
conditions in health, education, and economic welfare and incompetent and inefficient 
personnel.”60 
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The Meriam Report signified empowering opportunities for American Indians 
that reflected Natives’ past protests.  Natives were characterized positively as having 
“much to contribute to the dominant civilization” through their “potential” inclusion as 
U.S. citizens.61 Also, the Meriam Report called into question the imposing and culturally 
insensitive language of the Dawes Act.  For instance, it contended that forced 
assimilation had backfired and would continue to do so: 
The view … would not recommend the disastrous attempt to force individual 
Indians or groups of Indians to be what they do not want to be, to break their pride 
in themselves or their Indian race, or to deprive them of their Indian culture. Such 
efforts may break down the good in the old without replacing it with 
compensating good from new.62 
Here, American Indians would be given the choice to hold onto vestiges of their 
traditional cultures.  The report suggested that “he who wants to remain an Indian and 
live according to his old culture should be aided in doing so.”63 
However, the Meriam Report also retained some oppressive Native identity 
constructions as dependents in need of assimilation, which carried over from the removal 
and allotment eras.  Concurrently, the report crystallized a controlled sovereignty for 
American Indians as a result of such dependency.  For instance, it demanded that Natives 
“be absorbed into the prevailing civilization or be fitted to live in that civilization” in 
order “to survive.”  It also recommended a new policy that would monolithically “merge 
all [Natives] into the general population” – even as so-called sovereigns.64 This lack of 
certainty regarding American Indian sovereignty and/or U.S. citizenship reinforced the 
identity duality of U.S. nationalism.  How could the Meriam Report suggest sovereignty 
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as a framework based on “depriv[ing] them of … Indian culture” while also 
recommending a merging of “all Indians” into U.S. culture as citizen-dependents that 
elided “Indian culture”?  Calloway suggests that the government’s granting of citizenship 
and/or sovereignty were “offered for show.”65 The U.S. government still aimed, Dippie 
writes, to “manage” American Indians, resulting in the existence of controlled citizenship 
and controlled sovereignty.66 Even the Meriam Act, an outwardly emancipatory report for 
American Indians, seemed to conflate Native assimilation and sovereignty.  
Ostensibly, these legacies challenged the Dawes Act by empowering American 
Indians, but simultaneously reifying the government’s negative identity constructions of 
Natives while also restricting their citizenship rights.  In the end, changes in the U.S. 
government’s “Indian” policy came in the first third of the twentieth century, beginning 
with the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 by Congress, which granted all 
American Indians limited inclusion in the U.S. civis. The Interior Department also 
crafted the Indian New Deal of 1934, which dismantled the allotment policy and began 
introducing tribal governance back onto the reservations.  These two symbolic efforts 
sought a break from the detrimental impact of the Dawes Act and illustrated the vitality 
of American Indian agency that developed from Native resistance to the U.S. government 
during the removal and allotment eras.  Concomitantly, the acts codified the ideological, 
discursive, and identity remnants from the 1830s and 1880s that limited Native 
sovereignty.  The analysis that follows considers the acts separately.  Within these two 
sections, American Indian empowerment, derived from earlier nineteenth century Native 
rebukes, is first assessed.  Then the acts – along with U.S. governmental discourse 
surrounding them – are analyzed for the ways that they imbricated a controlled 
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citizenship (Indian Citizenship Act) and a controlled sovereignty (Indian New Deal) for 
Native communities.   
HYBRIDITY, NATIVE VOICE & ‘CONTROLLED CITIZENSHIP’  
IN THE INDIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT OF 1924  
The 1920s was a decade of unprecedented affluence and comfort for many U.S. 
communities.  According to Calloway, though, “few [American Indians] shared in the 
prosperity that many Americans enjoyed during the ‘roaring twenties.’”67 This was so 
because the allotment policy – despite its assimilationist ends and benevolent goals – had 
diminished American Indian economies, broken apart tribal relations and isolated Natives 
away from the U.S. civis despite the Dawes Act’s pledges.  But there were kernels of 
progress for indigenous communities.  Given the wave of change motivated by veteran 
citizenship, the Meriam Report and especially Native resistance, the U.S. government 
took a turn toward emancipation for American Indians through the Indian Citizenship Act 
of 1924.  The following analysis explores how American Indians affected the passage of 
the Indian Citizenship Act, especially as it came to symbolize the vitality of nineteenth 
century Native voices.  The section also considers how the Indian Citizenship Act and the 
governmental rhetoric surrounding its ratification reified the hypocritical identity duality 
embedded in the logic of U.S. nationalism.  Native and governmental influences pulled 
through the act exhibited the hybridity of their voices – an amalgam that empowered 
Natives with U.S. citizenship, but offered them only a highly controlled citizenship.   
Native Impact on the Indian Citizenship Act 
American Indian discourses influenced the ratification of the Indian Citizenship 
Act, regardless of the shortcomings of the policy.  According to Prucha, that the Interior 
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Department even entertained revising Native policy in such ways is “proof-positive” that 
the U.S. government listened to what Native communities had to say.68 The discursive 
remnants of Native discourse during the removal and allotment debates are visible in the 
passage and the rhetoric surrounding this change in Native policy.  The act provided that 
“all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they 
are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States” – an action that “would not 
impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property.”69 Here, 
American Indians appeared to be assimilated enough to enter the U.S. civis. Seemingly, 
their moral inheritance strategy bore-out as they were seen as potential property owners.   
Moreover, the demands of nineteenth century Natives to embrace vestiges of their tribal 
identities were also codified by the Indian Citizenship Act. 
Integrationist American Indians had sought U.S. citizenship throughout the four 
decades preceding the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.  As the previous chapter indicates, 
the Five Civilized Tribes, through memorials, petitions, Native biographies, and Native 
oratory, insisted on equal inclusion by appealing to the government’s republican 
sensibilities and by appropriating the government’s familial and economic language.  
According to Stremlau, these integrationist sentiments were not enacted as policy during 
“the height of the Dawes era.”70 However, their rhetoric functioned to expose the 
inconsistencies of identity duality by pointing to how the Dawes Act – and, hence the 
government as republican father – had not fulfilled the promises of U.S. citizenship for 
American Indians.  Residues of their call for inclusion are visible within the discourse of 
governmental officials.  For instance, Representative Homer Snyder (New York) noted in 
1920 that he was angered by past office holders for failing to take into account Native 
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opinions on U.S. citizenship.  He said that “citizenship was the only way to salvation” 
and that (integrationist) Native “nations wanted to rid [themselves] of dependents” 
especially as “the more virile” U.S.-Native relations were becoming by not considering 
“what they [Natives] say.”71 The existence of a citizenship act stands as a tribute to these 
earlier efforts of integrationist American Indians in the late nineteenth century. 
Such integrationist efforts, like those of Arthur Parker (Seneca), worked through 
earlier forms of Native protest and emerged as the citizenship bill was being discussed.  
Utilizing familial and republican lines of argument, Parker noted that “we have proven 
our worth as children” and “have done all we can” to assimilate to agricultural 
subsistence.72 In this quotation, Parker appropriated the government’s paternal language 
as a way to empower Natives as worthy U.S. citizens, a Native rhetorical strategy carried 
over from both the removal and allotment eras.  The worth that Parker championed 
hinged on the fulfillment of assimilation as republican agriculturalists.  Also, Parker’s use 
of the Pan-Indian “we” and the elision of his own Seneca Nation, signify that Parker 
maneuvered through the government’s homogenization of American Indians under the 
removal and allotments acts.  Importantly, Parker’s appropriation of pan-Indianism 
illustrated the legacy of American Indian and governmental arguments from the 
nineteenth century.     
Not all American Indians supported U.S. citizenship for indigenous groups, 
however.  Those Native communities seeking a separatist autonomy were not satisfied 
with the U.S. government’s efforts in 1924 to codify citizenship for all American Indians.  
But these separatists found an opening in the Indian Citizenship Act’s claim that it 
“would not impair … the right of any Indian” to tribalism.  This clause constituted 
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American Indians as capable and protected in their “rights.”  Moreover, the clause 
reflected the separatists’ pro-tribal viewpoints, hence punctuating the agency of their 
nineteenth century voices.73 Organizing under the act’s homogenous “any Indian” 
moniker, these separatists refused to accede to U.S. citizenship because they still held 
onto the hope that they could gain independence outside the scope of governmental 
influence.  Of this, a Mohawk chief exhorted a Bureau of Indian Affairs agent: “The law 
of 1924 cannot … apply to Indians since we are independent nations.”74 Clearly, 
American Indian identity was constituted, here, as autonomous and unified; the latter was 
reflected by the pan-Indian use of “we” and appropriation of the generic “Indian” 
construction.   
Some resisted integration based on memories to pre-removal U.S.-Native 
relations.  This rhetorical strategy was part of American Indian rebuttals to the removal 
and allotment acts. The Oneida and Seneca nations, for example, claimed sovereignty 
apart from the purview of the Indian Citizenship Act by noting, “[we] firmly adhere to 
the terms of the Treaty of Canandaigua between our nations … and the U.S. as of 
November 11, 1794” and that “any [other] acts thereafter … through officers, courts, or 
legislature contrary to the above are without sanction of law and repugnant to the nation 
of Oneida Indians.”75 The Oneida and Seneca referenced a time when their identities 
were amicable in granting the U.S. government the treaties it desired.   According to 
Young, such resistance has the power to force the U.S. government to lose “its univocal 
grip on meaning” and to find itself “open to the trace of the language of the other.”76 In 
the least, writes Hoxie, such remonstrances to U.S. citizenship likely fed into the Indian 
Citizenship Act’s final clause that protected tribal rights.77 
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Seemingly channeling the identity duality of republican appeals from the anti-
citizenship discourse of allotment era Natives, other American Indian separatists 
questioned how the Indian Citizenship Act would work.  Emma D. Johnson (Mohawk) 
asked a group of white reformers if the act did anything to clear up the confusion of 
Native citizenship: “I live upon a reservation now. I know nothing whatever about my 
rights as a citizen … My people do not know when they are citizens or when they are 
not.”78 Her words spoke wisdom to the havoc that the identity duality of U.S. citizenship 
wrecked on American Indians.  Johnson’s discourse simultaneously pointed to how the 
Dawes Act’s republicanism had failed by continuing to deny Native rights.  For instance, 
she said: “The Department sends word back ‘You are citizens of the United States. We 
can’t [help] you’” and then “The word sometimes comes back, ‘Why you are wards of 
the government, we cannot grant you that.’”  In the end, she queried what the republican 
“father” actually expected of the so-called “Indian citizens”: “Where are we now?”79 She 
asked for “clarity” on her status as either a U.S. citizen or a member of a sovereign 
Native nation.80 Johnson also constituted the government’s identities as unhelpful and, 
perhaps, violative of its self-professed benevolent characterization.  She was not alone 
such negative characterizations of the government.  Even Indian Commissioner Thomas 
Morgan noted that such confusion was one “of the injustices of the white race”; his words 
demonstrated how American Indian constructions of the government permeated the 
government’s own rhetoric.81 Overall, the Indian Citizenship Act seemingly answered 
the question, thus evidencing other ways in which such American Indian critiques were 
considered.   
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As demonstrated, American Indian voices – both integrationist and separatist – 
were visible with the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act.  The act, again, made all 
“Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States … citizens of the United 
States,” but also protected tribal rights: “[the act] shall not in any manner impair or 
otherwise affect the right of any Indian.”82 Native communities were granted U.S. 
citizenship and also a connection to their tribalism on paper.  Furthermore, the symbolic 
act pointed to the ways that nineteenth century American Indian protest entered into the 
U.S. government’s Native policy in the first third of the twentieth century. In the end, 
though illustrative of Native agency, the legislation left much to be desired in terms of 
granting wholesale equal citizenship to American Indians, revealing the subjugation of 
controlled citizenry.  
Controlled Citizenship of American Indians 
The Indian Citizenship Act, though trumpeting the inclusion of American Indians, 
also merged the languages of assimilation and segregation, thus calling on the ideologies 
of paternalism, republican fatherhood, territoriality and citizenship that diminished 
Native identities during the removal and allotment eras.  Of this, Prucha asserts that 
because the act made Natives “both citizens of the United States and persons with tribal 
relations … the complete transition from tribal status to individualized citizenship … did 
not occur.”83 As a result, the government furthered the ambiguities of American Indian 
identities as Natives were both included within U.S. communities and excluded, having 
“tribal relations” that cordoned them off away from the U.S. nation’s epicenters.84 The 
Indian Citizenship Act offered only a controlled citizenship – one represented by 
governmental control of Native land – that was administrated by a continually 
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paternalistic executive branch.  Such executive control undercut the representative rights 
of American Indians as U.S. citizens.  Part of the controlled citizenship spawned from the 
limits of Native communities to work through the representative channel of Congress.  
Instead, American Indians were forced to deal primarily with the executive – a branch 
that faced very “few checks and balances” when it came to Native affairs.85 
Governmental discourse in support of the Indian Citizenship Act exhibited the 
inconsistencies of identity duality and the injurious nationalist ideologies suffusing the 
act.  According to Representative Clyde Kelly (Pennsylvania) who spoke on the House 
floor during the act’s debate, the legislation complemented “our belief that all men are 
equally entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and that such equality of 
opportunity will best promote American civilization.”86 Despite this emancipatory 
sentiment, however, he claimed the Indian Citizenship Act’s promotion of these 
opportunities would best serve the U.S. nation, not American Indians: “[Indian 
citizenship] means the development of the individual through liberty … and work … so 
that he may promote the common good of the Nation.”87 Here, Kelly masked the 
promotion of U.S. welfare in a benevolent protection of Native rights to citizenship. He 
also alluded to Native identities as commodified laborers on their allotments – conflating 
the notions of citizenship and territory that was a predictable result of expansion in the 
late nineteenth century.       
Such governmental discourse also reified the paternal and territorial ideologies 
that came to undergird U.S.-Native policies throughout the nineteenth century.  That is, 
the government – especially through the executive branch, which was at the helm of 
Indian policy – was constituted as a republican father in charge of a dependent Native 
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population.  Kelly continued, for instance, that “the Indian Bureau insists that it is better 
fitted to guard the life, liberty and pursuit of happiness of the Indian than he himself … it 
compels him [Indians] to bow to its bureaucratic will by demanding that our American 
civilization will be advanced by such sacrifice” of American Indians.  In this quotation, 
the executive was shown to claim a paternal and controlling role in granting citizenship. 
Natives, whose identities were fashioned here as ward-like and subservient, would 
remain open to the influences of the U.S. government as a republican father.  American 
Indians were asked to “sacrifice” their independence in the service of the nation 
(“American civilization”).  This sacrifice was reminiscent of ties between 
citizenship/inclusion and contributions to the greater good visible in both the removal and 
allotment eras.  Such incongruity revealed the identity duality of citizenship, 
consequently co-constructing governmental and indigenous identities as paternal and 
ward-like in a way that echoed the discourse of the nineteenth century. 
The government’s ideology of territoriality also figured into the identity duality of 
the Indian Citizenship Act.  Citizenship should have granted American Indians full 
ownership – not occupancy – of their lands.88 Conversely, the act’s denial of Native land 
rights clarified the unequal status of their identities within the U.S. nation, even though 
their inclusion was codified with the Act’s passage.  Smith argues that “the retreat from 
full and equal citizenship for Native Americans was virtually complete” with the passage 
of the Indian Citizenship Act.89 Kelly’s supporting speech on behalf of the act argued 
that American Indians would remain “wards of the courts just as are other incompetents 
… permitted to dispose of their property only upon approval from the executive [the 
Interior Department] with proper protection for dependents.” 90 Following from the trust 
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clause of the Dawes Act, Native citizenship did not include a mandate for the ownership 
of land.  The government’s doctrine of discovery and demands for Native toil precluded 
fulsome citizenship for American Indians.  Instead, the paternal executive branch – 
through the court system – administrated land use and provided the “proper protection” 
of American Indians as citizen-dependents of the government.  The constitution of the 
government as an administrative “father” did not stray far from executive and 
congressional constructions surrounding the Indian Removal and Dawes Acts.  Moreover, 
the ward-like status of Native identity instantiated through government’s rhetoric, here, 
reflects the discursive legacy of the removal and allotment periods. 
The identity duality of Native citizenship also appeared in Supreme Court 
decisions.  And, again, these discourses channeled nineteenth century ideologies into a 
rhetoric that further diminished American Indian identities in the first third of the 
twentieth century.   As Smith articulates, even with the promise of a “Native American 
… citizenship status that few desired, legislators and judges also specified that after 
naturalization, the former tribesmen would still not be equal citizens.”91 Wilkins concurs, 
noting that legal cases surrounding the Indian Citizenship Act only created “second class 
citizens” of American Indians.92 One case, U.S. v. Nice (1916), is vital in illustrating the 
government’s hypocritical pairing of assimilation and segregation.   
In U.S. v. Nice the Supreme Court held that citizenship did not guarantee 
American Indians a life outside the scope of the government.  In fact, citizenship was 
shown to further tighten the paternal bonds of the republican father to his ward.  To this 
effect, Justice Van Devanter asserted that “citizenship is not incompatible with tribal 
existence or continued guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely 
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emancipating Indians or placing them beyond the reach of governmental regulations 
adopted for their protection.”93 Here, the government cemented its controlling identity by 
guiding communities in need of protection.  Notice that, to the high court, Native 
citizenship was well suited to both tribalism and guardianship.  The former clarified the 
liminal position of American Indians – they existed between tribalism and Americanism. 
Put differently, they were segregated from the U.S. civis, while also expected to 
assimilate and contribute their labors to the United States.  The latter component of 
“guardianship” indicated that the U.S. government planned to control American Indian 
communities despite the so-called emancipatory aims of the Indian Citizenship Act.  The 
act’s claims of citizenship and bi-nationalism (tribal and U.S. citizen) helped legitimize 
the government’s efforts to assimilate and control indigenous people.  In the end, U.S. v. 
Nice is important to the Indian Citizenship Act mostly because it led directly to, and 
enabled, the ratification of the act itself.94 
Though demonstrating an empowered American Indian agency, the Indian 
Citizenship Act and the government’s discourses underscoring it forced Natives into a 
controlled citizenship. This status placed them in the discomfited position of remaining a 
part of the U.S. nation as dependent wards and, yet, held them to a tribal identity that was 
severely weakened by the limited inclusion offered by the Dawes Act and the Indian 
Citizenship Act.  The assimilation of American Indians as citizen-dependents while 
concurrently isolating them physically on allotted reservations and segregating them 
civically by failing to protect their fulsome citizenship rights, signified the identity 
duality extant in the government’s nationalism.  And, it punctuated the vitality of territory 
as a space for the imbrication of Native identities and governmental control over 
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indigenous communities. Overall, contends Prucha, “citizenship, in fact, had little effect 
upon the paternalistic directing of the individual Indians from Washington.”95 
HYBRIDITY, NATIVE VOICE & ‘CONTROLLED SOVEREIGNTY’ 
 IN THE INDIAN NEW DEAL OF 1934 
 As Native appeals for a change in American Indian policy intensified, the 
executive began considering ways to promote assimilation that were less vigorous than 
allotment.  American Indians’ economic and political conditions worsened during the 
Great Depression as a scarcity of funds was available for Native reform and because the 
government’s attention was focused on rejuvenating the nation’s overall economy. In the 
midst of this dire situation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt received an urgent request 
from a group of some six hundred educators, social workers and concerned citizens 
worried about the “extreme, even tragic” condition of American Indians due to the Dawes 
Act.  The group asserted in 1932, “We do not believe we are exaggerating when we 
suggest that your administration represents almost the last chance for the Indians.”96 The 
president must have taken this message, and others like it, to heart; for, as Roosevelt 
crafted his New Deal he included a provision to “uplift” American Indian communities 
from the doldrums of the Dawes Act.97 
Roosevelt appointed John Collier, a social worker and advocate for indigenous 
rights, as his Commissioner for Indian Affairs in 1933 to salve the wounds of Native 
affairs.  Heading up the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Collier started work on the Indian New 
Deal of 1934 to end allotment and to fulfill the following three goals for American Indian 
communities: “Economic reorganization of the Indians, principally on the land.  
Organization of the Indian tribes for managing their own affairs. Civil and cultural 
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freedom and opportunity for the Indians.”98 Summarily, he hoped that Natives would 
“play a more active role in running their own affairs” by organizing their own tribal 
governments and “supporting Indian cultures.”99 
The Indian New Deal was an amalgam of empowerment and oppression for 
American Indians.  On the one hand, Natives (especially separatists) were being given 
what they had demanded for so many years – self-sovereignty.  And, combined with the 
Indian Citizenship Act, which satisfied integrationist Natives, the new policy signaled a 
sea change for American Indian emancipation by satisfying both demands at once.  Here, 
Natives’ use of moral inheritant links to homelands (in the service of achieving 
citizenship or sovereignty) garnered success.  Whereas the Indian Citizenship Act tended 
to model the integrationist Native stance of inclusion within the U.S. citizenry, the Indian 
New Deal was more closely aligned with separatist Natives who demanded sovereignty 
outside the scope of citizenship mandates.   
However, the Indian New Deal also proved that juggling both U.S. citizenship 
and Native sovereignty could perpetuate the identity duality of U.S. nationalism.  As 
Calloway contends, the act was “another paternalistic promise to bring a ‘new era’ in 
Indian affairs … mandating one policy for all Indians, and making little allowance for the 
tremendous diversity of Indian America.”100 Such an inconsistency left American 
Indians with only a controlled sovereignty that was empowered and simultaneously 
suppressed, especially as full independence could not be achieved.  Controlled 
sovereignty also reified the identity constructions of previous decades, including the 
monolithic characterizations tendered by the U.S. government. This portion considers 
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both Native enactments of empowerment and the government’s granting of controlled 
sovereignty; both demonstrated the hybridity of the Indian New Deal. 
Native Impact on the Indian New Deal 
Native communities affected the ratification of the Indian New Deal by calling 
into question the Dawes Act.  And, one of the most reverberating signs of indigenous 
agency was the way in which the Bureau of Indian Affairs actually consulted with Native 
leaders before making decisions on U.S.-Native policy.  For instance, in 1934 as 
Commissioner Collier was studying what would become the Indian New Deal, he spoke 
with scores of Native nations about the policy.  They desired “to be understood” and, 
hence, Collier suggested to President Roosevelt that “we may be helped through knowing 
them and even through trying to help them in their desperately unequal struggle for 
continued existence.”101 Overall, Collier – or one of his representatives – met with some 
200 Native nations throughout 1934, exhibiting the legacy of Native activism and agency 
throughout the nineteenth century.       
Due to the self-governance promises of the Indian New Deal, American Indians 
seeking a separate sovereignty tended to agree with Collier’s plan to reinstate tribal 
governments.  And, as with Native voices in the midst of the citizenship act discussion, 
they successfully urged the Bureau of Indian Affairs to listen.  Collier, for instance, 
argued in 1934 that Native opinions should invariably be considered before passing “any 
further legislation.”  Further, sociologist Donald Young suggested to Collier that the 
Bureau could learn something from the separatist voice: “No culture is so perfect that it 
will not bear improvement by borrowing from almost any other culture.”102 Collier then 
reported to Roosevelt that “we should examine with a wondering and tender concern, and 
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with some awe, these Indian communities” and what they “desire from” the U.S. 
government.103 Collier’s words seem to highlight the importance of previous American 
Indian remonstrations to the U.S. government’s Native policies.  The Indian New Deal 
signified the power of separatist American Indian agencies during the removal era and, 
particularly, in Native rebukes to the Dawes Act. 
American Indian separatists had urged throughout the allotment period for a 
repeal of the Dawes Act.  In 1934 as Collier made his way around reservations to 
deliberate with Native nations about their opinions, he came into contact with these 
discourses.104 One such anti-allotment viewpoint was held by Luther Standing Bear 
(Sioux) who told Collier that forced assimilation through the Dawes Act had produced 
disastrous consequences for Native nations.  Speaking “for all” American Indians – a 
pan-Indian strategy – he explained that “[t]rue, the white man brought great change. But 
the varied fruits of his civilization, though highly colored and inviting, were sickening 
and deadening.  And, if it be the part of civilization to maim, rob, and thwart, then what is 
the process?”105 Constructing U.S. governmental identities, to that point, as thievish – a 
residue of the removal and allotment eras – Standing Bear urged for a return to self-
sovereignty for Native nations and heralded Collier’s idea for reorganization as “what we 
want.”106 And, Collier’s comments about the U.S. government as “fatal” and “evil” in its 
criminal acts spoke to how Native constructions of governmental identities were 
appropriated by government officials themselves.107 
Other separatists opined that the Indian New Deal would improve economic and 
cultural conditions for American Indians.  In the process, they empowered their identities 
as self-sustaining – a rhetorical strategy present in the removal and Dawes eras. 
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Moreover, the unified stature of Native nations was buttressed as individual rhetors 
referred to a general “us,” “we” or “Indians” – an outward sign of pan-Indianism. This 
demonstrated how the government’s monolithic image of Natives was appropriated as 
way to assert the potency of American Indian unification.  For instance, Ralph 
Fredenberg (Menominee) told the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in 1934: “If we 
were to get the benefit of the [Indian New Deal] that provides that the Indians might set 
up their own form of organization, might form their own self-government, that would 
secure for us in the future the thing that we now enjoy … [we would] be in responsible 
positions.”108 In this instantiation, the Indian New Deal was described as uplifting Native 
communities.  Fredenberg’s call for self-sustenance was buttressed by the Indian New 
Deal, which allowed American Indians “to organize for their common welfare” and 
granted “certain rights of home rule to Indians.”109 Here, Native identity was positioned 
as amenable to autonomy.  Such separatist arguments exhibited the power of Native 
agency – especially of removal and Dawes era arguments for sovereignty – in the new 
legislation.  
The nineteenth century argument that American Indians needed protection from 
the Dawes Act also appeared in Native discourse in support of the Indian New Deal. 
Antonio Luhan (Taos Pueblo), for example, said that in the past allotment “nearly 
destroy[ed] us; call[ed] our ways bad or immoral or something, and put in the paper that 
they [U.S. government] are going to stop us.”110 And, reflecting such Native sentiment, 
Collier employed similar reasoning in his justification of the Indian New Deal: “the 
allotment system with its train of evil consequences should be definitely abandoned … it 
is a complete failure.”111 
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Subsequently, the Indian New Deal predicated the end of allotment on the need to 
protect American Indians from the deleterious effects of the Dawes Act. The new 
legislation was going to “conserve and develop” American Indians and their “rights and 
powers.”112 In the twentieth century, continued Luhan, Natives “look[ed] far ahead and 
the [Indian New Deal] is like putting a wall around us to protect us – and this [bill] is this 
wall. And no white man or grafter can come inside and take away our land.”113 Co-
opting the paternal and republican fatherhood ideologies of the U.S. government, Luhan 
assured Collier that the Indian New Deal “would be” desired by “all of us.”114 
Fredenberg similarly enacted this sentiment of pan-Indianism as he assented to the new 
policy: “This is the thing we want. This is what we would like to accomplish … the self-
government title, I understand, will give us the authority to organize and submit a 
charter.”115 American Indian identities were shown here to be emboldened with the 
authority to manage their own affairs.  At the same time, they were not fully independent 
as the U.S. government re-enacted dependence as a part of the Indian New Deal.  In both 
of these iterations, though, the separatist Native voice demanded a break from the forced 
assimilative entailments of the Dawes Act.  The passage of the Indian New Deal 
reflected, in part, these Native demands. 
Perhaps the most intriguing stipulation of the Indian New Deal came in the form 
of restoring tribal order and self-sufficiency to American Indian nations.    With the 
Dawes Act, Native culture was disdained in favor of an all-out assimilative plan.   
According to Calloway, “for a century and a half, the federal government had tried to … 
dismantle tribal governments, stamp out native [sic] languages and eradicate tribal 
cultures.”  With the Indian New Deal, alternatively, the government “tried to reverse” this 
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and “rejuvenate tribal governments, preserve native [sic] languages, and revive tribal 
cultures.”116 Such efforts would be accomplished by allowing American Indians the right 
to adopt “an appropriate constitution and by-laws, which shall be authorized by a 
majority of the adult members of the tribe.”117 Seemingly, separatist Natives, in 
particular, would achieve the self-governance they had demanded through their 
memorials, petitions, publications and many speeches of the nineteenth century.  This 
demand, and its attendant Native identity constructions as worthy and autonomous, was a 
carry-over from American Indian rhetoric of the removal and allotment eras.  The Indian 
New Deal echoed the discourses of nineteenth century Native separatists.  
 American Indian separatists worked through this rupture that the Indian New 
Deal offered in terms of organizing self-governments through constitutional documents.  
Here, Natives acquiesced in the form of a constitutional document to motivate 
sovereignty.  According to Ben Reifel (Brule Sioux), Collier’s policy appeared 
acceptable because it empowered Natives with political agency: “it was always up to the 
people to amend those constitutions and make them useful.”118 Republicanism was even 
channeled as separatists attempted to illustrate their self-sufficiency to produce on their 
reservations.  Fredenberg urged Collier to move forward with the policy, noting that a 
number of Native nations “live very much as any other community does. We have our 
own schools. We operate everything on our reservation out of our own funds … We have 
our own milling industry … We have farms, dairy herds and modern machinery.”119 
Fredenberg’s arguments came very close to the appeals of the Five Civilized Tribes in the 
nineteenth century who expressed similar assimilation. He also showed how the topoi of 
territory as a vital component of Native identity resonated in the early twentieth century. 
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The passage of the Indian New Deal pointed to how, indeed, American Indians had 
proven themselves as self-reliant.  Alfred Dubray (Rosebud Sioux) reminded Collier of 
the same semblance of American Indian republicanism: “[w]e are really quite politically 
minded.”120 Dubray, here, spoke of “Indians” in general, revealing that the residues of 
pan-Indianism still existed in the twentieth century. Of these reshaped Native identities of 
unity and stability, Collier justified the Indian New Deal by noting “they have real power 
and authority over their own affairs.”121 Thus, ripples of nineteenth century separatist 
American Indians were reflected in the executive’s discourse about the new policy, 
likewise evidencing the constitutive power of Native identity constructions.   
The Native integrationist voice, which during the nineteenth century demanded 
U.S. citizenship, also influenced the Indian New Deal by prompting an “opt-out” clause.  
That is, if an American Indian nation did not want to participate in the Indian New Deal, 
they could still retain their individual allotments and remain U.S. citizens, per the Indian 
Citizenship Act.  According to Dippie,  “the opt-out clause … [was] the first time in the 
history of federal Indian affairs that Indians themselves would have the unusual privilege 
of accepting or rejecting a government policy initiative by referendum.”122 Prucha notes 
that this clause came from Collier’s many meetings with Native nations during 1934.  As 
a result, Section 18 of the Indian New Deal mandated that “This Act shall not apply to 
any reservation wherein a majority of the adult Indians … shall vote against the 
application.”123 Such a choice was driven by American Indian opinions on the new 
policy and was simultaneously emancipating for integrationists who wanted to exercise 
their U.S. citizenship on their allotments. The decades-long efforts of American Indian 
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integrationists came to fruition with a consideration of their perspectives in the Indian 
New Deal. 
The integration position additionally called into question the identity duality of 
the Indian New Deal.  Of the separation side of the duality, pro-citizenship Natives like 
Vera Connolly (unknown)124 noted that the act violated the republican ideals of inclusion 
in the U.S. civis: “It perpetuates segregation under the guise of self-government … and 
shifts the incentive which the authors of the Allotment Act had in mind for individual 
ownership of property leading toward citizenship. The policy is a reversal of the past.”125 
Connolly unmasked the alleged self-sovereignty promised in Collier’s plan and called 
into question the limits of American Indian representation due to an empowered 
executive as “the Great Father.”126 Similarly, Ray Jimerson (Choctaw) contended that 
the Indian New Deal would work to ostensibly create a rift between Native citizens and 
other U.S. citizens.  He said that the act would precipitate “a prejudice which will imperil 
our social and economic status.”127 This prejudice existed, in part, because Native 
“citizens” did not share the same representation as other U.S. citizens – the latter did not 
have to answer to the executive, but rather were represented in Congress.  To this point, 
Jimerson said that instead of assimilating and incorporating American Indians, the 
Bureau’s new plan would “abandon” Natives in their “civilizing pursuits” and, hence, 
violate the promises of “Indian aid.”128 Again, their views were codified as the “opt-out” 
clause.  In the least, integrationist sentiments – both from the Dawes era and the early 
twentieth century – were present in the legislation.  
At the same time, some integrationists challenged the new legislation by 
hearkening to memories of past U.S. Native policies.  Rupert Costo (Cahuilla) was 
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suspicious because sovereignty – in varying forms – had been promised in the removal 
era.  He averred that “in history … this has not worked.”129 Linking the negative impact 
of Jacksonian autonomy for American Indians to the Indian New Deal he continued, “the 
Indian is now being led to believe” in the same way “that they, for the first time in 
history, would have self-government.  But … any plans the Indians might have for such 
self-government would have to be first submitted to the interior secretary or the 
commissioner of Indian affairs [sic] for supervision and approval.” Costo, speaking here 
to a Collier representative, cynically interrogated the executive’s benevolent aims in 
recommending passage of the Indian New Deal: “I suppose you would call all this 
maneuvering self-rule. I call it fraud.”130 Ramon Roubideaux (Sioux) echoed Costo’s 
sentiments that the executive’s republican fatherhood identity was a façade.  Here, he 
worked through paternal language to demonstrate not the positive attributes of a familial 
relationship, but rather its deleterious impact: “It’s not self-government, because self-
government by permission is no self-government at all … Everything they’ve done has 
been under the wing of the Government; it’s just like the rich kid with the rich father. 
Everything was planned for him, he never develops this mind of his.”131 To all the above 
viewpoints, Collier argued that he would urge Natives to “manage their own affairs 
effectively” free from “white interference for selfish ends.”132 Here, Collier seemingly 
demonstrated the legacy of American Indian identity constructions of the U.S. 
government. Whether integrationists textured the Indian New Deal is difficult to say 
deterministically.  However, after meeting with such Native groups, Collier addressed 
these critiques and identity constructions in his justificatory discourse.  
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Ultimately, if American Indians rejected the new legislation, they did not have to 
accept it.  This semblance of choice demonstrated the powerful growth of Native agency 
over the years.  Seemingly, American Indians could decide their own status as U.S. 
citizens or as members of separate sovereignties. Yet, such choice comprised a 
hegemonic entailment, as well – especially as Natives consented to the more oppressive 
tenets of the Indian New Deal.  The following discussion examines how the U.S. 
government exhibited this hegemony through both a fortification of identity duality and 
the enactment of a controlled sovereignty for Natives.  
Controlled Sovereignty of American Indians 
For all the emancipatory promise of the Indian New Deal, the act and its attendant 
governmental discourse also reflected nineteenth century ideologies and identities.  The 
government had dismantled allotment by transferring lands from individual American 
Indians back to communal Native nations.  But, the Interior Department possessed the 
ultimate role in administrating this process of re-parceling territory – a veritable re-
treading of the doctrine of discovery from the removal era. The U.S. government’s focus 
in the policy, first and foremost, on land occupancy alluded to the importance of territory 
for both U.S. national and Native communities.  Simultaneously, since land was linked to 
power, the paternal sentiments that were resonant in the government’s allotment 
discourse also wound their way into the Indian New Deal.  Of these ideologies, Section 
Three noted that “the Secretary of the Interior, if he shall find it to be in the public 
interest, is hereby authorized to restore to tribal ownership the … lands of any Indian 
reservation heretofore opened, or authorized to be opened, to sale, or any other form by 
Presidential proclamation.”133 Here, the executive was unquestionably solidified as the 
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primary institutional body governing U.S.-Native affairs; it could also salve or “restore” 
and “protect” tribal culture.134 
The Interior Department and the U.S. presidency, in particular, crystallized their 
complete control over the land transferal process.  American Indian representation in the 
government was lessened as a result of direct and exclusive dealings with the executive 
branch.  And, without representatives of their own within the executive, American 
Indians were left to the whims of the Interior Department and Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
Burnette and Koster argue that a lack of Native management over the transferal process 
disparaged a proper “system of checks and balances – no procedure through which 
inequities could be righted.”  They suggest that there was no way to “gauge” whether all 
of indigenous lands “were being returned.”135 Moreover, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
held the deeds to the transferred lands “in trust for the Indian tribe … for which the land 
is acquired.”136 There was little difference between this provision in Section Five and the 
Dawes Act’s paternal trust clause.137 This controlled sovereignty hearkened to an 
identity duality and the ways that assimilation and cooperation could concomitantly 
involve exclusionary measures.  The “trust” relationship also reified governmental and 
Native identities as dominant and subservient, respectively.  Also, the U.S. government 
controlled Native territory – a synecdoche of controlled sovereignty based in the Indian 
New Deal.  
The ideology of territoriality and the inconsistencies of identity duality also 
carried into the management of reservation resources.  Though Native nations were 
supposedly “to return their individual land holdings to the protection of tribal status” and 
“control them” outside of governmental influence – as Collier noted in a 1935 report – 
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they apparently did not possess the right to use their natural resources as they pleased.138 
Instead, Section Six of the Indian New Deal mandated that “the Secretary of the Interior 
is directed to make rules and regulations for the operation and management of Indian 
forestry units … to limit the number of livestock grazed on Indian range units.”  
Furthermore, the Interior Department was authorized to “acquire … any interest in … 
water rights or surface rights to lands.”139 In sum, American Indians did not possess 
autonomous rights over their forests, cattle ranges, water sources or mineral collieries. 
Instead the act, working through paternalism, justified its “influence over tribal lands” on 
a benevolent protection of Natives in ways reminiscent of the Dawes Act.  The Interior 
Department could “promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to protect 
the range … to prevent soil erosion [and] to assure full utilization of the range.”140 
Though American Indians were not overtly labeled as unworthy, that the government 
retained the right to intercede on their lands showed a continued hierarchical relationship 
between the government and Native communities.  In a sense, this additionally alluded to 
the government’s conflation of territory and citizenship made resonant during both the 
removal and allotment eras. 
The U.S. government’s republican fatherhood and paternal identities also 
perpetuated the imbalance of power. The referendums for Native constitutions, for 
example, promised in the Dawes Act could only be “authorized and called by the 
Secretary of the Interior under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe.”141 Here, 
Native empowerment through the adoption of constitutions was seemingly impeded. This 
was so especially because the constitutions had to first be drafted with the aid of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and only then could they be “subject to the approval of the 
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Secretary of the Interior” as an administrative force.142 In these quotations, it remains 
clear that the executive controlled the trajectory of these alleged Native-regulated 
governments.  To this controlled sovereignty situated in the Indian New Deal, Deloria 
laments that the Bureau of Indian Affairs, ostensibly, “set up puppet governments on the 
reservations and somehow mysteriously govern[ed] all aspects of tribal life by remote 
control.”143 As Deloria and others maintain, governmental control was changed in form 
only, representing a “shift in strategy rather than a fundamental change in policy.”144 
Moreover, that American Indian governments had to be constructed in the form of 
constitutions and U.S. legal traditions demonstrated the act’s support of republican 
structures as vital to American Indian uplift and the insistence on assimilating Native 
communities to these structures.  Indian Commissioner Collier’s boast that “personal 
government of the tribes by the Secretary of the Interior and the Indian Commissioner is 
brought to an end” remains questionable given the paternal and republican fatherhood 
ideologies circulating throughout the early twentieth century.145 
In the end, the Indian New Deal forced Native communities into a controlled 
sovereignty that promised them independence as restructured tribal nations, but 
concurrently supplanted tribal governance with the U.S. government’s paternalism.  This 
paternalism was a residue of nineteenth century ideologies from Jacksonian discourse in 
the 1830s through to the rhetoric of Senator Henry Dawes in the 1880s.  The identity 
duality of segregating American Indians under promises of autonomy while continuing to 
assimilate them remains stark in the Indian New Deal. Of this controlled sovereignty, 
Cornell avers that “the Indian New Deal set out to grant to Indians a limited but enlarged 
degree of control over their affairs and destinies but did so in the service of the ends pre-
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selected by the dominant society and through methods given by that society, after its own 
models.” 146 In other words, the Native life-ways that Collier guaranteed would “rebuild 
the shattered morale of a subjugated people” continued to be eclipsed by governmental 
influence.147 Ostensibly, American “economic and political institutions would be 
reproduced within Indian societies, as a result of Indian efforts.”148 
The Indian New Deal carried over the government’s identity constructions of a 
dependent American Indian population from the Indian Citizenship Act.  These 
characterizations, along with the government’s self-professed supreme and controlling 
identities, were also remnants of the removal and allotment eras.  Harmon argues, “that 
by labeling, excluding and wielding political and economic power, [the United States] 
eventually set the important parameters of Indianness.”149 But the U.S. government was 
not the only party vested with the agency to set these parameters.      
Importantly, the Indian Citizenship Act and the Indian Reorganization Act 
contained empowering ruptures for American Indians.  Native communities were able to 
exploit these entreés, reshaping in the process their identities as U.S. citizens and/or 
separate sovereigns of a Native nation.  An assessment of the way American Indians 
added to the hybrid relationship with the U.S. government exemplifies the way that their 
agencies can be seen as vital and resonant or “reconstructive.”150 While nineteenth 
century Native protest may have achieved small in-roads during the 1830s and 1880s, the 
resonance of these arguments was magnified in the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act 
and the Indian New Deal.  These two pieces of legislation stood as symbolic markers of 
Native empowerment.  
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CONCLUSION 
While the Indian Citizenship Act forced a controlled citizenship and the Indian 
New Deal cemented a controlled sovereignty, American Indian rhetoric was not ignored 
during the early twentieth century.  And, the combination of Native integrationist and 
Native separatist arguments – oftentimes crafted by pan-Indian gatherings – blended into 
the U.S. government’s twin policies of citizenship and self-determination.  Natives’ 
success in motivating the Indian Citizenship Act signifies the efforts of nineteenth 
century integrationist American Indians who sought U.S. citizenship.  These American 
Indians’ “culturetypal” discourses, or those that “successfully rearrange[d] the culturally 
established public vocabulary to produce social change,” came to bear in the 1924 act.151 
In contrast, the tribalism supported by the Indian New Deal – though far from 
establishing complete Native autonomy – punctuated the efforts of nineteenth century 
separatist American Indians.  These Natives engaged in a counter-cultural rhetoric that 
challenged “existing characterizations and narratives” (i.e., assimilation) by seeking 
separatism versus conciliation to U.S. citizenship.152 As Lucaites and Condit assert, 
when these culturetypal and counter-cultural discourses are combined, “they can produce 
radical changes” in public culture.153 Part of these changes in the removal, allotment and 
post-Dawes periods involved both Native and governmental identities, as well as U.S. 
policies. 
Ultimately, the Indian Citizenship Act and the Indian New Deal are emblematic 
of the hybrid relationship between the U.S. governmental and American Indian voices. 
This relationship at once constructed institutional and Native identities as it proceeded to 
organize the ways of administrating policies among the cultures.  The hybrid interaction, 
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therein, brings to mind Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism. With dialogism, discourse 
“generates a conversation between mixed or competing voices” whose point is not 
necessarily “fusion or resolution but the mutual illumination of their differences” and 
similarities.154 In this way, when the U.S. government and American Indians interacted 
they were not inexorably seeking union or division, but rather were making sense of their 
public lives together.  
Hybridity takes rhetoric beyond the nationalist or individualist construct of 
discourse.  Single cultural voices blend, demonstrating how cultural discourses borrow 
from each other, craft homologies, use each other’s strategies and impact each other’s 
identities.  Cultural identities come from the rhetoric that mixes in the “Third Space” and 
takes on hybrid qualities.155 Murphy notes of hybridity that it reveals “the dialogic 
potential of rhetoric, possibilities that arise not from the neutral orchestration of 
languages and voices” but from the co-mingling of “vocabularies.”  Within these 
vocabularies are found cultural identities and identity transformations.156 
This project on the hybrid relationship between American Indians and the U.S. 
government in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries implies that identities 
transform and merge – they change together, not in isolation or in a unidirectional 
fashion.  “Seeing around the corner,” or what W.E.B. DuBois deemed “double 
consciousness,” is not equivalent to a complete eradication of identities.157 According to 
Bahktin, Bhabha and Young, because contact among cultures involves transformations on 
the part of dominant and subaltern groups, power is shared among these cultures.158 
Hoxie is correct when he asserts that the interactions of the government and Native 
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communities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made it possible for 
them “to communicate … with each other in new ways.”159 
END NOTES
 
1 Dewitt Clinton Duncan, “Conditions in Indian Territory,” Senate Committee 
Investigation, Senate Report no. 5013, 59th Congress, 24th session, pt. 1, Nov. 1906. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Frederick Hoxie, Talking Back to Civilization: Indian Voices from the 
Progressive Era (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), 26-27. 
5 Peter Nabokov, Native American Testimony: A Chronicle of Indian-White 
Relations From Prophecy to the Present, 1492-2000 (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 
256-263. 
6 Ruth Muskrat Bronson, “Life on the Checkerboard,” in Indians Are People Too,
ed. Ruth Muskrat Bronson (New York: Friendship Press, 1944), 262. 
7 Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian 
Policy (Lawrence: U of Kansas P, 1982), 142.   
8 Bronson, “Life on the Checkerboard,” 262. 
9 Nabokov, Native American Testimony, 263.
10 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Verso, 1993), xxv. 
11 Homi Bhabha, “Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and 
Authority under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817,” Critical Inquiry 12:1 (1985): 154 
12 See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge UP, 1977). 
558
13 Johannes Angermuller and Katharina Bunzmann, “Hybrid Spaces – Theory and 
Beyond,” in Hybrid Spaces: Theory, Culture, Economy, eds. Johannes Angermuller, 
Katharina Bunzmann and Christina Rauch (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 
2000); Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, 
trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: U of Texas P, 1981); Homi Bhabha, 
Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994); and Monika Kaup and Debra E. 
Rosenthal, “Introduction,” in Mixing Race, Mixing Culture: Inter-American Literary 
Dialogues, eds., Monika Kaup and Debra J. Rosenthal (Austin: U of Texas P, 2002);  
14 Kaup and Rosenthal, “Introduction,” xiv. 
15 See Dippie, The Vanishing American.
16 For a countervailing conclusion, see S. Elizabeth Bird, Dressing in Feathers: 
The Construction of the Indian in American Popular Culture (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1996); Haig A. Bosmajian, “Defining the ‘American Indian’: A Case 
Study in the Language of Suppression,” The Speech Teacher 21 (March 1973): 89-99; 
and Richard Morris and Phillip Wander, “Native American Rhetoric: Dancing in the 
Shadows of the Ghost Dance,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1990): 165. 
17 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, 272.
18 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “Agency: Promiscuous and Protean,” Communication 
and Cultural/Critical Studies 2 (2005): 4-5. 
19 Syncretism is the fusion of originally different rhetorical forms.  According to 
Stewart and Ernst, it is the transaction “in which two groups or individuals are affected” 
in some way through “contact” (Tony K. Stewart and Carl W. Ernst, “Syncretism,” in 
South Asian Folklore, eds., Peter J. Claus and Margaret A. Mills [New York: Garland, 
559
2003], 125).   Syncretism observes a symbiotic relationship through discourse at “any 
particular moment” (Charles Stewart, “Syncretism and its Synonyms: Reflections on 
Cultural Mixture,” Diacritics 29:3 [1999]: 55).   
20 Campbell, “Agency: Promiscuous and Protean,” 4-5.  
21 Edouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1999), 
144. 
22 Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and The 
Subjugation of the American Indian (New York: Knopf, 1975), 10. 
23 Hoxie, Talking Back to Civilization, ix. 
24 See Francis Paul Prucha, The Indians in American Society: from the 
Revolutionary War to the Present (Berkeley: U of California P, 1988), viii-xi. 
25 Howard Zinn and Anthony Arnove, Voices of a People’s History of the United 
States (New York: Seven Stories, 2004), 23-28. 
26 Dippie, The Vanishing American, 73.
27 This conception of Native voice conflicts with Wander’s theory of the Third 
Persona, or the silhouetted audience that is “not present” and is forgotten “in history, a 
being whose presence, though relevant to what is said, is negated through silence.”  
Rather, this project signifies that American Indian agency was neither forgotten nor silent 
during these eras, but rather empowered and vital to U.S.-Native relations (Philip 
Wander, “The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory Central States 
Speech Journal 35 [1984]: 210-211). 
28 Hoxie, Talking Back to Civilization, 27.
560
29 David Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The 
Masking of Justice (Austin: U of Texas P, 1999), 4. 
30 Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty, 5.
31 Separatist American Indians were granted this same opportunity for U.S. 
citizenship.  Most, however, “resisted … because they saw [military service] as an 
infringement of their tribal sovereignty and treaty rights.”  Moreover, some declared war 
on Germany separately to underscore the idea that “they were independent nations” and 
would fight “as allies, not as subjects of the United States” (Colin G. Calloway, First 
Peoples: A Documentary Survey of American Indian History [Boston: Bedford/St. 
Martins, 1999], 374). 
32 Citizenship for Native World War I Veterans, November 6, 1919, U.S. Statutes 
at Large, 41: 350.
33 President Woodrow Wilson insisted on the segregation of black and white 
troops during World War I, ironically at a time of increased inclusion of other immigrants 
as a part of the U.S. citizenry by reprobating “hyphenization.”  He urged segregation to 
quell Jim Crow-era tensions between whites and African Americans in the U.S. civis and 
within the military itself (See Mary Stuckey, “‘The Domain of Public Conscience’: 
Woodrow Wilson and the Establishment of a Transcendent Political Order,” Rhetoric and 
Public Affairs 6:1 [2003], 12-14).    
34 Cato Sells, “The ‘First Americans’ as Loyal Citizens,” American Review of 
Reviews 57 (May 1918): 523. 
35 Found in Calloway, First Peoples, 373.
561
36 Cato Sells, “The ‘First Americans’ as Loyal Citizens,” American Review of 
Reviews 57 (May 1918): 523. 
37 Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History 
(New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1997), 274; 463. 
38 Dippie, The Vanishing American, 194.
39 Joseph Claymore in Nabokov, Native American Testimony, 281.
40 Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the 
American Indians, abridged ed. (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1986), 78.   
41 Red Fox Skiuhushu, “If the Red Man Can Fight, Why Can’t He Vote?” in 
Literary Digest 59 (Dec. 21, 1918): 36-37. 
42 John Collier, “Radio Address, May 7, 1934,” quoted in Prucha, Great Father,
abridged, 323. 
43 Prucha, The Indians in American Society, 54.
44 Dippie, The Vanishing American, 142.
45 Antonio Luhan, “To John Collier, Feb. 1934,” in Mable Dodge Luhan, Winter 
in Taos (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935), 20. 
46 Prucha, The Indians in American Society, 54.
47 Clinton Rickard, “Comments,” in Report of the Executive Council on the 
proceedings of the First Annual Conference of the Society of American Indians, October 
12-17, 1911, Columbus, Ohio, ed. Arthur C. Parker (Washington, D.C.: Printing Office, 
1912), n.p. 
48 Prucha, The Indians in American Society, 54.
49 Ibid. 
562
50 John Collier, “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1935,” in 
The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 2, ed. Wilcomb 
E. Washburn (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 921; 926. 
51 Chief Standing Bear, Land of the Spotted Eagle (Boston: n.p., 1933), 90. 
52 William H. King, “Speech on Allotment Reform, April 11, 1932,” 
Congressional Record, 72d Congress, 1st session, pp. 7938; 7935. 
53 Ibid. 
54 According to Hightower Langston, Standing Bear’s biography as well as his 
many public speeches and protest letters “to Congress resulted in a Senate investigation.”  
King was a member of that Senate investigation whose findings against allotment were 
aided by Standing Bear, especially as he simultaneously “conducted a lecture tour in the 
East to garner support on behalf of his people” (Donna Hightower Langston, The Native 
American World [Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2003], 93).   
55 Quoted in Lewis Meriam, The Problem of Indian Administration (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins U P, 1928), vii. 
56 Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 
1880-1920 (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1984), 242. 
57 John Collier, “An Indian Renaissance,” in The American Indian and the United 
States: A Documentary History, vol. 2 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 921-926.  
58 Calloway, First Peoples, 378.
59 Meriam, The Problem of Indian Administration, 7. 
60 Prucha, The Great Father, 278
61 Meriam, The Problem of Indian Administration, 86. 
563
62 Ibid. 
63 Meriam, The Problem of Indian Administration, 87. 
64 Meriam, The Problem of Indian Administration, 22. 
65 Calloway, First Peoples, 350.
66 Dippie, The Vanishing, 142.
67 Calloway, First Peoples, 415.
68 Prucha, The Great Father, 319.
69 Indian Citizenship Act, June 2, 1924, U.S. Statutes at Large, 43: 253.
70 Rose Stremlau, “‘To Domesticate and Civilize Wild Indians’: Allotment and 
the Campaign to Reform Indian Families, 1875-1887,” Journal of Family History 30
(2005): 272. 
71 Quoted in Hoxie, A Final Promise, 182.
72 Arthur C. Parker, quoted in Russel Lawrence Barsh, “American Indians in the 
Great War,” Ethnohistory 38 (1991): 287-288. 
73 Indian Citizenship Act, June 2, 1924, U.S. Statutes at Large, 43: 253.
74 Quoted in Laurence Hauptman, The Iroquois and the New Deal (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse UP, 1981), 6. 
75 Quoted in To Be An Indian: An Oral History, eds. Joseph H. Cash and Herbert 
T. Hoover (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1995), 124-125. 
76 Robert J.C. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 22. 
77 Hoxie, Talking Back to Civilization, 27.
564
78 Emma D. Johnson, “Discussion on Reservation Administration,” in Nabokov, 
Native American Testimony, 286.
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Thomas Morgan, “Supplemental Report on Indian Education” (Dec. 1, 1889), 
in House Executive Doc. No. 1, part 5, 51st Congress, 1st session, pp. 101-102.  
82 Indian Citizenship Act, June 2, 1924, U.S. Statutes at Large, 43: 253.
83 Prucha, The Great Father, 273.
84 Smith, Civic Ideals, 463.
85 Prucha, The Great Father, 273.
86 Clyde Kelly, “On Behalf of Indian Citizenship,” in Laurence F. Schmeckebier, 
The Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, Activities and Organization (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins U P, 1927), 158-160. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Smith, Civic Ideals, 460.
89 Smith, Civic Ideals, 463.
90 Clyde Kelly, “On Behalf of Indian Citizenship,” in Laurence F. Schmeckebier, 
The Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, Activities and Organization (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins U P, 1927), 158-160.  
91 Smith, Civic Ideals, 460.
92 Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty, 5.
93 U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S., 598 (1916). 
94 Ibid. 
565
95 Prucha, The Great Father, 306.
96 Petition to Roosevelt, January 28, 1932 in William H. King, “Conditions of the 
Indians in the United States: Speech of William H. King Delivered in the Senate, 
February 8, 1933,” Senate Document No. 214, 72d Congress, 2d session, p. 26. 
97 Prucha, The Indians in American Society, 54.
98 John Collier, From Every Zenith: A Memoir and Some Essays on Life and 
Thought  (Denver: Sage Books, 1963), 115. 
99 Calloway, First Peoples, 418.
100 Ibid. 
101 Quoted in Richard Weiss, “Ethnicity and Reform: Minorities and the 
Ambience of the Depression Years,” Journal of American History 66 (1979): 566. 
102 Donald Young, American Minority Peoples: A Study in Racial and Cultural 
Conflicts in the United States (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1932), 460. 
103 Quoted in Richard Weiss, “Ethnicity and Reform: Minorities and the 
Ambience of the Depression Years,” Journal of Americ an History 66 (1979): 566. 
104 Prucha, The Great Father, 319.
105 Chief Standing Bear, Land of the Spotted Eagle, 90.
106 Ibid. 
107 John Collier, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1934 in 
Documents of United States Indian Policy, ed. Francis Paul Prucha (Lincoln: U of 
Nebraska P, 1990), 225. 
566
108 Ralph Fredenberg, “Indian Self-Determination, 1934” in Hearings before the 
Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, 73d Congress, 2d session, S. 2755 and S. 
3645, Part 2, 110-113.  
109 Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), June 18, 1934, U.S. 
Statutes at Large, 48: 984-988. 
110 Antonio Luhan, “To John Collier, Feb. 1934,” 
111 Collier, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1934,” 225. 
112 Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), June 18, 1934, U.S. 
Statutes at Large, 48: 984-988. 
113 Antonio Luhan, “To John Collier, Feb. 1934,” 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ralph Fredenberg, “Indian Self-Determination, 1934” in Hearings before the 
Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, 73d Congress, 2d session, S. 2755 and S. 
3645, Part 2, 110-113. 
116 Calloway, First Peoples, 417.
117 Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), June 18, 1934, U.S. 
Statutes at Large, 48: 984-988. 
118 Found in To Be An Indian: An Oral History, eds. Joseph H. Cash and Herbert 
T. Hoover (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1995), 124-125. 
119 Fredenberg, “Indian Self-Determination, 1934,” 110-112. 
120 Dubray quoted in To Be An Indian: An Oral History, eds. Joseph H. Cash and 
Herbert T. Hoover (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1995), 124-125. 
567
121 John Collier, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1934 in 
Documents of United States Indian Policy, ed. Francis Paul Prucha (Lincoln: U of 
Nebraska P, 1990), 227. 
122 Dippie, The Vanishing American, 317.
123 Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), June 18, 1934, U.S. 
Statutes at Large, 48: 984-988. 
124 Though rarely occurring, sometimes a Native rhetor’s nationality is not 
discernible from the texts under consideration.  In these atypical instances, “unknown” is 
noted in parenthesis following their names. 
125 Vera Connolly, “Washington Conference,” Indian Truth 11 (January 1934): 3-
4. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ray W. Jimerson, April 12, 1934 in Congressional Record, 73d Congress, 2d 
session, p. 11733. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Costo quoted in Kenneth R. Philip, “Resisting the Indian New Deal,” in Indian 
Self-Rule, ed. Kenneth R. Philp (Salt Lake City, UT: Howe Brothers, 1986), 34. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Roubideaux quoted in To Be An Indian: An Oral History, eds. Joseph H. Cash 
and Herbert T. Hoover (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1995), 124-125. 
132 John Collier, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1934 in 
Documents of United States Indian Policy (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1990), 227. 
568
133 Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), June 18, 1934, U.S. 
Statutes at Large, 48: 984-988. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Robert Burnette and John Koster, The Road to Wounded Knee (New York: 
Bantam Doubleday, 1974), 15-16. 
136 Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), June 18, 1934, U.S. 
Statutes at Large, 48: 984-988. 
137 See General Allotment Act (1887), United States Statutes at Large, 24, 388-
391. 
138 John Collier, “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1935,” in 
The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 2, ed. Wilcomb 
E. Washburn (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 921; 926. 
139 Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), June 18, 1934, U.S. 
Statutes at Large, 48: 984-988. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Vine Deloria, Custer Died For Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (Norman: U of 
Oklahoma P, 1988), 145. 
144 Calloway, First Peoples, 440.
145 John Collier, “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1935,” in 
The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 2, ed. Wilcomb 
E. Washburn (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 921; 926. 
569
146 Stephen Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political 
Resurgence (New York: Oxford UP, 1988), 94-95.  
147 John Collier, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1934 in 
Documents of United States Indian Policy (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1990), 227. 
148 Cornell, The Return of the Native, 95.
149 More to this point, Harmon claims that “[g]overnment policies and the laws 
that embody them have been especially important external determinants of Indian 
identity” (Harmon, “Wanted,” 255-6).  
150 Todd McDorman, “Challenging Constitutional Authority: African American 
Responses to Scott v. Sandford,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 83 (1997): 194; 204.  
151 John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Michelle Condit, “Reconstructing 
<Equality>: Culturetypal and Counter-Cultural Rhetoric in the Martyred Black Vision,” 
in Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, 3d edition, ed. Carl R. Burgchardt (State College, 
PA: Strata, 2005), 469. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Lucaites and Condit, “Reconstructing <Equality>”, 470. 
154 Kaup and Rosenthal, “Introduction,” xxii. 
155 Of the dialogic process, Bahktin argues, “hybridization … is a mixture of two 
social languages within the limits of a single … encounter, within the arena of utterance, 
between two different linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another” by culture, 
“social differentiation” or some other factor (Bahktin, The Dialogic Imagination, 358).   
Clearly, Bakhtin’s theories follow from the middle-ground position that takes as its thrust 
the impact of hybridity on both or the many identities mingling in the contact zone. 
570
156 John M. Murphy, “Mikhail Bahktin and the Rhetorical Tradition,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 87 (2001): 275. 
157 W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk (Minneola, NY: Dover Publications, 
1998), pp. 7-15. 
158 See Bahktin, Dialogic Imagination; Bhabha, Location of Culture; and Young, 
Colonial Desire.
159 Hoxie, Talking Back to Civilization, 27.
571
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
PRIMARIES AND PRIMARY COLLECTIONS
Abolition of Treaty Making, March 3, 1871, U.S. Statutes at Large, 16: 566.   
 
Adams, John Quincy. “Annual Message, December 2, 1828.” In State of the Union  
Messages of the Presidents, vol. 1, edited by Fred Israel, 287. New York: Chelsea 
House, 1982. 
 
Adams’s Remarks, April 20, 1830, Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress,
Senate (April 20, 1830), 359 
 
Agreement with the Sioux of Various Tribes, 1882-83. In Indian Affairs: Laws and  
Treaties, Vol. II., edited by Charles J. Kappler. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1904. 
 
Ames, “The Choctaws,” Cherokee Phoenix vol. 2:37 (December 23, 1830): p. 2, col. 2a- 
4b. 
 
An Act Concerning Aliens, June 1798. In A Documentary History of the United States,
7d., edited by Richard D. Heffner, 71-72. New York: Signet, 2002. 
 
Anonymous (Taino). “You Have Come a Powerful Man.” In History of the Indies, Book  
One, translated by Andree Collard, 55. New York: Harper, 1971. 
 
Anonymous, “The Indian’s Farewell,” in Cherokee Phoenix, vol. 2:50 (March 31, 1830),  
p.4, col.1a. 
 
Anonymous. “Song of the Removal to Oklahoma.” In Exiles of Florida, edited by Joshua  
Giddens, 35. Columbus, OH: Follett, Foster and Company, 1858. 
 
Anonymous. “Poem: Cherokees’ Reply to the Proposition that They Should Remove  
Beyond the Mississippi,” in Cherokee Phoenix vol. 2:25 (September 23, 1829), p. 
4, col. 1a. 
 
Antiwaneto. “We Hear on All Sides.” In Documents Relative to the Colonial History of  
New York, vol. 10, edited by E.B. O’Callaghan, 252-254. Albany: Weed, Parsons, 
1858. 
 
Apess, William. A Son of the Forest: The Experience of William Apes [sic]: A Native of  
the Forest. New York: Burnee, 1831, 157; 205. 
 
Arthur, Chester A. “Annual Message to Congress, December 6, 1881.” In A Compilation  
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 8, comp., James D. 
Richardson, 54. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937. 
572
Atkins, J.D.C. “Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 5, 1885.” In The  
American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 3, edited by 
Wilcomb Washburn, 357. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Authorization of the Board of Indian Commissioners, April 12, 1869, in U.S. Statutes at  
Large, 16: 40.
B—DB. “For the Cherokee Phoenix,” Cherokee Phoenix vol. 1:4 (March 13, 1828), p. 2,  
col. 4,5; p. 3, col. 1,2. 
 
Barbour, James. “Message to the House of Representatives, February 16, 1826.” In  
“Preservation of the Indians,” Niles’ Weekly Register 30 (June 10, 1826), 275. 
 
Bates’ Remarks, May 19, 1830, Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress,
House (May 19, 1830), 1050. 
 
Black Elk, “The Spider’s Web.” In Black Elk Speaks, edited by John G. Neihardt, 35-36.  
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1931. 
 
Black Hawk, Black Hawk’s Autobiography. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1999. 
 
Black Hawk Tour, Niles’ Weekly Register 8 [1833]: 182).    
 
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1765-1769, vol. 1.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. 
 
Black Thunder. “Speech to American Commissioners, 1815.” In Biography and History  
of the Indians of North America, edited by Samuel G. Drake, 632. Boston: n.p., 
1841. 
 
Board of Indian Commissioners. “Twelfth Annual Report, November 1, 1880.” In Carl  
Schurz, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior,” November 1, 1880, 
House Executive Document no. 1, 46th Congress, 3d session, serial 1959, pp. 7-9.   
 
Boudinot, Elias. “To the Publics,” Cherokee Phoenix vol. 1:1 (February 21, 1828), p.  
3, col. 2b-4. 
 
Bouinot, Elias. “New Echota Editorial,” Cherokee Phoenix vol. 1:6 (March 27, 1828),  
p. 3, col. 1b. 
 
Boudinot, Elias. “Editorial (November 12, 1831).” In Cherokee Editor: The Writing of  
Elias Boudinot, edited by Theda Perdue, 142. Knoxville: University of  
Tennessee  Press, 1983. 
 
Brant, Joseph. “We Have Borne Everything Patiently for This Long Time.” In Indian  
573
Oratory: Famous Speeches by Noted Indian Chieftains, edited by W.C. 
Vanderwerth, 50-53. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989. 
 
Bronson, Ruth Muskrat. “Life on the Checkerboard.” In Native American Testimony: A  
Chronicle of Indian-White Relations From Prophecy to the Present, 1492-2000,
edited by Peter Nabokov, 262. New York: Penguin, 1999. 
 
Buffalo. “You Must Remember.” National Archives I., Treaty no. 287, RG 75, T-494,  
roll 5, 362. 
 
Calhoun, John. “South Carolina Exposition, December 19, 1828.” In The Papers of John  
C. Calhoun, vol. 10, 1825-1829, edited by Clyde N. Wilson and W. Edwin 
Hemphill, 461. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1977. 
 
Callahan, S. Alice. Wynema: A Child of the Forest. Lincoln: University of Nebraska  
Press, 1997. 
 
Canassatego. “We Now Speak.” In Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania,
vol. 5, edited by Samuel Hazard, 401-402. Harrisburg, PA: T. Fenn & Co., 1851-
53. 
Cass, Lewis. “To the President of the United States, Department of War, January 23,  
1832.” National Archives, Record Group 75, Ratified Indian Treaty File No. 178, 
Item 2-T, Secretary of War, Letters Sent, vol. 9.    
 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
 
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company, 135 U.S. 641 (1890). 
 
Cherokee Council, “The Cherokees,” in Cherokee Phoenix vol. 1:44 (January 14, 1829),  
p. 1, col. 4b-5a. 
 
Cherokee Nation, “To the People of the United States (July 7, 1830),” Niles Weekly  
Register, August 21, 1830. 
 
Cherokee Nation, “A Petition, January 29, 1897,” Library of Congress, Senate  
Committee on Indian Affairs File, RG233, HR54A-H13, box 192. 
 
Chief Hollow Horn. “Against Allotment.” In My People the Sioux, Luther Standing Bear.  
Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1918. 
 
Chief Standing Bear. Land of the Spotted Eagle. Boston: n.p., 1933. 
 
Chippewa Removal Song. In Indian Sketches Taken During an Expedition to the Pawnee  
Tribes [1833], edited by John Trent Irving, Jr., xxvii. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1955. 
 
574
Choctaw Nation, “Congressional Memorial, February 17, 1894,” Library of Congress,
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs File, RG233, HR53A-H13.3, Box no. 141. 
 
Choctaw Nation, “To the Congress of the United States, February 4, 1897,” Library of  
Congress, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs File, RG233, HR54A-H13.1, box 
192. 
 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, “To the Congress of the United States, January 23,  
1900,” Library of Congress, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs File, RG233, 
HR56A-H9.3. 
 
Citizenship for Native World War I Veterans, November 6, 1919, U.S. Statutes at Large,
41: 350.  
 
Civilization Fund Act, March 3, 1819, U.S. Statutes at Large, 3:516-517. 
 
Claymore, Joseph. “Commentary.” In Native American Testimony: A Chronicle of  
Indian-White Relations From Prophecy to the Present, 1492-2000, edited by Peter 
Nabokov, 281. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. 
 
Cleveland, Grover. “First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1885.” In The Inaugural  
Addresses of the Presidents, edited by John Gabriel Hunt, 247. New York: 
Gramercy, 1997. 
 
Cleveland, Grover. “Second Annual Message, December 6, 1886.” In A Compilation of  
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 8, comp., James D. Richardson, 
519. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937. 
 
Coacoochee, “Speech to Removal Council.” In The Origin, Progress  
and Conclusion of the Florida War, edited by John T. Sprague. (New York: n.p.).  
 
Cocke, John. “Letter to James Barbour,” January 11, 1826, in Office of Indian Affairs, bin  
M234, reel 1. 
 
Coffee, John. “Talk to the Creek and Chickasaw,” Niles Weekly Register (September 18,  
1830). Quoted in The Chickasaws, edited by Arrell Gibson, 154. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1971. 
 
Coke Bill of 1881. In Indian Land in Severalty As Provided For By the Coke Bill, 46th  
Congress,1st session, S. 48, edited by Henry S. Pancoast, 3-7. (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1884. 
 
Coke, Richard. “U.S. Congress, Senate, Debate on Bill to provide Lands in Severalty,  
January 20, 1881 from Congressional Record, 46th Congress, 3d session.” In The 
American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by 
Wilcomb Washburn, 1700-1704. New York: Random House, 1973. 
575
Colbert, Levi. “Plea from the Chickasaw,” Journal of the Chickasaw Council, October  
16, 1826 to November 1, 1826. In American State Papers, vol. 2, Indian Affairs, 
10. 
 
Collier, John. From Every Zenith: A Memoir and Some Essays on Life and Thought.  
Denver: Sage Books, 1963. 
 
Collier, John. “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1934.” In Documents of  
United States Indian Policy, edited by Francis Paul Prucha, 225. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1990. 
 
Collier, John. “Radio Address, May 7, 1934.” In The Great Father: The United States  
Government and the American Indians, unabridged, edited by Francis Paul 
Prucha, 323. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.   
 
Collier, John. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1935.” In The  
American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 2, edited by 
Wilcomb E. Washburn, 921-927. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973. 
 
Collier, John. “An Indian Renaissance.” In The American Indian and the United States: A  
Documentary History, vol. 2. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973, 921-926. 
 
Colon, Francisco. The Life of the Admiral Christopher Columbus. New Brunswick:  
Rutgers University Press, 1959. 
 
Committee Report on the Southern Department, August 3, 1787, Journals of the  
Continental Congress, vol. 33., 456, 459. 
 
Connolly, Vera. “Washington Conference,” Indian Truth 11 (January 1934): 3-4. 
 
Constitution of the United States of America. in A Documentary History of the United  
States, 7d., edited by Richard D. Heffner, 22. New York: Signet, 2002. 
 
Continental Congress. “Report of Committee on Indian Affairs, October 15, 1783,”  
Journals of the Continental Congress, 25: 681-683, 693. 
 
Cornplanter, “Listen to Me Fathers of the Thirteen Tribes,” in Colonial Records of  
Pennsylvania, vol. 16, p. 35, RG 13, carton 3, folder 1 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania 
State Archives). 
 
Corn Tassel. “Let Us Examine the Facts.” In Tatham’s Characters Among the North  
American Indians. London: Annual of Biography and Obituary, 1820. 
 
Costo, Rupert. “Resisting the Indian New Deal.” In Indian Self-Rule, edited by Kenneth  
R. Philip, 34. Salt Lake City, UT: Howe Brothers, 1986. 
576
Crawford, T. Hartley. “Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 25,  
1838.” In The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History,
vol. 1, edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn, 31. New York: Random House, 1973.   
 
Creation of an Indian Peace Commission, July 20, 1867, in U.S. Statutes at Large, 15: 17.
Creek and Seminole Nations, “To the Congress of the United States, 1890” Library of  
Congress, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs File, RG233, HR54A-H13.1, box 
193. 
 
Creek and Choctaw Indians of Oklahoma, “To the Committee on Indian Affairs – A  
Protest Against Allotment of Lands by the Full Blood Creek Indians, November 
21, 1899,” Library of Congress, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs File, RG233, 
HR56A-H9.3. 
 
Curtis Act (1898), United States Statutes at Large, 30, 504-505. 
 
Danforth, Samuel. “A Brief Recognition of New England[‘]s Errand Into the  
Wilderness.” In American Rhetorical Discourse, 3d, edited by James F. Klumpp 
and Ronald Reid, 37-51. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2004. 
 
Dawes, Henry. “Solving the Indian Problem,” in Fifteenth Annual Report of the Board of  
Indian Commissioners (1883), pp. 69-70. 
 
Dawes, Henry L. “Senate Arguments, December 15, 1886.” In Proceedings of the Fifth  
Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian,
1887 (Philadelphia, 1887), 12-13; 63-69. 
 
Declaration of Independence. In A Documentary History of the United States, 7d., edited  
by Richard D. Heffner, 12. New York: Signet, 2002. 
 
Delano, Columbus. Report of the Secretary of the Interior, November 23, 1874, House  
Executive Document no. 1, part 5, 43-2, serial 1639, pp. v, vii. 
 
Delaware Treaty, Fort Pitt, September 17, 1778. In The American Indian and the United  
States: A Documentary History, vol. III, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 2263. 
New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Deroin, Mitchel. “The Chiefs, April 15, 1895” in Office of Indian Affairs, Special Case 
147, L 18666-1895, National Archives. 
 
Dolph, Joseph. Debate on Bill to Provide Lands in Severalty, December 15-16 and  
January 18, 25, 1887. In The American Indian and the United States: A 
Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 1878. New York: 
Random House, 1973. 
577
Duncan, D.W. “How Allotment Impoverishes the Indians: Testimony Before a Senate  
Investigating Conditions in Indian Country,” Senate Report No. 5013, 59th 
Congress, 2d Session, Part 1, 180-190. 
 
Duncan, Dewitt Clinton. “Conditions in Indian Territory,” Senate Committee  
Investigation, Senate Report no. 5013, 59th Congress, 24th session, pt. 1, Nov. 
1906. 
 
Eastern Cherokees. “To Andrew Jackson, July 2, 1817.” In The Correspondence of  
Andrew Jackson, vol. 1, edited by John Spencer Bassett, 142-143. Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie, 1928. 
 
Eaton, John. “Letter to John Ross, Richard Taylor, Edward Gunter, and William Coody,  
April 18, 1829,” Office of Indian Affairs, Letter Book no. 5, pp. 408-12, Record 
Group 75, National Archives.
Eaton, John. “To the Cherokee Nation on Removal, April 18, 1829,” in Office of Indian  
Affairs, Letter Book no. 5, Record Group 75, pp. 408-412, National Archives. 
 
John Eaton, “Secretary of War Annual Report (1830)” in American State Papers, vol. 4,  
serial 458, p. 286. 
 
Eaton, John. “How to Treat with the Indians,” Cherokee Phoenix 2: 48 (March 17, 1830),  
1, col. 5b. 
 
Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. Reports, 98-99, 102, 109 (1884). 
 
Ellis, A.G. “Some Account of the Adventures of the New York Indians Into Wisconsin,”  
Wisconsin Historical Collections vol. 2 (1855), 415. 
 
Erret, Russell. In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Indian Affairs, Lands in Severalty  
to Indians: Report to Accompany H.R. 5038, 46th Congress, 2d session, May 28, 
1880, H. Report, 1576, 7-10. 
 
Forsyth’s Remarks, April 15, 1830, Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress,
Senate (April 14, 15, 1830), 326. 
 
Foster’s Remarks, May 17, 1830, Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress,
House (May 17, 1830), 1030. 
 
Four Bears. “With Ingratitude.” In Chardon’s Journal at Fort Clark, 1834-1839, edited  
by Annie H. Abel, 123.  Pierre, SD: Department of History of the State of South 
Dakota, 1932. 
 
Fredenberg, Ralph. “Indian Self-Determination, 1934,” Hearings before the Committee  
578
on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate, 73d Congress, 2d session, S. 2755 and S. 3645, 
Part 2, 110-113. 
 
Frelinghuysen’s Remarks, April 9, 1830, Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in  
Congress, Senate (April 9, 1830), 312. 
 
General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) of 1887, in U.S. Statutes at Large 24 188: 388-391. 
 
Grant, Ulysses S. “First Annual Message, December 6, 1869.” In A Compilation of the  
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 7, comp., James D. Richardson, 38-
39. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937. 
 
Gray, Robert. A Good Speed to Virginia [1609], edited by W.F. Craven, ci. New York,  
n.p., 1937. 
 
Great Debates in American History, vol. 8, edited by Marion Mills Miller. New York:  
Current Literature Publishing Company, 1913. 
 
Haltburton, Thomas. “Removal of the Indians,” The North American Review vol. 30,  
issue 66 (January 1830), 66. 
 
Harkins, George Harkins. “Farewell Letter to the American People, 1832,” The American  
Indian vol. 1:3 (December 1926), 7, 12. 
 
Hayes, Rutherford B. “Third Annual Message, December 1, 1879.” In Great Debates in  
American History, Civil Rights, part two, volume VIII., edited by Marion Mills 
Miller, 287. New York: Little and Ives, 1913. 
 
Hayt, Ezra. “To Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz, January 24, 1879,” House Report 
no. 165, 45th Congress, 3d session, serial 1866, pp. 2-3. 
 
Heckaton, “Speech [1834],” in Arkansas Gazette [November 11, 1834], also found in  
From the Heart: Voices of the American Indian, edited by Lee Miller, 223. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1995. 
 
Herring, Elbert. “Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, March 24, 1832,” in House  
Executive Document no. 2, 22d Congress, 2d session, serial 233, p. 163. 
 
Hitchcock, Ethan Allen. “Annual Report of the Department of the Interior, June 30,  
1903.” In Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 18, edited by Charles J. Kappler, 
2-3. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904. 
 
Homestead Act, May 20, 1862, 37th Congress, 2d session, Chapter 75. 
 
House Report no. 237, 21:1, serial 200, p. 6-7 
 
579
Indian Citizenship Act, June 2, 1924, U.S. Statutes at Large, 43: 253.
Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), June 18, 1934, U.S. Statutes at Large,
48: 984-988. 
 
Indian Rights Association. “Statement of Objectives,” Second Annual Report of the  
Executive Committee on the Indian Rights Association (1885), 5-7. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Letter to Rachel Jackson, October 21, 1814.” In The Correspondence  
of Andrew Jackson, vol. 1, edited by John Spencer Bassett, 365-366. Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie, 1928. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Letter to John Williams, May 18, 1815.” In The Papers of Andrew  
Jackson, vol. 3, edited by Harold D. Moser. David R. Hoth and George H. 
Hoemann, 74-75. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996). 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Talk to the Creeks, September 4, 1815.” In Correspondence of  
Andrew Jackson, vol. 2, edited by John Spencer Bassett, 216-217. Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Institute, 1928. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Talk with George Colbert and the Chickasaw, February 13, 1816.” In  
The Papers of Andrew Jackson, vol. 4, edited by Harold D. Moser. David R. Hoth 
and George H. Hoemann, 13. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996. 
 
Jackson, Andrew.  “To James Monroe, March 4, 1817.” In Correspondence of Andrew  
Jackson, vol. 2, edited by John Spencer Bassett, 278-279. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Institute, 1928. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “To Choctaw Indians, October 3, 1820.” In The Papers of Andrew  
Jackson vol. 4, edited by Mozer, Hoth, Hoemann, 391-392. Knoxville: University 
of Tennessee Press, 1996.  
 
Jackson, Andrew. “To Choctaw Indians, October 17, 1820.” In The Papers of Andrew  
Jackson vol. 4, edited by Mozer, Hoth, Hoemann, 393-396. Knoxville: University 
of Tennessee Press, 1996. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “First Inaugural, March 4, 1829.” In A Compilation of the Messages  
and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 2, comp., James D. Richardson, 438. 
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Letter to James Gadsen, October 12, 1829.” In Correspondence of  
Andrew Jackson, vol. 4, edited by John Spencer Bassett, 81. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Institute, 1928. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Draft of First Annual Message, December 7, 1829.” In The  
580
Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, vol. 4, edited by John Spencer Bassett, 103. 
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie, 1928. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “First Annual Message, December 7, 1829.” In A Compilation of the  
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 2, comp., James D. Richardson, 457-
459. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Letter to John Pitchlynn, August 5, 1830.” In Correspondence of  
Andrew Jackson, vol. 4., edited by John Spencer Bassett, 169. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Institution, 1929. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Second Annual Message to Congress, 1830,” U.S. House Journal,
6 December 1830, 25. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Letter to Colonel Anthony Butler, March 6, 1832.” In  
Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, vol. 4, edited by John Spencer Bassett, 415.  
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1929. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Talk to the Cherokees, March 6, 1835.” In The Correspondence of  
Andrew Jackson, vol. 1, edited by John Spencer Bassett, 86. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie, 1928. 
 
Jackson, Andrew. “Annual Message, December 7, 1835.” In A Compilation of the  
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 3, comp., James D. Richardson, 172-
173. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas. “To Chastellux, June 7, 1785.” In The Papers of Thomas Jefferson  
vol. 8, edited by Julian Boyd, 186. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson. “First Inaugural, March 4, 1801.” In The Inaugural  
Addresses of the Presidents, edited by John Gabriel Hunt, 24. New York: 
Gramercy, 1997. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas. “Presidential Message, 1803.” Record Group 233, Records of the  
U.S. House of Representatives, File HR7A-D1 at the National Archives II. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas. “Message of January 18, 1803.” In A Compilation of the Messages  
and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. 1, comp., James D. Richardson, 352. New 
York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897.  
 
Jefferson, Thomas. “On Indian Trading Houses – Confidential Letter to Congress,  
January 18, 1803.” In A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents, vol. 1, comp., James D. Richardson, 340-41. Washington, D.C.: 
Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937.  
 
Jefferson, Thomas. “Letter to William Henry Harrison, February 27, 1803.” In The  
581
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 9, edited by Albert E. Berghe, 370-371. 
Washington: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, 1907. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas.  “Letter to William Ludlow, September 6, 1824.” In The Writings of  
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 16, edited by Andrew A. Lipscomb, 272. Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing, 1903. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas. Notes on the State of Virginia. Richmond, VA: J.W. Randolph, 1853. 
 
Jimerson, Ray W. “Comments, April 12, 1934,” Congressional Record, 73d Congress, 2d  
session, p. 11733. 
 
Johnson, Emma D. “Discussion on Reservation Administration.” In Native American  
Testimony, Native American Testimony: A Chronicle of Indian-White Relations  
From Prophecy to the Present, 1492-2000, edited by Peter Nabokov, 286. New  
York: Penguin Books, 1999. 
 
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 5 L.Ed. 681, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823). 
 
Jones, William A. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 15,  
1901.” In Documents of United States Indian Policy, 2d., edited by Francis Paul 
Prucha, 202. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990. 
 
Jumper, “Removal Speech,” in U.S. Congress, 25th, 1st session, Senate Executive  
Document 119, passim.
Kănakûk, “Why the Indians Will Not Give Up their Land (1827).” In Fourteenth Annual  
Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology (1896), part 2, 685-696. 
 
Kelly, Clyde. “On Behalf of Indian Citizenship.” In The Office of Indian Affairs: Its  
History, Activities and Organization, edited by Laurence F. Schmeckebier, 158-
160. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1927. 
 
Kicking Bear. “I Bring You Word from Your Fathers the Ghosts.” In Indian Oratory:  
Famous Speeches by Noted Indian Chieftains, edited by W.C. Vanderwerth, 247. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000. 
 
King Phillip. “You See This Vast Country.” In Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675- 
1699, edited by Charles Lincoln, 10-11. New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1918. 
 
King, William, “Petition to Roosevelt, January 28, 1932.” In “Conditions of the Indians  
in the United States: Speech of William H. King Delivered in the Senate, 
February 8, 1933,” Senate Document No. 214, 72d Congress, 2d session, p. 26. 
 
King, William H. “Speech on Allotment Reform, April 11, 1932.” Congressional Record,
72d Congress, 1st session, pp. 7938; 7935. 
582
Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Nations. “Memorial of the Kiowa, Comanche, and  
Apache Tribes of Indians in Oklahoma Territory, n.d., 1903,” Library of 
Congress, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs File, RG233, HR57A-H10.1, box 
93. 
 
Lea, Luke. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” November 27, 1850,  
Senate Executive Document no. 1, 31st Congress, 2d session, serial 587, pp. 35-
37. 
 
Leech Lake, “Protest of Leech Lake Indians Against the Removal of Reservation,  
January 12, 1898,” Library of Congress, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs File, 
RG233, HR55A-H8.1, box 193. 
 
Leupp, Francis. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 30,  
1905.” In Documents of United States Indian Policy, 2d., edited by Francis Paul 
Prucha, 205. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990. 
 
Leupp, Francis E. The Indian and His Problem (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1910),  
vii. 
 
Little Star. “Going Back.” In Native American Testimony: A Chronicle of Indian-White  
Relations From Prophecy to the Present, 1492-2000, edited by Peter Nabokov, 
388-389. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. 
 
Little Turtle. “Brothers, These People Never Told Us They Wishes to Purchase Our  
Lands from Us.” In Indian Oratory: Famous Speeches by Noted Indian 
Chieftains, edited by W.C. Vanderwerth, 56-59. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1989. 
 
Little Turtle, “These People Never Told Us They Wished to Purchase Our Lands From  
Us,” American State Papers. Indian Affairs, 1789–1815 (Washington, D.C.: Gales 
and Seaton, 1832), Vol. 1: 567, 570–71, 576. 
 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 19 App. D.C. 315 (1902). 
 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).   
 
Lords of Trade. “Letter to Sir William Johnson.” In New York Colonial Documents vol.  
7, edited by E.B. O’Callahan, 535-536. Albany: Weed, Parsons, 1858. 
 
Luhan, Antonio. “To John Collier, Feb. 1934.” In Winter in Taos, edited by Mable Dodge  
Luhan, 20. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935. 
 
Lumpkin’s Remarks, May 17, 1830, Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress,
House (May 17, 1830), 1016. 
583
Lumpkin, Wilson. Removal of the Cherokee Indians from Georgia, vol. 2. New York:  
Augustus M. Kelly, 1907. 
 
Madison, James. “The Federalist Number Ten.” In A Documentary History of the United  
States, 7d., edited by Richard D. Heffner, 40-43. New York: Signet, 2002. 
 
Madison, James. “Special Message to Congress, January 27, 1825.” In A Compilation of  
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 2, comp., James D. Richardson, 
280-283. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937. 
 
Major Crimes Act, U.S. Statutes at Large, 22, 385. 
 
Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967, vol. 1, edited by Fred Israel. New  
York: Random House, 1967. 
 
Manypenny, George. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” November  
22 1856, Senate Executive Document no. 5, 34th Congress, 3d session, serial 875, 
pp. 571-75. 
 
Marshall, John. “To Joseph Story, May 1, 1828.” In Papers of John Marshall, vol.11,  
edited by Charles F. Hobson, 94. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2002. 
 
Mather, Cotton. “Decennium Luctuosum.” In Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699,
edited by Charles H. Lincoln, 242. New York: Lincoln, 1913. 
 
Mather, Increase. “A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New England.” In So
Dreadful a Judgment: Puritan Responses to King Phillip’s War, 1676-1677,
edited by Richard Slotkin and James K. Folsom, 138-139. Middletown, CT: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1978. 
 
Mayobanex. “The Spaniards are Violent.” In History of the Indies, Book Two, translated  
by Andree Collard, 146. New York: Harper, 1971. 
 
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), 4 Wheaton 316. 
 
McKinney, Thomas. “Letter.” In Magazine of the Reformed Dutch Church 4 (August  
1829): 118. 
 
Medill, William. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” November 30  
1848, House Executive Document no. 1, 30th Congress, 2d session, serial 537, pp. 
385-89. 
 
Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848,
584
vol. 7, edited by Charles Francis Adams. Philadelphia: JB Lippincott and Co, 
1877. 
 
Mihnehwehna. “Englishman!” In Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian  
Territories Between the Years 1760 and 1776, edited by Alexander Henry, 44. 
New York: I. Riley, 1809. 
 
Mix, Charles. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 6 1858,  
Senate Executive Document no. 1, 35th Congress, 2d session, serial 974, pp. 354-
59. 
 
Monroe, James. “Second Annual Message, December 1818.” In A Compilation of the  
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. 2, comp., James D. Richardson, 46. 
New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897. 
 
Monroe, James. “Monroe Doctrine – Annual Message of 1823.” In A Documentary  
History of the United States, 7d., edited by Richard D. Heffner, 96-98. New York: 
Signet, 2002.   
 
Monroe, James. “Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1824.” In A Compilation of  
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 3, comp., James D. Richardson, 
830. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937. 
 
Monroe, James. “Message on Indian Removal, January 27, 1825.” In Documents of  
United States Indian Policy, 2d., edited by Francis Paul Prucha, 40. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1990.   
 
Montezuma, Carlos. “What Indians Must Do,” Quarterly Journal 2 (1914): 294-9. 
 
Morgan, John. “U.S. Congress, Senate, Debate on Bill to provide Lands in Severalty,  
January 20, 1881 from Congressional Record, 46th Congress, 3d session.” In The 
American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by 
Wilcomb Washburn, 1700-1704. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Morgan, Thomas J. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 1,  
1889.” in The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, 
vol. 1, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 531. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Morgan, Thomas. Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 1, 1889, in House  
Executive Document no. 1, 51t Congress, 1st session, serial 2725, 3-4. 
 
Morgan, Thomas. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1889,” House  
Executive Document no. 1, 51st Congress, 1st session, serial 2725, 3-4.   
 
Morgan, Thomas. “Supplemental Report on Indian Education, December 1, 1889,  House  
Executive Doc. No. 1, part 5, 51st Congress, 1st session, pp. 101-102. 
585
Morgan, Thomas J. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 5,  
1890.” In The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, 
vol. 1, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 435. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Morgan, Thomas J. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 1,  
1891.” In The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, 
vol. 1, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 529. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103-104 (March 26, 1790). 
 
Northwest Ordnance. In The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary  
History, vol. III, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 2144. New York: Random House, 
1973).  
 
Oberly, John H. “Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 3, 1888. In  
The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 1,
edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 422-423. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Ohio Wyandot Council. “Speech on Removal,” in U.S. Congress, 23d, 1st session, Senate  
Document 512, vol. 2, 597. 
 
Ohnawiio, Oteatohatongwan and Teholagwanegen. “Formerly, We Enjoyed the  
Privilege.” In American State Papers: Indian Affairs, vol. 7, 617. Washington: 
Office of Indian Affairs, 1903.  
 
Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca Council. “Speeches to the Governors of New York and  
Virginia, 1684.” In The History of the Five Nations of Canada, edited by 
Cadwallader Colden, 46-51. London, 1755. 
 
Oregon Treaty, June 14, 1846. In Treaties and Conventions between the United States of  
America and Other Power since July 4, 1776 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1871), n.p. 
 
Organization of the Department of Indian Affairs, June 30, 1834, U.S. Statutes at  
Large, 4:735-738. 
 
Osceola, “To Wiley Thompson, October 23, 1834,” In Red Patriots: The Story of  
the Seminoles, edited by Charles Coe, 91. Cincinnati, OH: Editor Publishing,  
1898. 
 
O’Sullivan, John. “Annexation,” The United States and Democratic Review, Vol. XVII,  
July/August (New York: O’Sullivan & Gardner Publishers, 1845), 5. 
 
Parker, Arthur C. Quoted in Russel Lawrence Barsh, “American Indians in the Great  
War,” Ethnohistory 38 (1991): 287-288. 
586
Parker, Ely. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 23,  
1869,” House Executive Document no. 1, 41st Congress, 2d session, serial 1414, 
pp. 448. 
 
Payne, David. “Comments.” In Proceedings of the Convention to Consider the Opening  
of Indian Territory, held at Kansas City, Mo. February 8, 1888 (Kansas City, MO: 
n.p., 1888), 59-60. 
 
Perkins, Bishop. Debate on Bill to Provide Lands in Severalty, December 15, 1886, in  
Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 2d session, 191. 
 
Permanent General Laws Relating to Indian Affairs – The Revised Statutes, Title  
XXVIII, chap. 2 (Performance of engagements between the United States and 
Indians), Sec. 2079. Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 1., edited by Charles 
J. Kappler, 8. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904.   
 
Petalesharo. “It Is Too Soon, My Great Father, to Send Those Good Men Among Us.” In  
Red Men Calling on the Great White Father, edited by Katharine C. Turner.  
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951. 
 
Pickett, Albert James. History of Alabama and Incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988. 
 
Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs. In Documents Relative to the Colonial  
History of the State of New York, vol. 7, edited by E.B.O’Callaghan, 639. Albany: 
Weed, Pearson, and Company, 1953. 
 
Platt Amendment. In Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of  
America, 1776-1949, vol. 8, edited by C. I. Bevins, 1116-1117. Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971. 
 
Pokegon, Simon. The Red Man’s Greeting at the Chicago Columbian World’s Exposition  
of 1893. Hartford, MI: C.H. Engle, 1893. 
 
Pontiac. “You Must Lift the Hatchet Against Them.” In The Conspiracy of Pontiac,
edited by Francis Parkman, 5. New York: Champlain, 1898. 
 
Pontitock Creek Treaty, March 24, 1832. In The American Indian and the United States:  
A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn, 2449 (New 
York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Posey, “To Wander Home,” in Gales & Seaton’s American State Papers, 1832-1860, vol.  
1 (“Military Affairs”), 356. 
 
Pratt, Richard Henry. “Opening Comments.” In Official Report of the Nineteenth Annual  
587
Conference of Charities and Correction (1892), 46–59.  
 
Price, Hiram. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, October 24, 1881. House  
Executive Document no. 1, 47th Congress, 1st session, serial 2018, pp. 1-3. 
 
Proclamation of 1763. In The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary  
History, vol. III, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 2135. New York: Random House, 
1973. 
 
Proclamation of the Continental Congress, September 22, 1783, Journals of the  
Continental Congress, vol. 25., 602. 
 
Pueblo Indians, “An Appeal for Fair Play and the Preservation of Pueblo Life,” in Santa  
Fe New Mexican, November 6, 1922, section 1, p. 1. 
 
Purchas, Samuel. Hakltuytas Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimmes. Glasgow, 1906. 
 
Pushmataha and Puckshunnubbee, “For the Cherokee Phoenix,” Cherokee Phoenix vol.  
2:29 (September 22, 1829): p. 2, col. 2b 
 
Quay, Matthew Quay. “Lone Wolf Comments, 1903.” In The Road: Indian Tribes and  
Political Liberty, edited by Russell L. Brash and James Y. Henderson, 95. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 
 
Quinney. “Fourth of July Address at Reidsville, New York, 1854,” The American Indian 
(January, 1928), n.p. 
 
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Indian Affairs, Letters Sent, vol A, p.143,  
Record Group 75, National Archives.  Also found in The American Indian and the 
United States: A Documentary History, vol. I, edited by Wilcomb Washburn. New 
York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Red Cloud. “Speech at Cooper Union, July 16, 1870,” New York Times (July 17, 1870),  
p. 6, col. 1. 
 
Red Fox Skiuhushu. “If the Red Man Can Fight, Why Can’t He Vote?” in Literary Digest 
59 (Dec. 21, 1918): 36-37. 
 
Red Jacket. “Celebrated Speech (1830),” Cherokee Phoenix vol. 2:47 (March 10, 1830),  
p. 4, col. 1a-3a. 
 
Red Jacket, “Refusal of a Land-Purchase Offer.” In Indian Biography, edited by B.B.  
Thatcher, 282-284. New York, 1845. 
 
Report of the Doolittle Commission, January 26, 1867, Senate Report no. 156, 39th 
Congress, 2d session, serial 1279, pp. 3-10. 
588
Report of the Indian Peace Commission, January 7, 1868, House Executive Document 
no. 97, 40th Congress, 2d session, serial 1337, pp. 15-17. 
 
Report of the Joint Committee in the Legislature of Georgia on Cherokee Lands,  
Cherokee Phoenix 1:3 (March 6, 1828), 1: col.4B. 
 
Rickard, Clinton. “Comments,” in Report of the Executive Council on the proceedings of  
the First Annual Conference of the Society of American Indians, October 12-17, 
1911, Columbus, Ohio, edited by Arthur C. Parker. Washington, D.C.: Printing 
Office, 1912.  
 
Ridge, John. “You Asked Us.” In Trail of Tears: The Rise and Fall of the Cherokee  
Nation, edited by John Ehle, 254. New York: Doubleday, 1988. 
 
Roosevelt, Theodore. “Duty of American Citizenship, January 26, 1883” found at the  
Archive of the Presidential Rhetoric Program at Texas A&M University, online at 
http://comm.tamu.edu/pres/speeches/trduties.html [accessed 12 January 2006]. 
 
Roosevelt, Theodore. “True Americanism,” The Forum Magazine (April 1894): 3. 
 
Roosevelt, Theodore. “Expansion and Peace,” in The Independent, December 21, 1899,  
n.p. 
 
Roosevelt, Theodore. “A Proclamation: June 23, 1902.” In Indian Affairs: Laws and  
Treaties, vol. 1, edited by Charles J. Kappler. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1904. 
 
Roosevelt, Theodore. The Winning of the West: An Account of the Exploration and  
Settlement or Our Country from the Alleghanies to the Pacific, vol. 8 in The 
Works of Theodore Roosevelt. New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1926. 
 
Rosebud Sioux. “Copy of Petition, January 15, 1897,” Library of Congress, Senate  
Committee on Indian Affairs File, RG233, HR54A-H13.1, box 193.  
 
Ross, John. “Annual Message, October 14, 1829.” In The Papers of Chief John Ross, vol.  
1, edited by Gary Moulton, 169. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985. 
 
Ross, John. “Annual Message, November 11, 1831.” In The Papers of Chief John Ross,
vol. 1, edited by Gary Moulton, 169. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1985. 
 
Ross, John. “Letter to Andrew Jackson, March 12, 1834.” In The Papers of Chief John  
Ross, vol. 1, edited by Gary Moulton, 279. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1985. 
 
589
Ross, John. “Letter to Lewis Cass, March 9, 1835.” In The Papers of Chief John Ross,
vol. 1, edited by Gary Moulton, 332-333. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1985. 
 
Ross, John. “Letter to Lewis Cass, February 29, 1836.” In The Papers of Chief John  
Ross, vol. 1, edited by Gary Moulton, 388. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1985. 
 
Ross, John, and William Hicks. “The Cherokees,” Cherokee Phoenix, vol 1: 44 (January  
14, 1829), p. 1, col. 4b-5a. 
 
Rossiter, Clinton, ed. The Federalist Papers. New York: Penguin, 1961. 
 
Roubideaux, Ramon. “Essay.” In To Be An Indian: An Oral History, edited by Joseph H.  
Cash and Herbert T. Hoover, 124-125. St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society 
Press, 1995. 
 
Rusling, General James, “Interview with President William McKinley,” The Christian  
Advocate 22 (January 1903): 17. 
 
Sa, Zitkala. “Impressions of an Indian Childhood,” Atlantic Monthly 85 (1900), 37-47. 
 
Satank. “Teach Us the Road to Travel,” New York Daily Tribune (Nov. 30, 1871), n.p. 
 
Saunders, Alvin.  “U.S. Congress, Senate, Debate on Bill to provide Lands in Severalty,  
January 20, 1881 from Congressional Record, 46th Congress, 3d session.” In The  
American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by 
Wilcomb Washburn, 1700-1704. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Schurz, Carl. “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, December 7, 1879.” House  
Executive Document no. 1, part 5, 46th Congress, 2d session, serial 1910, pp. 5-6. 
 
Schurz, Carl. “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, November 1, 1880.” House  
Executive Document no. 1, 46th Congress, 3d session, serial 1959, pp. 3-4; 11-13. 
 
Schurz, Carl. “Present Aspects of the Indian Problem,” North American Review CXXXIII 
(July 1881): 6. 
 
Scott, Winfield. “Address to the Cherokee Nation, May 10,1838.” In Correspondence of  
the Eastern Division Pertaining to Cherokee Removal, April 1838-December 
1838, Microfilm Record M1475 (National Archives and Records Administration).  
Also found in A Wilderness Still The Cradle of Nature: Frontier Georgia, edited 
by Edward J. Cashin, 137-138. Savannah: Beehive Press, 1994. 
 
Sells, Cato. “The ‘First Americans’ as Loyal Citizens,” American Review of Reviews 57
(May 1918): 523. 
590
Sells, Cato. “Speech to the Indian Rights Association, October 2, 1920.” In The Great  
Father: The United States Government and the American Indians, unabridged, 
Francis Paul Prucha, 801. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. 
 
Seminole Nation, “Memorial of the Seminole, February 6, 1897,” Library of Congress,
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs File, RG233, HR54A-13.1, box 193. 
 
Sherman, William T. “End of the Indian Problem.” In House Executive Document no. 1,
48th Congress, 1st session, serial 2182, pp. 45-46. 
 
Shullushoma, “It’s Been a Great Many Years,” in U.S. Congress, 23d, 1st session, Senate  
Document 512, vol.1, 240. 
 
Sioux Man. “The Dead Did Not Return, 1891.” In Speaking of Indians, edited by Ella  
Deloria, 63. New York: Friendship Press, 1944. 
 
Skinner, Thomas. Debate on Bill to Provide Lands in Severalty, December 15-16 and  
January 18, 25, 1887, in The American Indian and the United States: A 
Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 1849. New York: 
Random House, 1973. 
 
Sloan, Thomas L. “The Reservation System, Report to the Interior Department” from  
Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of the Society of the American 
Indians Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian., 1912, 112. 
 
Smith, Edward.  “Letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 29, 1873.” In  
Documents of United States Indian Policy, 2d, edited by Francis Paul Prucha, 143. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990. 
 
Smith, John Q. Smith. “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October  
30, 1876,” House Executive Document no. 1, 44th Congress, 2d session, serial 
1749, pp. vii-xi. 
 
Speckled Snake, “Response to a Message from President Andrew Jackson Concerning  
Indian Removal, 1830,” Niles Weekly Register vol. 36:36 (June 20, 1830), 274. 
 
Sprague’s Remarks, April 17, 1830, Gales & Seaton’s Register of Debates in Congress,
Senate (April 17, 1830), 356. 
 
Springer, William, Debate on Bill to Provide Lands in Severalty, December 15-16 and  
January 18, 25, 1887. In The American Indian and the United States: A 
Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 1863. New York: 
Random House, 1973. 
 
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. 641 (1899). 
591
Story, William. “Indian Destiny,” Cherokee Phoenix vol. 1, no. 45 (21 January 1829),  
1-2.  
 
Taylor, Nathaniel G.  “Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November  
23, 1869,” House Executive Document no. 1, 40th Congress, 3d session, serial 
1366, pp. 476-479. 
 
Tecumseh, “Sleep Not Longer O Choctaws and Chickasaws, 1811.” In History of Fort  
Wayne, edited by Wallace A. Brice. Fort Wayne, IN: D.W. Jones and Son, 1868. 
 
Teller, Henry. “U.S. Congress, Senate, Debate on Bill to provide Lands in Severalty,  
January 20, 1881 from Congressional Record, 46th Congress, 3d session.” In The 
American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by 
Wilcomb Washburn, 1700-1704. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Tisho Mingo, William M’Gilvery and Stimoluet, “Indian Emigration,” Cherokee  
Phoenix vol. 1:16 (June 11, 1828), p.2, col. 1-2. 
 
Trade and Intercourse Act, March 30, 1802, U.S. Statutes at Large, 2:139-46. 
 
Trade and Intercourse Act, June 30, 1834, U.S. Statutes at Large 4:729-730 
 
Transfer of Indian Affairs to the Department of the Interior, March 3, 1849, U.S. Statutes  
at Large, 9:395. 
 
Treaty with the Creeks, January 24, 1826. In The American Indian and the United States:  
A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E.Washburn, 2410-2411. New 
York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Treaty with the Creeks, March 24, 1832. In The American Indian and the United States:  
A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn, 2438-2440. 
New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, 1830. In The American Indian and the United States: A  
Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn, 2423-2436. New 
York: Random House, 1973.      
 
Treaty of Doak’s Stand, 1828. In The American Indian and the United States: A  
Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn, 2377. New York: 
Random House, 1973. 
 
Treaty of Fort Gibson, March 28, 1833. In The American Indian and the United States: A  
Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn, 2446. New York: 
Random House, 1973. 
 
592
Treaty of Fort Stanwix, October 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.; and Northwest Ordinance (July  
13, 1787), National Archives Microfilm Publication, M332, roll 9. 
 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848. In Treaties and Conventions between the  
United States of America and Other Power since July 4, 1776 Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1871), n.p. 
 
Treaties of Harmar (1789), Creeks (1790), Oneidas (1794), Greenville (1795), Choctaws  
(1801), Kaskaskias (1803), and Sacs and Foxes (1804). In The American Indian 
and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. IV, edited by Wilcomb 
Washburn, 2255-2268. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Treaty of Hopewell. In The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary  
History, vol. IV, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 2275. New York: Random House, 
1973. 
 
Treaty of McIntosh. In The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary  
History, vol. IV, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 2269. New York: Random House, 
1973. 
Treaty of New Echota, December 29, 1835.” In The American Indian and the United  
States: A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn, 2461. 
New York: Random House, 1973.  
 
Treaty of Payne’s Landing, May 9, 1832. In The American Indian and the United States:  
A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn, 2443. New 
York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Treaty with the Western Cherokees, May 6, 1828. In The American Indian and the  
United States: A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E.Washburn, 
2421. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Tucker, John Tucker. A Sermon Preached at Cambridge, 29 May 1771. Boston: Draper,  
1771. 
 
Turner, Frederick Jackson. The Significance of the Frontier in American History, edited  
by S.P. Langley, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the 
Year 1893. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1894.   
United States Statutes at Large, 21st Congress, Sess. 1, Ch. 148, 1830. 
 
U.S. Congress, 23d, 1st session, Senate Document 512, vol. 1, p. 240. 
 
U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S., 598 (1916). 
 
Vanderwerth, W.C., ed. Indian Oratory: Famous Speeches by Noted Indian Chieftains.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989. 
593
Vest, George. “U.S. Congress, Senate, Debate on Bill to provide Lands in Severalty,  
January 20, 1881 from Congressional Record, 46th Congress, 3d session.” In The 
American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by 
Wilcomb Washburn, 1700-1704. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Wahunsonacock. “1622 Speech to John Smith.” In Travels and Works of Captain John  
Smith, edited by Edward Arber, 137. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press, 1910. 
 
Washakie. “Protest to Governor John W. Hoyt.” In Washakie, edited by Grace Raymond  
Hebard, 212. Cleveland, OH: Arthur Clark, 1930. 
 
Washburn, Wilcomb E., ed. The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary  
History, vol. 4 (New York: Random House, 1973).     
 
Washington, George. “Third Annual Message to Congress, October 25, 1791.” In A
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. 1, comp., James 
D. Richardson, 96-97. New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897. 
 
Washington, George. “Fifth Message to Congress, October 25, 1793.” In A Compilation  
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. 1, comp., James D. 
Richardson, 133. New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897. 
 
Washington, George. “Farewell Address, September 17, 1796.” In A Compilation of the  
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 1, comp., James D. Richardson, 213. 
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1937. 
 
Wa Thishnade. “A House of Our Own.” In The Omaha Tribe, 27th Annual Report of the  
Bureau of American Ethnology, 1905-1906, edited by Francis La Flesche and  
Alice Fletcher, n.p. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1911. 
 
Weaver, James. Debate on Bill to Provide Lands in Severalty, December 15-16 and  
January 18, 25, 1887. In The American Indian and the United States: A 
Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb Washburn, 1857-1858. New 
York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Winnebago Indians, To the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress Assembled  
– A Petition of the Winnebago Indians of Wisconsin, 15. Stevens Point, WI: 
Gazette Book and Job Office, 1889. 
 
Winnemucca, Sarah. Life Among the Piutes: Their Wrongs and Claims. Reno: University  
of Nevada Press, 1994. 
 
Wood Pecker, Roman Nose, Locust, Timson, Samuel Ward, Situagee and Ball Town  
George, “To Aquohee District,” in Cherokee Phoenix vol. 1:30 (September 24, 
1838), p. 2, col. 4a. 
594
Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 
Wovoka. “Promise of the Ghost Dance.” In The Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux  
Outbreak of 1891, edited by James Mooney, n.p. Washington D.C.: Bureau of 
Ethnology, 1896. 
 
Xitha Gaxe. “A House of Our Own.” In The Omaha Tribe, 27th Annual Report of the  
Bureau of American Ethnology, 1905-1906, edited by Francis La Flesche and 
Alice Fletcher. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1911. 
 
Yava, Albert. “We Want to Tell You Something.” In Native American Testimony: A  
Chronicle of Indian-White Relations From Prophecy to the Present, 1492-2000,
edited by Peter Nabokov, 246-250. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. 
 
Yoholo, Tuckaubatchie Hajo, Tustenuggee, Smut Eye, et. al. “Memorial of the Creek  
Nation of Indians,” in Cherokee Phoenix vol. 2:48 (March 17, 1830), p.4, col. 1a-
4b. 
 
Young Joseph. “An Indian’s Views of Indian Affairs,” North American Review 128
(April 1879), 412; 433. 
 
BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of  
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. 
 
Anderson, Terry L. Sovereign Nations or Reservations? An Economic History of  
American Indians. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 
1995. 
 
Bakhtin, Mikhail, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. Michael Holquist; trans.  
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981. 
 
Barker, Chris. Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  
Publications, 2003. 
 
Beasley, Vanessa. You, the People: American National Identity in Presidential Rhetoric.
College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004. 
 
Bercovitch, Sacvan. The American Jeremiad. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,  
1978. 
 
Bhabha, Homi. Nations and Narration. London: Routledge, 1990. 
 
595
---. Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 1994. 
 
Bird, S. Elizabeth. Dressing in Feathers: The Construction of the Indian in American  
Popular Culture. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996. 
 
Blomley, Nicholas K. Law, Space and the Geography. New York: Guilford, 1994. 
 
Bodnar, John. The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America.  
Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1985. 
 
Borneman, Walter R. 1812: The War that Forged a Nation. New York: Harper Perennial,  
2005. 
 
Bowers, John, Donovan Ochs and Richard Jensen. The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control.
Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1994. 
 
Brands, H.W. Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times. New York, Doubleday, 2005. 
 
Brooker, Peter. A Concise Dictionary of Cultural Theory. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford  
University Press, 1999. 
 
Brown, Dee. Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West.
New York: Henry Holt, 2000. 
 
Bruner, M. Lane. Strategies of Remembrance: The Rhetorical Dimensions of National  
Identity. University of South Carolina Press, 2002. 
 
Buchanan, John. Jackson’s Way: Andrew Jackson and the People of the Western Waters.
New York: Wiley and Sons, 2001. 
 
Burke, Kenneth. The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology. Berkeley: University of  
California Press, 1970. 
 
Burnette, Robert, and John Koster, The Road to Wounded Knee. New York: Bantam  
Doubleday, 1974. 
 
Cain, William E., ed. William Lloyd Garrison and the Fight Against Slavery – Selections  
from The Liberator. Boston: Bedford, 1995. 
 
Calloway, Colin G. First Peoples: A Documentary Survey of American Indian History.
Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999. 
 
Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. Deeds Done in Words:  
Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990. 
 
596
Cash, Joseph H., and Herbert T. Hoover, eds. To Be An Indian: An Oral History. St. Paul:  
Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1995. 
 
Churchill, Ward. Indians Are Us? Culture and Genocide in Native North America.
Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1993. 
 
---. Indians are Us? Culture and Genocide in North America. Monroe, ME: Common  
Courage Press, 1994. 
 
Clark, Blue. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: Treaty Rights and Indian Law at the End of the  
Nineteenth Century. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994. 
 
Clements, William M. Oratory in Native North America. Tucson: University of Arizona  
Press, 2002. 
 
Clifton, James A. The Invented Indian: Cultural Fictions and Government Policies. New  
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1990. 
 
Coleman, William S.E. Voices of Wounded Knee. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,  
2000. 
 
Comfort, William Wistar. William Penn, 1644-1718: A Tercentenary Estimate  
Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1944. 
 
Condit, Celeste Michelle, and John Louis Lucaites. Crafting Equality: America’s Anglo- 
African Word. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
 
Cornell, Stephen. The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence. New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
 
Dangerfield, George. The Era of Good Feelings. Chicago: Dee Publishing, 1989. 
 
Daniels, Roger. Coming to American: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in  
American Life, 2d ed. New York: Perrenial, 2002. 
 
DeJong, David H. Promises of the Past: A History of Indian Education. Golden, CO:  
North American Press, 1993. 
 
Delaney, David. Race, Place and the Law, 1836-1948. Austin: University of Texas Press,  
1998. 
 
Deloria, Vine. Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto. Norman: University of  
Oklahoma Press, 1988. 
 
Deloria, Vine, and Clifford M. Lytle. American Indians, American Justice (Austin:  
University of Texas Press, 1983. 
597
De Rosier, Arthur H. The Removal of the Choctaw Indians. Knoxville: University of  
Tennessee Press, 1970. 
 
Dippie, Brian. The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy.
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991. 
 
Drinnon, Richard. Facing West: The Metaphsyics of Indian Hating and Empire Building.  
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997. 
 
DuBois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folk. Minneola, NY: Dover Publications, 1998. 
 
Eby, Cecil. “That Disgraceful Affair” – The Black Hawk War. New York: Norton, 1972. 
 
Ellington, Ter. The Myth of the Noble Savage. Berkeley: University of California Press,  
2001. 
 
Fields, Wayne. Union of Words: A History of Presidential Eloquence. New York: The  
Free Press, 1996. 
 
Fixico, Donald L. Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945- 
1960. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986. 
 
Foner, Phillip S., and Robert James Branham. Lift Every Voice: African American  
Oratory, 1787-1900. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998. 
 
Fowler, William. Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for  
North America, 1754-1763. New York: Walker and Company, 2004. 
 
Frank, Stephen M. Parenthood and Masculinity in the Nineteenth Century American  
North. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Frye Jacobson, Matthew. Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign  
Peoples At Home and Abroad, 1876-1917. New York: Hill and Wang, 2000.   
 
Fritz, Henry E. The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890 (Philadelphia:  
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981. 
 
Garroutte, Eva Marie. Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native America.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. Encounters with Nationalism. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1994. 
 
Gerstle, Gary. American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 2001. 
 
598
Gibbon, Guy. The Sioux: The Dakota and Lakota Nations. Malden, MA: Blackwell  
Publishing, 2003. 
 
Glissant, Edouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan  
Press, 1999. 
 
Gould, Lewis. The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1890-1914.
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000. 
 
Grossman, Mark The Civil Rights Movement Companion. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC- 
CLIO, 1993. 
 
Gurko, Miriam. Indian America: The Black Hawk War. New York: Crowell, 1970. 
 
Hagan, William T. The Indian Rights Association: The Herbert Walsh Years, 1882-1904 
Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1985. 
 
---. The Sac and Fox Indians. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,  
1988. 
 
Halbert, S.H., and T.H. Ball. The Creek War of 1813 and 1814 (Tuscaloosa: University  
of Alabama Press, 1995. 
 
Harjo, Joy, and Gloria Bird. Reinventing the Enemy’s Language: Contemporary Native  
Women’s Writings of North America. New York: Norton, 1997. 
 
Hauptman, Laurence. The Iroquois and the New Deal. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse  
University Press, 1981. 
 
Hertzberg, Hazel. The Search for an American Indian Identity. Syracuse: Syracuse  
University Press, 1971. 
 
Hietala, Thomas. Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. 
 
Hittman, Michael. Wovoka and the Ghost Dance. Lincoln: University of  
Nebraska Press, 1997. 
 
Hobsbawm, E.J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Hoganson, Kristin L. Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked  
the Spanish-American and Philippine American Wars. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998. 
 
Holland, James W. Andrew Jackson and the Creek War: Victory at the Horseshoe.
599
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1968. 
 
Horseman, Reginald. Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo- 
Saxonism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. 
 
Hoxie, Frederick E. A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880- 
1920. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.  
 
---, ed. Talking Back to Civilization: Indian Voices from the Progressive  
Era. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001. 
 
Hurt, R. Douglas. The Indian Frontier, 1763-1846. Albuquerque: University of New  
Mexico Press, 2002. 
 
Jackman, Mary R. The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, and  
Race Relations. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 
 
Jahoda, Gloria. The Trail of Tears: The Story of the American Indian Removal, 1813- 
1855. New York: Wings Books, 1995. 
 
James, Marquis. The Life of Andrew Jackson: The Border Captain and Portrait of a  
President. New York: Garden City Publishing, 1940. 
 
Johansen, Shawn. Family Men: Middle-Class Men in Early Industrializing America. New  
York: Routledge, 2001. 
 
Josephy, Alvin M. The Patriot Chiefs: A Chronicle of American Indian Resistance. New  
York: Penguin, 1993. 
 
Kammen, Michael. The Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in  
American Culture. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991. 
 
Kaplan, Amy. Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture. Cambridge: Harvard  
University Press, 2002. 
 
Kerber, Linda. Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 
 
Kersh, Rogan. Dreams of a More Perfect Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. 
 
Kettner, James H. The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill:  
University of North Carolina Press, 1978. 
 
Keyssar, Alexander. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the  
United States. New York: Basic, 2000. 
 
600
King, C. Richard. Colonial Discourses, Collective Memories, and the Exhibition of  
Native American Cultures and Histories in the Contemporary United States. New 
York: Garland Publishing, 1998. 
 
Kleinig, Bruce. Paternalism. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984. 
 
Konig, Hans. The Conquest of America: How the Indian Nations Lost Their Continent.
New York: Cornerstone, 1993. 
 
Konkle, Maureen. Writing Indian Nations: Native Intellectuals and Politics of  
Historiography, 1827-1863. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004. 
 
Krupat, Arnold. Red Matters: Native American Studies. Philadelphia: University  
Pennsylvania Press, 2002. 
 
Langston, Donna Hightower. The Native American World. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and  
Sons, 2003. 
 
Lens, Sidney Lens. The Forging of the American Empire – From the Revolution to  
Vietnam: A History of U.S. Imperialism. Chicago: Haymarket Press, 2003. 
Lepore, Jill. The Name of War: King Phillip’s War and the Origins of American Identity.
New York: Vintage, 1998. 
 
Leverenz, David. Paternalism Incorporated: Fables of American Fatherhood, 1865- 
1940. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
 
Lewis, David Rich.  Neither Wolf Nor Dog: American Indians, Environment and  
Agrarian Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Lieven, Anatol. American Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism. New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Linecum, Gideon. Pushmataha: A Choctaw Leader and His People. Tuscaloosa:  
University of Alabama Press, 2004. 
 
Maddox, Lucy. Citizen Indians: Native American Intellectuals, Race and Reform. Ithaca:  
Cornell University Press, 2005. 
 
Masur, Louis P. 1831: Year of Eclipse. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2002. 
Mead, Walter Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it  
Changed the World. London: Routledge, 2002. 
 
601
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edition. Ed., Frederick C. Mish.  
Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Incorporated, 1998. 
 
Mihesuah, Devon, ed. Natives and Academics: Writing About American Indians. Lincoln:  
University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 
 
---. So You Want to Write About American Indians? A Research Guide for Scholars,  
Students and Writers. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005. 
 
Moquin, Wayne, and Charles Van Doren. Great Documents in American Indian History.
New York: De Capo, 1995. 
 
Moulton, Gary E. John Ross: Cherokee Chief. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1978. 
 
Musicant, Ivan. Empire By Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the  
American Century. New York: Henry Holt, 1998. 
 
Nabokov, Peter. Native American Testimony: A Chronicle of Indian-White Relations  
From Prophecy to the Present, 1492-2000. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. 
 
Nelson, Dana. National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of  
White Men. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. 
 
Niezen, Ronald. The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 
 
Osborn, William M. The Wild Frontier: Atrocities During the American-Indian War from  
Jamestown Colony to Wounded Knee. New York: Random House, 2000. 
 
Otis, D.S. The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands. Norman: University of  
Oklahoma Press, 1973. 
 
Pearce, Roy Harvey. Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American  
Mind. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Perdue, Theda. Cherokee Editor: The Writing of Elias Boudinot. Knoxville: University of  
Tennessee Press, 1983. 
 
Pessen, Edward. Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, and Politics. Urbana:  
University of Illinois Press, 1985. 
 
Phillips, John Franklin. The American Indian in Alabama and the Southeast (Nashville,  
TN: Parthenon Press, 1986. 
 
Pierson, George Wilson. Tocqueville and Beaumont in America. New York: Oxford  
University Press, 1938. 
602
Prucha, Francis Paul. The Great Father: The United States Government and the  
American Indians, unabridged. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.   
 
---. The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians,
abridged. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986.   
 
---. The Indians in American Society: From the Revolutionary War to the Present.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.  
 
---. Documents of United States Indian Policy, 2d. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska  
Press, 1990. 
 
---. American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly. Berkeley: University  
of California P, 1994. 
 
Remini, Robert V. Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars. New York: Viking, 2001. 
 
Ricci, David M. Good Citizenship in America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University  
Press, 2004. 
 
Rogin, Michael Paul. Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and The Subjugation of the  
American Indian. New York: Knopf, 1975. 
 
Ryan, Susan M. The Grammar of Good Intentions: Race and the Antebellum Culture of  
Benevolence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
 
Satz, Ronald N. American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era. Lincoln: University of  
Nebraska Press, 1975. 
 
Savage, William W. Indian Life: Transforming an American Myth. Norman: University  
of Oklahoma Press, 1977. 
 
Susan Scheckel. The Insistence of the Indian: Race and Nationalism in Nineteenth  
Century American Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
 
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. The Age of Jackson. New York: Book Find Club, 1945. 
 
Schmeckebier, Laurence. The Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, Activities and  
Organization. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1927. 
 
Schudson, Michael. The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life. New York: The  
Free Press, 1998. 
 
Schuetz, Janice. Episodes in the Rhetoric of Government-Indian Relations. Westport, CT:  
Praeger, 2002. 
603
Seidler, Victor Jeleniewski. Man Enough: Embodying Masculinities. Thousand Oaks,  
CA: Sage, 1997. 
 
Senier, Siobhan. Voices of American Indian Assimilation and Resistance: Helen Hunt  
Jackson, Sarah Winnemucca, and Victoria Howard. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2001. 
 
Shalhope, Robert E. The Roots of Democracy: American thought and Culture, 1760- 
1800. Boston: Twayne, 1990. 
 
Sloane, Thomas. Encyclopedia of Rhetoric. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Smith, Paul Chaat, and Robert Allen Warrior. Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement  
from Alcatraz to Wounded Knee. New York: New Press, 1996. 
 
Smith, Rogers M. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Views of Citizenship in U.S. History. New  
Haven: Yale University Press , 1997. 
 
Starita, Joe. Dull Knifes of Pine Ridge: A Lakota Odyssey. New York: Putnam’s Sons,  
1995.   
 
Stephanson, Anders. Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right.
New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. 
 
Stewart, Charles J., Craig Allen Smith, and Robert E. Denton, Jr., Persuasion and Social  
Movements, 4th ed. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2001. 
 
Stuckey, Mary E. Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity.
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2004. 
 
Takaki, Ronald. Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th Century America. New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1990.  
 
Tatum, Lawrie. Our Red Brothers and the Peace Policy of President Ulysses S. Grant.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970. 
 
Taylor, Theodore. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. 
 
Therborn, Goran. The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology. London: Verso  
Press, 1988. 
 
Thornton, Russell, ed. Studying Native America: Problems and Prospects. Madison, WI:  
University of Wisconsin Press, 1998. 
 
Todorov, Tzvetan. The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. New York:  
Harper Perennial, 1992. 
604
Unrau, William. The Kaw People. Phoenix: Indian Tribal Series, 1975. 
 
Utley, Robert M. The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890. Albuquerque:  
University of New Mexico Press, 1984. 
 
Wald, Priscilla. Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form. Durham:  
Duke University Press, 1995. 
 
Waldstreicher, David. In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American  
Nationalism, 1776-1820. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 
 
Walker, Cheryl. Indian Nation: Native American Literature and Nineteenth-Century  
Nationalisms. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997. 
 
Wallace, Anthony F.C. The Long, Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians. New  
York: Hill and Wang, 1993.  
 
---. Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans. Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1999. 
 
Ward, John William. Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age. New York: Oxford University  
Press, 1979. 
 
Warnick, Barbara, and Edward S. Inch. Critical Thinking and Communication, 2d. New  
York: MacMillan, 1994. 
 
Warren, Louis S. Buffalo Bill’s America: William Cody and the Wild West Show. New  
York: Knopf, 2005. 
 
Warrior, Robert Allen. Tribal Secrets: Recovering American Indian Intellectual  
Traditions. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 
 
Washburn, Wilcomb E. The Assault on Indian Tribalism: The General Allotment Law  
(Dawes Act) of 1887. Philadelphia: Lipincott Company, 1975. 
 
---. Red Man’s Land, White Man’s Law: The Past and Present Status  
of the American Indian. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997. 
 
Weinberg, Albert K. Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalistic Expansionism in  
American History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935. 
 
Wildenthal, Bryan H. Native American Sovereignty on Trial: A Handbook with Cases,  
Laws and Documents. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003. 
 
Wilkins, David E. American Indian Sovereignty and the Supreme Court: The Masking of  
605
Justice. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997. 
 
Wilson, Kirt. The Reconstruction Desegregation Debate: The Politics of Equality and the  
Rhetoric of Place, 1870-1875. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
2002. 
 
Wright, J. Leitch. Creeks and Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the  
Muscogugle People. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986. 
 
Wright, Ronald Wright, Stolen Continents: 500 Years of Conquest and Resistance in the  
Americas. New York: Mariner, 2005. 
 
Yenne, Bill Indian Wars: The Campaign for the American West. Yardley, PA:  
Westholme, 2005. 
 
Young, Donald Young. American Minority Peoples: A Study in Racial and Cultural  
Conflicts in the United States. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1932. 
 
Young, Robert J.C. Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race. London:  
Routledge, 1995. 
 
Zinn, Howard. A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present. New York: Harper  
Collins, 2005. 
 
Zinn, Howard, and Anthony Arnove, Voices of a People’s History of the United States.
New York: Seven Stories, 2004. 
 
ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS
Agnew, Brad. “Voices from the Land Run of 1889,” The Chronicles of Oklahoma 67
(1989): 4-29. 
 
Angermuller, Johannes, and Katharina Bunzmann. “Hybrid Spaces – Theory and  
Beyond.” In Hybrid Spaces: Theory, Culture, Economy, edited by Johannes 
Angermuller, Katharina Bunzmann and Christina Rauch, 3-12. New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction Press, 2000. 
 
Balibar, Eitenne. “The Nation Form: History and Ideology.” In Race, Nation, Class:  
Ambiguous Identities, edited by Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, 93-
100. London: Verso, 1991. 
 
Bhabha, Homi. “The Commitment to Theory.” New Formations 5 (1988), 5-23. 
 
Black, Jason Edward. “The Mascotting of Native America: Construction, Commodity,  
and Assimilation.” American Indian Quarterly 23 (2003): 605-623. 
606
---. “Sacagawea as Commodity, Currency and Cipher: Consequences of the U.S. Mint’s  
Gold Dollar for American Indian Women.” International Journal of Media and  
Cultural Politics 1:2 (2004): 226-230. 
 
---. “Symbolic Suicide as Mortification, Transformation, and Counterstatement: The  
Conciliatory (Yet) Resistant Surrender of Maka-tai-mesh-ekia-kiak.” Kenneth 
Burke Journal 2:1 (2005): 1-20. 
 
---. “Authoritarian Fatherhood: Andrew Jackson’s Early Familial Lectures to America’s  
‘Red Children.’” Journal of Family History 30:3 (2005): 247-264. 
 
Bosmajian, Haig. “Defining the ‘American Indian’: A Case Study in the Language of  
Suppression.” The Speech Teacher 21 (1973): 89-99. 
 
Botkin, Daniel B. “Introduction.” In The Colonizers: Early European Settlers and the  
Shaping of North America, edited by T.J. Stiles, xix-xxiii. New York: Perigree, 
1998. 
 
Campbell, John Angus. “Between the Fragment and the Icon: Prospect for a Rhetorical  
House of the Middle Way.” Western Journal of Communication 54 (1990): 368. 
 
Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs. “The Rhetoric of Radical Black Nationalism: A Case Study in  
Self-Conscious Criticism.” Central States Speech Journal 22 (1971): 151-160. 
 
---. “The Rhetoric of Women’s Liberation: An Oxymoron.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 
59 (1973): 74-86. 
 
---. “Agency: Promiscuous and Protean.” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 2
(2005): 1-19. 
 
Carpenter, Ronald. “Frederick Jackson Turner and the Rhetorical Impact of the Frontier  
Thesis.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 63 (1977): 117-129. 
 
Casey, Michael W., and Douglas A. Foster. “The Moral Inheritance of a President.” In  
The Stone-Campbell Movement: An International Religious Tradition, edited by 
Michael W. Casey and Douglas A. Foster, 109-127. Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 2001. 
 
Charland, Maurice. “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Quebecois.”
Quarterly Journal of Speech 73 (1987): 133-150. 
 
Charles, Asselin. “Colonial Discourse Since Christopher Columbus.” Journal of Black  
Studies 26 (1995): 134-152. 
 
Cheyfitz, Eric. “Doctrines of Democracy.” Journal of Early American Life 2:1 (2001):  
607
1-14. 
 
Clair, Robin Patric. “Organizing Silence: Silence as Voice, and Voice as Silence in  
Narrative Explanation of the Treaty of New Echota.” Western Journal of 
Communication 61 (1997): 315-337. 
 
Clark, Blue. “Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: Implications for Federal Indian Law.” Western  
Legal History 5 (1992): 1-18. 
 
Clemmons, Linda M. “’We Will Talk of Nothing Else’ – Dakota Interpretations of the  
Treaty of 1837.” Great Plains Quarterly 25 (2005): 173-185. 
 
Conser, William H. “John Ross and the Cherokee Resistance Campaign, 1833-1838.”  
Journal of Southern History 44:2 (1978): 191-212. 
 
Deloria, Philip, and Neal Salisbury. “Introduction.” In A Companion to American Indian  
History, edited by, Philip Deloria and Neal Salisbury, ii-x. New York: Blackwell, 
2002. 
 
Deloria, Vine. “American Indians in Historical Perspective.” In Native American Law  
and Colonialism, Before 1776-1903, edited by John R. Wunder, 123-135. New 
York: Garland Press, 1996. 
 
Demos, John. “The Changing Faces of Fatherhood: A New Exploration in Family  
History.” In Father and Child: Developmental and Clinical Perspectives, edited 
by Stanley Cath, Alan Gurwitt and John Munder Ross, 427-433. Boston: Little 
and Brown, 1982. 
 
Diggins, John Patrick Diggins. “Republicanism and Progressivism.” American Quarterly 
37:4 (1985): 572-598. 
 
Dorsey, Leroy G. “The Frontier Myth in Presidential Rhetoric: Theodore Roosevelt’s  
Campaign for Conservation.” Western Journal of Communication 59 (1995): 1-
19. 
 
Dorsey, Leroy G., and Rachel M. Harlow, “‘We Want Americans Pure and Simple’”  
Theodore Roosevelt and the Myth of Americanism.” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 
6:1 (2003): 55-78. 
 
Dow, Bonnie J., and Mari Boor Tonn, “’Feminine Style’ and Political Judgment in the  
Rhetoric of Ann Richards.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 79 (1993): 286-302. 
 
Edmunds, R. David. “Native Americans and the United States, Canada and Mexico.” In A
Companion to American Indian History, edited by Phillip Joseph Deloria and 
Neal Salisbury, 401-411. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002. 
 
608
Estin, Ann Laquer. “Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The Long Shadow.” In The Aggressions of  
Civilization: Federal Indian Policy Since the 1880s, edited by Sandra Cadwalader 
and Vine Deloria, Jr., 216-217. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984. 
 
Finkelstein, Norman. “History’s Verdict: The Cherokee Case.” Journal of Palestine  
Studies 24 (1995): 34-50. 
 
Fixico, Donald L. “Federal and State Policies and American Indians.” In A Companion to  
American Indian History, edited by Phillip Joseph Deloria and Neal Salisbury, 
384-390. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002. 
 
Flores, Lisa. “Constructing Rhetorical Borders: Peons, Illegal Aliens and Competing  
Narratives of Immigration.” Critical Studies in Media Communication 20 (2003): 
362-387 
 
Fotion, Neil. “Paternalism.” Ethics 89 (1979), 191-196. 
 
Freeman, Jody. “Constitutive Rhetoric: Law as a Literary Activity.” Harvard Woman’s  
Law Journal 14 (1991): 305-325. 
 
Frickey, Phillip. “Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and  
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law.” 107 Harv. L.Rev. 381 (December 1993). 
 
Glassberg, David. “History and the Public: Legacies of the Progressive Era.” Journal of  
American History 73:4 (1987): 957-980. 
 
Goodell, Grace E. “Paternalism, Patronage, and the Potlatch: The Dynamics of Giving  
and Being Given To.” Current Anthropology 26 (1985): 247-266. 
 
Greaves, Thomas C. “Liminality.” In Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory, edited  
by Michael Payne, 312. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
Gregg, Richard. “The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 
4:1 (1971): 71-91. 
 
Gronbeck, Bruce E. “The Rhetorics of the Past: History, Argument and Collective  
Memory.” In Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases, edited by Kathleen 
J. Turner, 47-60. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998. 
 
Gutierrez, David G. “Significant to Whom?: Mexican Americans and the History of the  
American West.” In A New Significance: Re-Envisioning the History of the 
American West, edited by Clyde A. Milner III, 67-89. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996. 
 
Hall, Stuart. “Introduction: Who Needs Identity?” In Questions of Cultural Identity,
edited by Stuart Hall and Paul du Guy, 2-9. London: Sage, 1996. 
609
Hammerback, John C., and Richard J. Jensen. “History and Culture as Rhetorical  
Constriants: Cesar Chavez’s Letter from Delano.” In Doing Rhetorical History: 
Concepts and Cases, edited by Kathleen J. Turner, 207-220. Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1999. 
 
Harjo, Joy, and Gloria Bird. “Introduction.” in Reinventing the Enemy’s Language:  
Contemporary Native Women’s Writings of North America, edited by Joy Harjo 
and Gloria Bird, 19-34 New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. 
 
Harmon, Alexandra Harmon. “Wanted: More Histories of Indian Identity.” In A
Companion to American Indian History, edited by Philip Deloria and Neal 
Salisbury, 259-270. New York: Blackwell, 2002. 
 
Harring, Sidney L. “Indian Law, Sovereignty and State Law: Native People and the  
Law.” In A Companion to American Indian History, edited by Phillip Joseph 
Deloria and Neal Salisbury, 452-460. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002. 
 
Jackson, Donald. “Introduction.” Black Hawk: An Autobiography, edited by Donald  
Jackson, 1-15. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1964. 
 
Jasinski, James. “A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward an  
Understanding of the Discursive (Re)Constitution of ‘Constitution’ in The 
Federalist Papers.” In Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases, edited by 
Kathleen J. Turner, 72-94. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998. 
 
Jehlen, Myra. “Why Did the Europeans Cross the Ocean?  A Seventeenth Century  
Riddle.” In Cultures of United States Imperialism, edited by Amy Kaplan and 
Donald Pease, 41-58. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. 
 
Johnson, Tadd M., and James Hamilton. “Sovereignty and the Native American Nation:  
Self-Governance for Indian Tribes – From Paternalism to Empowerment.” Conn. 
L.Rev.27 (1995): 1253. 
 
Joseph, May. “Hybridity.” In Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory, edited by  
Michael Payne, 32. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
Katriel, Tamar. “Site of Memory: Discourse of the Past in Israeli Pioneering Settlement  
Museums.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 80 (1994): 1-20. 
 
Kaup, Monika. “Constituting Hybridity as Hybrid: Metis Canadian and Mexican  
American Formations.” In Mixing Race, Mixing Culture: Inter-American Literary 
Dialogues, edited by Monika Kaup and Debra J. Rosenthal, 186. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2002. 
 
Kaup, Monika, and Debra E. Rosenthal. “Introduction.” In Mixing Race, Mixing Culture:  
610
Inter-American Literary Dialogues, edited by Monika Kaup and Debra J. 
Rosenthal, xiv. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002. 
 
Kenny, Michael G. “A Place for Memory: The Interface between Individual and  
Collective History.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41:3 (1999): 
420-438. 
 
Kerber, Linda. “The Republican Mother: Women and the Enlightenment – An American  
Perspective.” American Quarterly 28:2 (1976): 187-205.  
 
Klumpp, James F., and Thomas A. Hollihan. “Rhetorical Criticism as Moral Action.”  
Quarterly Journal of Speech 75 (1989): 84-97. 
 
Kuypers, Jim A., Marilyn J. Young, and Michael Launer.  “Composite Narrative,  
Authoritarian Discourse and the Soviet Response to the Destruction of Iran Air 
Flight 655.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 87 (2001): 305-320. 
 
Lake, Randall. “Enacting Red Power: The Consummatory Function in Native American  
Protest Rhetoric.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 69 (1983): 127-142. 
 
---. “Between Myth and History: Enacting Time in Native American Protest Rhetoric.”  
Quarterly Journal of Speech 77 (1991): 123-151. 
 
Lewis, David Rich. “Still Native: The Significance of Native Americans in the History of  
the Twentieth-Century American West,” In A New Significance: Re-Envisioning 
the History of the American West, edited by Clyde A. Milner III, 213-240. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Lucaites, John Louis, and Celeste Michelle Condit. “Reconstructing <Equality>:  
Culturetypal and Counter-Cultural Rhetoric in the Martyred Black Vision.” In 
Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, 3d edition, edited by Carl R. Burgchardt, 467-
486 State College, PA: Strata, 2005. 
 
Magdaleno, Jana Sequoya. “How (!) Is An Indian? A Contest of Stories, Round 2.”  
Postcolonial Theory and the United States: Race, Ethnicity and Literature, edited 
by Amritjit Singh and Peter Schmidt, 286-287. Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2000. 
 
Mahon, John K., and Brent R. Weisman, “Florida’s Seminole and Miccosukee People.”  
In The New History of Florida, edited by Michael Gannon, 183-206. Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1996. 
 
McDorman, Todd. “Challenging Constitutional Authority: African American Responses  
to Scott v. Sandford.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 83 (1997): 192-209. 
 
McGee, Michael Calvin. “In Search of ‘The People’: A Rhetorical Alternative.”  
611
Quarterly Journal of Speech. 61 (1975): 235-249. 
 
---. “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology.” Quarterly Journal of  
Speech 66 (1980): 1-16. 
 
---. “Text, Context and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture.” Western Journal of  
Speech Communication 54 (1990): 274-289. 
 
McNickle, D’Arcy. “Indian-White Relations from Discovery to 1887.” In The Rape of  
Indian Lands, edited Paul Wallace Gates, 1-12. New York: Arno Press, 1979. 
 
Morris, Richard, and Phillip Wander. “Native American Rhetoric: Dancing in the  
Shadows of the Ghost Dance.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1990): 164-191. 
 
Murphy, John M. “Mikhail Bahktin and the Rhetorical Tradition.” Quarterly Journal of  
Speech 87 (2001): 259-277.    
 
Newcomb, Steven. “On the Words ‘Tribe’ and ‘Nation.’” Indian Country Today 24:26 [8  
December 2004], A3. 
 
Newmeyer, R. Kent. “Law and Character: John Marshall as an American Original –  
Some Thoughts on Personality and Judicial Statesmanship.” 71 U. Colo. L.Rev. 
1365 (2000). 
 
Nomura, Gail M. “Significant Lives: Asia and Asian Americans in the U.S. West.” In A
New Significance: Re-Envisioning the History of the American West, edited by 
Clyde Milner, 135-152. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” Representations 
26 (1989): 7-25. 
 
O’Connor, John E. “The White Man’s Indian: An Institutional Approach,” In  
Hollywood’s Indian: The Portrayal of the Native American in Film, edited by 
Peter C. Rollins and John E. O’Connor, 27-31. Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1998. 
 
Olken, Samuel. “Chief Justice John Marshall and the Course of American Constitutional  
History.” 33 J. Marshall L.Rev. 743 (Summer 2000). 
 
Ono, Kent, and Derek Buescher. “Deciphering Pocahontas: Unpackaging the  
Commodification of an American Indian Woman.” Critical Studies in Media 
Communication 18 (2001): 23-43. 
 
Parry-Giles, Shawn, and Diane M. Blair. “The Rise of the Rhetorical First Lady: Politics,  
Gender Ideology and Women’s Voice, 1789-2002.” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 
5:4 (2002): 565-599. 
612
Porter, Joy. “Native Americans: The Assertion of Sovereignty and the Negotiation of  
Citizenship and Identities.” In Federalism, Citizenship and Collective Identities in 
U.S. History, edited by Cornelius A. Van Minnen and Sylvia Hilton, 180-198. 
Amsterdam: VU Boekhandel University Press, 2000. 
 
Rathbun, Lyon. “The Debate Over Annexing Texas and the Emergence of Manifest  
Destiny.” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 4:3 (2001): 459-493. 
 
Reuben, Julie A. “Beyond Politics: Community Civics and the Redefinition of  
Citizenship in the Progressive Era.” History of Education Quarterly 37:4 (1997): 
399-420. 
 
Rich, Elizabeth. “Remember Wounded Knee: AIM’s Use of Metonymy in 21st Century  
Protest.” College Literature 31:3 (2004): 63-73. 
 
Ritter, Kurt W. “American Political Rhetoric and the Jeremiad Tradition: Presidential  
Nomination Acceptance Addresses, 1960–1976.” Central States Speech Journal 
31 (1980): 153–171. 
 
Robbins, William G. “In Search of Western Lands.” In Land in the American West:  
Private Claims and the Common Good, edited by William G. Robbins and James 
C. Foster, 3-22. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000. 
 
Rogers, Daniel T. “In Search of Progressivism.” Reviews in American History 10:4  
(1982): 113-132. 
 
Rosteck, Thomas. “Form and Cultural Context in Rhetorical Criticism: Re-Reading  
Wrage.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 84 (1998): 471-490. 
 
Ruoff, A. Lavonne Brown, ed. “Editor’s Introduction.” In S. Alice Callahan,  
Wynema: A Child of the Forest, xiii-xlviii. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1997. 
 
Salisbury, Neal. “Native People and European Settlers in Eastern North America, 1600- 
1783.” In The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples in the Americas, vol. 1, 
part 1, edited by Bruce Trigger and Wilcomb E. Washburn, 1-17. London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Senier, Siobhan. “Allotment Protest and Tribal Discourse: Reading Wynema’s Successes  
and Shortcomings.” American Indian Quarterly 24:3 (2000): 420-440. 
 
Sevitch, Benjamin. “The Rhetoric of Paternalism: Elbert H. Gary’s Arguments for the  
Twelve-hour Day.” Western Speech Journal 35 (1971): 15-23. 
 
Shanley, Kathryn. “Writing Indian.” In Studying Native America: Problems and  
613
Prospects, edited by Russell Thornton, 146. Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1998. 
 
Slotkin, Richard. “Buffalo Bill’s ‘Wild West’ and the Mythologization of the American  
Empire.” In Cultures of United States Imperialism, edited by Amy Kaplan and 
Donald Pease, 164-184. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. 
 
Soja, Edward. “History: Geography: Modernity.” In The Cultural Studies Reader, edited  
by Simon During, 135-150. London: Routledge, 1994. 
 
Stewart, Tony K., and Carl W. Ernst. “Syncretism.” In South Asian Folklore, edited by  
Peter J. Claus and Margaret A. Mills, 125. New York: Garland, 2003. 
 
Stremlau, Rose. “’To Domesticate and Civilize Wild Indians’: Allotment and the  
Campaign to Reform Indian Families, 1875-1887.” Journal of Family History 30
(2005): 265-286. 
 
Strickland, William. “The Rhetoric of Removal and the Trail of Tears: Cherokee  
Speaking Against Jackson’s Indian Removal Policy, 1828-1832.” Southern 
Speech Communication Journal 47 (1982): 292-309.   
 
Stuckey, Mary. “’The Domain of Public Conscience’: Woodrow Wilson and the  
Establishment of a Transcendent Political Order.” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 6:1 
(2003): 1-23. 
 
Stuckey, Mary E., and John Murphy. “By Any Other Name: Rhetorical Colonialism in  
North America.” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 25 (2001): 73-
98. 
 
Taylor, Quintard. “Through the Prism of Race: The Meaning of African-American  
History in the West.” In A New Significance: Re-Envisioning the History of the 
American West, edited by Clyde Milner, 289-300. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996. 
 
Theodore, Alisse. “’A Right to Speak on the Subject’: The U.S. Women’s Anti-Removal  
Petition Campaign, 1829-1831.” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 5:4 (2002): 601-623. 
 
Van Den Berghe, Pierre L. “Response to Goodell.” Current Anthropology 26 (1985):  
262-270. 
 
Wald, Patricia. “Terms of Assimilation: Legislating Subjectivity in the Emerging  
Nation.” In Cultures of United States Imperialism, edited by Amy Kaplan and 
Donald Pease, 59-84. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000. 
 
Wander, Phillip. “The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism.” Central States Speech  
Journal 34 (1983): 1-18.   
614
---. “The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory.” Central States  
Speech Journal 35 (1984): 197-216.  
 
Washburn, Wilcomb. “Introduction.” in The American Indian and the United States: A  
Documentary History, vol. 4, edited by Wilcomb E. Washburn, 2448. New York: 
Random House, 1973. 
 
Watts, Eric King. “’Voice’ and ‘Voicelessness’ in Rhetorical Studies.” Quarterly Journal  
of Speech 87 (2001): 179-196. 
 
Weaver, Hilary N. “Indigenous Identity: What Is It, and Who Really Owns It?” American  
Indian Quarterly 25:2 (2001): 240-255. 
 
Weiss, Richard. “Ethnicity and Reform: Minorities and the Ambience of the Depression  
Years.” Journal of American History 66 (1979): 566-585. 
 
White, James Boyd. “Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature.” In  
Jurisprudence Classical and Contemporary: From Natural Law to 
Postmodernism, edited by Robert Hayman, Nancy Levit, and Richard Delgado, 
479-486. St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2002. 
 
Whitt, Laura Anne. “Cultural Imperialism and the Marketing of Native America.”  
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 19 (1995): 1-33. 
 
Zagari, Rosemary. “Morals, Manners and the Republican Mother.” American Quarterly 
44:3 (1992): 192-215. 
 
Zelizer, Barbie. “Reading the Past Against the Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies.”  
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 12 (1995): 204-239. 
 
615
616
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
JASON EDWARD BLACK 
 
Personal Information
Home Contacts:  5043 Carroll Street 
 Northport, AL 35475 
 ph: 205-333-4015 
 
Office Contacts:  Department of Communication Studies 
University of Alabama 
Box 870172 
 Tuscaloosa, AL 35487  
ph:   205-348-8075 
fax: 205-348-8080  
 jason.black@ua.edu
Education 
 
Ph.D., 2006, Department of Communication, University of Maryland.  
 
Emphasis on U.S. public address and rhetorical culture with a research specialty in 
American Indian discourse, African American discourse, cultural identity, institutional 
rhetoric, citizenship, ideological criticism, and nationalism. 
 
Dissertation:  “U.S. National and Native Voices in the Nineteenth Century: Rhetoric in 
the Removal and Allotment of American Indians,” Shawn Parry-Giles, advisor 
 
M.A, 2002, Department of Communication, Wake Forest University.  
Emphasis on rhetorical criticism and social change 
 
Thesis: “The Ideograph of Animal <Rights>: Controversy Examined in the Animal 
Protection Movement.”  Eric King Watts, advisor 
 
B.S., magna cum laude, 1998, College of Communication, Florida State University.  
 
Emphasis on political communication and rhetoric 
 
617
Employment and Teaching 
(1) University of Alabama, Communication Studies, Assistant Professor, 2005-present 
 
COM499: Capstone Seminar in U.S. War/Protest Discourses 
COM467: Seminar in Public Address: Rhetoric of African America 
 
COM122: Critical Decision Making 
 
COM100: Rhetoric and Society – anticipated Fall 2006 
 
COM541: Rhetorical Theory – anticipated Fall 2006 
 
(2) University of Maryland, Communication, Instructor, 2002-2005 
 
COMM 398: Rhetoric of U.S-Indian Relations, new course 
COMM 398N: Rhetoric of Native America, new course 
COMM 388: Communication Practicum 
COMM386: Communication Internship 
 
COMM 360 Rhetoric of Black America 
COMM 324: Gender and Communication 
COMM 250 Introduction to Communication Inquiry, co-taught 
 
(3)   Towson University, Mass Comm. and Communication Studies, Adjunct, 2003-2004  
 
COMM 211 Rhetorical Criticism and Theory 
(4)   Wake Forest University, Communication, Graduate Assistant, 2000-2002 
 
COMM 107 Public Speaking 
(5)   Florida State University, Communication, Undergraduate Assistant, 1997-1998 
 
COM 340 Oral Communication, co-taught 
618
Research-Specific Employment
(1)   Wake Forest University, Department of Communication, 2000-2002 
 
Book Editor.  Read and copy-edited Dr. Michael J. Hyde’s forthcoming book, 
Acknowledgement: A Rhetorical Inquiry; suggested structural and content changes; and 
offered further sources and research. 
 
Graduate Research Assistant. Obtained rhetorical documents and various information for 
Dr. Michael J. Hyde; edited manuscript of forthcoming book; and contributed rhetorical 
analysis. 
 
(2)   University of Washington, Department of Communication, Summer 2000. 
 
Visiting Graduate Research Assistant. Garnered information for Dr. Barbara Warnick’s 
book, Critical Literacy in a Digital Age re online campaign parody and various articles; 
provided rhetorical analysis of myriad political web sites; and edited portions of her 
book.   
Academic Service - University 
(1)   University of Alabama, Department of Communication Studies 
 
Graduate Admissions Committee, Spring 2006 - present 
 
Rhetoric “Brown Bag” Coordinator, Spring 2006-present 
 
Graduate Recruitment Coordinator, Fall 2005-present 
 
Rhetoric Curriculum Committee, Fall 2005-present 
 
College Human Resources Committee, Fall 2005-present 
 
Department Public Relations Officer, Fall 2005-present 
 
Judge, Alabama Forensics Early Bird Tournament, Fall 2005-present 
 
Judge, University of Alabama High School Debate Tournament, Fall 2005-present  
 
(2)   University of Maryland, Department of Communication 
 
2004 Public Address Conference Assistant, Summer 2004-Fall 2004. 
 
619
Debate Watch 2004 Facilitator, Fall 2004 
 
Co-Creator of Service Learning Program, Fall 2003 – present. 
 
Outreach Assistant, Fall 2002 – present. 
 
Graduate Student Government Representative, Fall 2002-Summer 2003. 
 
Discussion Leader, Center for Political Communication and Civic Leadership, Fall 2002. 
 
(3)   National Communication Association
Panel Chair, “[Mis]Handling Crises in Presidential Discourse,” Boston, MA, Nov. 2005 
 
Reviewer, Public Address Division, Feb. 2005 – present. 
 
Reviewer, American Studies Division, Feb. 2005 – present. 
 
Nominating Committee Member, elected position, Public Address Division, Nov. 2004 - 
Nov. 2005. 
 
Panel Chair, “Constructing Political Voice and Participation Through Literature, 
Discourse, and Letters,” Miami Beach, FL, Nov. 2003.  
 
(4)   Southern States Communication Association
Panel Chair, “Bio-Critical Assessments of Rhetorical Artistry,” Dallas, TX, April 2006.  
 
Reviewer, Rhetoric and Public Address Division, Aug. 2005 – present. 
 
Reviewer, Political Communication Division, Aug. 2005 – present. 
 
Pre-Conference Planning Committee, “Pre-Conference on Rhetorical Ethos,” Winston-
Salem, NC, April 2002.   
 
(5)   Biennial Public Address Conference
Chair, “Praising Photography’s Witness: Image Vernaculars and American Visual 
Traditions,” Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, Oct. 2006.  
 
620
(6)   Rocky Mountain Communication Review
Editorial Board, Jan. 2005–present. 
 
(7)   Kaleidoscope Graduate Journal
Editorial Board, Jan. 2005–present. 
 
(8)   New Directions in American Indian Studies Conference, Chapel Hill,  NC 
 
Planning Committee Member, Fall 2003-Spring 2004. 
 
Planning Committee Member, Spring 2005-Fall 2005. 
 
(9)   Conference on Liberation Affairs
Board Member, Fall 2002-present. 
 
Editorial Board Member, Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, Fall 2002-present. 
 
(10)   Wake Forest University, Department of Communication 
 
Faculty Committee Representative, Fall 2001 - Spring 2002. 
 
Faculty Graduate Committee, Fall 2001 - Spring 2002. 
 
Representative to the Graduate Student Association, Fall 2001 - Spring 2002. 
 
(11)   Florida State University, College of Communication 
 
Undergraduate Advisor, Spring 1997-Fall 1998. 
 
News Director, WVFS-Tallahassee, Fall 1996-Fall 1998. 
 
Museum Docent, Florida History Museum, Fall 1996-Spring 1998. 
 
Graduate Advising
Charles Womelsdorf, M.A. student, University of Alabama, 2006-present. 
 
621
Paige Thurmond, M.A. student, University of Alabama, 2005-present. 
 
Ralph Hardesty, M.A. student, University of Alabama, 2005-present. 
 
Sheila Kinyon, M.A. student, University of Alabama, completed Spring 2006. 
 
Independent Studies & Student Honors Projects – Univ. of Alabama
Graduate 
 
Charles Wommelsdorf, “Rhetorical Secrecy in American Politics,” University of 
Alabama, Fall 2006. 
 
Paige Thurmond, internship coordinator, William Jefferson Clinton Presidential Center, 
Spring 2006 
 
Sheila Kinyon, “Educational Reform and the Montessori Movement,” University of 
Alabama, Spring 2006. 
 
Jillian Marty, “Readings in the Rhetoric of the Black Panthers,” University of Alabama, 
Spring 2006. 
 
Paige Thurmond, “The Alabama Civil Rights Movement, 1960-1963,” University of 
Alabama, Spring 2006. 
 
Undergraduate 
 
Katriesa Crummie, senior project, “The Rhetoric of Meteorological Hysteria in Alabama 
Tornado Coverage,” University of Alabama, Fall 2006. 
 
Jackson Clifford Hataway, honors study in war/protest rhetoric, University of Alabama, 
Spring 2006. 
 
Treva Dean, senior project, “Readings/Research in the Rhetoric of Native America,” 
University of Alabama, Spring 2006. 
 
Treva Dean, Southern States Communication Association Undergraduate Honors 
Conference Attendee, Dallas, TX, April 2006.  
 
Jason Norris, senior undergraduate independent study, “Techno Pulpits and Public 
Address: The Impact of New Technologies on Baptist Preaching,” University of 
Alabama, Fall 2005. 
 
622
Honors
Top paper in Kenneth Burke Society Division, Southern States Communication 
Association, Dallas, TX, April 2006. 
 
Top Paper in Communication and Law Division, National Communication Association, 
Boston, MA, Nov. 2005. 
 
Wrage-Baskerville Award for Top Contributed Paper in Public Address, Public Address 
Division, National Communication Association convention, Chicago, IL, Nov. 2004. 
 
NCA Doctoral Honors Conference participant, Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, 
July 2004. 
 
Outstanding Doctoral Research Award, Department of Communication, Univ. of 
Maryland, May 2004. 
 
Outstanding Teaching Award, Department of Communication, Univ. of Maryland, May 
2004. 
 
Owen Peterson Award in Rhetoric & Public Address, Public Address Division, Southern 
States Communication Association convention, Tampa, FL, April 2004. 
 
Jarrard Top Paper, Carolinas Communication Association, Raleigh, NC, Oct. 2003. 
 
University of Maryland Graduate Membership Award for National Communication 
Association, 2003-2004. 
 
Top Four Paper in Burke Division, National Communication Association, Miami, FL, 
Nov. 2003. 
 
Outstanding Graduate Scholar, Department of Communication, Univ. of Maryland, May 
2003. 
 
Jarrard Top Paper, Carolinas Communication Association, Greensboro, NC, Oct. 2002. 
 
University Fellowship, University of Maryland, 2002-2006. 
 
Outstanding Master’s Student Award, Wake Forest University, 2001-2002. 
 
Wake Forest University Graduate Membership Award for National Communication 
Association, 2001-2002. 
 
Top Paper in Free Speech, Southern States Communication Association convention, 
Lexington, KY, April 2001. 
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Lambda Pi Eta Honor Society, member since 1998. 
 
Golden Key Honor Society, member since 1998. 
 
J.M. Rubin Foundation Graduate Scholar, 2000-2002 
 
Rotary of Palm Beach Scholar, 1995-1999. 
 
Kiwanis of Palm Beach Scholar, 1995-1999. 
 
Florida Academic Scholar, 1995-1999. 
 
Grants
Research Advisory Committee Grants, Univ. of Alabama, “Rhetorical Identities of 
Native and Anglo Cultures in Alabama’s Creek War, 1813-1814.” $2,500, Summer 2006-
Spring 2008 
 
Jacob K. Goldhaber Grant, Univ. of Maryland, Sept. 2004, competitive grant award 
 
Instructional Improvement Grant, Univ. of Maryland, “Service Learning in 
Communication Experiences (SLICE) Program,” $3,500. 19 May 2005, competitive 
award. 
 
Publications
Research Articles 
 
Black, Jason Edward. “Authoritarian Fatherhood: Jackson’s Early Lectures to America’s  
Red Children.” Journal of Family History 30:3 (2005): 247-264. Lead article.
Black, Jason Edward. “Symbolic Suicide as Mortification and Transformation: The  
Conciliatory (Yet) Resistant Surrender of Maka-tai-mesh-ekia-kiak.” Kenneth 
Burke Journal 2:1 (2005). Lead article.
Black, Jason Edward. “Sacagawea as Commodity, Currency, and Cipher: A Cultural- 
Feminist Reading of the U.S. Mint’s Gold Dollar.” International Journal of 
Media and Cultural Politics 1:2 (2005): 226-230. 
 
Black, Jason Edward. “SLAPPs and Social Activism: Free Speech Struggles in Grey2K’s  
Campaign to Ban Dog Racing.” Free Speech Yearbook 40 (2003): 70-82. 
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Black, Jason Edward. “Extending the Rights of Personhood, Voice, and Life to Sensate  
Others: A Homology of Right to Life and Animal Rights Rhetoric.” 
Communication Quarterly 51:3 (2003): 312-331. 
 
Black, Jason Edward. “The Mascotting of Native America: Construction, Commodity,  
and Assimilation.” American Indian Quarterly 26:4 (2002): 605-622. 
 
Black, Jason Edward. “Constitutive Rhetoric and the Animal Protection Movement: The  
Identities of Welfare and Rights.” Ohio Speech Journal 39 (2001): 30-47. 
 
Book Chapters 
 
Black, Jason Edward. “Performing Native America: Image Events in the Thanksgiving  
Day of Mourning Protests.” Image Events: From Theory to Action. Eds. Kevin 
Michael Deluca and Joe Wilferth. New York: Guilford Press, forthcoming. 
 
Black, Jason Edward. “Kicking Bear’s ‘I Bring You Word from Your Fathers the Ghosts’  
Address.” Voices of Democracy Project. NEH-University of Maryland-Penn State 
University collaborative, forthcoming. 
 
Black, Jason Edward. “Elizabeth Birch: Activist for the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and  
Transgender Community.” Contemporary American Orators: A Bio-Critical 
Sourcebook. Eds. Bernie Duffy and Richard Leeman.  Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 2005. 
 
Black, Jason Edward. “Re/Claiming Indianness: Performative Rhetoric in the Plymouth  
Day of Mourning Protests.”  Proceedings of the New Directions in American 
Indian Research. Ed. Lindsay Smith.  University of North Carolina Press, 2004 
 
Black, Jason Edward and Jennifer Black. “The Rhetorical Terrorist: Implications of the  
USA Patriot Act on Animal Liberation.” Terrorist or Freedom Fighter? Essays 
on Animal Liberation. Eds. Anthony Nocella and Steve Best. New York: Lantern 
Press, 2004. 288-299.  
 
Black, Jason Edward. “The Animal Protection Movement: Cases of Welfare and Rights,”  
Proceedings of the 6th Communication Conference on the Environment.
Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati Press, 2001.   
 
Book Reviews 
 
Eric P. Kaufman, The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America. Rhetoric and Public Affairs,
forthcoming. 
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Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism.
Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 9:1 (2006). 
 
Eva Marie Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native America.
Quarterly Journal of Speech 90:1 (2004). 
 
Stanley Renshon, One America? Political Leadership, National Identity and the 
Dilemmas of Diversity. Rhetoric and Public Affairs 5:2 (2003). 
 
Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust.
Quarterly Journal of Speech 89:1 (2003). 
 
Works Under Review
“Civic Engagement, Technology and the Rhetoric of Social Movements: The Promises of 
Student Activism through Electronic Curriculum,” book chapter, under review, with Beth 
S. Bennett. 
 
“Remembrances of Removal: Native Resistance to Allotment and the Unmasking of 
paternal Benevolence,” mid-stage at Southern Communication Journal.
“Constituting the ‘Allotment Indian’: The Role of Paternal Rhetoric in America’s Dawes  
Act Era.” final stage at Rhetoric & Public Affairs.
Professional Papers
“Remembering Indian Removal: Resistive Native Discourse and the Enactment of  
Collective Memory,” Carolinas Communication Association Convention, 
September 2006. Competitive Paper. 
 
“Memorializing the Alabama Creek War, 1813-1814: Anglo/Native Identities in the  
Monuments of Fort Mims and Horseshoe Bend,” National Communication 
Association Convention: San Antonio, Texas, Nov. 2006.  Panel Paper. 
 
“The Rhetoric of Native America Course: Teaching at the Interstices of Context,  
Criticism and Multiple Cultures,” National Communication Association 
Convention: San Antonio, Texas, Nov. 2006.  Panel Paper.  
 
“Symbolic Suicide as Mortification and Transformation: The Conciliatory (Yet) Resistant  
Surrender of Maka-tai-mesh-ekia-kiak.” Southern States Communication 
Association Convention: Dallas, Texas, April 2006. Competitive Paper. Top 
Paper in Kenneth Burke Division 
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“Sacagawea as Commodity, Currency and Cipher: Consequences of the U.S. Mint’s Gold  
Dollar for American Indian Women.” National Communication Association 
Convention: Boston, Massachusetts, November 2005. Competitive Paper. 
 
“Relocating Renegades/Raising Red Children: The Ideologies of Exclusion, Inclusion  
and Paternalism in America’s 1830s Indian Removal Rhetoric.”  National 
Communication Association Convention: Boston, Massachusetts, November 
2005. Invited panel piece. 
 
“Removal and Collective Memory: Native Responses to Allotment and the Reconfiguring  
of U.S. Benevolence.”  National Communication Association Convention: 
Boston, Massachusetts, November 2005. Invited panel piece. 
 
“Codifying Plenary Power in Indian Country: Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock and the  
Construction of a Weakened Native America.” National Communication 
Association Convention: Boston, Massachusetts, November 2005. Competitive 
Paper. Top Paper in Communication and Law Division 
“Chief Black Hawk and Hybrid Identities of Chief/Child and Native/American.”  New  
Directions in American Indian Research: Chapel Hill, North Carolina, October 
2005. Competitive Paper. 
 
“Constituting the ‘Allotment Indian’: The Role of Paternal Rhetoric in America’s Dawes  
Act Era.” National Communication Association Convention: Chicago, Illinois, 
November 2004. Wrage-Baskerville Award in Public Address.
“Teaching at the Crucible of Diversity and Public Address: A Case Study of The Rhetoric  
of Native America.” National Communication Association Convention: Chicago, 
Illinois, November 2004. Competitive G.I.F.T.S. Program 
 
“Enriching the Public Address Classroom through African-American Discourse: A Case  
Study of The Rhetoric of Black America.” National Communication Association 
Convention: Chicago, Illinois, November 2004. Competitive Poster Presentation.   
 
“Reflections on Fatherhood, Paternalism, Gender, Ethnicity, Class and Cognitive  
Dissonance.” National Communication Association Convention: Chicago, 
Illinois, November 2004. Invited panel piece. 
 
“Adjudicating the ‘Plenary Ward’: Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock and the Constitution of a  
Diminutive Native Identity.” Conference on Liminality and the Humanities: Salt 
Lake City, Utah, September 2004. Competitive Paper. 
 
“Marshalling Identity: America’s Cherokee Cases and the Role of Paternal Nationalism.”  
NCA Doctoral Honors Conference: Albuquerque, New Mexico, July 2004. 
Competitive Paper. 
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“Constructing Rez Indian Identity? The Ironies of Paternal Imperialism in Dawes Act  
Rhetoric.” Eastern Communication Association Convention: Boston, 
Massachusetts, April 2004. Invited panel paper. Read by Celeste LaCroix. 
 
“Re/Claiming Indianness: Performative Rhetoric in Contemporary Native Protest.”   
New Directions in American Indian Studies Conference, Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina, March 2004. Competitive Paper. 
 
“Marshalling Identity: America’s Cherokee Cases and the Role of Paternal Nationalism.”  
Southern States Communication Convention: Tampa, Florida, April 2004. Owen 
Peterson Award in Rhetoric & Public Address.
“Authoritarian Fatherhood: Jackson’s Early Lectures to America’s Red Children.”  
National Communication Association Convention: Miami Beach, Florida, 
November 2003. Competitive Paper. 
 
“Surrender as Mortification and Transformation: Chief Black Hawk’s Symbolic Suicide,  
September 1832.” National Communication Association Convention: Miami 
Beach, Florida, November 2003. Top Four Paper in Burke Division.
“Justifying the Service Learning Component to Undergraduate Internship Programs.”  
National Communication Association Convention: Miami Beach, Florida, 
November 2003.  Invited pre-conference paper. Read by Julie S. Gowin. 
 
“Re/Claiming Indianness: Performative Rhetoric in the Plymouth Day of Mourning 
Protests.” Carolinas Communication Convention: Raleigh, North Carolina, 
October 2003. Jarrard Top Paper.
“Extending the Rights of Personhood, Voice and Sanctity of Life to Sensate Others: A
Rhetorical Homology of the Right to Life and Animal Rights Movements.”  
Eastern Communication Association Convention: Washington, D.C., April 2003. 
Competitive Paper. 
 
“Debates, Dialogues and Civic Engagement.”  Eastern Communication Association  
Convention: Washington, D.C., April 2003. Pre-Conference Paper, with Shawn 
Parry-Giles. 
 
“Exploring Native and University Identities: The Ideographic <Indian> as Mascot.”  
Southern States Communication Association Convention: Birmingham, Alabama, 
April 2003. Competitive Paper. 
 
“Re-Examining the SCLC: Free Speech, Civil Rights and the Battle of Birmingham.”  
Southern States Communication Association Convention: Birmingham, Alabama, 
April 2003. Competitive Paper 
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“Unpacking the Collegiate Mascot Controversy: The Native American <Indian> as  
Representational Ideograph.” Carolinas Communication Association Convention: 
Greensboro, North Carolina, October 2002. Jarrard Top Paper.
“Confederate Flags and the First Amendment: Free Speech Examined at the Stadium and  
Statehouse.” Southern States Communication Association Convention: Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, April 2002. Invited panel paper. 
 
“Barking at the SLAPP on Greyhound Protection: Grey2K’s Struggle for Free Speech in  
the Electoral Process.” Southern States Communication Association Convention: 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, April 2002. Competitive Paper. 
 
“Sublimity and the Social Movement Manifesto: The Ethos of SDS’s Port Huron  
Statement.” Eastern Communication Association Convention: New York, New 
York, April 2002. Competitive Paper.   
 
“Abolitionism and Non-Identification in the Rhetorical Process: William Lloyd  
Garrison’s Moral and Anti-Political Appeal.” National Communication 
Association Convention: Atlanta, Georgia, November 2001. Invited panel paper. 
 
“The Animal Protection Movement: Cases of Welfare and Rights.” 6th Communication  
Conference on the Environment sponsored by the Center for Environmental 
Communication Studies: Cincinnati, Ohio, July 2001. Competitive Paper.  
 
“Animal Rights, Identification and Competence in the Rhetorical Process: A Case Study  
of PETA’s Anti-Dairy Campaign.” Southern States Communication Association 
Convention: Lexington, Kentucky, April 2001.  Competitive Paper. 
 
“Battling Cyber-Parody in the Political Arena: A Case Study of the Bush Campaign’s  
Clash with GWBush.com.” Southern States Communication Association 
Convention: Lexington, Kentucky, April 2001.   Top Paper in Free Speech 
Division.  
 
“The Cold War Kid: A Narrative Critique of Billy Joel’s Rhetoric.” Southern States  
Communication Association Undergraduate Honors Conference: St. Louis, 
Missouri, April 1999.  Competitive Paper.  
 
Guest Lectures
“New Directions in Ideographic Criticism,” University of Alabama, Graduate Rhetorical 
Criticism (COM548), Dr. Janis Edwards, Spring 2006. 
 
“The Ideological Turn in Rhetorical/Cultural Studies,” University of Alabama, Graduate 
Rhetorical Criticism (COM548), Dr. Janis Edwards, Spring 2006. 
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“Hegemonic Masculinity,” University of Alabama, Communication & Gender (COM 
469), Dr. Marsha Houston, Fall 2005. 
 
“Visual Metaphors of Booker T. Washington as Back-turning Spade,” University of 
Alabama, Rhetorical Criticism (COM 340), Dr. Janis Edwards, Fall 2005. 
 
“Introduction to Rhetoric,” University of Maryland, Communication Inquiry (COMM-
250), Dr. Susan Hubbard, Spring 2005. 
 
“Burkean Theory,” University of Maryland, Communication Inquiry (COMM-250), Dr. 
Susan Hubbard, Spring 2005. 
 
“Fisher’s Theory of Narrative,” University of Maryland, Communication Inquiry 
(COMM-250), Dr. Susan Hubbard, Spring 2005. 
 
“The Rhetorical Tradition,” University of Maryland, Communication Inquiry (COMM-
250), Instructor David Payne, Summer 2004. 
 
“Kenneth Burke and Dramatism,” University of Maryland, Communication Inquiry 
(COMM-250), Instructor David Payne, Summer 2004. 
 
“Narrative Theory and Criticism,” University of Maryland, Communication Inquiry 
(COMM-250), Instructor David Payne, Summer 2004. 
 
“Walking the Path of American Indian Activism,” University of Maryland, Voices of 
Leadership (COMM-461), Dr. Shawn Parry-Giles, Spring 2004. 
 
“What to Expect When You’re Expecting (To Undertake Graduate Study in 
Communication!),” University of Maryland, Undergraduate Communication Association, 
Winter 2004. 
 
“Publishing as a Graduate Student,” University of Maryland, Introduction to Graduate 
Study in Communication (COMM 700), Dr. Deb Cai, Fall 2003. 
 
“Social Movement Inquiry in Rhetorical Studies,” University of Maryland, Public 
Relations Publics (COMM-617), Dr. James Grunig, Spring 2003. 
 
“History and Ideology of the American Indian Movement,” University of Maryland, 
Voices of Leadership (COMM-461), Dr. Shawn Parry-Giles, Spring 2003. 
 
“Tips for Crafting Essay Questions,” University of Maryland, Teaching Colloquium 
(COMM-686), Dr. Andrew Wolvin, Fall 2003. 
 
“McCarthyism and the Rhetoric of the Red Scare,” Wake Forest University, American  
Rhetorical Movements II. (COM-341), Dr. Deepa Kumar, Spring 2002.   
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Civic Engagement 
Consultant, American Indian Student Association, University of Maryland, 2003-2005. 
 
Consultant, The Veterans Corporation, Alexandria, VA, 2002-2005. 
 
Advisory Committee, Harvey Milk City Hall Memorial Committee, 2005-present 
 
Facilitator, Debate Watch, Fall 2004 
 
Facilitator, trained by the Studies Circle Research Center, Washington, DC, Fall 2002. 
 
Tutor, East Forsyth School, Advanced Placement American Government, Winston-
Salem, NC, 2001-2002. 
 
Tutor, Wake Forest University, Introduction to Communication, 2000-2002. 
 
Chairperson, Planning Committee, Greyhound Friends of North Carolina, Greensboro, 
NC, 2001-2002. 
 
Adoption Coordinator, Greyhound Friends of North Carolina, Greensboro, NC, 1999-
2002. 
 
Community Writing and Speaking
“The State of African American Identity Constructions in the Media in the Wake of 
Hurricane Katrina,” panel discussion, Capstone Association of Black Journalists, 
February 20, 2006, Univ. of Alabama. 
 
Book Review: Bill Yenne, The Campaign for the American West. Anniston Star,
February 2006.  
 
Book Review: Louis S. Warren, Buffalo Bill’s America: William Cody and the Wild 
West Show. Anniston Star, December 2005.  
 
“American Indian mascots and the NCAA,” radio interview, WACT – Tuscaloosa, 
August 9, 2005 
 
“London attacks violate Islamic principles,” editorial, Tuscaloosa News, July 17, 2005, 
p.7D 
 
“Ramadan hunger strikes in Maryland,” interview, Baltimore Sun, March 3, 2004, p. 1D   
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Academic Memberships
National Communication Association, 2000-present 
 
Southern States Communication Association, 1998-present 
 
Eastern Communication Association, 2001-present 
 
Carolinas Communication Association, 2001-present 
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